SOCIAL PROTECTION POLICY PAPERS

Paper 12

# Social protection global policy trends 2010-2015

# From fiscal consolidation to expanding social protection: Key to crisis recovery, inclusive development and social justice

Social Protection Department

International Labour Office

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*ILO Cataloguing in Publication Data*

Social protection global policy trends 2010-2015: from fiscal consolidation to expanding social protection: key to crisis recovery, inclusive development and social justice / International Labour Office. - Geneva: ILO, 2014

ISBN: 9789221292357; 9789221292364 (web pdf)

International Labour Office

social protection / economic recovery / economic recession / economic disparity / fiscal policy / national planning / developed countries / developing countries

02.03.1

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Printed in Switzerland

# Abstract

This policy paper: (i) examines IMF government spending projections for 181 countries, identifying two main phases: fiscal expansion (2008-2009) and fiscal consolidation (2010 onwards); (ii) presents the main adjustment measures considered since 2010 and their adverse socio-economic impacts in both high income and developing countries; (iii) analyses divergent trends in social protection across regions, focusing on the positive expansion of social protection floors in a majority of developing countries; (iv) reviews potential areas of fiscal space for the necessary extension of social protection systems; and (v) presents the developmental arguments to invest in social protection in pursuit of crisis recovery, inclusive development and social justice.

JEL Classification: E62, I30, I38, J18, J80, H53, H55, H51, O2

Keywords: social protection, public policy, fiscal policy, fiscal consolidation, social policy, development planning and policy

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# Preface

The global financial and economic crisis has forcefully underlined the importance of social security as an economic and social necessity, as set out in the ILO Social Protection Floors Recommendation, 2012 (No. 202). While social protection played a strong role in the expansionary response immediately after the onset of the global crisis, many governments embarked on fiscal consolidation and premature contraction of expenditures from 2010 onwards, despite an urgent need of public support among vulnerable populations. The cost of adjustment was passed on to populations, who have been coping with fewer jobs and lower income for more than five years. Depressed household income levels are leading to lower domestic consumption and lower demand, slowing down recovery.

At the same time, many middle-income countries, such as Brazil or China, have boldly expanded their social protection systems, thereby contributing to their domestic demand-led growth strategies. Some lower-income countries have extended social protection mainly through temporary safety nets with very low benefit levels. However, in many of these countries debates are under way on building social protection floors as part of comprehensive social protection systems.

This policy paper is based on the research conducted for the ILO's World Social Protection Report 2014/15. It focuses specifically on fiscal policies and trends in social protection. Trends in specific social protection policies such as child benefits, pensions, unemployment support or universal health protection, are addressed in other policy papers in this series. This and the related papers reflect the principles of the ILO Social Protection Floors Recommendation, 2012 (No. 202) on the extension of social security, agreed by 185 countries and further endorsed by G20 leaders and the United Nations.

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# Acknowledgements

As a product of the research conducted for the ILO's World Social Protection Report 2014/15, this policy paper was drafted by a team supervised by the Director of the ILO Social Protection Department, Isabel Ortiz, consisting of Krzysztof Hagemejer, formerly Chief of the Social Policy, Governance and Standards Branch; Anne Drouin, Chief of the Public Finance, Actuarial and Statistics Services Branch; Florence Bonnet, Social Security Statistics Coordinator; Christina Behrendt, Senior Social Protection Policy Specialist; Emmanuelle St-Pierre Guilbault, Legal Specialist; Xenia Scheil-Adlung, Coordinator Social Health Protection; and John Woodall, formerly Coordinator Pension Policy.

Substantial inputs to the report were received from Matthew Cummins, Social and Economic Policy Specialist at the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), and several colleagues in the ILO Social Protection Department, including James Canonge, Social Protection Officer; Fabio Durán Valverde, Senior Specialist Social Security; Aidi Hu, Coordinator Country Operations, Asia; Cristina Lloret, Junior Social Security Actuary; Valérie Schmitt, Chief, Social Policy, Governance and Standards Branch; Helmut Schwarzer, Senior Social Security Specialist for the Americas and the Caribbean; Maya Stern-Plaza, Junior Legal Officer; Victoire Umuhire, Junior Legal Officer; Veronika Wodsak, Technical Officer Social Security; Hiroshi Yamabana, Social Security Actuary; and Katharina Diekmann, Zita Herman, Vinu Parakkal Menon, Jahnavi Sen and Nicholas Teasdale-Boivin.

The report benefited from comments from colleagues in other ILO technical departments and field offices, including Manuela Tomei, Director of the Conditions of Work and Equality Department; Michelle Leighton, Chief of the Labour Migration Branch; Philippe Marcadent, Chief of the Inclusive Labour Markets, Labour Relations and Working Conditions Branch; Shauna Olney, Chief of the Gender, Equality and Diversity Branch; Alice Ouedraogo, Chief of the HIV/AIDS and the World of Work Branch; Laura Addati, Maternity Protection and Work–Family Specialist; Janine Berg, Senior Development Economist; Fabio Bertranou, Senior Labour Market and Social Protection Specialist, ILO Buenos Aires; Theopiste Butare, Senior Social Security Technical Specialist, ILO Yaoundé; Pablo Casalí, Senior Social Security Specialist, ILO Lima; Luis Casanova, National Officer, ILO Buenos Aires; Raphael Crowe, Senior Gender Specialist; Adrienne Cruz, Senior Gender Specialist; Loveleen De, Social Security Consultant, ILO Bangkok; Juan De Laiglesia, Economist and Labour Market Specialist; Maria Gallotti, Specialist in Migration Policies; Youcef Ghellab, Head Social Dialogue and Tripartism Unit; Frank Hoffer, Senior Research Officer, ILO Bureau for Workers' Activities; Lee-Nah Hsu, Technical Specialist on HIV/AIDS; Kroum Markov, Legal Specialist; Barbara Murray, Senior Disability Specialist; Susan Maybud, Senior Gender Specialist; Seil Oh, Social Security Officer, ILO Bangkok; Céline Peyron Bista, Chief Technical Adviser, ILO Bangkok; Markus Ruck, Senior Social Security Specialist, ILO New Delhi; Catherine Saget, Senior Economist; Francis Sanzouango, Employer Relations Specialist, Bureau for Employers' Activities; Sinta Satriana, Social Security Consultant, ILO Bangkok; Stefan Trömel, Senior Disability Specialist; Catherine Vaillancourt-Laflamme, Chief Technical Adviser, ILO Manila. Comments and guidance from the ILO's Deputy Director-General for Policy, Sandra Polaski, are especially appreciated.

The ILO is also grateful for the helpful comments received from other United Nations organizations, including from Diana Barrowclough, Senior Economic Affairs Officer at the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD); Michael Clark, Special Adviser on International Governance at the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO); Sarah Cook, Director of the United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD); Christian Courtis, Human Rights Officer at the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR); Frédéric Dévé, Governance Adviser, FAO; David Evans, Director of the Department of Health Systems Financing, World Health Organization (WHO); Lynn Gentile, Human Rights Officer, OHCHR; Catalina Gomez, Social Protection Consultant, UNICEF; Katja Hujo, Research Coordinator, UNRISD; Alex Izurieta, Senior Economic Affairs Officer, UNCTAD; Gabriele Köhler, formerly South Asia Regional Adviser on Social Policy, UNICEF; Hans-Horst Konkolewsky, Secretary-General, International Social Security Association; Joseph Kutzin, Coordinator, Health Financing Policy, WHO; Daniel Lopez Acuña, Adviser to the Director General, WHO; Sheila Murthi, Social Protection Consultant, UNICEF; Krista Orama, Focal Point for the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, OHCHR; Shahra Razavi, Chief Research and Data Section, UNWOMEN; Stefania Tripodi, Human Rights Officer, OHCHR; Jenn Yablonski, Social Protection Specialist, UNICEF; Ilcheong Yi, Research Coordinator, UNRISD; Michael Cichon, former Director of the ILO Social Security Department and now President of the International Council on Social Welfare; and for the comments of three anonymous peer reviewers.

## Executive Summary

- This policy paper: (i) examines IMF government spending projections for 181 countries, identifying two main phases: fiscal expansion (2008-2009) and fiscal consolidation (2010 onwards); (ii) presents the main adjustment measures considered since 2010 and their adverse socio-economic impacts in both high income and developing countries; (iii) analyses divergent trends in social protection across regions, focusing on the positive expansion of social protection floors in a majority of developing countries; (iv) reviews potential areas of fiscal space for the necessary extension of social protection systems; and (v) presents the developmental arguments to invest in social protection in pursuit of crisis recovery, inclusive development and social justice.

- The global financial and economic crisis has forcefully underlined the importance of social security as an economic and social necessity, as set out in the ILO Social Protection Floors Recommendation (2012), No. 202.

- In the first phase of the crisis (2008–09), social protection played a strong role in the expansionary response. About 50 high- and middle-income countries announced fiscal stimulus packages totalling US$2.4 trillion, of which approximately a quarter was invested in counter-cyclical social protection measures.

- In the second phase of the crisis (2010 onwards), many governments embarked on fiscal consolidation and premature contraction of expenditure, despite an urgent need of public support among vulnerable populations. In 2015, the scope of public expenditure adjustment is expected to intensify significantly. According to IMF projections, 120 countries, of which 86 are developing, will be contracting expenditures in terms of GDP. The scope of adjustments will then steadily increase to affect 131 countries in 2016. Further, a fifth of countries are undergoing excessive fiscal contraction, defined as cutting public expenditures below pre-crisis levels.

- Contrary to public perception, fiscal consolidation measures are not limited to Europe; many developing countries have adopted adjustment measures, including the elimination or reduction of food and fuel subsidies; cuts or caps on wages, including for health and social care workers; more narrow targeting of social protection benefits; and reforms of pension and health care systems. Many governments are also considering revenue-side measures, for example increasing consumption taxes such as value added tax (VAT) on basic products that are consumed by poor households.

- In developing countries, some of the proceeds of these adjustments, e.g. from the elimination of subsidies, have been used to design narrowly targeted safety nets, as a compensatory mechanism to the poorest. However, given the large number of vulnerable low-income households in developing countries, more efforts are necessary to meet the social protection needs of the population.

- Of particular significance are the divergent trends in richer and poorer countries: while many high-income countries are contracting their social security systems, many developing countries are expanding them.

- High-income countries have reduced a range of social protection benefits and limited access to quality public services. Together with persistent unemployment, lower wages and higher taxes, these measures have contributed to increases in poverty or social exclusion, now affecting 123 million people in the European Union, 24 per cent of the population, many of them children, women and persons with disabilities. Future old-age pensioners will receive lower pensions in at least 14 European countries. Several European courts have found cuts unconstitutional. The cost of adjustment has been passed on to populations, who have been coping with fewer jobs and lower income for more than five years. Depressed household income levels are leading to lower domestic consumption and lower demand, slowing down recovery. The achievements of the European social model, which dramatically reduced poverty and promoted prosperity and social cohesion in the period following the Second World War, have been eroded by short-term adjustment reforms.

- Most middle-income countries are boldly expanding their social protection systems, thereby contributing to their domestic demand-led growth strategies: this presents a powerful development lesson. China, for instance, has achieved nearly universal coverage of pensions and increased wages; Brazil accelerated the expansion of social protection coverage and minimum wages since 2009. Continued commitment is necessary to address persistent inequalities.

- Some lower-income countries have extended social protection mainly through narrowly targeted temporary safety nets with very low benefit levels. However, in many of these countries debates are underway on building social protection floors as part of comprehensive social protection systems. There are options available to governments to expand fiscal space for social protection even in the poorest countries.

- The case for social protection is compelling in our times. Social protection is both a human right and sound economic policy. Social protection powerfully contributes to reducing poverty, exclusion, and inequality – while enhancing political stability and social cohesion. Social protection also contributes to economic growth by supporting household income and thus domestic consumption; this is particularly important during this time of slow recovery and low global demand. Further, social protection enhances human capital and productivity, so it has become a critical policy for transformative national development. Social protection and specifically social protection floors are essential for recovery, inclusive development and social justice, and must be part of the post-2015 development agenda.

# 1. Expanding social protection: Key to crisis recovery, inclusive development and social justice

Social protection systems have undergone profound changes in recent years. While many emerging economies have taken bold measures to expand social protection to promote economic and social development, other parts of the world, including many high-income countries, have been grappling with fiscal consolidation[1] and adjusting their social protection systems to make for cost savings (ILO, 2014a). These divergent policy trends and their implications are the focus of this policy paper. In particular, the report identifies the rationale and impact of, respectively, fiscal consolidation measures and expansionary policies on recovery efforts in high-, middle- and low-income countries. The report concludes by setting out the positive developmental impacts of social protection in the drive to promote sustainable and inclusive growth, to build human capital, and to achieve political stability, together constituting a set of powerful reasons why social protection must be part of the post-2015 development agenda.

Social dialogue plays a key role in finding balanced solutions to economic and social challenges, a reason why this report is launched at the international meeting of the International Association of Economic and Social Councils and Similar Institutions (AICESIS) in Seoul, Republic of Korea, on Promoting Social Protection Floors for All through Social Dialogue. While in some countries, policy responses to the global crisis have been shaped though social dialogue, in many other countries this has not been the case. Public policy decisions have often been taken behind closed doors, as technocratic solutions with limited or no consultation, potentially resulting in lack of public ownership, civil unrest and adverse socio-economic impacts. National tripartite dialogue, with government, employers and workers as well as academics, civil society and others, is fundamental to adopt optimal public policies. Social dialogue is needed to ensure social protection systems and a socially-responsible recovery aimed at achieving inclusive growth and social justice.

# 2. Grappling with recession and slow growth: Social protection and the global crisis

## 2.1 Social protection in the first phase of the global crisis: Expansion and fiscal stimulus (2008–09)

As the crisis bit in 2008–09, the vast majority of governments in countries immediately affected scaled up public social expenditure in order to sustain growth and protect their populations from the adverse effects of the food, fuel and financial shocks. A total of 145 countries ramped up public expenditure during this first phase of the crisis. At least 48 countries announced fiscal stimulus packages totalling US$2.4 trillion, of which approximately a quarter was invested in social protection measures (figure 1). An ILO survey of fiscal stimulus plans in 54 developing and developed countries (ILO, 2009b) indicated that 54 per cent of governments boosted cash transfers, 44 per cent

[1] In this report, “fiscal consolidation” refers to the wide array of adjustment measures adopted to reduce government deficits and accumulated debt. Fiscal consolidation policies are often referred to as austerity policies.

supported old-age pensions and 37 per cent increased access to health benefits. Additionally, 16 per cent of governments introduced food subsidies.

Social protection played a key role in attenuating the immediate negative effects of the crisis on households in this first phase. One of the key lessons from these initial crisis responses is that social protection can function as an automatic stabilizer most effectively if the relevant schemes and programmes are implemented before crisis conditions take hold (ILO, 2010b; ILO and World Bank, 2012; Bonnet, Saget and Weber, 2012; Behrendt et al., 2011). In the absence of such social protection measures, the effect of the crisis on unemployment, households' disposable income and poverty rates in 2009–10 would have been much higher (ILO, 2011).

**Figure 1. Social protection in stimulus packages, 2009-09 (percentage of total announced amount)**




Source: Ortiz and Cummins, 2013, based on UNDP, 2010 and IMF country reports.
Link: http://www.social-protection.org/gimi/gess/RessourceDownload.action?ressource.ressourceId=43337.

## 2.2 Social protection in the second phase of the global crisis: Fiscal consolidation (2010 and after)

These Keynesian counter-cyclical measures were short-lived. As the crisis moved into a second phase from 2010 onwards, rising concerns over sovereign debt levels and fiscal deficits led governments to abandon fiscal stimuli and introduce fiscal consolidation measures. According to the IMF's projections of government expenditure in the *World Economic Outlook* database (October 2014), 106 of the 181 countries for which data were available moved to contract public spending in 2010.

In 2015, the scope of public expenditure contraction is expected to intensify significantly, with impacts in 120 countries, and then steadily increase to affect 131 countries in 2016 (figure 2a).[2] It is important to note that this trend is observed across countries with different levels of income. Specifically, during 2010 public expenditure contraction affected 13 low-income, 28 lower-middle-income, 33 upper-middle-income and 32 high-income countries. In 2015, according to the latest IMF fiscal projections, as

[2] IMF expenditure projections change significantly; this section is an update of earlier work (Ortiz and Cummins, 2012; Ortiz and Cummins, 2013) in which the authors applied the same methodology to understand the scope of austerity, using the same data source – the expenditure projections contained in the IMF's *World Economic Outlook*, updated every six months. Any divergence in results is due to changes in IMF forecasts.

many as 86 developing and 34 high-income countries are expected to contract public expenditures.[3]

**Figure 2a. Number of countries contracting public expenditures (year on year), 2008-16, in percentage of GDP**




Source: ILO calculations based on the IMF's World Economic Outlook database (Oct. 2014).

In terms of real spending growth, a more conservative measure, IMF fiscal data reveal a peak contraction in 2011, with more than 65 countries contracting, but thereafter an easing from 2012 onwards (figure 2b). Again, the incidence is larger in developing countries than in high-income economies.

**Figure 2b. Number of countries contracting public expenditures (year on year) 2008-16, in real terms**




Source: ILO calculations based on the IMF's World Economic Outlook database (Oct. 2014).

Compared with the pre-crisis period, an alarming number of countries in 2013–15 appear to be undergoing excessive fiscal contraction, defined as cutting public expenditures

[3] For a more detailed analysis of public expenditure trends worldwide between 2005 and 2015, see Ortiz and Cummins, 2013.

below pre-crisis levels.[4] In terms of GDP, analysis of expenditure projections reveals that in 34 countries (about one-fifth of the total), governments may be cutting their budgets excessively during 2013–15 (figure 3a). These include countries with significant development challenges, such as Eritrea, Sudan, Yemen, Iran, Iraq, Bhutan, Sri Lanka, Ethiopia, Guyana, Tuvalu, Nigeria, Madagascar, Jamaica, Guinea-Bissau, Guatemala, Burundi, Grenada and Botswana, among others. More than half (18) of these countries are expected to reduce spending by more than 3.0 per cent of GDP, on average, during this latest phase of the crisis when compared to expenditure levels during the pre-crisis period. In real terms, 17 governments are forecast to have fiscal envelopes in 2013–15 that are smaller, on average, than those of 2005–07 (figure 3b). This is a dramatic situation, especially for developing countries where social spending is already very limited to start with.

How have governments been adjusting public expenditures since 2010? A review of 314 IMF country reports in 174 countries published between January 2010 and February 2013 (Ortiz and Cummins, 2013) indicates that governments are considering a combination of six main policy options (table 1 and figure 4), which relate strongly to the social protection of populations (see also box 1): phasing out or eliminating subsidies; cutting or capping wage bills; increasing taxes on consumption; undertaking pension reforms aimed at reducing the costs of pension systems; rationalizing and more narrowly targeting social assistance and other social protection benefits; and introducing reforms to health-care systems aimed at cost containment. These fiscal consolidation strategies are not limited to Europe, and, in fact, are prevalent in developing countries. Many governments are also considering revenue-side measures that can have adverse impacts on vulnerable populations, mainly the introduction or extension of consumption taxes such as VAT, on basic products that are disproportionately consumed by poor households. All of the different adjustment approaches pose potentially serious consequences for vulnerable populations, as summarized below.

[4] For the purposes of this report, excessive fiscal contraction is defined as reducing government expenditure below pre-crisis levels (average spending values during 2005–07). The analysis does not make a judgment about the adequacy of pre-crisis spending levels, it merely uses expenditures in 2005–07 to establish a baseline.

**Figure 3a.** **Excessive fiscal contraction: Decline in total government expenditure relative to GDP (2013-15 average over 2005-07 average, percentages)**




Note: Excessive fiscal consolidation is defined here as a cut of expenditures below pre-crisis levels.
Source: ILO calculations based on IMF, World Economic Outlook database (Oct. 2014).

**Figure 3b.** **Excessive fiscal contraction: Decline in real government expenditure (2013-15 average over 2005-07 average, percentages)**




Note: Excessive fiscal consolidation is defined here as a cut of expenditures below pre-crisis levels.
Source: ILO calculations based on IMF, World Economic Outlook database (Oct. 2014).

**Box 1**
**From fiscal stimulus to fiscal consolidation – Implications for social protection**

In 2008–09 there was a global counter-cyclical policy consensus, whereby countries coordinated policies to combat the negative social and economic impacts of the crisis with the aim of maintaining demand and growth. The IMF spelled out the need for global fiscal stimulus: “In normal times, the Fund would indeed be recommending to many countries that they reduce their budget deficit and their public debt. But these are not normal times if no fiscal stimulus is implemented, then demand may continue to fall what is needed is a commitment by governments that they will follow whatever policies it takes to avoid a repeat of a Great Depression scenario” (Blanchard, 2008).

Early in 2010, IMF advice underwent a major change (later to be supported by the OECD), and ultimately also by the G20. Two IMF Board papers approved in February 2010 – Exiting from crisis intervention policies and Strategies for fiscal consolidation in the post-crisis world – called for large-scale fiscal adjustment “when the recovery is securely underway” and for structural reforms in public finance to be initiated immediately “even in countries where the recovery is not yet securely underway” (IMF, 2010a; IMF, 2010b). Reforms of pension and health entitlements were called for, accompanied by strengthened “safety nets” for the poorest (IMF, 2010a, pp. 15–32). On the composition of fiscal adjustment, it was advised that most of it could come from:

1. unwinding the previously adopted fiscal stimulus packages;

2. reforming pension and health entitlements to reduce the long-term financial obligations of the state by way of avoiding “a rise in spending as a share of GDP” (IMF, 2010a, p. 16);

3. containing other spending, by means such as eliminating subsidies;

4. increasing tax revenues.

All these suggested reforms became mainstream policy advice in a majority of countries around the world after 2010 and shaped the direction embraced by the economic adjustment programmes agreed with countries facing a sovereign debt crisis. The OECD 2010 Economic Outlook (OECD, 2010) also focused on the urgent need for fiscal consolidation and structural reforms (in, for example, labour and product markets), pointing out that in both OECD and non-OECD countries the economic slack was disappearing rapidly. While these documents generally focused on higher-income countries, they also urged fiscal adjustment in developing countries, given that the risk of debt distress was increasing there too. These documents thus represented the first signs of a worldwide policy reversal. However, it turned out that economic slack did not disappear and instead a slow growth pattern risks becoming entrenched, partly due to fiscal consolidation itself.

**Table 1. Main adjustment measures by region, 2010-13 (number of countries)**

| | Eliminating subsidies | Wage bill cuts/caps | Increasing consumption taxes | Pension reforms | Rationalizing and targeting social assistance | Health reforms |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| East Asia and the Pacific | 12 | 13 | 8 | 4 | 9 | 0 |
| Eastern Europe and Central Asia | 9 | 15 | 13 | 16 | 15 | 9 |
| Latin America and the Caribbean | 11 | 14 | 13 | 12 | 11 | 0 |
| Middle East and North Africa | 9 | 7 | 7 | 5 | 5 | 3 |
| South Asia | 6 | 4 | 4 | 1 | 4 | 0 |
| Sub-Saharan Africa | 31 | 22 | 18 | 9 | 11 | 0 |
| Developing countries | 78 | 75 | 63 | 47 | 55 | 12 |
| High-income countries | 22 | 23 | 31 | 39 | 25 | 25 |
| **All countries** | **100** | **98** | **94** | **86** | **80** | **37** |

Source: Ortiz and Cummins, 2013, based on IMF country reports (Jan. 2010 to Feb. 2013).

**Figure 4. Main adjustment measures in 174 countries, 2010-13 (by policy option)**




Source: Ortiz and Cummins 2013, based on 314 IMF Country reports from Feb 2010 to Feb 2013.

### Eliminating or reducing subsidies

Overall, 100 governments in 78 developing and 22 high-income countries appear to be reducing or removing subsidies, predominately on fuel, but also on electricity, food and agriculture. While energy subsidies are being scaled back across all regions, this policy choice appears to be especially dominant in the Middle East and North Africa, South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa. The removal of public support for food and agriculture is also most frequently observed in the Middle East and North Africa, and in sub-Saharan Africa. These adjustment measures are being implemented at a time when food and energy prices are hovering near record highs; if basic subsidies are withdrawn without compensation being provided through adequate social protection mechanisms, food and energy may become unaffordable for many households, in particular, but not only, the poorest ones. The lack of proper compensation has led to a significant number of public demonstrations, reported in 60 countries (Ortiz et al., 2013; Zaid et al., 2014).

### Wage bill cuts/caps

As recurrent expenditures such as the salaries of civil servants (particularly of social sector workers) tend to be the largest component of national budgets, an estimated 98 governments in 75 developing and 23 high-income countries have considered reducing their public wage bills, often as a part of civil service reforms. This policy stance may translate into salaries being reduced or eroded in real value, payments being made in arrears, hiring freezes and/or employment retrenchment, all of which have adverse impacts on the delivery of public services to the population. Health authorities have warned of the health hazards caused by such fiscal consolidation in Europe and other regions.

### Increasing consumption taxes on goods and services

Some 94 governments in 63 developing and 31 high-income countries have been considering options to boost revenue by raising rates of VAT or sales tax, or removing exemptions. The consequent increases in the costs of basic goods and services are usually regressive, as they tend to affect more significantly the costs of living of lower-income households, including those already in poverty, unless compensatory measures are in place, for example through the provision of cash and near-cash (e.g. food stamps) benefits, or the distribution of basic goods and services at subsidized prices to lower income groups.

Some other countries are considering alternative tax approaches, involving for example the expansion of usually more progressive taxes, such as those on income, inheritance, property and corporations, including taxes on the financial sector.

### Reforming pension and health systems

Approximately 86 governments in 47 developing and 39 high-income countries have been considering a variety of changes to their contributory pension systems, by means such as making eligibility conditions stricter or raising the statutory pensionable age, so that people have to work longer to receive a full benefit, lowering benefit replacement rates, or eliminating minimum pension guarantees for less fortunate workers. Another 37 countries are also discussing reforming their health-care systems with a focus on cost containment, generally by increasing fees and co-payments made by patients along with cost-saving measures in public health centres. These adjustment measures have immediate negative effects on the poor, increase poverty risks for others, and may lead to the effective exclusion of many from the receipt of benefits or critical assistance at a time when their incomes are decreasing and their social needs are greatest.

### Rationalizing and more narrowly targeting social assistance and other social protection benefits

Overall, 80 governments in 55 developing and 25 high-income countries have been considering rationalizing their social spending, often by revising eligibility criteria and targeting benefits more narrowly on the very poorest, which implies a de facto reduction of social protection coverage and a more limited role for social protection systems in preventing poverty. A more narrow targeting on the poorest has been discussed by governments in 25 high-income and 55 developing countries, including low-income countries such as the Gambia, Haiti, Mali, Mauritania, Nicaragua, Senegal, Sudan, Timor-Leste, Togo and Zambia, where on average about half of the population is below the national poverty line. In such places, the rationale for targeting assistance on the poorest of the poor is weak. This policy approach runs a high risk of excluding large segments of vulnerable populations at a time of economic crisis and hardship. Rather than targeting and scaling down social protection programmes to achieve cost savings over the short term, there is a strong case for scaling them up in times of crisis and building rights-based social protection floors.

Contrary to public perception, fiscal consolidation measures are not limited to Europe; in fact, most of the adjustment measures summarized here feature most prominently in developing countries, particularly subsidy reduction, wage bill cuts/caps, and more and more “rationalization” of existing social protection programmes. The main risk of these expenditure-contracting measures is that, when taken without due recognition of their negative consequences, they result in often large vulnerable groups being excluded from receiving benefits or critical assistance.

Ill-designed fiscal consolidation measures threaten not only the human right to social security, but also the rights to food, health, education, and other essential goods and services (Sepúlveda, 2012; UN, 2012b). In many contexts, fiscal consolidation policies are driven by a cost-saving logic, and their negative social impacts on women, children, older persons, the unemployed, immigrants or persons with disabilities, are viewed as unavoidable collateral damage in the quest for fiscal balances and debt service (CESR, 2012). The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights has warned that “austerity measures endanger social protection schemes, including pensions, thereby dramatically affecting the enjoyment of the rights to social security and to an adequate standard of living” (OHCHR, 2013, para. 36), particularly for vulnerable and marginalized groups, pointing to States’ positive obligation to ensure adequate financial regulation, as necessary to safeguard human rights, as well as the obligation to ensure the satisfaction, at the very least, of minimum essential levels of all economic, social and cultural rights, including the right to social security (OHCHR, 2013, esp. paras 36–71).

## 2.3 Divergent trends across countries

Generally, the latest available complete data (2011) show a worldwide decline in social protection expenditure in terms of GDP, particularly for middle-income and high-income countries (figure 5).[5] Only low-income countries have increased public social protection expenditure as a percentage of GDP. The level of social expenditure has not risen sufficiently to keep up with the increases in unemployment and poverty.

The four panels of figure 5 show trends in per capita real government social protection expenditure in the two phases of the crisis. It is clear that, despite the significant contraction in 2011, a large number of countries (mostly in the developing world) were at that point still expanding social security. It must be noted that in many of these developing countries such expansion is being partly financed using the cost savings resulting from fiscal consolidation and adjustment measures such as reducing or eliminating subsidies (including food and fuel subsidies). The net social outcome effects remain to be studied and will inevitably vary from country to country.

While a significant number of governments have adjusted their social protection systems since 2010, many developing countries have taken bold measures to extend social protection coverage and enhance at least the social assistance provided to the poorest segments of their populations (see figures 5 and 6). The strong push for the expansion of social protection started well before the onset of the global crisis, but has accelerated since 2009, sometimes as part of short-term fiscal stimulus measures, often as part of longer-term structural policies aiming at promoting human and economic development, as well as political stability.

[5] At the time of writing of this report, comparable worldwide data on social security expenditure trends for 2012–14, and measurements of their more recent effects on inequalities and poverty, are limited.

**Figure 5. Public social expenditure as a percentage of GDP, real GDP and real social protection expenditure (index 100=2007): (a) world; (b) high-income countries; (c) middle-income countries; (d) low-income countries**




Note: The panel on high-income countries excludes the Russian Federation. The left (vertical) scale differs between income groups.
Sources: ILO calculations based on ILO, OECD, Eurostat, CEPAL, ADB, World Bank, IMF and national data.
Link: http://www.social-protection.org/gimi/gess/RessourceDownload.action?ressource.ressourceId=43321.

**Figure 6. Trends in government and public social expenditure per capita (in constant prices): (a) 2007-09; (b) 2009-11**




Sources: ILO calculations based on ILO, OECD, Eurostat, CEPAL, ADB, World Bank, IMF and national data.
Link: http://www.social-protection.org/gimi/gess/RessourceDownload.action?ressource.ressourceId=43322.

**Figure 7. Expansion of social protection in middle- and low-income countries: Selected examples of new and expanded programmes, 2000-13**




Source: ILO compilation.
Link: http://www.social-protection.org/gimi/gess/RessourceDownload.action?ressource.ressourceId=43519.

# 3. High-income countries: Fiscal consolidation and its effects

The majority of high-income countries (HICs)[6] have been engaged in long-term reforms of social protection pension systems since long before the crisis, under pressure from demographic change and the search for long-term sustainability. The recent fiscal consolidation policies have accelerated such changes, however, affecting all areas of social protection.

## 3.1 Overview: Prioritizing financial sector recovery over social protection

The significant increases in social protection spending in the early phase of the crisis were broadly aimed at countervailing the exceptional severity of the economic downturn. There were, however, significant differences across countries: in late 2008 and 2009, while among European HICs such increases amounted to around 7 per cent in real terms, they exceeded 10 per cent in the entire OECD and reached 15 per cent in the United States, with their effect continuing through 2010 (OECD, 2012a). These increases crucially contributed to minimizing the social costs and limiting the economic impact of the crisis by avoiding a collapse of consumption and maintaining economic activity (see section 2.2 below).

**Figure 8. Support for the financial sector, fiscal stimulus packages and public debt increases, selected HICs, 2008-10 (US$ billions)**




Note: North America includes United States and Canada; Europe includes Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom.
Sources: IMF, 2010c; IMF, 2013a; Stolz and Wedow, 2010; UNDP, 2010.
Link: http://www.social-protection.org/gimi/gess/RessourceDownload.action?ressource.ressourceId=43679.

The second phase of the crisis, beginning in 2010, saw a total policy reversal: annual spending growth slowed significantly, followed by a contraction in social expenditure in 2011 for many HICs. This reflected not a reduction in social protection needs, but rather a

[6] This section focuses mostly on HICs which are members of the OECD. The situation of other HICs is not discussed here as it mostly relates to countries where social protection developments resemble those of middle-income countries: for example, Bahrain, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, where aggregate social protection expenditure is less than 5 per cent of GDP (with the exception of Kuwait, where it amounts to 12 per cent of GDP), in comparison to an average of 22 per cent of GDP in OECD countries.

180-degree shift in governments' public expenditure policy from 2010 onwards. The sovereign debt crisis in Europe turned public attention to government spending, as if it were this that had caused the crisis. However, government debt and deficits were symptoms of the crisis, not its cause. Rising debts and deficits at this point resulted from bank bailouts to rescue the financial sector from bankruptcy, stimulus packages, and lower government revenues due to the slowdown in economic activity (figure 8). Yet fiscal consolidation focused on deep cutbacks to public policies and shrinking the State as the main way to fix the deficit, calm the markets and revitalize the economy; following this logic, the Euro-pean social model was depicted as unaffordable and burdensome, which ultimately reduced competitiveness and discouraged growth.

When government policies shifted highest priority to servicing debt and achieving fiscal balances in 2010, employment and social protection became secondary priorities. Decisions were taken to reduce public expenditures in most HICs, despite rising unemployment and poverty (see table 1 above). Public social expenditure in HICs has not kept pace with populations' needs for income security and access to health and other social services.

**Figure 9. Increase in the proportion of the population at risk of poverty in 18 European countries between 2008 and 2012**




* Data for 2011.
Note: This graph is based on an at-risk-of-poverty line of 60 per cent of median equivalized income anchored at a fixed moment in time (2008).
Source: Eurostat.
Link: http://www.social-protection.org/gimi/gess/RessourceDownload.action?ressource.ressourceId=43342.

Overall, unemployment rose by more than 45 per cent, with more than 44 million unemployed in OECD HICs in 2013 compared to 2008, while expenditure on unemployment benefits and tax-funded social assistance was initially increased but later reduced, with around half of those unemployed not receiving unemployment benefits (ILO, 2014a, Annex IV, table B.3; ILO, 2014b). At the time of writing this report, there are large groups of people, many of them formerly in the middle class, living in conditions of poverty or near-poverty in HICs; this situation is most evident in the crisis-affected countries of Europe, where in 2012 there were 9.5 million more poor people than in 2008, and child poverty was reported to be increasing at an alarming rate[7] (figure 9). Rising unemployment and increased poverty on such a scale in so many European countries should have prompted measures to further strengthen social protection expenditure rather than curtailments informed by fiscal consolidation objectives.

[7] Eurostat data for 2012, except Ireland (2011); based on fixed poverty line as of 2008.

**Figure 10. Distribution of expenditure-based versus revenue-based fiscal consolidation plans in 30 OECD countries, 2009-15**




Sources: Based on OECD, 2012b; Rawdanowicz, Wurzel and Christensen, 2013. Link to original graph: http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/governance/restoring-public-finances-2012-update_9789264179455-en [accessed 30 Apr. 2014].
Link: http://www.social-protection.org/gimi/gess/RessourceDownload.action?ressource.ressourceId=43477.

**Table 2. Selected fiscal consolidation measures recently adopted or under discussion in high-income countries**

| Country | Measures adopted or under discussion |
|---|---|
| Denmark | Freeze in several social benefits, reduction of duration of unemployment benefits, introduction of a ceiling on family benefits |
| Estonia | Increases in VAT (to 20 per cent) and excise taxes, decreases in social benefits (health, pensions), operating spending cuts, (temporary) adjustment in second pillar pension contributions, land sales, discretionary spending cuts |
| France | Cuts in public pensions, health care and public administration; increase of retirement age (from 60 years to 62 years by 2018); increased taxes on capital; increase in top income tax rate by 1 percentage point; plans to increase required contribution record to receive a full pension (de facto increasing further the retirement age for future generations) |
| Germany | Additional taxes, cuts in spending on social security and labour market policies, adjustments to unemployment insurance provisions, cuts in military and administrative expenditure |
| Greece | 10 per cent reduction in general government expenditure on salaries and allowances, public sector recruitment freeze, drastic structural reform to social protection system and drastic reduction in the number of the public bodies/entities linked to local authorities |
| Hungary | Cuts to the public sector (reduction of wages, elimination of certain benefits), six-year tax for financial institutions, increase in VAT to 27 per cent, reduction of bureaucracy for investors, ban on foreign exchange mortgages and partial reversal of pension reform |
| Ireland | Tax increases, spending cuts (public sector wages, social welfare benefits) |
| Italy | Public sector hiring freeze and public sector wage cuts, curtailments in health-care spending, reduction in transfers from central to regional and local governments, drastic adjustments to public pension system |
| Latvia | Increase in VAT from 18 to 21 per cent, introduction of capital income tax, increase of personal income flat tax rate by 3 percentage points and adjustments to public pension system |
| Portugal | Reduction in public sector pay and hiring, increase in VAT to 23 per cent, taxes on high income earners and drastic adjustments to public pensions |
| Romania | 25 per cent reduction in public sector wages, 15 per cent reduction in pensions and unemployment benefits, other adjustments to social protection system, increase in VAT from 19 to 24 per cent |
| Spain | Cuts in public sector jobs and pay, introduction of new income tax, increase in VAT to 21 per cent, cuts in public pension provision including the suspension of pension indexing to inflation |
| United Kingdom | Abolition of child trust fund, cuts in employment programmes, civil service recruitment freeze, increase in VAT from 17.5 to 20 per cent. |
| United States | Freeze of non-security discretionary funding for three years by cutting/reducing 120 programmes deemed ineffective, public sector pay freeze, reduction in duration of unemployment insurance, restrictions to food assistance system, introduction of a national health insurance programme. |

Sources: Based on ILO, EU and IILS, 2011, and national sources.

Reductions in social protection were most severe in those HICs with the highest budget deficits, which were also those with the most limited social assistance programmes in place (Greece, Portugal and Ireland) (Vaughan-Whitehead, 2014).[8] According to a recent OECD survey across more than 30 OECD countries, around half have been considering fiscal consolidation plans requiring adjustments of more than 5 per cent of GDP from 2009 to 2015, with a high predominance of direct spending cuts as opposed to revenue-side measures (figure 10). The survey indicates that the current fiscal consolidation plans are leading to a decline in social transfers in cyclically adjusted terms in about half of OECD countries, while adjusted household taxes are expected at the same time to increase in most OECD countries.[9]

Social protection has frequently been targeted for expenditure reductions or freezes, in particular in the areas of unemployment benefits, health care, pensions and social assistance (see table 2). On the revenue side, measures have often aimed at increasing indirect taxes, such as VAT, which is reported to have increased on average by 1.8 percentage points in European Union member countries.[10] Such increases in indirect taxes disproportionately affect low income groups (Thomas and Picos-Sánchez, 2012).

**Box 2**
**Using sovereign pension reserve funds to fund bailouts**

Sovereign pension reserve funds, normally established to support governments in funding future pension liabilities by complementing the accumulated funds from employers' and workers' contributions, have been tapped to a substantial extent during the course of the global crisis to help ease the strain on national public finances. In some cases they have been used them to finance interventions directly; in others, to support specific economic sectors facing difficulties or to guarantee loans.

For example, the Irish National Pension Reserve Fund was used to recapitalize the Irish banking system as one of the solicited national contributions under the economic adjustment programme for Ireland. Another example is the Australian Future Fund, which received its last financial allocation from the government in 2008, as a result of which its asset level is now considered to fall below its target level as determined by Australia's Government Actuary. The New Zealand Superannuation Fund, meanwhile, has increased its exposure to New Zealand's domestic economy in response to the government's advice to consider attractive investment opportunities in New Zealand. Here too, the government reduced the transfer of funds from the government budget to the Fund in 2009/10 and suspended it in 2010/11; it is scheduled to resume in 2020/21.

Source: ILO, 2011; Casey, 2014; national sources.

In addition to these measures, some governments have had to look at available sources of funding to finance bailouts of financial institutions in trouble. The use of national pension funds, either through explicit loans and investment decisions or through non-explicit loan guarantees (see box 2), is cause for concern, as such funds are subject to rigorous performance objectives and targets as well as strict governance rules which now appear to be being sidestepped. Such pension assets usually represent the accumulated

[8] Greece reduced public spending by more than €30 billion or the equivalent of 10 per cent of GDP between 2009 and 2011, and an additional 8 per cent is expected to be saved by 2015 (Hermann, 2013; OECD, 2012b).The Irish austerity programme is also intended to save approximately 18 per cent of GDP by 2015, while Spain, Portugal, the United Kingdom and Hungary aim at 7–8 per cent of savings at least (Vaughan-Whitehead, 2014).

[9] This result is based on an OECD survey of the consolidation strategies of over 30 governments between 2009 and 2015. Most governments reported plans to improve their public budgets primarily via spending restraints (Rawdanowicz, Wurzel and Christensen, 2013).

[10] According to Eurostat, the average VAT rate in the EU was 19.4 per cent in 2008; by 2012, it had increased to 21.0 per cent.

contributions of workers and employers towards guaranteeing their social security in old age, a demand ever more pressing as these societies age.

Overall, the deployment of vast public resources to rescue private institutions considered "too big to fail" and, to a lesser degree, to fund fiscal stimulus plans, caused sovereign debt to increase, forced taxpayers to absorb the losses and, ultimately, hindered economic growth (figure 11). Many governments have curtailed government consumption and investment and also reduced social benefits, thus creating a vicious circle: reductions in infrastructure investment and public sector wages, as well as cuts in social security, further depressed aggregate demand in the economy, in consequence reducing the demand for labour, and thus in turn increasing unemployment, reducing revenues from income taxation and narrowing the available fiscal envelope, thereby adding pressure to further reduce social transfers. The cost of adjustment has been passed on to populations, who have now been attempting to cope with fewer jobs, lower income and reduced access to public goods and services for more than five years.

**Figure 11. The social and economic risks of fiscal consolidation**




Source: ILO.
Link: http://www.social-protection.org/gimi/gess/RessourceDownload.action?ressource.ressourceId=43680.

## 3.2 First phase of the crisis: Scaling up social protection to sustain households' disposable income and domestic demand (2008–09)

The automatic provision of unemployment insurance benefits in the early phase of the crisis demonstrated the counter-cyclical role of such schemes, where funded from accumulated contributions with a view to meeting increased benefit expenditures during economic downturns. In a number of countries, these schemes were scaled up to facilitate access to benefits in the face of massive unemployment. For example, the United States extended the maximum duration for paying benefits as job opportunities were too few to accommodate the increased numbers of unemployed. Other countries, such as Germany, adjusted their legal frameworks to allow companies in certain sectors to introduce a temporary reduction in working time, compensated for by social protection benefits, in order to avoid job cuts. Other examples of good practice include special stimulus packages incorporating urgently needed social assistance benefits for the growing number of poor. These and other such short-term adjustments limited the fall in citizens' purchasing power and thus also the decline in global aggregate demand.

Data from the United States, Japan, France and Germany from 2009 to early 2010 provide evidence of the counter-cyclical automatic economic and social stabilizer function of social protection expenditure, especially of the role played by special fiscal stimuli to scale up short-term benefits for the unemployed and the poor in reversing the downward trend of private consumption expenditure (figure 12).[11]

**Figure 12. Trends in real per capita public social protection expenditure, GDP, consumption and unemployment, 2007-2012/13: (a) United States; (b) Japan; (c) France; (d) Germany**




Note: Indexed levels, 2007 =100.
Sources: ILO, OECD, Eurostat, IMF.
Link: http://www.social-protection.org/gimi/gess/RessourceDownload.action?ressource.ressourceId=43323.

Further evidence of the counter-cyclical effect of social protection is provided by analysis of different components of growth in private disposable income over time. Before the crisis, labour income, net social benefits, taxes and property income varied across economic cycles such that gross disposable real income increased by around 4 per cent annually in the European Area up to 2008 (figure 13). Then, in 2009 and early 2010,

[11] In Germany, where 26 per cent of GDP was spent on public social protection in 2012, four stimulus packages were introduced from 2008, with the main aim of preserving jobs. Their cost as of 2011 amounted to about 4 per cent of 2008 GDP (compared to 19.8 per cent spent on the rescue of the financial sector). In France, where 32 per cent of GDP in 2012 was spent on social protection, extraordinary fiscal rescue efforts were more modest, representing (as of 2011) 1.6 per cent of 2008 GDP (compared to 19.0 per cent spent on the rescue of the financial sector). In the United States, where 20 per cent of GDP in 2012 was spent on social protection, there was one main extraordinary stimulus package in 2008 and some lesser ones afterwards. As of 2011, their cost amounted to about 5.6 per cent of the 2008 GDP (compared to 5.1 per cent spent on the rescue of the financial sector).

populations in a majority of countries experienced significant declines in their incomes from earnings and other sources of market income, due to increased unemployment, reductions in working time and earnings, and declining profits and other capital incomes.

**Figure 13. Contributions of various components to the growth of nominal gross disposable income of household, European Area 17 countries, 2000-12 (percentages)**




Notes: Annual percentage change and percentage point contributions. Labour income includes compensation of employees, gross operating surplus and mixed income (compensation of self-employed).
Source: Eurostat/European Central Bank.
Link: http://www.social-protection.org/gimi/gess/RessourceDownload.action?ressource.ressourceId=43324.

On average, incomes from earnings and capital (market incomes) dwindled by 1.9 per cent per year in real terms across the OECD over this period; however, in some countries, such as Greece, Iceland and New Zealand, market incomes dropped by more than 7 per cent per year (figure 14). Increased social transfers and other elements of the special fiscal stimuli played a particularly strong role in cushioning the effects of a reduction of market incomes in countries such as Estonia, Ireland, New Zealand and Spain. In other countries, where regular and adequate social protection benefits were not available, no such cushioning effect against the drastic falls in households' disposable income could be observed. From 2010 up to early 2012, the earnings component added on average 2 percentage points to growth of disposable incomes, while changes in reduced social benefits clearly worked in the opposite direction.

However, the evidence of the counter-cyclical automatic economic and social stabilizer function of social protection expenditure observed in 2009 and early 2010 was not enough to contain the pressure from financial markets, ratings agencies and orthodox approaches to adopt adjustment measures in social protection programmes from 2010. Instead of joining with social partners in looking for alternative responses to the crisis that could have enabled them to accommodate structural reform without undermining social rights or exacerbating the hardship experienced by enterprises, the governments of most HICs adopted fiscal consolidation policies, including reductions in benefit entitlements and durations. Negative outcomes during this deep and protracted economic downturn are seen not only in increased poverty but also in the gradual economic effects of reduced aggregate private consumption (see section 2.3).

**Figure 14. Annual changes in disposable income, 2007-10, by income component, selected OECD countries**




Notes: 2007 figure refers to 2006 for Chile and Japan; 2008 figure for Australia, Finland, France, Germany, Israel, Italy, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden and the United States. Figure for 2010 refers to 2009 for Hungary, Japan, New Zealand and Turkey; 2011 for Chile. Data for 2010 based on the European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) surveys are provisional for Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Slovakia and Slovenia. Household incomes are adjusted for household size. Market incomes are reported net of taxes in Hungary, Mexico and Turkey.
Source: Based on OECD Income Distribution database; see OECD, 2013a.
Link: http://www.social-protection.org/gimi/gess/RessourceDownload.action?ressource.ressourceId=43417.

Despite the cushioning and consumption-stabilizing effects of taxes and transfers, the crisis effectively depressed disposable incomes in many OECD countries, with in many cases negative knock-on effects on private consumption and aggregate demand. Overall, between 2007 and 2010 private households suffered an annual decline in their disposable incomes of as much as 8.4 per cent in Iceland and between 2 and 4 per cent in Estonia, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand and Spain (figure 14). This effect was further sharpened by the internal devaluations pursued in some countries of the eurozone.

## 3.3 Second phase of the global crisis: Fiscal consolidation, 2010 onwards

The turn towards fiscal consolidation measures in the second phase of the crisis, from 2010 onwards, reversed the expansionary stance typical of responses to the first phase and included various measures to reduce benefits. This coincided with the policy reversal adopted by the IMF Board and endorsed by the OECD and the G20 (box 1). More recently, IMF Chief Economist Olivier Blanchard has admitted serious underestimation of fiscal multipliers with respect to the depth of the economic contraction in the design of fiscal consolidation policies (Blanchard and Leigh, 2013); also, IMF research has acknowledged that fiscal consolidation has adverse effects on both short- and long-term unemployment, private demand and GDP growth, with wage earners hurt disproportionately more than profit- and rent-earners (Guajardo, Leigh and Pescatori, 2011; Ball, Leigh and Loungani, 2011), and that policies that sustain aggregate demand are still critically important (Blanchard, Jaumotte and Loungani, 2013). Nevertheless, at the time fiscal consolidation policies were adopted across HICs, with spending cuts targeted in particular on short-term benefits, such as unemployment benefits, family benefits and family support programmes, thus making it more difficult for households to maintain a life in dignity with at least a minimum income security, especially for many families with children. Following recent reforms, some European countries may no longer be compliant with the requirements of the ILO's Social Security (Minimum Standards) Convention, 1952 (No. 102), which most of them have ratified. Table 2 provides an overview of some of the main measures adopted during the global crisis.

### Unemployment benefits

Access to unemployment benefits, and the levels and maximum duration of payments, were reduced starting in 2010 (see also ILO, 2014a, section 3.2). Increases in poverty have been attributed in part to such reductions in protection: one recent study, for example, argues that increases in poverty in the United States stem directly from cuts to unemployment benefits (CBPP, 2014).

In countries with advance-funding approaches, unemployment benefits from 2008 to early 2010 were financed from current contributions and reserve funds accumulated under unemployment insurance (UI) schemes. However, as high unemployment rates persisted beyond 2010, UI reserve funds started to run out. Increases to UI contribution rates were then considered, although there was reluctance from employers, who argued on the contrary for pro-cyclical support in the form of lower social security contributions. This highlights the importance of promoting counter-cyclical UI funding in countries without advance-funding policies to ensure the availability of reasonable UI funds during future economic downturns. The advance funding of unemployment benefits in reasonable proportions and within a well-governed framework could help to ease the pressure on public budgets during downturns, when needs are high and revenues are falling, and when the business sector is less receptive to possible contribution increases.

### Health

Most governments have initiated reforms in health protection systems, such as rationalizing the costs of public health facilities, introducing patient co-payments and cutting wage bills for medical staff. Increased out-of-pocket expenditures for health add further pressure on governments to increase pensions and other social protection benefits to cover the additional cost for households of seeking necessary health care. Meanwhile, a lower quality of health service provision leads to worse health outcomes (e.g. Karanikolos et al., 2013; Mladovsky et al., 2012). Weakened mental health, increased substance abuse and higher suicide rates have all been linked with fiscal consolidation measures (WHO, 2011; Stuckler and Basu, 2013). The European Centre for Disease Control warned that serious health hazards are emerging because of the fiscal consolidation measures introduced since 2008.[12] More specifically, in Greece, Spain and Portugal citizens' access to public health care services has been seriously constrained, to the extent that there are reported increases in mortality and morbidity. *The Lancet* speaks of "a Greek public health tragedy" in which citizens are subject to one of the most radical programmes of welfare state retrenchment in recent times (Kentikelinis et al., 2014).

### Social benefits

The vast array of tax-financed allowances such as child allowances, disability benefits and housing support have been rationalized during the crisis in the search for cost

[12] In January 2013, doctors from Portugal, Spain, Ireland and Greece sent an open letter to European political leaders and health authorities in which they deplored the effects that financial and economic decisions adopted as a response to the economic crisis were having on the health of the populations of their countries and called for immediate action to reverse this situation: http://www.epha.org/spip.php?article5563 [accessed 1 May 2014].

savings. The negative effects of fiscal consolidation on poverty have been most noticeable in countries where the basic system of social assistance is weak or has been recently weakened, as in some of the crisis-hit Baltic States and the European countries under ratified economic adjustment programmes. The Government in Greece, for instance, is planning drastic structural changes to replace a large number of existing social benefits, such as disability and family benefits, as well as the minimum pension provided under social insurance schemes, with a safety net for the poorest, a single targeted guaranteed minimum income scheme providing a relatively low benefit. Ireland is also replacing a universal child benefit by a means-tested allowance to low-income families. The introduction of means testing for previously universal benefits, and the more narrow targeting of benefits on people living in poverty, erodes the principles of universal protection which used to be part of the social contract in many European countries, based on legal rights. For instance, fiscal consolidation measures have restricted the access of persons with disabilities to community living, education, primary care and assistance. Cuts in gender equality programmes, child-care services, parental and child benefits, services to victims of violence and legal aid affect women in particular (EU Commissioner for Human Rights, 2013).

## Pensions

Common pension reforms include raising the retirement age, reducing benefits, increasing contribution rates and reducing pension tax exemptions, as well as the structural reforms introduced in some countries. Most countries were introducing changes to their pension systems prior to the crisis, in view of the demographic ageing of populations, but fiscal consolidation precipitated drastic cost-saving measures adopted without adequate consideration of their social impacts. Some of these reforms have been contested in national constitutional courts. A good measure by which to grasp the effect of reforms is the gross theoretical replacement rate for public (statutory) pensions. Simulations show future pensioners receiving lower pensions in at least 14 European countries, with a projected decline by more than 10 percentage points in eight countries (figure 15).[13]

[13] Since these projections were made, Portugal, Spain, Greece and Italy have adopted further austerity measures to reduce future pension entitlements under their public systems (EU Social Protection Committee, 2009; European Commission, 2012a).

**Figure 15. Reduction in gross theoretical replacement rates of statutory pensions for average wage workers retiring at age 65 after 40 years of contributions, 2010-50 (percentage points of theoretical average wage)**




Source: Based on European Commission, 2012a; European Commission, 2012b.
Link: http://www.social-protection.org/gimi/gess/RessourceDownload.action?ressource.ressourceId=43721.

Most structural pension reforms in HICs that have introduced the principle of individual savings have removed the de facto minimum pension guarantees that used to be explicitly provided under traditional "defined benefit" pension systems (some of which are still in existence). In addition, numerous reforms have further eroded the purchasing power of pensions through indexation measures limiting their adjustment to a level below changes in prices and wages: Spain, for instance, stopped indexing pensions to price inflation in 2013.[14] These changes result in more older persons not having sufficient income security: pensioners become poorer and poorer as they grow older and the real value of their pension dwindles in the absence of adequate indexation mechanisms. In Sweden and Poland, for instance, poverty rates for older persons have nearly doubled, from 10 to 18 per cent and from 7 to 14 per cent respectively between 2005 and 2012 (see ILO, 2014a, chapter 4). There is a need to revisit pension provisions to ensure that explicit provision is made for minimum benefit guarantees through contributory pension systems or via coordinated policies with non-contributory social assistance benefits.

Overall, the ILO expects that more and more workers will have to resort to tax-financed social assistance or guaranteed minimum income schemes in their old age as a result of the pension reforms of the past decade or so. Some national pension systems will no longer meet the adequacy requirements they are required to fulfil in countries that have ratified the European Code of Social Security and the ILO's Convention No. 102 – which is the case for a majority of European countries.

## Erosion of the European social model

In 2012, 123 million people in the then 27 Member States of the European Union, representing 24 per cent of the population, were at risk of poverty or social exclusion,

[14] Ley 23/2013 Reguladora del Factor de Sostenibilidad y del Índice de Revalorización del Sistema de Pensiones de la Seguridad Social, *Boletin Oficial del Estado*, 26 Dec. 2013.

compared to 116 million in 2008, and as many as 800,000 more children than in 2008 were living in poverty.[15] These figures raised alarm across Europe. Some estimates foresee an additional 15–25 million people facing the prospect of living in poverty by 2025 if fiscal consolidation continues (Oxfam, 2013). Higher poverty and inequality are the results not only of the severity of the global recession, but also of specific policy decisions curtailing social transfers and limiting access to quality public services. The achievements of the European social model,[16] which dramatically reduced poverty and promoted prosperity in the period following the Second World War, have been eroded during and since the crisis by a series of adjustment reforms that have led to a resurgence of poverty in Europe and a loss of prosperity for the middle classes. The long-accepted concept of universal access to decent living conditions for all citizens has been threatened by a widening gulf between more narrowly targeted programmes for those at the lower levels of the income distribution and a stronger emphasis on individual savings for the middle and upper income groups. This fragmentation of social security systems limits the potential for a collective pooling of risk, erodes social solidarity, limits the responsibility of the State to the care of only the extremely poor, and changes the terms of the social contract that has been at the very basis of the European social model. The weakening of collective bargaining and social dialogue, along with the deregulation and "flexibilization" of labour markets, has further compounded this erosion (ILO, 2013; IILS, 2012; Vaughan-Whitehead, 2013).

[15] According to Eurostat, "at risk of poverty or social exclusion" means that they were at risk of poverty (set at 60 per cent of the national median equivalized disposable income, after social transfers), severely materially deprived and/or living in households with very low work intensity (Eurostat, 2013).

[16] Recent ILO research identifies the following key features of the European social model: (1) increased minimum rights on working conditions, (2) universal and sustainable social protection systems, (3) inclusive labour markets, (4) strong and well-functioning social dialogue, (5) public services and services of general interest, and (6) social inclusion and social cohesion (Vaughan-Whitehead, 2013).

**Figure 16. Real public social protection and real household final consumption expenditure, unemployment and real GDP: Recent developments in the four EU countries under economic adjustment programmes, 2008–13: (a) Ireland; (b) Greece; (c) Portugal; (d) Cyprus**




Note: Indexed levels, 2007 =100.
Sources: ILO, OECD, Eurostat, IMF.
Link: http://www.social-protection.org/gimi/gess/RessourceDownload.action?ressource.ressourceId=4320.

Furthermore, while cost savings from fiscal consolidation measures may have assisted in servicing debt, they have not supported economic growth. In Ireland, Greece, Portugal and Cyprus, where some of the boldest structural reforms have taken place as part of the terms agreed under the different economic adjustment programmes adopted by these countries since 2008, disposable household incomes have declined in consequence, as a result of high unemployment, lower wages and social protection expenditure cuts, and this in turn has led to lower consumption (figure 16). For example, in Greece the reform of the social protection system limits the responsibility of the State to a guaranteed minimum income benefit targeted on the poor, which is provisionally set at a low level equivalent to 75 per cent of the current average minimum pension guarantee. The reform foresees that supplementary pensions will likely become the responsibility of individuals and employers (through a system of individual accounts); this replaces a system, albeit a very fragmented one, of dubious sustainability, under which in the past nearly every person could count on having at least a minimum old-age pension. As salaries decreased by nearly 35 per cent and unemployment increased to 28 per cent between 2008 and the end of 2013, the revenues from contributions to the social security system have dwindled. Continuing to pay social security benefits would have required deficit financing, but this was not prioritized. Instead, curtailments informed by fiscal consolidation objectives have reduced social protection expenditure by more than 12 per cent in real terms since 2008, and private consumption followed the same downward path (figure 16, panel (b)). Inevitably, poverty in Greece rose to a historically high level, exceeding 35 per cent of the population in 2013, inflicting intense human suffering as many families found themselves unable to access any longer the basic necessities for a life in dignity. Trade union activists speak of "a programmed impoverishment of the population".[17]

Other countries under severe pressure from financial markets, such as Italy and Spain, also introduced reforms that were more far-reaching than in countries where the debt crisis was less acute, such as France or Belgium, or marginal, as in Germany. While some reforms were aimed at making necessary improvements in administrative efficiency, others represented a shift away from an approach focusing on the *prevention* of poverty and of income insecurity for the entire population towards an approach limited to poverty *alleviation* ("safety nets"). Such reforms have disproportionately emphasized the fiscal objective of balan-cing public budgets without due consideration to the objective of adequate benefits to all people, as promulgated in various international instruments – including, among others, ILO Convention No. 102, the Invalidity, Old-Age and Survivors' Benefits Convention, 1967 (No. 128), and the Social Protection Floors Recommendation, 2012 (No. 202). Such disequilibrium constitutes a significant danger for social cohesion and social justice, and contributes to the erosion of the European social model.

In some European countries, courts have reviewed the constitutional validity of fiscal consolidation measures. In 2013, the Portuguese constitutional court ruled that four fiscal consolidation measures in the budget, mainly affecting civil servants and pensioners, were unlawful and in breach of the country's constitution. In Latvia, the 2010 budget proposed new spending cuts and tax increases, including a 10 per cent cut in pensions and a 70 per cent decrease for working pensioners; the constitutional court ruled that the pension cuts were unconstitutional on the grounds that they violated the right to social security, and the cuts had to be reversed. In Romania, 15 per cent pension cuts proposed in May 2010 were also declared unconstitutional; although pensions partly funded by worker contributions are constitutionally protected, the Government had circumvented this protection on the grounds of a separate constitutional article allowing the temporary limitation of certain rights in order to defend national security (UNDP and RCPAR, 2011; OHCHR, 2013). More recently, the European Parliament has launched an inquiry into the democratic legitimacy of adjustment reforms and their social impacts in Ireland, Cyprus, Spain, Slovenia, Greece, Portugal and Italy (European Parliament, 2014a; European Parliament, 2014b).

## 3.4 Adequate transfers, taxes and social dialogue: Key elements of a socially responsive recovery

Social protection plays a role in preventing as well as reducing poverty in all societies, although the potential of different social protection systems to prevent and reduce poverty varies. For example, without social protection transfers and tax measures, 32.2 per cent of the people of Finland would have found themselves in poverty in 2010, as opposed to the 7.3 per cent of the population who actually were in poverty that year. Figure 17 sets out the effective poverty prevention and reduction capacity of national transfers and tax systems in OECD countries. It shows quite significant differences between countries, even for those at a similar level of economic development and potential fiscal resources, illustrating the point that it is the political will of each society that sets the framework for its social protection system.

[17] Mr Rompolis, Greek Confederation of Trade Unions (GSEE), Geneva, 14 Jan. 2014.

**Figure 17. Poverty rates in OECD countries before and after taxes and social protection transfers, latest available year**




Note: Relative poverty line defined as 50 per cent of median equivalized household income.
Source: Based on OECD Income Distribution database.
Link: http://www.social-protection.org/gimi/gess/RessourceDownload.action?ressource.ressourceId=43437.

Social protection supports growth and structural change in the labour market. It also supports household income, essential to sustain consumption and domestic demand. Adequate levels of social protection are an important element of an inclusive growth strategy, as outlined in the various sections of this report.

Integrating social protection, employment and taxation policies is key to a socially responsive recovery. The increase in poverty and inequalities reflects to a large extent not just the recent crisis, but a longer-term trend weakening the State's developmental role and redistributive capacity (e.g. OECD, 2008; OECD, 2011a; UNRISD, 2010). Global imbalances may be further exacerbated as households increase their precautionary savings because they have lost trust in the capacity and/or willingness of the public system to provide for their long-term income security. This situation calls for effective coordination of social protection, employment and fiscal policies to better address emerging circumstances in the labour market and to avert lasting damage to their knock-on effects on current and future levels of social protection for all, including not only the poorer segments of society but also the middle class. Countries are encouraged to make better use of their social protection systems in order to avoid a rupture in solidarity across generations and income groups, and to achieve social peace.

National dialogue and consultations on alternative policy options can achieve an optimal balance between adequacy and sustainability. ILO country surveys in Europe have indicated that most reforms adopted during the crisis have been introduced without due regard to consultations with social partners and key stakeholders in civil society (e.g. Guardiancich, 2012). As a result, those reforms tend to be unbalanced, overemphasizing the cost-effectiveness dimension with a view to restoring public finances, while overlooking the social outcomes in terms of poverty and inequality. National dialogue is essential to secure adequate social protection measures, particularly with regard to protecting children and older persons from poverty and vulnerability, and to ensure that necessary adjustments are based on a fair and viable balance between adequacy and sustainability, as part of the core social contract on which modern societies are based.

The Social Protection Committee of the European Commission stressed in late 2013 that lessons must be learnt from recent reform experiences, that policy corrections must be considered on the basis of robust social impact assessments of both short- and long-term effects and, above all, that such analysis should be available before policies are adopted.[18] The ILO encourages all countries to re-establish national policy dialogue with the social partners and all other parts of civil society to explore the optimal policy options that effectively address poverty and inequalities.

**Box 3**
**Iceland: A socially responsive recovery from the crisis**

Iceland repudiated private debt to foreign banks and did not bail out its financial sector, pushing losses on to bondholders instead of taxpayers. This was not a sovereign debt issue; according to the IMF, this debt was a result of privatization and deregulation of the banking sector, facilitated by easy access to foreign funding; the growing imbalances were not detected by Iceland's financial sector supervision. Two national referendums, held in 2010 and 2011, allowed citizens to vote on whether and how the country should repay a nationalized private debt; Icelandic voters delivered a resounding "no" to the orthodox policies that would have accompanied such a debt repayment plan. Despite the pressures and threats elicited by Iceland's heterodox policies – debt repudiation, capital controls and currency depreciation – the country is recovering well from the crisis (Krugman, 2012). It has regained access to international capital markets while preserving the welfare of its citizens, with support from the IMF. In 2012, Iceland's credit rating was much higher than Greece's. As Iceland's IMF Article IV Consultation stated:

A key post crisis objective of the Icelandic authorities was to preserve the social welfare system in the face of the fiscal consolidation needed. Wage increases, agreed among the social partners in May 2011, led to a rise in nominal wages of 6 per cent and the unemployment rate fell to about 7 per cent in 2012. …

… In designing fiscal adjustment, the authorities introduced a more progressive income tax and created fiscal space to preserve social benefits. Consequently, when expenditure compression began in 2010, social protection spending continued to rise as a per cent of GDP, and the number of households receiving income support from the public sector increased. These policies led to a sharp reduction in inequality. Iceland's Gini coefficient – which had risen during the boom – fell in 2010 to levels consistent with its Nordic peers (IMF, 2012, pp. 5–6).

There are examples of good approaches. The Nordic social model is not only resilient but has been actively used in crises. Finland, for example, ring-fenced its health and social protection system during the major economic crisis it faced in the 1990s after the downfall of the former Soviet Union, at a time when the Nordic social model was heavily criticized for impeding growth. More recently, Nordic countries have reformed

[18] The EU Social Protection Committee concluded in September 2013 that "social impact assessments must become part of the Economic Adjustment Programmes in order to choose the most appropriate path of reforms and adjust the resulting distribution impact across income and age groups" (EU Social Protection Committee, 2013, p. 26).

while preserving the fundamental values of their social model, and are now well placed to face the aftermath of the global crisis, both economically and socially (see box 3). Other good examples include measures taken during the early phase of the crisis to scale up targeted assistance: in the United States, for example, the food subsidies for the poor which cut the number of households living in extreme poverty by half, and the Affordable Health Care Act of 2013 which introduced health coverage for all citizens (CBPP, 2014).

Other significant examples include social protection measures that were already in place before the crisis and could be easily scaled up when conditions dramatically worsened, such as the unemployment insurance scheme in Germany, which could provide adapted benefits to help limit lay-offs, or the French reforms to provide firms with incentives for retaining older workers while also hiring younger workers.

# 4. Middle-income countries: Inclusive growth through social protection

## 4.1 Significant extension of social protection coverage

In many middle-income countries, the dominant trend of recent years, starting well before the global crisis of 2008, has been that of an expansion of social protection coverage, yet with wide cross-national variation. Many social protection policy reforms explicitly acknowledged the importance of investments in health, education and social protection, in order to foster inclusive growth and poverty reduction in the short term, and to build human capital and human capacities in the longer term. In many ways, these policies mark a clear break with some of the policies of the 1980s and 1990s, which emphasized cutbacks to the public sector, the introduction of user fees for health, education and other public services, and the privatization of pensions. The experience of the fiscal and economic crises of the late 1990s in Asia and Latin America prompted many countries to reconsider their economic models. The new policies recognize a more active role of the State in fostering social and economic development and strengthening domestic demand. The strong emphasis on social protection policies in many middle-income countries is a powerful testimony to the premise that sustainable and equitable growth cannot be achieved in the absence of strong social protection policies and the progressive extension of social security coverage to much larger groups of the population (ILO, 2010a; ILO, 2011; ILO, 2012a).

Several middle-income countries, including Argentina, Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Namibia, South Africa and Thailand, have significantly extended various elements of their social protection systems, particularly since the early 2000s, with remark-able outcomes (see, e.g. Fiszbein and Schady, 2009; ILO, 2010a; ISSA, 2013). These efforts were temporarily disrupted in some parts of the world by the global crisis, the effects of which compounded those of the food and fuel crises in various ways. Some countries rebounded after 2010 in terms of economic growth, but still saw an increase in vulnerable and informal employment, and their economic positions remain exposed to the uncertain recovery of global demand.

Several countries, which recently joined the ranks of middle-income countries or graduated from least developed country status, such as Cabo Verde, Ghana, Lesotho and Zambia, have implemented distinct social protection policies aiming at gradually extending social protection to larger groups of the population, in so far as available national and external resources allow, as part of their development strategies.

Many reforms have focused on non-contributory schemes and programmes, such as conditional or unconditional cash transfers for children and families, social pensions, and/or employment guarantee schemes. Many countries have also rendered their social insurance programmes more equitable, more effective and more sustainable, although many are also still struggling to bring the majority of informal workers, especially in rural areas into the formal economy. These reforms contributed to further extension of national social protection systems, while ensuring that at least a minimum level of social security is guaranteed in the form of a national social protection floor.

Table 3 and the map in figure 7 above illustrate the wide range of recent efforts to extend social protection in middle-income countries, both through the introduction of new schemes and programmes and the significant expansion of existing ones.

**Table 3. Selected recent examples of the extension of social protection in middle-income countries***

| Type of programme | Countries in which programmes/schemes have recently been introduced or significantly expanded |
|---|---|
| Child and family benefits | Argentina, China, Mongolia, Senegal, South Africa |
| Cash transfers with human development focus | Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Ghana,** Honduras, Indonesia, Jamaica, Mexico, Mongolia, Nicaragua, Philippines, United Republic of Tanzania |
| Household minimum income support | Chile, China, Ghana,** Zambia** |
| Public employment programmes | Argentina, Cameroon, Ghana,** India, Indonesia, South Africa |
| Maternity protection | Argentina, Plurinational State of Bolivia, Ghana,** India,** Indonesia,** Jordan, South Africa |
| Unemployment protection | Jordan, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Thailand, Viet Nam |
| Social pensions | Argentina, Plurinational State of Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Cabo Verde, Chile, China, Costa Rica, India, Lesotho, Mauritius, Republic of Moldova, Namibia, Panama, Peru, Samoa, South Africa, Thailand, Viet Nam |
| Health coverage expanded | Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Ghana, Lao PDR, Indonesia, Mexico, Morocco, Thailand |

* Inevitably, this table cannot provide a full account of recent reforms and initiatives, but presents only a selection for illustration purposes.
** Pilot programme.
Source: ILO compilation.

The large number of middle-income countries that have extended social protection demonstrates a significant prioritization of social protection policies in this group of countries in recent years, highlighted by the fact that many middle-income countries have also significantly expanded the envelope of resources allocated to social protection.

Good rates of economic development have contributed to the observed significant increases in social protection expenditure ratios in many middle-income countries, although a wide variation in expenditure levels persists. Since 2000, 14 out of the 32 countries included in figure 18 have increased the proportion of GDP invested in public social protection (including health) by more than 3 per cent of GDP.

**Figure 18. Increase in public social protection expenditure, selected middle-income countries, 2000 to latest year (percentage of GDP)**




Source: See detailed sources in Annex IV, table B.12.
Link: http://www.social-protection.org/gimi/gess/RessourceDownload.action?ressource.ressourceId=43537.

## 4.2 Towards more inclusive growth

Many middle-income countries have enjoyed relatively high rates of economic growth since 2000. This growth has helped to enlarge fiscal space, broaden the revenue base of the State and facilitated the strengthening of public administrations, all of which are conducive to the extension of social protection. Taking advantage of this opportunity, some Latin American and Asian economies, having learnt from the financial crises they faced in the 1980s, late 1990s and again in the early 2000s, have been expanding social protection mechanisms to better protect the most vulnerable groups of their population, and to enable the population to better cope with social risks and contingencies.

Most importantly, the crisis has triggered a shift in the way developing countries see the relationship between growth and social protection. When emerging economies found demand for their exports falling, policy-makers started questioning unsustainable export-led growth models and moving instead towards recovery strategies centred on building up domestic consumption and internal markets. One way to raise household income and thereby domestic consumption is through improved social protection systems.

With the aim of moving economies on to a more sustainable development path, the extension of social protection has been seen as an investment to foster a healthier, better educated and more highly skilled workforce capable of responding to new demands and to support the transition to the higher levels of productivity necessary to sustain economic growth (ILO, 2011; ILO, 2014c; see also figures 23 and 24 below). Such measures can contribute to overcoming a “middle income trap” of stagnating growth due to unbalanced growth trajectories (IMF, 2013c; Aiyar et al., 2013). The expansion of effective social protection mechanisms for the whole population, particularly for the middle classes, is also considered to be an effective way to counter disproportionately high precautionary savings rates, which can hold back aggregate domestic demand and contribute to global imbalances (Padoan, 2010; Social Protection Floor Advisory Group, 2011).

In fact, many middle-income countries have pursued the expansion of their social protection systems explicitly with the objective of investing in human capital and human capabilities, with a view to achieving more sustainable and inclusive growth.

The expansion of social protection coverage in Brazil (see box 4), China (see box 5) and Thailand are particularly instructive examples, as in these cases the extension of social security coverage was embedded in a broader approach aimed at moving the economy to a more inclusive and more sustainable growth pattern, which included also measures to reform minimum wages. These countries have implemented a package of economic and social policies combining contributory and non-contributory programmes to reinforce their national social protection floors and strengthen their social security systems. These have been coordinated with employment policies, and particular emphasis has been placed on making the benefits and services accessible to the population through an integrated approach. These governments have not focused exclusively on reducing poverty by targeting social protection measures on the poorest, but have pursued a broader strategy, which also helped low income earners and the middle classes to improve their living standards sustainably. These cases highlight the importance of coherent strategies that embed social policies in a wider range of coordinated employment, labour market, fiscal and macroeconomic policies.

While some middle-income countries have managed to reduce inequalities significantly, more efforts are necessary in this area (UNDP, 2014; UN, 2013a). Here the social protection system plays a particularly important role as one of the channels through which the benefits of growth can be shared in a more equitable way: not only in its direct impact on redistribution through social transfers and contributions, but also in more indirect ways by facilitating access to health and education. Investing in the extension of social protection, as many middle-income countries have done, helps to contain inequality and its negative effects on growth, and allow countries to follow a more equitable and more sustainable growth path (e.g. Berg and Ostry, 2011; Ostry et al., 2014). Such an approach is, indeed, particularly relevant for middle-income countries, which now are the home of the majority of the world's poor (Sumner, 2010). In this context, social protection mechanisms play a particularly important role in reducing and preventing poverty, containing inequality, ensuring equitable life chances and fostering social inclusion.

**Box 4**
**The role of social protection in the Brazilian model of domestic demand-led growth**

When the financial crisis hit Brazil in 2008, the Brazilian economy, which had hitherto benefited greatly from favourable terms of trade and growing exports of commodities, suffered severely from a sharp decline in exports and a credit crunch among private Brazilian banks. This resulted in a loss of 695,000 formal jobs in November and December 2008 (see CAGED/IPEADATA) and a fall in GDP of 4.4 per cent in the fourth quarter of 2008 (Berg and Tobin, 2011, p. 5). To counterbalance the decline in exports, the government responded with a strategy of domestic demand-led growth. This strategy had two pillars: boosting domestic consumption by increasing family incomes and stimulating domestic investments. To the latter end, a fiscal stimulus package of US$20 billion (1.2 per cent of GDP) was launched, focusing on investments in infrastructure and the establishment of credit lines for sectors experiencing difficulties. To support domestic demand, tax cuts for middle-income households and social policies focusing on the poorest were financed through the stimulus package. Besides guaranteeing the maintenance of the existing social protection programmes and compliance with previous commitments, the Government extended the conditional cash transfer programme Bolsa Família to 1.3 million additional extremely poor families; in addition, the duration of unemployment insurance payments was extended by two months for people who had been working in sectors strongly hit by the crisis, benefiting some 310,000 people. Although quantitatively the investments in social protection seem comparably small, accounting for only 2.4 per cent of the stimulus package, the existing comprehensive network of social policies allowed for a quick reaction at low cost by means of scaling up relevant programmes; this had a very significant impact, reaching over 1.6 million of the most vulnerable people. Outside the stimulus package, the Government also maintained the real increases in the official minimum wage scheduled for February 2009 and January 2010. It is estimated that in 2009 this affected more than 20 per cent of the population, principally those on lower incomes.

Social policies and increases in the minimum wage thus helped to maintain or even increase the incomes of the poorest, and this in turn contributed to domestic demand growth. Despite a decrease in GDP in 2009 of 0.6 per cent, private consumption remained stable and in the second half of 2009 was already beginning to grow again (Berg and Tobin, 2011, p. 7). This had multiplier effects on the economy, boosting employment and incomes and contributing substantially to its recovery. By 2010, GDP had grown again by an impressive 7.5 per cent (IMF, 2013a). The stronger accent on domestic-led growth has not broken the prevailing trend in reducing inequality, as shown by the continued drop of the Gini index from 0.54 in 2008 to 0.526 in 2012 (IPEA, 2013, p. 11). Thus, by boosting the incomes of the lower and middle classes, social protection helped mitigate the impact of the crisis on the most vulnerable and functioned as an important element of the domestic demand-led growth policy implemented by the Brazilian Government as a response to the crisis. The case of Brazil also proves that income policies can promote economic growth while reducing poverty and inequality.

Sources: Based on Berg and Tobin, 2011; IILS, 2011; IPEA, 2013; IMF, 2013a; CAGED/IPEADATA database.

Given the slowing rates of economic growth in many middle-income countries (IMF, 2013a) and the potentially detrimental effects of ill-designed fiscal consolidation policies, continued efforts are essential to strengthen social security systems and expand them in two dimensions: guaranteeing at least basic levels of social security to all through national social protection floors, and progressively reaching higher levels of social security that effectively prevent vulnerability and respond to the social security needs of the middle classes, which are often neglected by conventional poverty reduction policies (e.g. Birdsall, 2010).

**Box 5**
**Strengthening domestic demand-led growth in China through increased wages and an expansion of social protection benefits**

Since the middle of the century's first decade, China's five-year plans have recognized the need to address rapidly growing income inequalities and to provide income security to all the people of China, who place great trust in the public social security system.

Income disparities between the rural and urban populations, between its more developed and less developed regions, among various groups of the population and among different sectors of the economy have been a recurrent concern of the national authorities. The other key social challenges in China are providing for income security, ensuring equal and affordable access to health, education and housing, and generating enough employment for both urban and rural populations. From the economic perspective, strengthening aggregate domestic demand and consumption has become one of the national priorities since the start of the global economic crisis, given the consequent lower demand for Chinese exports.

The Government has clearly seen the links between these economic and social challenges and decided to address them as closely as possible. The rapid economic growth China has experienced since the late 1970s has built up the country's economic and fiscal capacity for the expansion of its social security system. Accordingly, alongside the economic expansion strategy, priority has been given to the following initiatives, among others:

- In 2003 and 2007, two new social health insurance schemes were established for, respectively, the rural population and the previously uninsured part of the urban population. These, together with other existing health insurance schemes, now cover a total of 1.34 billion people, more than 96 per cent of the population.
- The adequacy of health insurance benefits was improved to ensure equal and effective access to health care. This took several forms, such as increasing reimbursement rates, extending the range of reimbursable items, raising the cap for reimbursement, introducing insurance for high out-of-pocket payments, reforming the public health sector, and investing more in rural health facilities and urban community-based health centres.
- In 2009 and 2011, two new old-age pension schemes were introduced, again for the rural population and uninsured urban residents. The goal was to achieve universal coverage by 2020; in fact, this was already reached in 2012. The total number of those insured under these two new schemes was 498 million at the end of 2013, including 138 million pensioners. Together with those covered under the existing schemes, the overall number of insured (including beneficiaries) amounted to 820 million, more than 80 per cent of the population over 18 years old.
- Both the new health and the new pension schemes are highly subsidized by the Government. For

instance, the annual fiscal contribution to health insurance for uninsured urban residents was raised from 40 yuan renminbi (CNY) per person in 2007 (as against CNY60 for the insured) to CNY280 in 2013, and is planned to rise again to CNY320 for 2014.

- The level of pension paid under the urban workers' pension system has been increased consecutively for ten years (2005–14) at an annual rate of 10 per cent to secure its purchasing power.
- The overall amount of social insurance benefits paid out in 2013 amounted to CNY2.8 trillion –a nearly threefold increase from its 2007 level – representing a major contribution to domestic-led growth.
- The minimum living standard guarantee programme has achieved the goal of universal coverage since 2007, making an essential contribution to the reduction of poverty and inequality.

As a result of these and other initiatives, social security expenditure has grown constantly, contributing to increases in disposable income for millions of households and supporting China's sustainable economic development.

Sources: Based on ADB, 2010; ILO, 2012c; ISSA, 2013; national sources.

# 5. Low-income countries: Beyond safety nets, towards social protection floor guarantees

## 5.1 Against the odds: Extending social protection coverage in low-income countries

Low-income countries face stronger constraints in extending social protection coverage than middle- and high-income countries. Typically, they face higher levels of poverty and destitution that have to be addressed with fewer financial resources, through weaker institutional capacities and within often fragile contexts. Nonetheless, a number of low-income countries have also taken decisive steps towards the extension of social protection in various areas (see figure 7 above and table 4). Rwanda, for example, thoroughly reformed its health system in order to ensure effective access for more than 90 per cent of the population to health services and improved the quality of health services provided; this has contributed to a rapid decrease in maternal and child mortality (Sekabaraga et al., 2011). Bangladesh, Kenya and Malawi are among the countries that have introduced conditional cash transfer programmes, which contributed to enhancing income security and access to education for the targeted vulnerable households in difficult contexts where public services and delivery capacities were sometimes too limited even to meet food security emergencies (García and Moore, 2012; Monchuk, 2014). In Nepal, the extension of social pension coverage has enhanced income security for older women and men. In Mozambique, a large cash transfer programme has improved income security for vulnerable households, many of which include older persons and children (Cunha et al., 2013). In Ethiopia, Malawi and Niger, among other countries, public employment programmes contribute to enhancing income security for workers in rural areas during the lean season (McCord, 2012; Lieuw-Kie-Song, 2011). Although the coverage of some of these programmes is limited to certain geographic areas or narrowly defined groups of the population, they constitute an important investment in the health, nutrition, education and productive capacities of the population, and have generated significant effects in reducing poverty and vulnerability and improving living standards.

As a result of these efforts, many low-income countries have significantly increased the share of GDP that they invest in social protection (including health) (see figure 19). This reflects an important shift in development priorities towards a stronger emphasis on human development.

Poor households, including the working poor, face insecurity in countries that provide no basic guarantee of income security and health care through social protection mechanisms. Many poor people work in the rural informal economy, where they depend largely on the income they can earn from selling their crops. From an economic perspective, the lack of social protection coverage leads to inefficient use of resources, forcing poor rural households to opt for low-risk, low-return crops, to hold liquid but less productive assets, and/or to withdraw children from school in response to crises.[19] The absence of insurance or other forms of protection can thus lead to chronic poverty, or to a situation in which people can easily fall back into poverty in the event of shocks and thus are not in a position to improve their situation in a sustainable manner. Social transfers can contribute to improving household income security by stabilizing and protecting consumption, which in turn can facilitate investment (ILO, 2010a).

**Figure 19. Increase in public social protection expenditure, selected low-income countries, 2000 to latest year (percentage of GDP)**




Note: Some donor-financed expenditure on social protection programmes may not be fully reflected in this figure.
Source: For details, see Annex IV, table B.12.
Link: http://www.social-protection.org/gimi/gess/RessourceDownload.action?ressource.ressourceId=43578.

**Table 4. Selected recent examples of the extension of social protection in low-income countries***

| Type of programme | Countries in which programmes/schemes have recently been newly introduced or significantly expanded |
|---|---|
| Child and family benefits | Mozambique, Nepal, Niger** |
| Cash transfers with human development focus | Bangladesh, Kenya,** Malawi** |
| Household minimum income support | Mozambique, Rwanda, Uganda** |
| Public employment programmes | Benin, Ethiopia, Malawi, Niger, Rwanda, United Rep. of Tanzania |
| Maternity protection | Bangladesh** |
| Social pensions | Bangladesh,** Kyrgyzstan, Nepal, Sierra Leone, Tajikistan, United Rep. of Tanzania** |
| Health coverage expanded | Burundi, Cambodia, Rwanda |

* As it is not possible to provide a full account of recent reforms and initiatives worldwide, this table presents a selection for illustration purposes.
** Pilot programme.
Source: ILO compilation from various sources.

[19] See e.g. Barrientos, 2007; Barrientos, 2013; Morduch, 1995; Dercon, 2003; ILO, 2010a; ILO, 2013; Social Protection Floor Advisory Group, 2011.

In recent years, social protection policies have been actively promoted in low-income countries, in recognition of their role in reducing chronic poverty and vulnerability, and in contributing to the attainment of economic and social development objectives. Emphasis has been placed on the role of social protection in enhancing nutrition, health and education outcomes, particularly for children, and in strengthening human resources and capabilities (see figures 23 and 24 below). More recently, stress has also been placed on the economic role of social protection in stabilizing household consumption, boosting aggregate demand and stimulating local markets, particularly in remote areas. Simulations of cash transfers in Ethiopia and Kenya demonstrate that the aggregate real benefit to the local economy is significantly higher than the actual amount of the transfer itself (FAO, 2014; Taylor, Thome and Davis, 2013). For many low-income countries, a particular challenge remains in shifting spending from security to social protection: a recent IMF study on Afghanistan found that there is a balance to be achieved between security and social spending in order to optimize the chances of establishing and maintaining social peace (Aslam, Berkes and Fukač, 2013).

These developments have shifted perceptions of social protection policies in low-income countries away from the assumption that they represent a cost (often assumed to be unaffordable) to an understanding that they constitute an "investment in people" that is in fact indispensable for future development (Cichon et al., 2006; ILO, 2008a; Monchuk, 2014). As a result of this shift, recent policies have placed a stronger emphasis on social and human development, with a focus on reducing extreme poverty and promoting "pro-poor growth" (e.g. OECD, 2009); some concentrated attention on targeted safety-net approaches, while others have gone further to promote inclusive growth (e.g. ILO, 2011).

Integrated development policies are crucial to foster synergies between the provision of cash transfers, access to health and other social services, and public investment. For example, a number of French-speaking African countries have implemented measures to ensure universal effective access to health care for children and young mothers. While these have had a notable impact, they could have been even more successful if they had been coupled with more effective measures to improve and scale up the supply, and improve the accessibility and quality, of health services. Such measures could include the strengthening of public health infrastructure through public employment programmes that also provide employment opportunities and strengthen income security for vulnerable populations.

## 5.2 Expanding social protection using proceeds from fiscal consolidation and adjustment measures

The expansion of social protection in developing countries began well before the global financial and economic crisis, and then gathered pace as the crisis led to an acceleration of investments in social protection. This was possible in part because some countries had benefited from the recent boom in commodity prices; however, many developing countries financed expansion of social protection from the proceeds of adjustment measures such as the reduction of subsidies, increased taxes on consumption taxes, such as VAT, and cost savings from reforms in the pension and social protection systems, as set out in section 2.2 above. The net welfare effects vary from country to country and have not yet been adequately studied.

**Box 6**
**Mozambique: Using a fuel subsidy to extend social protection**

In Mozambique, the Government has worked together with the ILO, the IMF, UNICEF, other UN agencies and the World Bank to reprioritize expenditure and to ensure sufficient resources are available for the building of a national social protection floor. A joint ILO–IMF study (Cunha et al., 2013) concluded that progressively expanding a social protection floor did not present a threat to fiscal sustainability. The study recommended that the ill-targeted fuel subsidy be replaced by a more effective social protection system. Revenues from the booming natural resource sector have the potential to widen the available fiscal space for such provision. The Government envisages making a budget allocation of around 0.8 per cent of GDP for the social protection floor over 2014–16.

During the food and fuel crisis, many developing countries increased subsidies or cut taxes on food and/or fuel (IMF, 2008); however, more recently 78 developing countries started to reverse food and energy subsidies, despite the lack of any clear indication that local food and energy prices had fallen or that any compensatory social protection floor had been successfully put in place. This trend was largely driven by the orthodox logic that generalized subsidies can be ineffective and costly, and that replacing them with targeted safety nets can remove market distortions and support vulnerable groups more cost-effectively (Coady et al., 2010). Thus the IMF standard strategy recommended reducing energy subsidies (IMF, 2013b), a policy which in principle can have positive environmental impacts – one reason why UN agencies have supported this policy in countries such as Mozambique (see box 6).

There are, however, some important policy implications that must be taken into account when considering a focus on subsidy removal and benefits targeted on the poorest.

- While subsidies can be removed overnight, developing a social protection system takes a long time, particularly in countries where institutional capacity is limited. Thus there is a high risk that subsidies may be withdrawn and populations left unprotected, without compensation through adequate social protection mechanisms, so that food and energy become unaffordable for many households, in particular, but not only, the poorest ones.

- Targeting the poor excludes other vulnerable households and may lead to poor developmental outcomes. Designing a safety net for the poor alone may leave unprotected many non-wealthy households that benefited from subsidies. The removal of fuel subsidies and consequent increases in energy prices to unaffordable levels have sparked protests in many countries, e.g. Algeria, Cameroon, Chile, India, Indonesia, Kyrgyzstan, Mexico, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Peru, Sudan and Uganda (Ortiz et al., 2013; Zaid et al., 2014). Recent studies, including some by the IMF, point out that income inequality is a gross obstacle to development, especially while global recovery remains fragile and many developing countries are trying to develop their internal markets to encourage national demand. A safety net for the poorest is by no means a sufficient response to these challenges.

- The large cost savings resulting from reductions in energy subsidies should allow countries to develop comprehensive social protection systems: fuel subsidies are large, but new safety nets tend to be small in scope and cost. For example, in Ghana, the eliminated fuel subsidy would have cost over US$1 billion in 2013, whereas the well-targeted LEAP programme costs about US$20 million per year.

- Subsidy reforms are complex and their social impacts need to be properly assessed, and discussed within the framework of national dialogue, so that the net welfare effects are understood and reforms are agreed before any subsidies are removed.

## 5.3 Beyond safety nets: Towards national social protection floors

The extension of social protection programmes in low-income countries has contributed greatly to accelerating social and economic development, and to progress towards the achievement of the MDGs (UN, 2013a). In addition, greater recognition is now given to the wider functions of social protection with regard to the realization of human rights, the containment of inequality and income insecurity, and the promotion of social cohesion. At the same time, low-income countries face certain specific constraints, including limited fiscal space, the unpredictability of external aid and weak institutional capacity, including with regard to tax systems. Economists often counsel governments in these countries to target social protection more narrowly as a way to reconcile poverty reduction with fiscal consolidation (Ravallion, 1999), a line of advice that has been particularly prevalent in the current recession and slow growth period. As a result, social protection programmes are often implemented in the form of temporary, small-scale safety net programmes, often narrowly targeted and/or limited to certain geographical areas. Allocating scarce resources to respond to the social protection needs of the population in a context of widespread poverty is a challenge, particularly with regard to establishing eligibility criteria that are equitable and transparent, and protect the dignity of the intended beneficiaries. It is important to bear in mind that people who manage to climb out of poverty are at high risk of falling back into poverty. In rural Ethiopia, between 1999 and 2009, less than 40 per cent of those who escaped poverty managed to remain above the poverty line (Chronic Poverty Advisory Network, 2014, p. 77).

While programmes of the safety-net type initially offer social protection to those targeted, their effectiveness is often hampered by their lack of foundations in national legislation and of stable, reliable sources of funding. Few low-income countries provide rights-based entitlements with clear definitions of eligibility criteria and type and level of benefits. Targeting social programmes on the extreme poor, excluding most of the poor and vulnerable households who are also in need of public assistance, is a politically difficult and administratively complicated enterprise.

In many countries, there is a marked cleavage between contributory and non-contributory schemes. Whereas social insurance schemes are often perceived as catering to the interests of the (often small) number of employees in the formal economy, non-contributory schemes (means tested or not) tend to be considered as part of poverty reduction policies. By better coordinating and combining contributory and non-contributory programmes, countries can find more effective ways not only to reduce poverty, but also to prevent impoverishment, keep those who escape poverty from falling back into it, and enhance economic security for the entire population. Comprehensive and well-coordinated social protection systems are therefore a major component of an integrated policy package to address chronic and recurrent poverty.

Some low-income countries have made great strides in improving coordination of existing social protection programmes, bringing them under a common strategic framework owned by the Government and developed with the participation of key stakeholders, and strengthening national legal, institutional and fiscal frameworks, so as to render national social security systems more effective, efficient, equitable and sustainable. Such efforts reach beyond a narrow focus on (often fragmented) safety nets, and aim at building national social protection floors and social security systems (ILO, 2012a).

During times of crisis, it is important to scale up, rather than scale down, social investments, and narrowly targeted safety nets tend to represent a de facto reduction in coverage. Given the critical importance of supporting households in times of hardship, and of raising people's incomes in order to encourage socio-economic recovery, a strong case can be made for the progressive extension of universal transfers to (for example) families with children, older persons, persons with disabilities and other groups. Targeting social protection on the poorest and excluding vulnerable populations as a conscious decision in policy design is inconsistent with the United Nations Charter, the Millennium Declaration the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (according to which everyone is entitled to minimum standards of living, including food, clothing, education and social security), and conventions that have been signed by virtually every government across the world (e.g. UN, 2008; Sepúlveda, 2014; Sepúlveda and Nyst, 2012).

A progressive expansion of social security provision requires, among other things, a strengthening of legal frameworks and institutional capacities, as well as a sustainable resource base, which in many cases will be based on a combination of domestic and external sources. Robust tax policies and tax administration are essential for ensuring that governments can rely on a sustainable and equitable resource base for their economic and social development policies. This is particularly important in resource-rich countries, in order to ensure that the benefits of growth are equitably shared and serve the needs of their populations (OECD, 2014; Hujo and McClanahan, 2009; Hujo, 2012).

An approach that focuses on nationally owned and rights-based solutions emphasizes the importance of effective national social protection policies that can support inclusive growth and sustainable social and economic development, and contribute to the realization of human rights. In doing so, this approach reaches beyond external development aid and short-term safety-net policies, and contributes to ensuring coherence between economic, employment and social policies within a strong and sustainable legal and institutional framework (Townsend, 2009; Behrendt et al., 2009). Such dedicated and nationally owned efforts to strengthen institutional capacities have contributed to enhancing development outcomes, for example in Ethiopia and Rwanda. In other countries, particularly those considered as fragile States, these challenges may be even greater; however, social protection is among the policy areas that can potentially contribute to strengthening the "social contract", fostering national dialogue and enhancing trust in the government and public institutions in general (e.g. Hickey, 2010).

If governments and other national actors pursue these policies with commitment and in good faith, the establishment and strengthening of national social protection floors will not only have an immediate impact on people's lives, but will also contribute to building more inclusive societies and economies in the longer term.

# 6. Fiscal space for social protection floors

It is often argued that social protection is not affordable or that government expenditure cuts are inevitable during adjustment periods. But there are alternatives, even in the poorest countries. Finding fiscal space for critical economic and social investments is essential if sustained and equitable development is to be achieved, particularly during a recession and periods of slow growth.

It is important to understand at the outset that governments' options in respect of revenue and spending vary widely across the globe. It is a matter of political choice (ILO, 2008a; Hall, 2010). Some countries opt to spend more or less, as part of their social contract, as shown in figure 20. As in spending decisions, there is a similar disparity in how governments raise resources for social and economic development. By utilizing all possible options to expand fiscal space and invest in their people, countries can achieve a virtuous circle of sustained growth and social development, and avoid the risk of a slow growth and weak human development trap (Ryder, 2013; ILO, 2012b).

**Figure 20. Total government expenditures in selected countries, 2013 (percentage of GDP)**




Source: IMF, 2013a.
Link: http://www.social-protection.org/gimi/gess/RessourceDownload.action?ressource.ressourceId=43518.

Today, the need to create and maintain fiscal space for socio-economic investments has never been greater. Given the significance of public investment in enhancing the prospects for equitable, inclusive economic growth and social development, it is critical that governments explore options to increase social spending and employment-generating economic investments. Even the IMF Managing Director, recognizing the risk that fiscal consolidation may jeopardize global recovery efforts, has called for “aggressive exploration of all possible measures that could be effective in supporting short-term growth” (Lagarde, 2011).

There are options available to governments to expand fiscal space for a socially responsive recovery even in the poorest countries – options that are all supported by policy statements of the United Nations and international financial institutions (IMF and World Bank, 2006; ILO, 2009a; ILO, 2011; ILO, 2012a; OECD, 2014; UNDP, 2007; UN, 2009; UN, 2013b). These include: (1) reallocating public expenditures, (2) increasing tax revenues, (3) extending social security contributions, (4) borrowing or restructuring existing debt, (5) curtailing illicit financial flows, (6) drawing on increased aid and transfers, (7) tapping into fiscal and foreign exchange reserves and/or (8) adopting a more accommodating macroeconomic framework (Hujo and McClanahan, 2009; Durán-Valverde and Pacheco, 2012; Ortiz and Cummins, 2012). Normally a government would carve out its own fiscal space from a few of these options. The uniqueness of each country requires that the range of options be carefully examined at the national level and the selection based on effective social dialogue and a sound approach to political economy (ILO, 2012a).

## 6.1 Option 1: Reallocating current public expenditures

This is the most orthodox option, which includes assessing ongoing budget allocations, replacing high-cost, low-impact investments with those that can generate larger socio-economic impacts, eliminating spending inefficiencies and/or tackling corruption. Reprioritization requires that governments be prepared to reconsider what areas of public policy require most support. For example, governments in Cambodia, Costa Rica, Mauritius and Sri Lanka have reduced expenditures in the defence and security sectors in favour of increased spending in social sectors. One area of expenditure with great potential in creating fiscal space is subsidies. Removing subsidies has allowed expansion of social protection schemes in a number of countries, including Mozambique and Ghana, though the net welfare effect of any reform must be properly understood prior to removing subsidies (box 7).

**Box 7**
**Financing social protection from subsidy removal**

Since 2010, 100 governments have been considering removing food and fuel subsidies and replacing them with safety nets targeted on the poor, including 31 countries in sub-Saharan Africa, 22 in HICs, 12 in East Asia and the Pacific, 11 in Latin America, nine in the Middle East and North Africa, and six in South Asia. The IMF's standard policy advice is to phase out energy subsidies (IMF, 2013b), a course of action that in principle has positive environmental externalities. However, the quick removal of subsidies – a main element of fiscal consolidation in developing countries – has led to significant protests against the resulting in higher food and fuel prices (Ortiz et al., 2013). For example, in Nigeria, where the majority of the population lives on less than US$2 per day, cheap petrol is viewed by many as the only tangible benefit they receive from the State: hence the massive protests in 2012 when the Government removed a fuel subsidy that kept food and transportation costs low.

There are three key lessons that Governments contemplating subsidy removal need to consider: (1) subsidy reforms are complex; there is no "one-size-fits-all" option, and the net welfare effect of any reform it its national context must be properly understood and discussed in national dialogue. (2) designing a meagre safety net for the poorest alone is an insufficient compensation mechanism if other households were also benefiting from subsidies; the huge public savings reaped from cancelling energy subsidies should allow governments to consider adequate universal social protection systems and other necessary development policies that work for all citizens, not just for a few. (3) As food and energy prices hover near record highs, scaling back subsidies should be avoided unless a well-functioning social protection system is already in place that can protect households; such a system takes time to be developed, and if subsidies are withdrawn overnight, populations will be left unprotected during a period of exceptional vulnerability, as shown by recent claims by civil society (Zaid et al., 2014).

**Box 8**
**Taxing mineral and natural resource extraction to generate fiscal space for social protection**

Taxing natural resource extraction offers great potential for many developing countries. While Norway's approach of taxing oil profits and storing the revenues in the Government Pension Fund Global is perhaps the best-known case, developing countries offer several innovative examples of channelling natural resource revenue streams for social protection (Hujo, 2012; OECD, 2014). For instance, Mongolia is financing a universal rights-based child benefit from taxation on copper exports. When copper prices dropped with falling demand in 2009, Mongolia was advised to target its universal child benefit; this it refused to do, when in 2010/11 copper prices rise again. Given the volatile nature of primary commodity prices, many governments have created "stabilization funds" based on windfall taxes. Such funds allow governments to smooth their income and expenditure, saving the proceeds bonanza years for "rainy days" when prices of commodity exports may be low, and hence ensuring that investments in social and economic development remain constant. Examples include Chile's Copper Stabilization Fund, Iran's Oil Stabilization Fund and Papua New Guinea's Mineral Resources Stabilization Fund. During the recent economic downturn, a number of countries have drawn on these funds to finance stimulus measures for national growth and increase social protection.

## 6.2 Option 2: Increasing tax revenues

This may be achieved by altering various types of tax rates, by strengthening the efficiency of tax-collection methods, and by improving overall compliance. As noted above, 94 countries are already increasing consumption taxes such as VAT, which are generally regressive as they cover products that the poor consume. The focus should be shifted instead to other taxes, such as those on corporate profits, financial activities, personal income, property, imports or exports, which tend to be progressive. Progressive taxation – the principal redistribution tool available to policy-makers – should be prioritized on grounds of both fiscal space and equity in order to enlist the political support of citizens and promote socio-economic recovery (IMF, 2010c; Ostry et al., 2014).

## 6.3 Option 3: Extending social security contributions

Generating funding through social contributions is by its nature associated with the extension of contributory social security schemes. Many countries in recent years have increased social protection financing significantly by this means, including Brazil, China, Costa Rica, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa and Thailand. In most countries, these initiatives are closely associated with the introduction of new measures to bring more workers into formal employment and to expand the coverage of contributory social security schemes.

## 6.4 Option 4: Borrowing or restructuring existing debt

Some countries have potential capacity to borrow (through loans or bond issues); other already have large debts and need better debt management. Debt restructuring is the process of reducing existing levels of debt or debt service charges. For those countries suffering from high levels of debt, restructuring existing debt may be possible and justifiable if the legitimacy of the debt is questionable (e.g. nationalized private sector debts) and/or the opportunity cost in terms of worsening growth and living standards is high (box 9). Five main options are available to governments seeking to restructure sovereign debt: (1) renegotiating debt (as more than 60 countries have done since the 1990s), (2) achieving debt relief/cancellation (e.g. under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative or HIPC, introduced in 1996), (3) entering into debt swaps/conversions (as done by more than 50 countries since 1980s), (4) repudiating debt (as Iraq and Iceland have done), or (5) defaulting (done by more than 20 countries since 1999, including Argentina and the Russian Federation). There is ample experience of governments restructuring debt or reducing debt service payments, often against opposition from creditors. The IMF has proposed a Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism (Kruger, 2002; IMF, 2003), and the United Nations has also called for a mechanism for the reduction of sovereign debt that deals fairly with lenders and borrowers alike (UN, 2009; UN, 2010).

**Box 9**
**Ecuador: Using resources freed up by debt restructuring for social protection**

Some developing countries have re-examined accumulated debts dating back to the 1970s in order to decrease their outstanding obligations. In 2008, Ecuador became the first country to hold an official audit to assess the legitimacy of its sovereign debt. The government-commissioned, two-year-long investigation concluded that some of its foreign debts (mostly private sector debts nationalized by former governments) had broken multiple principles of international and domestic law and were therefore “illegitimate”. While Ecuador respected all of the debt that had contributed to the country’s development – the so-called “legitimate” debt – it defaulted on its alleged illegitimate debt in November 2008 and bought it back at 35 cents to the dollar just a few weeks later.

On the basis of the Ecuadorean (and also the Norwegian) experience, a special United Nations Commission of Experts on Reforms of the International Monetary and Financial System came out in support of public debt audits as a mechanism for transparent and fair restructuring of debts (UN, 2009). The public resources freed up in Ecuador by this method were invested in human development, which included doubling education spending between 2006 and 2009, nearly doubling housing assistance programmes for low-income families and ex-panding its main social protection programme, the cash transfer Bono de Desarrollo Humano (human devel-opment bond). The results are impressive: poverty fell from a recession peak of 36.0 per cent to 28.6 per cent, unemployment dropped from 9.1 per cent to 4.9 per cent and school enrolment rates rose significantly (Ray and Kozameh, 2012).

## 6.5 Option 5: Curtailing illicit financial flows

Curtailing illicit financial flows (IFFs) also has the potential to generate large amounts of additional resources for socio-economic investments, including social protection. IFFs involve capital that is illegally earned, transferred or used and include, inter alia, traded goods that are mispriced to avoid higher tariffs, wealth funnelled to offshore accounts to evade income taxes and unreported movements of cash (UNDP, 2011). It is estimated that in 2009 US$1.3 trillion in IFFs moved out of developing countries, mostly through trade mispricing, of which nearly two-thirds ended up in high-income countries; this amounts to more than ten times the total amount of aid received by developing countries (figure 21).

**Figure 21. Illicit financial flows (IFF) versus official development assistance (ODA), 2000-09 (current US$ billions)**




Sources: Kar and Curcio, 2011; World Bank, World Development Indicators, 2011.
Link: http://www.social-protection.org/gimi/gess/RessourceDownload.action?ressource.ressourceId=43517.

## 6.6 Option 6: Drawing on increased aid and transfers

This requires either engaging with different donor governments in order to increase North–South or South–South transfers, or reducing South–North transfers, such as IFFs, which are significantly larger (see above). As a result of the fiscal consolidation policies adopted in most donor countries, development aid fell by 4 per cent in real terms in 2012, following a 2 per cent fall in 2011 (OECD, 2013b). In 2012, the United Nations Special Rapporteurs for the Right to Food, and for Extreme Poverty and Human Rights, called for a global fund for social protection to redress the balance (De Schutter and Sepúlveda, 2012).

## 6.7 Option 7: Using fiscal and central bank foreign exchange reserves

This includes drawing down fiscal savings and other state revenues stored in special funds, such as sovereign wealth funds, and/or using excess foreign exchange reserves in the central bank for domestic and regional development. A more detailed discussion of this option can be found in Ortiz and Cummins, 2012; here there is space only to highlight the case of sovereign wealth funds (SWFs), which can potentially be used for national socio-economic development and social protection. The logic behind SWFs – such as the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority, Norway’s Government Pension Fund Global, and Singapore’s Temasek Holdings and Government of Singapore Investment Corporation – is to maximize financial returns on investment, usually in international capital markets. While creating an SWF is an option available to most governments, many have questioned the logic of investing earned public income for capital market growth when those resources could be invested in social and economic goods and services urgently needed at home. The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, for example, has used its fiscal reserves to finance a number of development objectives both domestically and regionally. On the other hand, Timor-Leste, a country with very low scores on human indicators of development and a high proportion of people living in poverty (50 per cent in 2007, up from 36 per cent in 2001), has an estimated US$6.3 billion stored in an SWF investing overseas. The key point is that governments have multiple options in how to use their reserves for socio-economic development, and the alternatives should be carefully evaluated (see box 8).

## 6.8 Option 8: Adopting a more accommodating macroeconomic framework

This entails allowing for higher budget deficits and higher levels of inflation without jeopardizing macroeconomic stability (e.g. through quantitative easing in the United States). The goals of macroeconomic policy are multiple, from supporting growth, price stabilization or inflation control to smoothing economic cycles, reducing unemployment and poverty, and promoting equity. In recent decades, macroeconomic frameworks have placed strong emphasis on short-term stabilization measures, such as controlling inflation and fiscal deficits, as part of broader efforts aimed at liberalizing economies, integrating them into global markets and attracting investment. While these macroeconomic objectives are not necessarily unsound, there is an increasing risk in many developing countries that other important objectives, such as employment-generating growth and social protection, lose priority and come to be underemphasized. It is important to underscore that there are diverse views on what constitutes an “acceptable” level of inflation or fiscal deficits, and that, as part of the crisis response, there has been a growing recognition of the need to ease budget constraints and allow for an increasing degree of deficit spending, especially to support socially relevant investments and employment-generating economic growth (IMF, 2009; Epstein, 2009; Pollin, Epstein and Heintz, 2008; Islam and Chowdhury, 2010a; Islam and Chowdhury, 2010b; UNCTAD, 2011; UNCTAD, 2012; UNCTAD, 2013).

In summary, there are ample opportunities for countries to increase fiscal space for social protection through a combination of tailored strategies. Usually it is appropriate for governments to consider a mix of the different strategies, as in the examples presented in table 5. Each country is unique, and the full range of available fiscal space options should be carefully examined – with close attention to the potential risks and trade-offs associated with each opportunity – at the national level through an inclusive dialogue to ensure a socially responsive recovery. All of the fiscal space options described in this report are supported by policy statements of the United Nations and international financial institutions. ILO Recommendation No. 202 emphasizes the responsibility of national governments in financing national social protection floors, and in mobilizing the necessary resources to ensure the financial, fiscal and economic sustainability of these arrangements. The Recommendation also notes explicitly that national resource mobilization strategies may include the effective enforcement of tax and contribution obligations, reprioritizing expenditure, and/or a broader and sufficiently progressive revenue base. The Recommendation further states that countries whose economic and fiscal capacities are insufficient to implement the guarantees may seek international cooperation and support to complement their own efforts (Paras 11–12; see also ILO, 2012a).

**Table 5. Fiscal space strategies: Country examples**

| Strategy | Pl. State of Bolivia | Botswana | Brazil | Costa Rica | Lesotho | Iceland | Namibia | South Africa | Thailand |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reallocating public expenditures | | | | × | × | × | | × | × |
| Increasing tax revenues | × | × | × | | × | × | | | × |
| Expanding social security contributions | | | × | × | × | | × | × | × |
| Reducing debt/debt service | × | × | × | × | × | × | | × | × |
| Curtailing illicit financial flows | | | | | | × | × | | |
| Increasing aid | | | | | | | × | | |
| Tapping into fiscal reserves | × | × | × | | | | | | |
| More accommodating macroeconomic framework | × | | × | | | × | | | |

Sources: Adapted from Durán-Valverde and Pacheco, 2012; Ortiz and Cummins, 2012.

# 7. Why social protection floors are key to recovery and must be part of the post-2015 development agenda

As the global community struggles to emerge from recession and slow growth, and assesses the current development agenda and the progress made towards the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals, it is high time to recall the three main reasons why social protection is one of the necessary conditions for sustainable development. First, it is a *human right* and a core element of labour rights. It is also a *social and political necessity*, as States need a capacity to intervene where markets have failed; effective national social protection systems are powerful tools to provide income security, to prevent and reduce poverty and inequality and to build inclusive society; thus they strengthen social cohesion and contribute to establishing and maintaining social peace. Social protection is also an *economic necessity* to sustain domestic consumption and demand by raising household income. Adequate social protection enhances productivity and human development, -enables workers to adapt to change, and facilitates equitable and inclusive structural change. Investing in social protection is investing in a healthy, productive and equitable society.

## 7.1 Social protection floors reduce poverty and inequalities

### Social protection reduces poverty and social exclusion

Social protection is a crucial instrument in addressing all forms of poverty. Cash transfer schemes have successfully reduced poverty in Africa, Asia, Central and Eastern Europe, and Latin America, potentially delivering much faster results than those expected from the “trickle-down” effects of economic policies. Although in practice benefits have tended to be lower than needed, a cash transfer at an adequate level can bring people out of poverty overnight. Equally importantly, cash transfers have had even larger effects on reducing the depth of poverty. For example, South Africa’s non-contributory grants have reduced the poverty gap by more than one-third (Woolard, Harttgen and Klasen, 2010), the Oportunidades programme in Mexico has reduced the numbers living in poverty by 10 per cent and the poverty gap by 30 per cent (Skoufias and Parker, 2001), and Kyrgyzstan’s Social Protection Programme has reduced the number of people living in extreme poverty by 24 per cent and the poverty gap among beneficiaries by 42 per cent (World Bank, 2003). The expansion of food assistance in the United States is reported to have reduced the number of households in extreme poverty by half (CBPP, 2014). Overall, social transfers and taxation have reduced poverty by more than 50 per cent in most European countries (see figure 17 above).

Social protection expenditure has a prominent role in reducing and preventing poverty, containing inequality and addressing social exclusion. Particularly crucial is its capacity to ensure that people can escape poverty for good: the risk of falling back into poverty is very high where effective social protection mechanisms do not exist (Chronic Poverty Advisory Network, 2014). Social protection is essential in addressing not only monetary poverty but also social exclusion (Babajanian and Hagen-Zanker, 2012). Indeed, social protection constitutes one of the essential channels through which governments can distribute and redistribute income and resources, and share the benefits of growth, reinforcing the democratic mandates granted them on election to fulfil societal expectations. The key role of social protection in inclusive growth is now widely recognized (e.g. OECD, 2009). It is therefore not surprising that higher levels of social protection expenditure are associated with lower levels of poverty (see figure 22).

**Figure 22. Public social expenditure (percentage of GDP) and proportion of the population in poverty**




Notes: R2 = 0.5326. The relationship between public social protection expenditure and poverty outcomes is complex, involving a variety of factors. It should be noted in particular that US$2 PPP per day does not represent a meaningful absolute poverty line in high-income countries; this cut-off point was selected for the purpose of the graph to ensure international comparability.
Sources: Public social protection expenditure: Based on data from IMF, OECD, Eurostat, ILO, CEPALSTAT, ADB and national sources. Poverty headcount: World Bank, World Development Indicators (accessed April 2013). For more details see Annex IV, table B.12.
Link: http://www.social-protection.org/gimi/gess/RessourceDownload.action?ressource.ressourceId=38559.

## Social protection reduces income inequality

The role of social protection reaches far beyond a mere reduction of income poverty. While debate has for some time focused narrowly on poverty reduction and the efficiency of targeting, it is increasingly acknowledged that the reduction of poverty is not sufficient to promote inclusive growth (UNDP, 2013; UN, 2013c; UN, 2013d). Broader social protection policies encompassing approaches such as extending social insurance are needed to help prevent poverty and insecurity and to contain inequality (figure 23). The correlation between public social protection expenditure and inequality (as expressed by the Gini coefficient) is less strong than for poverty, but there is still a distinct relationship, suggesting that higher levels of social protection expenditure are associated with lower levels of inequality.

**Figure 23. Public social expenditure (percentage of GDP) and income equality (Gini coefficient), latest available year**




Notes:R2 = 0.3893. Again, the relationship between social protection policies (measured here by expenditure) and inequality (here measured by Gini coefficient) is much more complex than can be captured here. Well-designed social protection policies address not only income inequality, but also various other dimensions of inequality (see e.g. UNRISD, 2010; OECD, 2011b; UNDP, 2014).

Sources: Public social protection expenditure: based on data from IMF, OECD, Eurostat, ILO, CEPALSTAT, ADB and national sources (see Annex IV, table B.12). Gini index: World Bank, World Development Indicators (accessed Jan. 2014); ADB, CEPAL; Solt, 2009; Solt, 2013).

Link: http://www.social-protection.org/gimi/gess/RessourceDownload.action?ressource.ressourceId=42217.

## Social protection contributes to human capital development, reduces hunger and contributes to food security

There is strong evidence of the positive impacts of social protection on hunger and nutrition. In Africa, Asia and Latin America, cash transfers have been shown to improve both the quantity and the diversity of food consumption, and to protect food consumption during shocks or lean periods. Better nutrition also contributes to better physical development: programmes in Mexico, Malawi, and Colombia all demonstrate reductions in the numbers of children with stunted growth (Yablonski and O'Donnell, 2009; Tirivayi, Knowles and Davis, 2013), while children in South African households receiving a pension grow on average 5 centimetres taller than those in households without a pension (Case, 2001).

## Social protection supports positive education outcomes

Social protection programmes, including cash transfers, the supply of free tuition and materials, and school feeding programmes, have all been shown to lead to higher school enrolment rates, fewer school dropouts and less child labour by removing demand-side barriers to education, including the need for poor families to rely on children for income-earning and care work. Transfer programmes in Bangladesh, Brazil, Cambodia, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Malawi, Mexico, Nicaragua, Pakistan, South Africa, and Turkey have all demonstrated significant increases in children's school enrolment and/or attendance (Adato and Bassett, 2008).

### Social protection supports positive health outcomes

Social protection can contribute to better and more equal health outcomes in various ways. Investments in health infrastructure, staff and drugs are most urgently needed where the burden of illness is heaviest. Financial support is also needed to prevent families falling into poverty because of heavy out-of-pocket health expenditures. A WHO cross-country study showed this can be done by reducing the health system's reliance on OOP and providing more financial risk protection (Xu, Evans and Kawabata, 2003). Thailand's commitment to achieving universal access to health care led to significant improvements in health outcomes on a number of measures, including take-up of services and the rate of health-related impoverishment (Evans et al., 2012; Tangcharoensathien et al., 2009). The Oportunidades programme in Mexico combined cash transfers and free health services with improvements in the supply of health services, leading to a 17 per cent decline in rural infant mortality over a three-year period and an 11 per cent reduction in maternal mortality rates (Barham, 2010; Adato and Bassett, 2008). In Ghana, user fee exemptions for pregnant women led to a significant reduction in the maternal mortality rate (Witter et al., 2007). More recently, there is evidence on the usefulness of broader social protection interventions in HIV and AIDS prevention, treatment, and care and support (ILO, 2008b; Temin, 2010). Cash transfers, for example, were found effective in supporting families to care for people living with HIV/AIDS and in improving access to treatment and adherence.

## 7.2 Social protection floors promote decent employment and inclusive growth

### Social protection promotes employment

Social protection plays a major role in creating access to full and productive employment and decent work for all, including women and young people, through cash transfers, active labour market measures, health insurance and family support policies. These have been shown to encourage labour market participation in low- and middle-income countries by guaranteeing public work opportunities, covering the costs of jobseeking and supporting those with childcare responsibilities – with particularly strong effects for women. In South Africa, labour market participation among those receiving cash transfers was 13–17 per cent higher than in similar non-recipient households, with the greatest difference among women (Economic Policy Research Institute, 2004). For young people who are structurally unemployed or at high social risk, the Joven programme in Chile combines work experience, training and apprenticeships; this model has been replicated in other South American countries (World Bank, 2003). In other countries, such as India and Uganda, cash transfers have been used to provide employment for local youth and poor people. Cash transfers can also provide critical resources for funding job search, supporting quality training and skills development, increasing access to credit and bolstering the resilience of agricultural smallholders in maintaining production. Public employment programmes can also be linked to green jobs and environmental improvements, as for example in Brazil and the Philippines. A recent study from the United States indicates that giving food assistance to the children of poor families increases their average annual earnings in the long run by as much as US$3,000, and their average number of hours of work by 150 annually (CBPP, 2014).

Many countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America have developed ways of coordinating social protection mechanisms with labour market policies and services, thereby strengthening opportunities for the unemployed to return to the market. One particularly interesting finding is that adult participants in a number of the Latin American cash transfer programmes mentioned above, as well as beneficiaries of similar schemes in

South Africa, were able to increase their rate of economic activity, finding their employability boosted through simple investments in and access to training and employment services, and to look for work more effectively with the costs of job searching boosted through the modest cash transfers received by families.

### Social protection promotes economic growth

Social protection schemes contribute to sustainable economic growth by raising labour productivity and empowering people to find decent jobs. Injecting money into rural communities can have important multiplier effects on the local economy, stimulating trade in goods and services and encouraging more dynamic local development based on both agricultural and off-farm activities (Tirivayi, Knowles and Davis, 2013; Alderman and Yemtsov, 2012). Social protection represents an investment in a country's "human infrastructure" no less important than investments in its physical infrastructure. Only a population that is healthy, well nourished and well educated can realize its potential for productive employment. The positive impacts of cash transfers on children's nutrition, and on access to health and education, have been well recorded around the world. Well-designed social protection systems thus enable a country to unlock its full productive potential and to promote inclusive growth (ILO, 2014d).

**Figure 24. Schematic representation of some of the positive impacts of the extension of social protection on inclusive growth (short term)**




Source: Based on Behrendt, 2013.
Link: http://www.social-protection.org/gimi/gess/RessourceDownload.action?ressource.ressourceId=43579.

There are multiple channels through which social protection systems can support such investments in people (see ILO, 2010a; Social Protection Floor Advisory Group, 2011; Behrendt, 2013), with beneficial effects in both the short and the longer term. In the short term, social protection can help to improve the health of the population, stabilize aggregate consumption, enable people to take more risky decisions and to engage in more productive economic activities, preserve and promote human capital and enhance the functioning of the labour market (see figure 24). It thereby contributes to supporting structural changes in the labour market and the economy, and also exercises its much-needed counter-cyclical function in economic downturns, such as that caused by the recent global crisis.

In the longer term, the effects of better access to food, better nutritional status and better health will contribute to the better physical and mental development of the population. The effects of enhancing access to education and improving educational performance also contribute to fostering a more productive and more readily employable workforce, which is one of the preconditions of sustained and inclusive growth (see figure 25).

**Figure 25. Schematic representation of some of the positive impacts of the extension of social protection on inclusive growth (longer term)**




Source: Based on Behrendt, 2013.
Link: http://www.social-protection.org/gimi/gess/RessourceDownload.action?ressource.ressourceId=43580.

The crisis has triggered a shift in the way the international community sees the relationship between growth, public intervention and social protection. In Asia and the Pacific, for example, policy-makers are increasingly moving away from export-led growth approaches alone towards more inclusive employment-intensive recovery strategies which emphasize the need to reduce high domestic savings rates and improve the region's underdeveloped social protection programmes (Ortiz and Cummins, 2013). China is a good example, having massively expanded social protection schemes in recent years to raise national living standards and promote national demand.

In Africa and elsewhere, the food price crisis highlighted the limitations of family- and community-based traditional support systems in responding to aggregate shocks and spurred efforts to strengthen local agriculture. At the global level, there is now an awareness of the need to raise household incomes, expand internal markets and prepare better for future shocks by building up stronger systems during the current crisis recovery period.

## Social protection supports social peace, political stability and state-building

Social protection is not only a human right; it is also a social and political necessity. There can be no inclusive and cohesive society where the poor and rich drift further and further apart. While the sources of political conflict vary from one country to another, conflict generally originates in severe social grievances, often rooted in the perception of inequality among social, ethnic, religious or other groups. Social protection measures have a central role to play in easing and preventing such sources of conflict. Governments that have introduced and maintained strong social security systems have not only significantly reduced inequality, but also earned the trust of their citizens by providing them with reliable benefits and quality services, delivered by efficient and trustworthy institutions (e.g. GIZ, 2012). Social dialogue has been key in finding solutions that are balanced and both economically and socially sustainable. Social protection thus plays a key role in state building, institution building and fostering social peace and social justice.

## 7.3 Leaving no one behind: Social protection floors to change people's lives by 2030

Social protection works. This is a key conclusion from this *World Social Protection Report*. The extension of social protection in many developing countries in recent years has successfully realized the right to social security for larger proportions of the population. More children and families receive cash benefits to enhance their income security, and these greatly facilitate access to nutrition, health and education. More older women and men can now rely on a regular source of income from a pension, even if levels are still modest. More people, especially those in rural areas, are benefiting from having the right to guaranteed employment for a certain number of days during lean seasons, and thus enhanced income security round the year. More children and adults have access to health services because governments have extended health insurance coverage and subsidized contributions for those who would not be able to afford them otherwise, and have improved the quality and accessibility of public health services. These significant investments in social protection also enable workers to engage in more productive employment, and strengthen aggregate consumption. A social protection benefit can make an enormous difference in the life of a single person, and of an entire country.

Despite these positive efforts, 73 per cent of the global working-age population, and their families, are still not sufficiently covered in comprehensive social security systems. More efforts are needed to accelerate the extension of social security to adequate levels. Governments, with the participation of social partners and other stakeholders, have a responsibility to fill the remaining gaps in social protection and to progressively ensure adequate levels of social security for their populations. Social protection floors address the daily concerns of families and households, and are linked to the realization of all people's rights – those of children, of women and men of working age, of persons with disabilities, of older persons. Rio+20's *The Future We Want* recognized "the need to provide social protection to all members of society, fostering growth, resilience, social justice and cohesion" and encouraged "initiatives aimed at providing social protection floors for all citizens" (UN, 2012a, p. 29). Looking beyond 2015, it is essential that social protection floors and social security systems be included among the new Sustainable Development Goals.

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# Annex I

**Table A.1 Projected changes in total government expenditures in 181 countries, 2005 - 2015** (actual and projected change as percentage of GDP)

| Country | Annual change | | | | | | | | | | | Period change | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2008 – 2009 versus 2005 - 2007 | 2010 – 2012 versus 2008 - 2009 | 2013 – 2015 versus 2008 - 2009 | 2013 – 2015 versus 2005 - 2007 |
| Afghanistan | 0.6 | 2.6 | 3.2 | -0.6 | 0.3 | -0.4 | 1.1 | 3.1 | -0.7 | 3.8 | 2.0 | 2.6 | 1.5 | 6.5 | 9.0 |
| Albania | -1.1 | 0.6 | 0.4 | 3.0 | 2.0 | -3.7 | -1.2 | -0.8 | 0.7 | 3.5 | -0.9 | 4.5 | -3.7 | -1.9 | 2.6 |
| Algeria | -3.6 | 1.7 | 4.4 | 4.6 | 4.4 | -5.3 | 3.3 | 3.5 | -7.7 | 2.8 | -2.0 | 10.4 | 0.2 | -2.8 | 7.6 |
| Angola | -1.0 | 3.6 | 2.8 | 14.2 | -13.5 | -1.9 | 0.1 | 1.2 | -0.6 | 0.9 | -0.4 | 10.6 | -8.2 | -7.5 | 3.1 |
| Antigua and Barbuda | 2.1 | -3.9 | -4.3 | 0.3 | 9.8 | -14.2 | 1.3 | -3.0 | 1.9 | -1.0 | -0.4 | 1.1 | -9.4 | -10.0 | -8.9 |
| Argentina | -1.2 | -0.5 | 1.6 | 1.0 | 3.2 | -0.1 | 2.0 | 2.3 | 1.9 | 3.0 | 0.5 | 3.5 | 3.6 | 9.9 | 13.4 |
| Armenia | ... | 0.1 | 2.4 | -0.2 | 6.3 | -2.4 | -1.2 | -1.1 | 1.5 | -0.1 | 0.4 | 4.6 | -0.4 | 0.0 | 4.7 |
| Australia | -0.2 | 0.0 | -0.3 | 0.7 | 2.9 | -0.9 | -0.5 | 0.2 | 0.6 | 0.2 | -1.1 | 1.9 | 0.3 | 0.7 | 2.6 |
| Austria | -3.8 | -0.8 | -0.5 | 0.7 | 3.3 | 0.2 | -2.1 | 0.9 | -0.4 | 1.5 | -1.6 | 1.7 | 0.8 | 0.7 | 2.4 |
| Azerbaijan | -3.2 | 4.2 | -0.9 | 5.2 | 2.7 | -2.1 | 2.3 | 2.7 | 1.3 | 1.7 | 0.2 | 7.3 | 1.6 | 6.7 | 14.0 |
| Bahamas | 0.6 | 0.5 | 1.7 | 0.3 | 2.0 | -0.1 | 1.9 | 0.7 | -0.7 | -0.4 | -0.1 | 2.7 | 2.4 | 2.5 | 5.2 |
| Bahrain | -1.1 | -0.8 | -0.8 | 0.3 | 2.0 | 2.9 | -1.0 | 2.1 | -1.0 | 2.9 | 0.0 | 0.5 | 3.9 | 5.9 | 6.4 |
| Bangladesh | 0.5 | -0.1 | -0.6 | 2.2 | -1.2 | 0.0 | 1.2 | 0.3 | 0.4 | -1.1 | 1.0 | 1.2 | 0.4 | 1.0 | 2.1 |
| Barbados | 1.4 | -3.4 | 4.7 | 0.9 | -0.7 | 3.4 | -0.2 | 4.9 | 0.0 | -2.6 | -0.9 | 2.6 | 4.5 | 5.7 | 8.3 |
| Belarus | 1.0 | 2.4 | 0.1 | 0.8 | -2.6 | -4.1 | -7.5 | 4.3 | 4.0 | 2.3 | 0.7 | 0.4 | -9.0 | -2.8 | -2.4 |
| Belgium | 2.7 | -3.4 | -0.2 | 1.6 | 3.9 | -1.1 | 0.9 | 1.6 | -0.6 | -0.4 | -0.4 | 2.2 | 2.0 | 2.3 | 4.6 |
| Belize | -3.1 | 2.0 | -1.0 | -0.4 | 0.2 | 0.6 | -0.3 | -1.8 | 3.0 | 0.2 | -0.6 | -0.3 | 0.0 | 1.6 | 1.3 |
| Benin | 0.9 | -1.9 | 4.0 | -2.0 | 3.7 | -4.6 | 1.1 | -0.5 | 1.4 | -0.2 | -0.2 | 1.8 | -2.2 | -1.0 | 0.8 |
| Bhutan | 5.5 | -2.1 | -0.8 | -0.4 | -1.4 | 11.4 | -7.0 | -1.2 | -3.6 | -1.9 | -5.9 | -2.3 | 5.6 | -4.3 | -6.6 |
| Bolivia | 0.8 | -3.3 | 2.8 | 2.7 | 0.5 | -4.3 | 3.9 | 0.7 | 2.4 | 0.8 | -1.5 | 3.7 | -1.3 | 3.0 | 6.7 |
| Bosnia & Herzegovina | 0.1 | 0.0 | 1.4 | 2.6 | -0.1 | 0.7 | -1.5 | 0.2 | -1.9 | 2.2 | -1.3 | 3.5 | -0.3 | -1.5 | 1.9 |
| Botswana | -5.9 | -1.1 | 3.5 | 11.1 | 4.0 | -11.0 | -3.5 | -0.7 | -0.5 | -0.9 | -2.3 | 15.1 | -11.5 | -15.1 | -0.1 |
| Brazil | 1.6 | 0.3 | 0.4 | -0.1 | -0.2 | 1.8 | -0.3 | 1.3 | 0.2 | 0.9 | -1.1 | 0.1 | 1.9 | 3.2 | 3.3 |

| Country | Annual change | | | | | | | | | | | Period change | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2008 – 2009 versus 2005 - 2007 | 2010 – 2012 versus 2008 - 2009 | 2013 – 2015 versus 2008 - 2009 | 2013 – 2015 versus 2005 - 2007 |
| Brunei Darussalam | -4.5 | -1.4 | 1.7 | -2.4 | 8.5 | 1.4 | -7.1 | 1.9 | 2.8 | -2.2 | 1.2 | 2.6 | 1.6 | 2.1 | 4.7 |
| Bulgaria | -0.6 | -1.5 | 1.3 | 0.2 | 1.0 | 0.5 | -2.3 | 0.0 | 2.9 | 1.6 | 0.3 | 1.1 | -0.5 | 2.9 | 3.9 |
| Burkina Faso | -0.1 | 1.9 | 1.1 | -4.8 | 3.3 | -1.5 | -0.2 | 3.2 | 2.4 | -0.7 | 0.0 | -1.8 | 1.1 | 5.2 | 3.4 |
| Burundi | -2.7 | 1.4 | 11.4 | 2.2 | -3.2 | 2.9 | -1.1 | -4.7 | -3.7 | -1.5 | 0.6 | 8.7 | -1.0 | -9.0 | -0.3 |
| Cambodia | -1.5 | 0.6 | 1.5 | 1.2 | 4.4 | -0.1 | -0.3 | 1.1 | -0.4 | 0.2 | -0.1 | 4.6 | 2.2 | 2.6 | 7.2 |
| Cameroon | -1.4 | -0.1 | 1.1 | 3.4 | -1.5 | 0.2 | 2.9 | -1.0 | 2.6 | 1.1 | 0.1 | 3.3 | 1.0 | 4.7 | 8.0 |
| Canada | 0.4 | -0.4 | -0.1 | 0.6 | 4.5 | 0.1 | -1.5 | -1.0 | -0.4 | -0.4 | -0.3 | 2.7 | 1.0 | -0.9 | 1.8 |
| Cape Verde | 1.1 | -0.2 | -3.8 | 0.1 | 3.2 | 5.8 | -5.4 | 1.3 | -1.4 | 1.1 | -0.7 | -0.9 | 4.3 | 2.5 | 1.6 |
| Central African Rep. | 3.1 | -3.0 | -0.8 | 2.9 | 0.0 | 2.4 | -2.9 | 0.7 | -1.6 | -0.2 | 1.5 | 1.4 | 0.7 | -1.0 | 0.4 |
| Chad | -1.2 | 2.4 | 3.2 | 1.7 | 5.3 | 0.2 | -2.0 | 1.6 | -1.9 | -1.6 | -0.2 | 7.3 | 2.0 | -0.5 | 6.8 |
| Chile | -0.6 | -1.5 | 0.7 | 2.3 | 3.0 | -0.8 | -0.7 | 0.5 | 0.0 | 0.5 | 0.5 | 3.8 | 0.4 | 1.1 | 4.8 |
| China | 0.4 | -0.2 | 0.3 | 4.3 | 2.9 | 0.7 | 0.8 | 1.1 | 0.9 | -0.7 | -0.2 | 5.9 | 3.1 | 4.4 | 10.3 |
| Colombia | -0.7 | 2.6 | -0.2 | -1.4 | 2.9 | -0.1 | -0.8 | -0.4 | 0.9 | 0.4 | 0.0 | 0.7 | 0.7 | 1.4 | 2.1 |
| Comoros | -0.2 | 1.4 | 1.0 | 3.8 | -3.0 | -0.9 | 0.0 | 3.2 | -0.2 | 0.4 | 1.2 | 3.4 | -1.4 | 1.2 | 4.7 |
| Costa Rica | 3.1 | 0.7 | -1.5 | 1.9 | 1.8 | 1.0 | 1.7 | 0.4 | -0.4 | 0.4 | 0.3 | 2.1 | 3.1 | 4.0 | 6.1 |
| Côte d'Ivoire | -2.6 | 3.6 | 2.1 | -6.2 | 1.0 | -3.2 | 4.6 | 10.1 | 2.2 | 3.0 | -2.5 | -3.1 | 3.7 | 15.4 | 12.3 |
| Croatia | -0.4 | -1.0 | -0.5 | 1.0 | 1.5 | 1.4 | -0.9 | 0.3 | 0.9 | 0.5 | 0.4 | 1.1 | 1.6 | 2.8 | 3.8 |
| Czech Republic | 0.1 | 1.3 | -0.4 | 0.6 | -0.4 | 0.1 | 4.6 | -2.5 | 0.0 | 1.0 | -0.7 | 0.6 | 2.1 | 2.5 | 3.0 |
| Dem. Rep. of Congo | -1.0 | -1.0 | 0.4 | -0.6 | 2.1 | 0.5 | -0.7 | -0.1 | 1.6 | 1.2 | -1.2 | 0.4 | 1.0 | 2.8 | 3.1 |
| Denmark | -0.3 | -1.0 | -0.9 | 0.1 | 3.5 | -0.8 | -0.6 | 1.3 | -2.2 | 0.1 | -0.3 | 0.9 | 0.9 | -0.6 | 0.3 |
| Djibouti | -1.8 | -1.3 | -0.8 | 0.7 | 6.4 | -0.5 | 0.0 | 1.7 | -2.3 | -1.2 | -0.8 | 2.9 | 3.3 | 1.0 | 3.9 |
| Dominica | -0.7 | 0.6 | 0.4 | 2.8 | 1.5 | -5.7 | -0.9 | 1.7 | 0.5 | 5.0 | 2.3 | 4.0 | -5.0 | 0.4 | 4.4 |
| Dominican Republic | 0.8 | -1.3 | 4.3 | 0.6 | 1.6 | 3.7 | -5.4 | 0.6 | -2.1 | 0.5 | -0.4 | 3.8 | 1.2 | -2.1 | 1.8 |
| Ecuador | -1.4 | 1.0 | 0.3 | 2.0 | -2.0 | -0.5 | 0.0 | 4.4 | -2.1 | -0.3 | -0.1 | 1.5 | 0.0 | 0.6 | 2.1 |
| Egypt | 1.0 | -0.2 | 3.4 | 10.6 | -2.3 | 1.7 | 4.4 | 1.4 | 3.8 | -1.2 | 0.1 | 11.7 | 4.0 | 9.5 | 21.2 |
| El Salvador | -0.6 | 4.5 | -2.5 | 0.7 | -1.4 | -1.2 | -1.6 | 0.8 | 4.4 | 1.9 | -1.8 | -0.1 | -2.7 | 2.5 | 2.3 |
| Equatorial Guinea | 0.3 | 0.7 | -1.3 | 1.2 | 2.2 | 0.2 | 0.0 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.4 | 0.3 | 1.6 | 1.3 | 2.2 | 3.8 |

| Country | Annual change | | | | | | | | | | | Period change | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2008 – 2009 versus 2005 - 2007 | 2010 – 2012 versus 2008 - 2009 | 2013 – 2015 versus 2008 - 2009 | 2013 – 2015 versus 2005 - 2007 |
| Eritrea | -4.1 | 5.9 | 2.6 | 0.2 | 38.5 | -20.1 | -6.6 | 10.5 | -5.2 | -2.4 | 1.9 | 23.2 | -1.7 | -3.2 | 20.0 |
| Estonia | 2.6 | -16.3 | -1.2 | 2.2 | -11.5 | 4.0 | -1.0 | -2.9 | -0.9 | -0.8 | -0.3 | -9.8 | -3.4 | -7.2 | -17.1 |
| Ethiopia | -0.5 | -0.1 | 0.3 | 5.4 | 5.3 | -4.6 | -2.4 | 1.8 | -1.3 | 1.0 | 0.1 | 8.2 | -3.0 | -3.3 | 4.9 |
| Fiji | -0.3 | -0.8 | -1.6 | -1.8 | -1.7 | 1.4 | -0.3 | -1.7 | 1.2 | 0.3 | 0.4 | -4.0 | -0.2 | 0.2 | -3.8 |
| Finland | -0.1 | 1.8 | -1.8 | -2.7 | 3.9 | -1.6 | 1.3 | 0.1 | -0.4 | 2.4 | 0.4 | -1.4 | 1.3 | 3.1 | 1.7 |
| France | -0.1 | -1.0 | -1.6 | 1.5 | 6.3 | -0.1 | -0.4 | 1.9 | 1.3 | 0.5 | -0.4 | 3.3 | 3.4 | 6.0 | 9.2 |
| Gabon | 0.4 | -0.4 | -0.3 | 0.8 | 3.8 | -0.3 | -0.5 | 0.8 | 0.5 | -0.1 | -0.6 | 2.3 | 1.5 | 2.0 | 4.4 |
| Gambia | 0.0 | 0.1 | -1.0 | -0.6 | 4.1 | -0.1 | 2.9 | 1.8 | -1.5 | -4.9 | 7.7 | 0.8 | 4.5 | 4.5 | 5.3 |
| Georgia | 0.0 | 0.9 | -4.6 | 0.9 | 4.3 | 1.1 | 1.7 | 3.8 | -3.0 | 1.1 | -1.9 | 0.2 | 5.7 | 6.0 | 6.2 |
| Germany | 2.8 | 1.1 | 5.1 | 4.2 | 3.1 | -2.8 | -4.0 | 0.5 | -0.8 | 1.3 | -0.6 | 9.6 | -3.7 | -4.9 | 4.7 |
| Ghana | -0.2 | -1.6 | -1.8 | 0.6 | 4.2 | -0.4 | -2.7 | -0.5 | -0.2 | -0.4 | -0.1 | 0.9 | -0.3 | -1.9 | -1.0 |
| Greece | -1.0 | 2.2 | 1.1 | 1.5 | -0.9 | 2.6 | -1.7 | 6.4 | -4.0 | -0.4 | -0.6 | 2.5 | 3.1 | 2.3 | 4.8 |
| Grenada | -0.9 | 0.8 | 2.1 | 3.1 | 3.4 | -2.5 | 0.4 | -1.7 | -3.0 | 0.1 | -2.2 | 6.5 | -1.1 | -5.8 | 0.7 |
| Guatemala | 1.9 | 5.7 | -4.7 | 0.2 | -0.3 | -0.2 | 0.5 | -2.1 | 2.4 | 2.4 | -3.1 | -1.2 | -0.8 | 1.0 | -0.2 |
| Guinea | 0.3 | 1.0 | -0.4 | -0.6 | 0.6 | 0.3 | -0.1 | -0.4 | -0.2 | -0.5 | 0.1 | -0.3 | 0.4 | -0.4 | -0.7 |
| Guinea-Bissau | -1.1 | 2.1 | -5.8 | 2.4 | 8.1 | 6.0 | -8.2 | 4.6 | -1.1 | 4.8 | -5.9 | 3.3 | 6.1 | 6.7 | 9.9 |
| Guyana | -3.7 | -0.1 | 2.6 | -0.7 | -1.5 | -2.2 | -1.2 | -3.3 | 0.1 | 6.0 | -1.3 | 0.3 | -4.8 | -3.7 | -3.5 |
| Haiti | 5.7 | 0.7 | -5.2 | -1.3 | 1.6 | -1.9 | -0.3 | 0.6 | -0.1 | 0.9 | 1.0 | -3.7 | -1.1 | -0.1 | -3.8 |
| Honduras | 4.6 | -0.7 | 0.4 | 2.4 | 4.5 | 0.4 | 2.7 | 2.7 | -0.7 | -2.3 | 0.0 | 4.7 | 5.3 | 5.8 | 10.4 |
| Hong Kong | -2.1 | 0.8 | 0.1 | 2.1 | 0.8 | -1.9 | -1.1 | 0.7 | 3.7 | -0.1 | -0.4 | 2.8 | -2.0 | 1.6 | 4.4 |
| Hungary | -1.5 | -1.5 | -0.6 | 3.2 | -1.2 | 0.4 | 2.2 | -0.6 | 1.6 | -2.0 | 2.4 | 1.7 | 1.0 | 2.5 | 4.2 |
| Iceland | 1.0 | 2.1 | -1.5 | -1.4 | 2.2 | -1.5 | 0.1 | -1.1 | 1.1 | 1.2 | 0.0 | -0.6 | -0.7 | 0.5 | -0.1 |
| India | -1.7 | -0.6 | 0.6 | 15.4 | -6.7 | 0.6 | -4.2 | 0.0 | -1.1 | 0.6 | -0.4 | 12.3 | -5.5 | -7.8 | 4.5 |
| Indonesia | -0.9 | 0.3 | -0.1 | 3.3 | -1.4 | -1.0 | -0.6 | 0.2 | 0.1 | -0.3 | -0.5 | 2.6 | -2.1 | -2.3 | 0.3 |
| Iran | -0.4 | 1.2 | 0.3 | 0.9 | -3.0 | -0.3 | 0.7 | 1.1 | 0.3 | 0.0 | -0.2 | -0.1 | -1.0 | 0.3 | 0.2 |
| Iraq | 4.3 | 0.8 | -3.8 | 3.1 | -2.0 | -1.5 | -1.7 | -4.2 | 0.3 | -0.4 | -0.6 | -0.2 | -5.0 | -8.6 | -8.8 |
| Ireland | -28.2 | -12.9 | -4.2 | 11.1 | 1.6 | -9.3 | -6.2 | -0.1 | 5.8 | -3.8 | -3.3 | 4.8 | -12.7 | -12.6 | -7.8 |

| Country | Annual change | | | | | | | | | | | Period change | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2008 – 2009 versus 2005 - 2007 | 2010 – 2012 versus 2008 - 2009 | 2013 – 2015 versus 2008 - 2009 | 2013 – 2015 versus 2005 - 2007 |
| Israel | 0.2 | 0.6 | 2.1 | 5.9 | 5.2 | 16.3 | -17.9 | -4.3 | -0.1 | -2.3 | -1.4 | 10.1 | 5.5 | -5.5 | 4.6 |
| Italy | -1.2 | -1.4 | -1.9 | -0.4 | -0.1 | -0.8 | -0.2 | -0.1 | -1.1 | -0.2 | 0.0 | -2.2 | -1.0 | -2.4 | -4.6 |
| Jamaica | 0.5 | 0.5 | -0.8 | 1.1 | 3.5 | -1.4 | -0.9 | 0.9 | 0.2 | 0.4 | -0.8 | 2.5 | 0.1 | 0.7 | 3.1 |
| Japan | -2.1 | 1.6 | 0.4 | 3.4 | 3.9 | -5.5 | -1.2 | -2.2 | -2.7 | 0.4 | -1.2 | 6.2 | -5.1 | -9.7 | -3.6 |
| Jordan | 0.3 | 0.4 | -1.2 | 2.4 | 4.3 | -1.1 | 1.7 | -0.7 | 0.1 | -0.1 | -0.5 | 3.9 | 2.0 | 1.9 | 5.8 |
| Kazakhstan | 1.1 | -2.5 | 0.6 | -2.6 | 0.6 | -4.5 | 2.8 | -1.7 | 3.8 | 3.2 | -5.1 | -2.7 | -2.9 | 1.1 | -1.6 |
| Kenya | 0.2 | -2.3 | 3.9 | 3.4 | -3.6 | -1.0 | -0.7 | 0.6 | -2.2 | 1.6 | -1.5 | 3.4 | -3.1 | -4.5 | -1.1 |
| Kiribati | 1.3 | 0.4 | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.8 | 0.9 | -1.1 | 1.2 | 1.2 | 1.1 | 0.2 | 1.4 | 0.9 | 3.4 | 4.8 |
| Korea | -3.5 | -14.3 | -1.6 | 0.6 | -4.3 | 2.3 | -1.9 | 13.9 | 5.4 | 7.1 | -5.2 | -7.4 | 3.5 | 20.6 | 13.2 |
| Kosovo | -0.3 | 0.6 | 0.2 | 0.4 | 0.5 | -1.8 | 0.4 | 0.7 | 0.4 | 0.3 | -0.4 | 0.9 | -1.1 | -0.1 | 0.9 |
| Kuwait | -1.7 | -3.7 | -1.4 | 5.6 | 4.4 | -0.3 | 0.2 | -0.2 | -0.9 | -0.9 | 3.3 | 5.6 | 2.0 | 1.6 | 7.2 |
| Kyrgyz Republic | -6.1 | 3.8 | -1.8 | 10.3 | 1.8 | 2.6 | -5.7 | -0.4 | 2.6 | 3.4 | 2.0 | 11.3 | -0.4 | 3.0 | 14.2 |
| Lao PDR | 0.3 | 0.6 | 1.8 | -2.0 | 4.5 | 3.0 | 0.0 | 3.1 | -1.8 | -2.8 | -1.5 | 1.6 | 6.2 | 4.2 | 5.8 |
| Latvia | 2.9 | -1.0 | 0.9 | -0.9 | 3.9 | 4.6 | -1.7 | 0.5 | 4.9 | -1.4 | -0.8 | 1.3 | 5.6 | 9.0 | 10.4 |
| Lebanon | 1.6 | -0.1 | -0.9 | 7.4 | 0.9 | -0.7 | -4.6 | -1.9 | 0.2 | -0.8 | -0.8 | 7.3 | -3.9 | -7.4 | -0.1 |
| Lesotho | -1.9 | 4.8 | -1.0 | -0.9 | -2.3 | -2.6 | -1.0 | 2.3 | -0.9 | 1.9 | 1.9 | -1.1 | -3.7 | -1.5 | -2.6 |
| Liberia | 3.1 | 2.5 | -0.2 | 6.1 | 10.6 | -9.8 | 6.0 | -1.9 | -1.0 | 1.9 | -3.0 | 12.1 | -1.1 | -1.1 | 11.0 |
| Libya | -0.4 | -1.0 | 5.3 | 14.0 | 3.6 | -0.7 | -3.5 | 1.1 | 2.1 | 2.0 | 0.1 | 18.9 | -0.9 | 2.1 | 21.1 |
| Lithuania | -13.3 | 2.1 | 2.5 | 7.1 | 17.3 | -4.8 | 1.6 | -10.5 | 25.3 | 13.7 | -10.6 | 18.2 | 1.5 | 25.9 | 44.1 |
| Luxembourg | 0.3 | 0.2 | 1.1 | 2.6 | 6.8 | -2.5 | -3.5 | -2.6 | -1.5 | 0.4 | -0.5 | 6.7 | -2.3 | -6.6 | 0.1 |
| Macedonia | -1.0 | -3.0 | -2.3 | 2.9 | 6.1 | -1.7 | -1.0 | 1.4 | -0.4 | 0.0 | 1.0 | 3.4 | 1.2 | 1.7 | 5.0 |
| Madagascar | -1.2 | -1.1 | -0.8 | 1.9 | -0.1 | -1.1 | -0.6 | 1.7 | -0.2 | 1.2 | -0.4 | 1.0 | -1.0 | 0.3 | 1.3 |
| Malawi | -3.8 | 0.1 | -2.8 | -0.8 | -3.8 | 0.0 | 0.0 | -0.6 | 2.5 | 1.0 | 0.9 | -4.5 | -2.1 | 0.9 | -3.6 |
| Malaysia | 0.7 | 1.7 | 2.5 | 0.4 | -1.4 | -0.1 | -2.5 | 6.2 | 5.3 | -5.1 | 1.4 | 1.9 | -0.5 | 5.2 | 7.0 |
| Maldives | -2.5 | 1.1 | 0.3 | 1.1 | 4.2 | -4.6 | 0.5 | 1.2 | -0.6 | -1.2 | -1.3 | 3.7 | -1.8 | -2.7 | 1.1 |
| Mali | 17.9 | -3.1 | -0.1 | 0.5 | 1.1 | -3.6 | -1.7 | 2.3 | 5.3 | 9.4 | -0.9 | 0.0 | -3.4 | 8.9 | 8.9 |
| Malta | 0.8 | 0.2 | -0.4 | -3.3 | 4.8 | -3.0 | 1.9 | -6.1 | 5.3 | 2.8 | -0.3 | -1.1 | -1.3 | 2.4 | 1.2 |

| Country | Annual change | | | | | | | | | | | Period change | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2008 – 2009 versus 2005 - 2007 | 2010 – 2012 versus 2008 - 2009 | 2013 – 2015 versus 2008 - 2009 | 2013 – 2015 versus 2005 - 2007 |
| Mauritius | 0.0 | -0.4 | -1.4 | 1.5 | -0.7 | -1.4 | 0.2 | 1.6 | 0.5 | 0.4 | -0.5 | 0.0 | -1.1 | 0.7 | 0.7 |
| Mexico | 0.5 | -0.9 | -0.6 | 1.0 | 2.5 | -1.2 | -0.5 | -1.3 | 1.6 | -0.3 | -0.1 | 1.5 | -0.7 | -0.5 | 1.0 |
| Moldova | 1.3 | 0.9 | 0.3 | 2.8 | 1.6 | -0.5 | -0.5 | 0.9 | 0.0 | -0.7 | -0.8 | 4.1 | 0.3 | 0.0 | 4.0 |
| Mongolia | 2.4 | 3.1 | 2.4 | -1.0 | 3.7 | -4.5 | -1.8 | 1.1 | -1.5 | 2.8 | 0.8 | 3.5 | -3.4 | -2.8 | 0.7 |
| Montenegro | -6.7 | 1.1 | 9.1 | 2.3 | -2.2 | 1.2 | 8.5 | 2.4 | -3.6 | -3.4 | -4.2 | 7.7 | 6.5 | 3.6 | 11.3 |
| Morocco | -1.6 | 3.6 | 1.1 | 8.8 | -3.8 | -1.9 | -2.1 | 2.2 | -1.4 | -0.5 | 5.1 | 8.8 | -4.5 | -3.8 | 5.0 |
| Mozambique | 4.7 | -3.1 | 0.7 | 1.8 | -0.7 | 0.8 | 2.6 | 1.6 | -2.3 | -0.9 | -0.5 | 0.8 | 2.7 | 1.6 | 2.4 |
| Myanmar | -1.9 | 4.1 | 1.2 | -0.3 | 4.8 | 0.3 | 0.8 | -1.0 | 3.0 | 6.3 | -5.2 | 4.2 | 2.9 | 7.9 | 12.0 |
| Namibia | 0.4 | 1.8 | -0.9 | -1.5 | 1.6 | 1.2 | -0.3 | 8.4 | 1.5 | 2.3 | -0.1 | -0.7 | 4.7 | 13.1 | 12.4 |
| Nepal | -1.2 | -1.3 | -0.9 | 2.2 | 4.5 | 1.4 | 3.5 | -2.1 | 3.3 | 4.3 | 0.3 | 3.4 | 5.3 | 11.3 | 14.7 |
| Netherlands | 0.3 | -1.0 | 2.2 | 0.4 | 4.0 | -0.6 | -0.1 | 0.7 | -2.1 | 1.5 | 1.6 | 3.6 | 1.5 | 1.4 | 5.0 |
| New Zealand | -1.0 | 0.4 | -0.4 | 0.7 | 4.5 | 0.0 | -1.2 | 0.7 | -0.5 | -0.4 | -1.0 | 2.8 | 1.6 | 0.6 | 3.4 |
| Nicaragua | 0.9 | 0.7 | -0.6 | 1.5 | 1.7 | 3.0 | -0.3 | -3.3 | -1.0 | -0.6 | 0.0 | 2.2 | 2.5 | -1.2 | 1.1 |
| Niger | 0.2 | -2.9 | -0.3 | 0.4 | 1.0 | -0.7 | 0.5 | 1.1 | 0.3 | 0.4 | 0.4 | -0.2 | 0.5 | 2.0 | 1.8 |
| Nigeria | -0.5 | -0.4 | 3.4 | -0.5 | 1.3 | -3.3 | -1.2 | 4.0 | 4.7 | 4.7 | -2.1 | 2.3 | -2.1 | 7.3 | 9.6 |
| Norway | -3.2 | -0.4 | 0.9 | -0.1 | 0.6 | -0.7 | 0.7 | -3.3 | -0.7 | -1.0 | 0.3 | 0.6 | -1.0 | -4.3 | -3.6 |
| Oman | -3.3 | -1.7 | 0.3 | -0.6 | 6.3 | -1.0 | -1.2 | -0.6 | 1.2 | 0.1 | 0.6 | 2.2 | 1.1 | 1.7 | 3.9 |
| Pakistan | -4.4 | -0.6 | 1.0 | -6.3 | 9.5 | -4.6 | 4.5 | 5.3 | -1.2 | 3.2 | 1.6 | -1.1 | 4.9 | 11.4 | 10.3 |
| Panama | 0.8 | 1.1 | 2.4 | 2.0 | -2.3 | 1.1 | -0.7 | 2.1 | -0.2 | -1.6 | -0.3 | 2.8 | 0.1 | -0.1 | 2.7 |
| Papua New Guinea | -1.1 | -0.5 | -0.1 | 1.4 | 0.6 | 0.7 | -0.2 | -0.3 | 0.9 | -0.3 | -0.8 | 1.5 | 0.8 | 1.0 | 2.5 |
| Paraguay | 2.0 | -1.8 | -2.4 | 1.8 | 6.8 | -8.7 | 0.6 | 3.7 | 3.8 | 1.1 | -9.5 | 3.0 | -3.7 | 0.3 | 3.3 |
| Peru | -0.1 | 1.2 | -0.8 | -1.2 | 4.4 | -1.6 | 1.8 | 3.9 | -2.4 | -0.2 | 0.6 | 0.8 | 3.1 | 3.9 | 4.7 |
| Philippines | 0.7 | -1.2 | -0.5 | 1.0 | 1.9 | -0.4 | -1.1 | 0.3 | 1.3 | 0.0 | 0.8 | 1.2 | -0.1 | 1.3 | 2.5 |
| Poland | -0.6 | -0.4 | -0.1 | -0.3 | 1.4 | -0.9 | -1.2 | 0.9 | -0.3 | 0.6 | 0.5 | 0.2 | -0.7 | -0.2 | 0.0 |
| Portugal | 0.8 | 0.4 | -1.7 | 1.0 | 1.4 | 0.8 | -2.1 | -1.2 | -0.4 | -0.6 | -0.4 | 0.8 | -0.3 | -2.6 | -1.8 |
| Qatar | 1.1 | -2.2 | 0.0 | 0.4 | 5.0 | 1.7 | -2.2 | -1.9 | 1.3 | -1.0 | -1.5 | 2.2 | 2.1 | 0.2 | 2.4 |
| Republic of Congo | 0.3 | -0.6 | -1.4 | -2.0 | 7.4 | -3.2 | -0.5 | 2.4 | 0.2 | 0.4 | -1.0 | 0.6 | 1.0 | 2.6 | 3.2 |

| Country | Annual change | | | | | | | | | | | Period change | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2008 – 2009 versus 2005 - 2007 | 2010 – 2012 versus 2008 - 2009 | 2013 – 2015 versus 2008 - 2009 | 2013 – 2015 versus 2005 - 2007 |
| Romania | -1.2 | 1.6 | 1.7 | 1.6 | 1.5 | 0.2 | -1.8 | -1.4 | -1.1 | 1.0 | -0.9 | 4.0 | -0.8 | -3.1 | 1.0 |
| Russia | 1.1 | -1.7 | 2.0 | 1.2 | 7.1 | -3.3 | -2.3 | 1.5 | 0.6 | -0.3 | 0.1 | 5.5 | -0.8 | -0.1 | 5.4 |
| Rwanda | 2.0 | -1.6 | 1.6 | 1.6 | -0.6 | 1.9 | 0.3 | -0.8 | 1.7 | 1.0 | -0.7 | 1.8 | 1.5 | 3.1 | 4.9 |
| Samoa | 3.2 | -2.8 | 3.6 | -3.2 | 5.2 | 6.3 | -3.5 | -0.1 | 1.1 | 4.2 | -9.3 | 0.8 | 6.6 | 6.2 | 7.0 |
| São Tomé & Príncipe | -12.9 | 2.2 | -7.5 | -7.8 | 18.4 | -0.6 | 0.0 | -4.9 | -13.4 | 8.2 | -0.3 | -2.9 | 7.0 | -4.3 | -7.2 |
| Saudi Arabia | -4.4 | -1.2 | 2.3 | -2.6 | 11.1 | -3.6 | -0.9 | 0.0 | 2.2 | 2.3 | 1.5 | 4.0 | 1.3 | 5.3 | 9.3 |
| Senegal | 0.9 | 3.0 | 0.9 | -1.2 | 0.2 | 0.6 | 1.7 | 0.1 | -0.7 | 0.1 | -0.9 | 0.5 | 1.9 | 1.6 | 2.1 |
| Serbia | -1.0 | 3.3 | -0.4 | -0.1 | 1.2 | 0.4 | -1.4 | 4.4 | -3.1 | 3.7 | -1.4 | 1.4 | 1.5 | 2.9 | 4.3 |
| Seychelles | -0.9 | 4.6 | -1.7 | -14.9 | 5.1 | 2.5 | -0.1 | 1.8 | 0.0 | -3.8 | -1.3 | -11.9 | 5.5 | 3.7 | -8.3 |
| Sierra Leone | -0.1 | -1.4 | -3.7 | 3.2 | 1.3 | 2.7 | 1.4 | -1.2 | -4.8 | 2.3 | 0.3 | 0.9 | 3.9 | 0.4 | 1.4 |
| Singapore | -1.1 | 0.6 | -0.8 | 5.6 | 0.3 | -3.3 | 0.3 | -0.2 | 2.0 | 1.0 | 0.3 | 5.5 | -3.1 | -0.4 | 5.1 |
| Slovak Republic | 0.3 | -1.5 | -2.3 | 0.7 | 6.6 | -1.7 | -0.9 | -0.7 | 0.5 | -0.4 | -1.8 | 2.0 | 0.7 | -0.4 | 1.6 |
| Slovenia | 0.3 | -0.1 | -2.3 | 1.1 | 4.6 | 0.8 | 0.1 | -1.3 | 9.8 | -6.9 | -1.7 | 1.8 | 2.7 | 6.4 | 8.2 |
| Solomon Islands | 6.3 | 3.3 | 5.7 | 2.1 | 6.7 | 2.9 | -5.1 | 0.6 | -3.6 | 2.2 | -1.1 | 10.4 | 3.1 | -0.7 | 9.6 |
| South Africa | 0.4 | 1.3 | 0.3 | 1.7 | 2.9 | -0.6 | -0.5 | 0.7 | 0.6 | 0.5 | 0.2 | 3.7 | 0.7 | 2.0 | 5.8 |
| Spain | -0.4 | -0.1 | 0.8 | 2.2 | 4.8 | 0.1 | -0.6 | 2.1 | -3.0 | -1.0 | -1.0 | 5.2 | 2.8 | 0.1 | 5.2 |
| Sri Lanka | 1.0 | 0.4 | -0.8 | -0.9 | 2.3 | -2.0 | -1.4 | -1.7 | -1.4 | 0.3 | 0.0 | -0.2 | -2.4 | -5.3 | -5.5 |
| St. Kitts and Nevis | 1.5 | -0.9 | -1.1 | -0.3 | 1.8 | 3.2 | -2.9 | -3.8 | 2.6 | -1.8 | -0.4 | -0.5 | 0.9 | -1.4 | -1.9 |
| St. Lucia | 3.4 | -1.7 | -2.7 | 0.9 | 1.7 | 1.9 | 2.0 | 1.5 | -2.7 | 0.3 | 0.6 | -0.6 | 4.6 | 4.0 | 3.4 |
| St. Vincent and Gren. | 1.9 | -0.8 | 1.0 | 1.6 | 3.0 | 0.0 | 1.6 | -5.8 | 2.6 | 3.0 | -2.2 | 3.5 | 0.7 | 1.2 | 4.7 |
| Sudan | 5.7 | -2.4 | 1.6 | -1.9 | -2.9 | -1.6 | -1.2 | -4.3 | -1.4 | 0.2 | 0.9 | -3.1 | -5.2 | -9.4 | -12.5 |
| Suriname | -0.3 | -1.8 | 1.2 | 1.0 | 5.5 | -1.9 | 0.7 | 3.4 | 0.7 | -2.5 | -0.1 | 3.9 | 2.4 | 3.9 | 7.9 |
| Swaziland | -1.4 | -3.7 | 3.1 | 2.6 | 1.6 | -2.8 | -6.0 | 3.0 | 3.3 | 1.9 | -0.2 | 4.2 | -5.0 | -0.4 | 3.8 |
| Sweden | -0.3 | -1.1 | -1.8 | 0.8 | 3.2 | -2.6 | -0.9 | 0.6 | 0.9 | -0.7 | -0.7 | 0.8 | -1.4 | -1.0 | -0.2 |
| Switzerland | -0.4 | -1.9 | -1.1 | -2.1 | 1.9 | -0.4 | 0.4 | -0.4 | 0.2 | 0.1 | 0.1 | -2.5 | 0.7 | 0.9 | -1.6 |
| Taiwan | -0.2 | -1.4 | -0.3 | 0.8 | 2.8 | -2.5 | 0.1 | 0.0 | -0.7 | -0.7 | -0.2 | 1.5 | -1.0 | -2.2 | -0.7 |
| Tajikistan | 2.7 | -1.1 | 6.1 | -0.8 | 1.5 | -2.5 | 0.9 | -2.5 | 3.2 | -1.3 | 1.3 | 3.6 | -2.0 | -0.6 | 3.0 |

| Country | Annual change | | | | | | | | | | | Period change | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2008 – 2009 versus 2005 - 2007 | 2010 – 2012 versus 2008 - 2009 | 2013 – 2015 versus 2008 - 2009 | 2013 – 2015 versus 2005 - 2007 |
| Tanzania | 1.6 | 1.0 | -0.1 | 1.5 | 2.4 | 0.5 | -0.6 | 0.3 | -0.4 | -0.3 | 0.4 | 2.9 | 1.4 | 0.9 | 3.8 |
| Thailand | 0.4 | -1.0 | 1.2 | -0.1 | 2.8 | -0.8 | 0.0 | 1.7 | -0.6 | -0.1 | 0.4 | 1.8 | 1.2 | 1.8 | 3.6 |
| Timor-Leste | -1.3 | -1.1 | 4.4 | 4.4 | 5.5 | -0.3 | 1.1 | 2.3 | 3.8 | 3.6 | -1.8 | 9.7 | 4.0 | 11.5 | 21.2 |
| Togo | 2.7 | 1.9 | -0.8 | -2.5 | 3.4 | 1.3 | 1.3 | 2.6 | -0.8 | 0.8 | -0.4 | -0.7 | 4.7 | 6.5 | 5.7 |
| Tonga | 4.2 | -0.2 | 0.5 | -0.7 | 3.0 | 4.5 | -0.6 | -3.8 | -0.5 | 2.6 | -0.4 | 1.1 | 4.3 | 2.7 | 3.8 |
| Trinidad and Tobago | 1.5 | 4.6 | -2.6 | 1.2 | 9.0 | -1.4 | -3.0 | -3.2 | 2.9 | -2.8 | 1.3 | 5.6 | 0.0 | -1.6 | 4.0 |
| Tunisia | 0.1 | -0.1 | 0.3 | 1.1 | 0.2 | 0.3 | 3.9 | 0.9 | 0.5 | -1.1 | -1.3 | 1.4 | 3.3 | 4.5 | 5.9 |
| Turkey | -2.4 | 0.3 | 0.1 | 0.9 | 4.1 | -1.9 | -1.5 | 1.1 | 1.7 | -0.8 | -0.4 | 3.2 | -0.5 | 0.8 | 4.0 |
| Turkmenistan | 0.8 | -4.7 | -1.5 | -2.6 | 2.5 | 0.7 | 0.6 | 0.0 | 1.6 | 0.2 | -0.4 | -3.9 | 2.3 | 4.1 | 0.2 |
| Tuvalu | 8.1 | 17.9 | -10.9 | -4.0 | 13.2 | -7.0 | -17.8 | -2.9 | 6.1 | 19.1 | -8.2 | 1.3 | -13.3 | -5.0 | -3.7 |
| Uganda | -1.9 | -0.4 | -0.4 | 0.6 | -0.6 | 5.0 | -2.3 | -0.8 | -1.3 | 2.0 | -1.4 | -0.1 | 3.0 | 1.2 | 1.1 |
| Ukraine | 2.6 | 0.5 | -0.8 | 3.6 | 1.1 | 0.4 | -3.4 | 3.1 | -0.3 | 0.0 | -1.8 | 3.8 | -0.2 | -0.2 | 3.6 |
| United Arab Emirates | -2.8 | -0.5 | 0.9 | 2.0 | 10.1 | -2.3 | -1.9 | -0.9 | 1.5 | -1.2 | -0.7 | 7.5 | 1.2 | 0.5 | 8.0 |
| United Kingdom | 0.4 | 0.1 | -0.3 | 2.6 | 4.4 | -0.7 | -1.4 | 0.3 | -1.2 | -1.3 | -1.0 | 4.7 | 0.7 | -2.0 | 2.6 |
| United States | 0.2 | -0.2 | 0.9 | 2.3 | 4.7 | -1.9 | -1.0 | -1.2 | -1.2 | 0.3 | -0.6 | 5.3 | -0.6 | -2.9 | 2.3 |
| Uruguay | -1.0 | 0.4 | -0.2 | -0.2 | 2.2 | 0.7 | -1.9 | 1.6 | 1.6 | 0.6 | -0.4 | 0.9 | 1.0 | 3.4 | 4.2 |
| Uzbekistan | -2.0 | -0.5 | 1.4 | 0.1 | 3.4 | -1.9 | -0.7 | 1.7 | 0.6 | 2.0 | -0.3 | 2.6 | -0.1 | 2.6 | 5.1 |
| Vanuatu | -0.2 | 1.8 | 1.9 | 5.0 | -0.2 | 0.3 | -2.5 | -1.4 | -1.6 | 1.0 | 0.9 | 6.8 | -1.9 | -4.3 | 2.5 |
| Venezuela | 1.6 | 5.7 | -3.3 | -1.1 | -1.6 | -1.7 | 7.9 | 0.5 | -2.0 | 5.2 | -0.7 | -2.2 | 2.9 | 7.2 | 5.0 |
| Vietnam | 1.5 | -0.1 | 2.0 | -1.0 | 4.5 | -1.6 | -3.1 | 2.5 | -0.9 | -1.6 | -0.7 | 2.5 | -0.6 | -2.1 | 0.4 |
| Yemen | 2.6 | 0.6 | 3.0 | 0.9 | -6.0 | -5.0 | -0.4 | 6.4 | -5.4 | -1.5 | -1.6 | 0.1 | -6.1 | -9.0 | -8.9 |
| Zambia | -0.8 | -2.8 | 0.2 | -0.5 | -1.7 | 0.3 | 1.2 | 3.0 | 3.2 | -1.4 | -0.6 | -2.1 | 1.3 | 5.8 | 3.7 |
| Zimbabwe | ... | -8.9 | -3.9 | -1.6 | 9.7 | 8.5 | 5.4 | 0.7 | 1.7 | 0.6 | -2.4 | -2.3 | 17.2 | 20.7 | 18.4 |

**Sources**
ILO's calculations based on IMF's *World Economic Outlook* (IMF, 2014)

**Table A.2 Real growth in 181 countries, 2005 - 2015** (actual and projected change, as percentage, in billions of local currency over average consumer prices)

| Country | Annual change | | | | | | | | | | | Period change | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2008 – 2009 versus 2005 - 2007 | 2010 – 2012 versus 2008 - 2009 | 2013 – 2015 versus 2008 - 2009 | 2013 – 2015 versus 2005 - 2007 |
| Afghanistan | 16.7 | 23.8 | 33.5 | -6.7 | 27.4 | 12.7 | 10.7 | 32.6 | 0.4 | 18.7 | 12.1 | 35.1 | 50.5 | 118.3 | 195.0 |
| Albania | 2.2 | 7.1 | 7.9 | 17.2 | 9.8 | -6.5 | -2.3 | -2.0 | 2.8 | 14.2 | 0.3 | 32.1 | -4.4 | 5.5 | 39.3 |
| Algeria | 7.0 | 16.9 | 22.4 | 28.3 | -4.7 | 1.2 | 26.1 | 10.7 | -16.4 | 12.4 | -1.6 | 49.4 | 20.4 | 24.1 | 85.4 |
| Angola | 18.5 | 33.0 | 32.0 | 63.0 | -36.9 | 5.6 | 14.1 | 5.0 | -1.4 | 2.6 | 1.2 | 71.3 | -9.1 | -1.5 | 68.8 |
| Antigua and Barbuda | 15.6 | -0.7 | -3.5 | 0.4 | 22.7 | -44.0 | 1.7 | -9.9 | 7.4 | -2.6 | 0.0 | 8.9 | -39.6 | -40.3 | -35.0 |
| Argentina | 5.3 | 10.5 | 24.2 | 19.2 | 15.6 | 15.8 | 23.3 | 15.8 | 16.2 | 28.3 | 25.1 | 52.2 | 51.6 | 167.3 | 306.8 |
| Armenia | ... | 15.8 | 27.1 | 3.1 | 9.2 | -5.8 | -3.4 | -1.1 | 7.2 | 5.1 | 5.3 | 31.2 | -4.2 | 6.0 | 39.1 |
| Australia | 4.2 | 4.2 | 5.7 | 6.8 | 8.4 | 2.4 | 2.1 | 2.1 | 2.7 | 1.4 | -0.7 | 17.0 | 8.7 | 14.8 | 34.2 |
| Austria | -4.9 | 2.2 | 2.4 | 1.5 | 3.8 | 1.9 | -2.6 | 1.8 | -0.9 | 4.0 | -1.3 | 5.7 | 2.6 | 4.2 | 10.2 |
| Azerbaijan | 17.3 | 63.7 | 25.3 | 33.1 | 0.1 | 5.8 | 19.7 | 12.7 | 8.2 | 6.5 | 5.9 | 74.8 | 25.2 | 64.6 | 187.7 |
| Bahamas | 7.2 | 7.0 | 11.8 | -1.1 | 5.0 | -3.9 | 6.5 | 3.1 | -0.2 | -0.6 | 2.6 | 11.4 | 3.8 | 8.4 | 20.8 |
| Bahrain | 13.3 | 9.8 | 10.1 | 15.7 | -5.9 | 22.4 | 9.3 | 10.7 | -0.1 | 11.7 | 0.4 | 23.2 | 30.6 | 54.8 | 90.8 |
| Bangladesh | 8.1 | 4.4 | -0.7 | 25.9 | -2.5 | 4.9 | 14.0 | 10.6 | 8.5 | -2.6 | 15.1 | 25.5 | 17.3 | 46.1 | 83.3 |
| Barbados | 8.7 | -7.8 | 13.8 | -4.5 | -5.3 | -0.1 | -10.9 | 4.3 | -1.4 | -5.7 | -1.4 | -1.5 | -8.6 | -14.7 | -16.0 |
| Belarus | 20.6 | 19.9 | 13.2 | 18.4 | -11.3 | 1.2 | -3.2 | 26.2 | 12.0 | 14.4 | 5.4 | 27.9 | 1.1 | 45.4 | 85.9 |
| Belgium | 7.2 | -4.0 | 2.9 | 1.9 | 6.1 | 0.0 | 2.2 | 2.1 | -0.5 | 0.4 | 0.7 | 5.6 | 5.2 | 7.3 | 13.3 |
| Belize | -7.9 | 11.3 | 0.3 | -3.8 | 1.2 | 6.4 | 3.3 | -2.7 | 13.6 | 2.1 | 0.2 | 0.4 | 8.5 | 24.1 | 24.6 |
| Benin | 6.5 | -5.9 | 27.7 | -4.3 | 21.5 | -16.5 | 8.8 | 2.2 | 12.6 | 4.6 | 4.0 | 21.5 | -2.3 | 19.8 | 45.6 |
| Bhutan | 24.7 | 1.8 | 9.0 | 7.6 | -0.2 | 47.7 | -8.0 | 2.9 | -5.0 | -1.8 | -13.8 | 14.4 | 40.9 | 25.0 | 43.0 |
| Bolivia | 7.7 | 2.7 | 15.2 | 11.2 | -1.1 | -2.8 | 23.2 | 9.8 | 14.2 | 6.6 | 0.1 | 22.3 | 15.5 | 55.8 | 90.6 |
| Bosnia & Herzegovina | 4.0 | 6.3 | 14.5 | 12.0 | -2.5 | 1.6 | -3.1 | -1.8 | -1.4 | 6.4 | 1.7 | 23.2 | -2.3 | -1.2 | 21.7 |
| Botswana | -6.6 | 0.3 | 17.5 | 25.7 | 3.9 | -9.0 | -7.2 | -2.0 | 4.5 | 3.5 | -3.5 | 42.5 | -12.3 | -10.9 | 26.9 |
| Brazil | 8.1 | 6.8 | 9.4 | 7.5 | 1.3 | 16.0 | 2.2 | 3.9 | 4.5 | 1.7 | -1.9 | 17.2 | 20.0 | 30.3 | 52.7 |
| Brunei Darussalam | 3.4 | 9.7 | 5.8 | 0.4 | -2.8 | 11.7 | 2.2 | 6.5 | 2.3 | 1.8 | 2.9 | 5.8 | 14.2 | 25.3 | 32.6 |
| Bulgaria | 5.8 | 1.4 | 12.2 | 3.5 | -1.0 | 1.6 | -3.1 | 1.3 | 8.2 | 5.8 | 2.7 | 11.5 | -0.6 | 12.5 | 25.4 |

| Country | Annual change | | | | | | | | | | | Period change | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2008 – 2009 versus 2005 - 2007 | 2010 – 2012 versus 2008 - 2009 | 2013 – 2015 versus 2008 - 2009 | 2013 – 2015 versus 2005 - 2007 |
| Burkina Faso | 5.7 | 11.6 | 11.7 | -15.1 | 19.0 | 6.8 | 7.0 | 25.4 | 14.8 | 3.8 | 6.8 | 3.4 | 32.0 | 87.5 | 93.8 |
| Burundi | 7.5 | 4.7 | 38.1 | 9.5 | 0.8 | 18.3 | 1.4 | -4.5 | -4.2 | 0.9 | 7.9 | 36.5 | 18.0 | 13.7 | 55.2 |
| Cambodia | 0.5 | 14.7 | 21.7 | 3.4 | 32.7 | 4.3 | 3.6 | 11.4 | 4.2 | 6.4 | 6.2 | 42.2 | 26.5 | 52.4 | 116.8 |
| Cameroon | -5.8 | 1.9 | 10.6 | 23.1 | -5.4 | 5.7 | 21.1 | 0.1 | 18.7 | 9.8 | 5.5 | 28.7 | 17.2 | 60.5 | 106.5 |
| Canada | 5.1 | 2.4 | 2.9 | 4.2 | 4.9 | 4.4 | -0.4 | -0.4 | 1.5 | 1.4 | 1.9 | 9.6 | 6.6 | 9.5 | 20.1 |
| Cape Verde | 9.7 | 6.6 | -4.9 | 3.9 | 10.7 | 17.7 | -12.1 | 3.3 | -3.0 | 5.7 | 1.0 | 8.0 | 14.9 | 13.4 | 22.6 |
| Central African Rep. | 26.1 | -16.4 | -0.6 | 22.2 | 1.8 | 18.9 | -11.9 | 5.3 | -41.8 | 0.1 | 16.9 | 15.3 | 12.3 | -31.5 | -21.1 |
| Chad | 16.0 | 24.3 | 41.3 | 13.8 | 9.9 | 24.5 | -2.2 | 9.3 | -3.4 | 3.7 | 4.5 | 57.3 | 32.4 | 40.0 | 120.2 |
| Chile | 7.2 | 6.6 | 9.3 | 7.0 | 15.1 | 9.8 | 3.0 | 5.8 | 4.2 | 4.9 | 5.7 | 24.5 | 22.2 | 40.5 | 74.8 |
| China | 16.8 | 15.7 | 16.3 | 37.8 | 25.5 | 14.9 | 14.7 | 13.4 | 11.4 | 4.9 | 6.0 | 79.1 | 47.0 | 95.2 | 249.6 |
| Colombia | 2.4 | 19.0 | 5.5 | -1.1 | 11.8 | 5.1 | 7.5 | 2.2 | 7.8 | 7.9 | 4.2 | 14.5 | 17.4 | 40.4 | 60.7 |
| Comoros | 2.4 | 6.8 | 6.3 | 18.5 | -10.2 | -1.4 | 4.6 | 14.2 | 4.4 | 5.5 | 9.4 | 19.6 | 0.8 | 24.5 | 48.9 |
| Costa Rica | 47.5 | 9.6 | -3.3 | 24.1 | 6.0 | 7.8 | 11.7 | 15.3 | 5.9 | 10.9 | 9.0 | 28.7 | 25.9 | 67.4 | 115.5 |
| Côte d'Ivoire | 15.4 | 38.3 | 4.3 | -1.4 | -14.7 | 8.7 | 36.8 | 35.6 | -3.3 | 8.3 | -0.7 | 3.3 | 40.8 | 88.8 | 95.0 |
| Croatia | 0.7 | 1.9 | 4.5 | 8.4 | 8.6 | 15.5 | -1.0 | 6.3 | 8.4 | 8.9 | 6.2 | 17.2 | 21.9 | 48.3 | 73.8 |
| Czech Republic | -0.2 | 7.6 | 0.7 | 8.0 | 2.6 | 6.2 | -14.2 | 36.3 | 8.1 | 13.5 | 5.5 | 12.5 | 8.6 | 51.2 | 70.1 |
| Dem. Rep. of Congo | 1.7 | 3.1 | 7.5 | 0.1 | -1.6 | -1.4 | -2.5 | -4.0 | 1.7 | 1.8 | -1.6 | 5.2 | -5.1 | -6.3 | -1.4 |
| Denmark | 3.8 | 2.4 | 3.9 | -0.9 | 5.0 | -2.5 | -2.4 | 0.3 | -5.3 | 3.1 | 1.6 | 4.9 | -1.6 | -5.0 | -0.3 |
| Djibouti | 0.1 | 1.2 | 0.5 | 1.3 | 5.4 | 2.5 | -1.0 | 2.4 | -3.0 | -0.7 | 0.2 | 4.8 | 5.3 | 3.1 | 8.0 |
| Dominica | 1.3 | 6.4 | 6.1 | 11.4 | 8.9 | -10.5 | 1.8 | 10.3 | 6.3 | 19.3 | 11.1 | 23.4 | -2.3 | 30.7 | 61.3 |
| Dominican Republic | 3.6 | 0.6 | 20.4 | 3.3 | 7.2 | 8.3 | -12.6 | 1.1 | -4.1 | 4.1 | 1.3 | 20.9 | 3.0 | -2.0 | 18.5 |
| Ecuador | -1.5 | 15.5 | 9.7 | 15.7 | -8.5 | 4.5 | 3.7 | 31.3 | -7.9 | 1.2 | 3.8 | 23.1 | 13.1 | 27.8 | 57.3 |
| Egypt | 16.4 | 8.2 | 23.6 | 59.9 | -9.9 | 13.0 | 23.8 | 8.2 | 14.2 | 1.1 | 3.4 | 78.4 | 27.7 | 66.9 | 197.7 |
| El Salvador | 0.1 | 25.1 | 1.5 | 9.9 | -3.9 | 0.2 | -2.7 | 8.6 | 18.2 | 8.1 | -1.5 | 16.6 | -0.8 | 28.7 | 50.1 |
| Equatorial Guinea | 5.3 | 8.2 | -3.4 | 6.0 | 6.7 | 3.3 | 2.6 | 2.5 | 2.5 | 4.2 | 3.9 | 9.9 | 9.3 | 19.7 | 31.5 |
| Eritrea | 19.0 | 49.8 | 25.7 | 36.3 | 52.0 | -15.5 | 4.9 | 40.6 | -21.1 | -12.2 | -8.5 | 121.5 | 19.8 | 6.1 | 135.0 |
| Estonia | 2.9 | -31.4 | -3.4 | -7.9 | -26.5 | 14.3 | 5.5 | -3.6 | -3.7 | -2.5 | -1.0 | -32.3 | -0.8 | -7.0 | -37.1 |

| Country | Annual change | | | | | | | | | | | Period change | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2008 – 2009 versus 2005 - 2007 | 2010 – 2012 versus 2008 - 2009 | 2013 – 2015 versus 2008 - 2009 | 2013 – 2015 versus 2005 - 2007 |
| Ethiopia | 9.6 | 14.7 | 13.7 | 6.6 | -3.0 | -9.4 | -0.4 | 8.1 | -0.5 | 5.6 | 3.5 | 19.0 | -8.6 | 0.5 | 19.6 |
| Fiji | 8.8 | 4.9 | 3.6 | -8.6 | 13.5 | 14.2 | -1.3 | 6.8 | 14.5 | 10.7 | 11.8 | 1.4 | 23.1 | 63.4 | 65.8 |
| Finland | 2.6 | 9.5 | -8.3 | -11.5 | 11.2 | -2.2 | 5.9 | 2.2 | 3.3 | 13.7 | 4.1 | -9.2 | 7.9 | 27.6 | 15.8 |
| France | 2.8 | 1.6 | 2.9 | 3.2 | 4.1 | 1.4 | 1.0 | 1.6 | 1.3 | 1.0 | 0.1 | 7.9 | 4.7 | 8.3 | 16.8 |
| Gabon | 2.3 | 1.9 | 2.8 | 0.9 | 4.0 | 0.7 | -0.2 | 0.7 | 0.9 | 0.5 | 0.0 | 5.4 | 2.8 | 4.5 | 10.2 |
| Gambia | 19.7 | 9.8 | 4.1 | 8.0 | -3.2 | 24.8 | 36.8 | 6.9 | -1.7 | -19.3 | 37.5 | 12.5 | 56.8 | 71.7 | 93.2 |
| Georgia | -2.2 | 5.0 | -18.5 | 8.3 | 31.6 | 11.0 | 1.4 | 20.7 | -4.1 | 11.7 | -0.5 | 10.8 | 36.1 | 59.2 | 76.5 |
| Germany | 25.3 | 14.0 | 37.7 | 17.2 | 1.6 | -0.6 | -4.9 | 10.3 | 0.1 | 8.6 | 3.1 | 50.0 | 0.2 | 12.5 | 68.7 |
| Ghana | -0.9 | -1.2 | -1.5 | 0.4 | 4.9 | 3.0 | -3.7 | -1.0 | 0.7 | 1.3 | 1.6 | 1.4 | 2.5 | 2.6 | 4.1 |
| Greece | -0.5 | 18.3 | 17.5 | 19.2 | 3.0 | 31.1 | 12.7 | 47.6 | -2.9 | 6.5 | 2.5 | 41.3 | 68.1 | 126.2 | 219.7 |
| Grenada | -1.4 | 6.6 | 8.8 | 6.9 | 4.4 | -12.5 | -8.4 | -11.7 | -10.6 | 0.9 | -1.8 | 17.8 | -18.8 | -35.3 | -23.8 |
| Guatemala | 20.9 | 16.5 | -10.3 | 1.6 | -7.5 | -4.2 | -0.3 | -7.0 | 10.8 | 10.0 | -8.5 | -4.5 | -10.2 | -1.9 | -6.3 |
| Guinea | 2.3 | 11.0 | 3.8 | -3.1 | 6.3 | 6.6 | 4.1 | -0.4 | 0.9 | 1.4 | 4.9 | 6.0 | 12.7 | 18.0 | 25.1 |
| Guinea-Bissau | -6.0 | 17.9 | -35.2 | 19.4 | 54.9 | 33.0 | -25.8 | 23.9 | -6.8 | 19.0 | -17.9 | 18.5 | 43.4 | 46.2 | 73.3 |
| Guyana | -9.4 | -1.3 | 15.8 | 2.0 | -4.3 | -4.5 | 10.5 | -25.3 | -2.9 | 52.5 | -3.0 | 9.4 | -8.8 | -0.1 | 9.3 |
| Haiti | 16.8 | 6.4 | -7.3 | -1.2 | 7.6 | 1.1 | 7.9 | 10.3 | 2.8 | 9.3 | 6.3 | -0.5 | 14.2 | 39.1 | 38.4 |
| Honduras | 44.6 | -1.6 | 5.2 | 14.7 | 29.1 | -2.6 | 18.3 | 12.0 | 1.5 | -3.8 | 3.0 | 35.2 | 28.4 | 45.3 | 96.4 |
| Hong Kong | -3.4 | 9.9 | 6.1 | 8.9 | 2.2 | -3.2 | 0.6 | 5.6 | 13.0 | 1.8 | 1.7 | 18.0 | 0.2 | 19.7 | 41.2 |
| Hungary | -4.6 | -3.5 | 0.3 | 28.7 | -7.7 | 0.7 | 14.7 | -0.4 | 10.7 | -7.2 | 16.3 | 22.5 | 6.0 | 22.5 | 50.1 |
| Iceland | 4.9 | 7.9 | -5.1 | -2.6 | -3.2 | -4.2 | 0.4 | -6.1 | 4.2 | 6.3 | 1.8 | -5.1 | -7.5 | -3.0 | -7.9 |
| India | 1.8 | 5.3 | 8.2 | 37.0 | -20.2 | -1.6 | -6.3 | -0.8 | -1.3 | 4.0 | 1.6 | 31.9 | -16.5 | -17.1 | 9.2 |
| Indonesia | 5.3 | 9.8 | 9.1 | 16.3 | -0.9 | 5.7 | 3.6 | 2.6 | 3.0 | 4.0 | 3.2 | 26.3 | 8.7 | 19.5 | 50.9 |
| Iran | 7.0 | 12.9 | 12.3 | 18.9 | -7.2 | 7.7 | 13.3 | 12.9 | 5.5 | 4.7 | 4.4 | 28.3 | 17.9 | 46.4 | 87.9 |
| Iraq | 37.1 | 12.2 | -7.7 | 7.1 | -11.8 | 0.8 | 6.9 | -33.2 | 1.1 | -3.4 | -3.1 | -0.8 | -12.3 | -34.0 | -34.5 |
| Ireland | -30.3 | -32.5 | -18.3 | 70.3 | -12.5 | 2.0 | 11.1 | 9.1 | 18.1 | -10.8 | -9.8 | 18.7 | 5.4 | 22.4 | 45.2 |
| Israel | 7.2 | 7.7 | 10.6 | 7.4 | 3.2 | 34.6 | -26.8 | -10.4 | 0.3 | -2.8 | -0.9 | 19.3 | 8.8 | -12.0 | 5.0 |
| Italy | 1.5 | 1.7 | 2.1 | 0.2 | 2.1 | 2.5 | 2.2 | 5.2 | 1.3 | 2.4 | 3.1 | 3.2 | 6.9 | 15.7 | 19.4 |

| Country | Annual change | | | | | | | | | | | Period change | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2008 – 2009 versus 2005 - 2007 | 2010 – 2012 versus 2008 - 2009 | 2013 – 2015 versus 2008 - 2009 | 2013 – 2015 versus 2005 - 2007 |
| Jamaica | 1.5 | 2.7 | 0.4 | 0.0 | 2.2 | -2.0 | -2.6 | -2.3 | -1.4 | 1.4 | 0.0 | 2.3 | -3.4 | -6.2 | -4.0 |
| Japan | -7.9 | 9.4 | 4.8 | 0.7 | 9.2 | -18.1 | -3.5 | -7.4 | -9.5 | 2.2 | -2.3 | 11.7 | -18.5 | -30.3 | -22.2 |
| Jordan | 1.1 | 1.4 | -2.3 | 3.4 | 6.6 | 0.4 | 2.3 | -1.2 | 0.7 | -0.8 | -0.9 | 5.7 | 4.7 | 4.5 | 10.4 |
| Kazakhstan | 9.8 | 5.4 | 10.4 | 4.8 | 11.2 | -8.1 | 14.1 | -2.7 | 16.0 | 14.4 | -9.0 | 20.0 | 4.9 | 32.4 | 58.9 |
| Kenya | 21.1 | 10.9 | 36.0 | 21.8 | -14.4 | 14.7 | 12.9 | 7.8 | -0.9 | 15.4 | -2.7 | 41.3 | 18.0 | 39.5 | 97.2 |
| Kiribati | 10.1 | 10.2 | 14.0 | 3.6 | 5.7 | 11.0 | 0.4 | 7.2 | 10.6 | 10.4 | 8.3 | 19.6 | 17.2 | 49.5 | 78.8 |
| Korea | -2.4 | -13.1 | 0.5 | -3.8 | -12.2 | 7.9 | -2.2 | 21.7 | 11.4 | 10.0 | -2.0 | -13.7 | 6.6 | 41.8 | 22.4 |
| Kosovo | 0.8 | 5.9 | 6.3 | 2.9 | 3.9 | -2.4 | 3.3 | 4.6 | 4.1 | 5.3 | 1.3 | 11.3 | 3.2 | 16.4 | 29.5 |
| Kuwait | -2.5 | -12.5 | -1.0 | 32.6 | 27.0 | 3.6 | 2.5 | 1.9 | 0.2 | -0.6 | 16.4 | 42.7 | 18.7 | 27.6 | 82.1 |
| Kyrgyz Republic | 6.4 | 37.5 | -1.1 | 53.5 | -23.2 | 10.1 | 7.0 | 10.0 | 6.4 | 6.6 | 1.8 | 48.3 | 3.6 | 25.9 | 86.7 |
| Lao PDR | 3.7 | 9.2 | 20.3 | -0.6 | 15.7 | 10.7 | 11.4 | 14.5 | 1.0 | -4.1 | -0.3 | 24.1 | 34.1 | 48.6 | 84.3 |
| Latvia | 28.5 | 8.5 | 15.9 | 0.3 | 29.4 | 29.8 | 0.6 | 10.9 | 28.7 | 4.3 | 4.6 | 29.9 | 52.4 | 119.7 | 185.4 |
| Lebanon | 18.7 | 15.8 | 17.3 | 14.6 | -19.6 | -2.6 | -4.1 | 1.0 | 6.2 | 0.8 | 0.8 | 19.8 | -15.3 | -10.0 | 7.8 |
| Lesotho | -3.4 | 11.6 | 5.5 | 3.3 | 12.3 | -5.3 | -5.0 | 9.2 | -1.3 | 8.2 | 8.9 | 17.6 | -0.3 | 11.5 | 31.1 |
| Liberia | 13.5 | 11.7 | 8.2 | 17.7 | 19.7 | -8.6 | 17.3 | -0.9 | 5.9 | 6.4 | 0.3 | 41.0 | 10.8 | 28.0 | 80.4 |
| Libya | 4.3 | -6.3 | 68.2 | 84.6 | 9.6 | 3.6 | -1.9 | 10.4 | 11.1 | 1.1 | -2.6 | 160.4 | 10.6 | 30.2 | 238.9 |
| Lithuania | -3.9 | 23.2 | 20.2 | 37.3 | 3.0 | 7.4 | -60.1 | 85.5 | 23.2 | -15.5 | 3.9 | 66.8 | -22.3 | -9.8 | 50.4 |
| Luxembourg | 12.9 | 11.5 | 16.4 | 9.0 | -6.8 | -3.0 | -1.7 | -3.8 | -0.7 | 4.9 | 2.7 | 20.1 | -8.6 | -8.4 | 10.0 |
| Macedonia | 3.7 | 1.1 | 1.2 | 3.3 | 9.9 | 3.5 | 0.1 | 3.1 | 3.3 | 2.6 | 4.2 | 9.7 | 9.6 | 19.3 | 30.8 |
| Madagascar | 4.1 | 1.8 | 8.9 | 10.2 | 0.2 | 0.6 | 0.1 | 1.6 | -0.4 | 6.5 | 3.7 | 17.4 | 1.3 | 7.8 | 26.5 |
| Malawi | -11.4 | 6.1 | -8.0 | 2.6 | -25.0 | -0.4 | -0.1 | -1.8 | 21.1 | 9.5 | 10.0 | -13.4 | -15.1 | 11.6 | -3.4 |
| Malaysia | 0.9 | 12.8 | 23.2 | 10.4 | 4.9 | 7.7 | -3.6 | 11.0 | 9.6 | -3.5 | 13.5 | 34.1 | 11.5 | 32.0 | 77.0 |
| Maldives | 1.5 | 10.4 | 10.6 | 14.1 | 5.6 | -5.5 | 9.5 | 8.9 | 0.6 | 1.6 | 0.0 | 29.3 | 6.4 | 17.7 | 52.2 |
| Mali | 49.1 | 18.1 | 10.6 | 10.9 | 3.0 | -7.0 | -0.4 | -1.9 | 16.1 | 24.9 | 1.8 | 26.5 | -6.5 | 25.7 | 59.0 |
| Malta | 7.0 | 10.1 | 3.8 | -9.5 | 29.7 | -3.6 | 13.5 | -25.3 | 32.2 | 18.3 | 3.0 | 9.8 | 8.2 | 38.4 | 52.0 |
| Mauritius | 3.3 | 1.8 | 3.0 | 5.7 | -3.6 | 2.9 | 1.6 | 3.9 | 5.3 | 4.1 | 1.9 | 6.5 | 3.4 | 16.0 | 23.5 |
| Mexico | 2.9 | -1.5 | 2.2 | 7.0 | 10.9 | -2.0 | -0.5 | -3.0 | 9.9 | 1.6 | 3.4 | 14.0 | 1.8 | 11.8 | 27.4 |

| Country | Annual change | | | | | | | | | | | Period change | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2008 – 2009 versus 2005 - 2007 | 2010 – 2012 versus 2008 - 2009 | 2013 – 2015 versus 2008 - 2009 | 2013 – 2015 versus 2005 - 2007 |
| Moldova | 11.4 | 12.2 | 5.3 | 14.8 | -0.6 | 3.6 | 4.1 | 6.5 | -0.6 | -0.3 | 0.2 | 22.9 | 8.4 | 13.7 | 39.7 |
| Mongolia | 12.3 | 14.4 | 12.6 | 2.0 | 4.6 | -0.1 | 1.7 | 5.4 | 4.5 | 9.8 | 5.2 | 17.5 | 5.1 | 24.1 | 45.8 |
| Montenegro | -9.6 | 32.0 | 53.3 | 11.2 | -10.9 | 19.7 | 50.6 | 15.7 | 6.5 | -2.7 | -6.1 | 47.0 | 59.8 | 101.5 | 196.1 |
| Morocco | 0.7 | 26.9 | 23.6 | 27.2 | -13.6 | -0.8 | -3.6 | -1.3 | 0.6 | 1.6 | 15.3 | 45.4 | -10.6 | -6.5 | 35.9 |
| Mozambique | 21.1 | -4.0 | 6.9 | 13.9 | 2.8 | 6.0 | 12.7 | 6.4 | -3.0 | 1.5 | 3.0 | 19.1 | 19.2 | 27.5 | 51.9 |
| Myanmar | 2.5 | 23.7 | 11.1 | 3.7 | 25.6 | 5.9 | 7.5 | 6.2 | 18.4 | 28.7 | -5.3 | 33.5 | 26.5 | 86.2 | 148.6 |
| Namibia | 25.9 | 22.2 | 0.1 | -4.5 | 20.0 | 13.7 | 4.3 | 61.3 | 14.6 | 17.8 | 8.1 | 12.0 | 54.1 | 175.2 | 208.1 |
| Nepal | 3.3 | 5.5 | 4.6 | 13.2 | 11.4 | 8.8 | 20.3 | 1.5 | 14.6 | 16.4 | 5.2 | 25.4 | 30.9 | 81.3 | 127.4 |
| Netherlands | 7.3 | -4.7 | 23.0 | 7.8 | 35.9 | 6.7 | 3.9 | 6.8 | -9.9 | 13.7 | 14.0 | 43.0 | 29.0 | 40.5 | 101.0 |
| New Zealand | 0.1 | 5.2 | 3.6 | 3.9 | 6.2 | 1.3 | -3.2 | -1.6 | -3.2 | -0.3 | -0.8 | 11.5 | 1.5 | -4.3 | 6.6 |
| Nicaragua | 4.7 | 3.7 | 3.8 | 3.5 | 4.0 | 10.5 | -0.5 | -7.3 | 1.3 | 2.4 | 1.6 | 9.4 | 9.6 | 7.5 | 17.6 |
| Niger | 5.4 | -9.4 | 2.5 | 1.8 | 4.7 | 2.8 | 10.0 | 10.8 | 4.8 | 5.6 | 5.6 | 2.4 | 16.3 | 41.9 | 45.3 |
| Nigeria | 5.1 | 5.0 | 26.3 | 3.4 | 6.7 | -1.5 | -2.4 | 35.5 | 26.0 | 27.4 | -2.0 | 26.0 | 11.9 | 99.1 | 150.8 |
| Norway | -8.2 | 17.4 | 14.7 | 7.1 | -3.8 | 18.5 | 7.9 | -17.8 | -2.1 | -2.7 | 7.5 | 20.6 | 14.8 | 1.5 | 22.3 |
| Oman | 2.1 | 4.4 | 5.7 | 5.4 | 5.6 | 1.9 | 3.8 | 3.6 | 4.1 | 2.1 | 3.6 | 14.0 | 8.6 | 20.2 | 37.0 |
| Pakistan | 10.4 | 14.0 | 9.5 | 6.9 | 0.1 | 4.0 | 29.3 | 22.7 | -1.7 | 9.2 | 2.0 | 18.2 | 34.6 | 73.3 | 104.9 |
| Panama | 10.7 | 16.2 | 19.1 | 14.4 | -5.7 | 7.9 | 4.3 | 9.3 | 3.7 | -3.9 | 2.7 | 30.1 | 11.2 | 21.7 | 58.4 |
| Papua New Guinea | 1.6 | 6.0 | 10.5 | 12.9 | 5.1 | 11.1 | 8.6 | 7.5 | 11.8 | 5.9 | 3.1 | 25.9 | 23.4 | 56.1 | 96.6 |
| Paraguay | 17.2 | 3.4 | 1.8 | 10.2 | 18.6 | -14.1 | 12.8 | 13.3 | 14.7 | 12.8 | -6.8 | 23.2 | 5.9 | 44.9 | 78.4 |
| Peru | 4.7 | 8.7 | 2.1 | -1.7 | 21.3 | 5.7 | 11.9 | 18.6 | 4.1 | 3.0 | 6.8 | 13.2 | 33.1 | 67.0 | 89.2 |
| Philippines | 11.2 | 7.9 | 6.4 | 10.7 | 9.4 | 10.9 | 2.8 | 5.8 | 11.3 | 3.3 | 4.2 | 23.7 | 20.4 | 45.5 | 80.0 |
| Poland | 0.9 | 2.4 | 6.2 | 1.7 | 7.4 | 3.2 | -3.3 | 10.8 | 4.6 | 8.9 | 9.3 | 10.5 | 8.2 | 31.0 | 44.8 |
| Portugal | 6.1 | 7.7 | 4.2 | 6.6 | 5.2 | 4.5 | -1.2 | -2.0 | 0.7 | 2.7 | 4.0 | 15.1 | 5.6 | 7.8 | 24.1 |
| Qatar | 3.7 | -3.6 | 2.8 | -0.1 | 9.8 | 4.7 | -8.4 | -9.8 | 2.6 | -0.5 | -1.9 | 5.5 | 0.2 | -8.0 | -3.0 |
| Republic of Congo | 29.2 | 18.3 | 13.0 | 0.6 | 29.1 | 20.1 | 23.8 | 17.4 | 3.6 | 3.4 | 0.5 | 31.3 | 66.6 | 108.7 | 174.1 |
| Romania | 3.2 | 17.5 | 20.9 | 20.0 | -4.1 | -1.1 | -4.1 | -2.0 | -0.2 | 6.5 | -0.3 | 39.3 | -6.4 | -5.3 | 31.9 |
| Russia | 16.4 | 7.8 | 20.4 | 12.7 | 1.5 | 2.7 | 4.7 | 10.3 | 2.2 | 0.5 | 0.4 | 31.0 | 10.5 | 22.7 | 60.9 |

| Country | Annual change | | | | | | | | | | | Period change | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2008 – 2009 versus 2005 - 2007 | 2010 – 2012 versus 2008 - 2009 | 2013 – 2015 versus 2008 - 2009 | 2013 – 2015 versus 2005 - 2007 |
| Rwanda | 19.7 | 1.9 | 16.2 | 16.6 | 2.5 | 17.0 | 12.0 | 6.1 | 12.1 | 12.0 | 5.0 | 31.0 | 30.7 | 73.5 | 127.2 |
| Samoa | 14.9 | -5.8 | 15.6 | -6.3 | 1.3 | 17.1 | -4.3 | -1.5 | 2.6 | 13.3 | -20.9 | 1.7 | 13.9 | 15.0 | 17.0 |
| São Tomé & Príncipe | -21.5 | 10.3 | -17.9 | -16.3 | 60.7 | 1.8 | 2.9 | -6.2 | -26.7 | 34.5 | 3.0 | -1.6 | 25.2 | 10.3 | 8.5 |
| Saudi Arabia | 10.2 | 8.1 | 13.2 | 8.2 | 9.6 | 7.6 | 19.5 | 6.6 | 4.7 | 7.1 | 4.2 | 25.9 | 30.0 | 59.3 | 100.7 |
| Senegal | 10.5 | 17.5 | 7.9 | -0.3 | 4.2 | 6.6 | 9.1 | 4.6 | -1.1 | 6.2 | 2.3 | 12.4 | 17.2 | 28.9 | 44.9 |
| Serbia | 2.4 | 13.7 | 8.6 | 3.7 | -2.9 | 0.7 | -2.9 | 6.7 | -6.0 | 7.6 | -1.7 | 12.3 | -0.5 | 0.9 | 13.4 |
| Seychelles | 6.3 | 26.4 | 29.9 | -37.9 | 13.9 | 11.9 | 10.4 | 14.2 | 3.5 | -6.7 | -0.3 | -16.2 | 33.7 | 48.4 | 24.3 |
| Sierra Leone | 8.3 | -1.4 | -19.5 | 26.0 | 10.1 | 21.3 | 12.0 | 7.2 | -9.5 | 18.3 | 8.1 | 13.3 | 40.7 | 59.4 | 80.6 |
| Singapore | 0.6 | 16.4 | 4.6 | 33.6 | 11.0 | -11.0 | 2.0 | -2.3 | 16.2 | 7.8 | 3.8 | 52.3 | -5.8 | 15.6 | 76.0 |
| Slovak Republic | 7.1 | 2.9 | 2.7 | 6.8 | 10.8 | -0.1 | -1.8 | -2.4 | 1.3 | 1.4 | -2.2 | 15.6 | 2.9 | 2.1 | 18.1 |
| Slovenia | 3.7 | 5.0 | 1.7 | 5.0 | 5.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | -7.6 | 20.1 | -11.4 | -2.2 | 10.7 | 0.1 | 4.6 | 15.8 |
| Solomon Islands | 34.4 | 8.9 | 17.2 | 6.6 | 9.2 | 19.3 | 2.1 | 4.8 | -3.6 | 4.8 | 1.0 | 26.8 | 28.3 | 33.0 | 68.7 |
| South Africa | 8.9 | 12.5 | 7.5 | 6.2 | 9.3 | 4.5 | 2.8 | 3.5 | 3.9 | 3.0 | 2.9 | 21.0 | 12.4 | 24.2 | 50.3 |
| Spain | 3.4 | 4.4 | 6.1 | 4.9 | 7.7 | -1.9 | -4.1 | 0.4 | -8.2 | -1.1 | -0.6 | 14.8 | -0.9 | -10.9 | 2.3 |
| Sri Lanka | 10.5 | 10.9 | 1.8 | -3.3 | 16.6 | 0.3 | 2.5 | -0.9 | -0.8 | 8.6 | 6.3 | 9.6 | 9.4 | 17.5 | 28.8 |
| St. Kitts and Nevis | 9.7 | 5.1 | -0.2 | 0.9 | -0.4 | 6.2 | -9.5 | -11.8 | 14.0 | -1.6 | 2.2 | 2.2 | -4.5 | -3.9 | -1.8 |
| St. Lucia | 16.6 | 2.5 | -6.8 | 0.1 | 8.5 | 8.6 | 6.8 | 1.6 | -7.4 | 0.5 | 3.3 | 0.4 | 18.9 | 15.3 | 15.7 |
| St. Vincent and Gren. | 9.5 | 4.5 | 8.5 | -2.4 | 6.4 | 0.3 | 1.1 | -16.8 | 12.3 | 12.0 | -4.3 | 7.8 | -1.7 | 3.9 | 11.9 |
| Sudan | 37.5 | 2.0 | 17.4 | -0.3 | -15.3 | 1.2 | -6.0 | -29.6 | -7.5 | 1.1 | 12.1 | 2.8 | -19.5 | -40.4 | -38.8 |
| Suriname | 3.6 | -2.4 | 11.3 | 9.5 | 36.6 | -1.8 | 3.8 | 20.0 | 4.9 | -6.4 | 3.1 | 37.8 | 24.2 | 43.4 | 97.6 |
| Swaziland | 3.2 | -0.5 | 12.3 | 8.7 | 4.0 | -6.0 | -16.6 | 11.8 | 14.9 | 8.2 | 1.7 | 19.5 | -11.6 | 9.0 | 30.3 |
| Sweden | 3.0 | 2.7 | 0.4 | 0.6 | 3.4 | 1.2 | -0.4 | 2.3 | 4.4 | 1.4 | 1.4 | 3.5 | 3.4 | 11.1 | 15.0 |
| Switzerland | 0.7 | -0.4 | 2.4 | -3.9 | 4.1 | 1.3 | 3.3 | 0.5 | 2.7 | 1.7 | 2.0 | -0.6 | 5.8 | 12.2 | 11.5 |
| Taiwan | -0.1 | -3.4 | 1.8 | -1.5 | 13.7 | -3.9 | 0.3 | 0.6 | -0.9 | -0.9 | 0.6 | 5.2 | 2.7 | 1.8 | 7.1 |
| Tajikistan | 23.4 | 11.6 | 55.6 | 11.1 | 15.9 | 2.7 | 12.0 | 3.4 | 20.5 | 2.8 | 10.6 | 62.1 | 20.4 | 62.1 | 162.8 |
| Tanzania | 17.8 | 9.3 | 8.7 | 13.4 | 11.9 | 8.8 | 1.0 | 3.7 | 8.6 | 5.5 | 8.8 | 30.6 | 17.1 | 39.6 | 82.4 |
| Thailand | 6.9 | 1.2 | 11.9 | 4.0 | 10.4 | 5.0 | 3.5 | 6.0 | 4.3 | -0.3 | 6.0 | 18.3 | 15.0 | 28.4 | 51.8 |

| Country | Annual change | | | | | | | | | | | Period change | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2008 – 2009 versus 2005 - 2007 | 2010 – 2012 versus 2008 - 2009 | 2013 – 2015 versus 2008 - 2009 | 2013 – 2015 versus 2005 - 2007 |
| Timor-Leste | 32.2 | 16.3 | 100.9 | 111.4 | 6.2 | 19.6 | 27.5 | -1.6 | -4.9 | 1.9 | -0.1 | 239.5 | 45.0 | 48.9 | 405.5 |
| Togo | 18.6 | 11.1 | 0.0 | -5.5 | 20.9 | 10.1 | 15.0 | 21.9 | 2.2 | 10.0 | 3.8 | 7.9 | 42.7 | 86.5 | 101.2 |
| Tonga | 20.0 | 8.6 | -3.6 | -0.7 | 9.4 | 20.3 | 2.0 | -11.3 | -2.0 | 11.2 | 1.4 | 4.2 | 22.5 | 20.3 | 25.3 |
| Trinidad and Tobago | 18.6 | 25.2 | 0.2 | 17.0 | -2.2 | -16.7 | -0.8 | -5.6 | 10.7 | -6.4 | 5.5 | 24.2 | -19.6 | -16.7 | 3.5 |
| Tunisia | 6.5 | 4.5 | 6.4 | 9.6 | 3.6 | 3.7 | 11.4 | 6.1 | 3.3 | -0.2 | -0.3 | 17.9 | 15.9 | 28.5 | 51.5 |
| Turkey | 0.0 | 7.6 | 2.6 | 4.8 | 5.6 | 0.9 | 6.5 | 3.4 | 7.4 | 1.6 | 1.5 | 12.3 | 9.4 | 24.6 | 39.9 |
| Turkmenistan | 13.8 | -12.5 | 2.7 | 29.3 | 47.6 | 10.1 | 30.3 | 14.6 | 20.3 | 12.2 | 5.8 | 55.6 | 66.0 | 160.1 | 304.8 |
| Tuvalu | 5.3 | 22.9 | -8.3 | -3.4 | 12.8 | -6.6 | -9.5 | -4.7 | 8.2 | 27.1 | -7.6 | 3.5 | -8.7 | 6.0 | 9.7 |
| Uganda | -2.6 | 2.6 | 6.6 | 11.6 | 1.9 | 38.6 | -7.1 | -2.5 | -1.3 | 20.0 | -1.4 | 18.5 | 32.2 | 41.1 | 67.3 |
| Ukraine | 19.6 | 14.3 | 15.4 | 13.7 | -14.9 | 9.4 | 3.7 | 15.1 | 2.7 | -6.1 | -2.8 | 20.2 | 8.3 | 17.3 | 41.1 |
| United Arab Emirates | -3.3 | 8.9 | 11.0 | 23.2 | 25.2 | 2.4 | 11.4 | 2.4 | 14.2 | -3.6 | 0.1 | 52.4 | 23.5 | 44.7 | 120.5 |
| United Kingdom | 4.3 | 3.7 | 2.7 | 5.3 | 4.7 | 0.0 | -4.0 | -0.8 | -1.8 | 0.7 | 0.0 | 11.0 | -0.7 | -3.9 | 6.6 |
| United States | 3.9 | 2.0 | 4.4 | 4.5 | 10.7 | -2.4 | -2.1 | -1.2 | -0.9 | 2.7 | 1.1 | 14.0 | 0.7 | 0.5 | 14.6 |
| Uruguay | -0.2 | 5.7 | 7.0 | 6.6 | 8.7 | 8.7 | 1.6 | 8.6 | 8.8 | 4.2 | 0.9 | 18.4 | 17.7 | 40.2 | 66.0 |
| Uzbekistan | 10.4 | 12.2 | 26.7 | 19.2 | 26.7 | 8.8 | 9.2 | 16.7 | 12.6 | 14.7 | 5.6 | 62.6 | 36.5 | 95.4 | 217.8 |
| Vanuatu | 3.4 | 21.3 | 17.1 | 34.5 | -0.5 | 2.8 | -6.7 | -3.5 | -4.9 | 8.2 | 8.2 | 57.4 | -3.1 | -4.7 | 50.0 |
| Venezuela | 29.5 | 33.5 | -3.2 | 2.0 | -21.7 | 6.5 | 32.3 | 0.9 | -8.7 | 1.7 | -7.6 | -2.8 | 14.1 | 12.4 | 9.2 |
| Vietnam | 14.8 | 7.6 | 16.9 | 1.4 | 22.5 | 3.7 | -2.6 | 16.8 | 0.4 | 0.8 | 4.0 | 27.6 | 18.5 | 32.9 | 69.6 |
| Yemen | 22.6 | 7.4 | 14.7 | 7.2 | -21.9 | 2.7 | -14.8 | 19.8 | -12.3 | -1.8 | -1.5 | 6.7 | -13.8 | -20.7 | -15.4 |
| Zambia | 2.0 | -0.6 | 11.9 | 3.6 | -7.0 | 17.5 | 16.7 | 20.9 | 20.5 | 0.7 | 4.2 | 7.4 | 35.1 | 96.2 | 110.8 |
| Zimbabwe | ... | -63.5 | 113.8 | -75.7 | 324.0 | 80.9 | 38.7 | 12.4 | 10.3 | 5.9 | -4.8 | -30.5 | 285.0 | 414.6 | 257.5 |

**Sources**
ILO's calculations based on IMF's *World Economic Outlook* (IMF, 2014)

## Table A.3 Overview of national social security systems

| Country | Number of policy areas covered by at least one programme | | Existence of programme(s) anchored in national legislation | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Number of policy areas (branches) covered by at least one programme | Number of social security policy areas covered by at least one programme | Sickness (cash) | Maternity (cash) [1] | Old age [2] | Employment injury [3] | Invalidity | Survivors | Family allowances | Unemployment [4] |
| **Africa** | | | | | | | | | | |
| Algeria | 8 | Comprehensive scope of legal coverage \| 8 | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| Angola | … | … | … | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | … | … |
| Benin | 6 | Limited scope of legal coverage \| 5 to 6 | ▲ | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | None |
| Botswana | 4 | Very limited scope of legal coverage \| 1 to 4 | ▲ | ▲ | ● | ● | None | ● | ● | ▲ |
| Burkina Faso | 6 | Limited scope of legal coverage \| 5 to 6 | ▲ | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | None |
| Burundi | 6 | Limited scope of legal coverage \| 5 to 6 | ● | ▲ | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | None |
| Cameroon | 6 | Limited scope of legal coverage \| 5 to 6 | ▲ | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ▲ |
| Cabo Verde | 7 | Semi-comprehensive scope \| 7 | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | None |
| Central African Republic | 6 | Limited scope of legal coverage \| 5 to 6 | ▲ | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | None |
| Chad | 6 | Limited scope of legal coverage \| 5 to 6 | ▲ | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | None |
| Congo | 6 | Limited scope of legal coverage \| 5 to 6 | ▲ | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | None |
| Congo, Democratic Republic of | 6 | Limited scope of legal coverage \| 5 to 6 | ▲ | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | None |
| Côte d'Ivoire | 6 | Limited scope of legal coverage \| 5 to 6 | △ | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ▲ |
| Djibouti | 6 | Limited scope of legal coverage \| 5 to 6 | ● | ● | ● | ● | None | ● | ● | None |

| Country | Number of policy areas covered by at least one programme | | Existence of programme(s) anchored in national legislation | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Number of policy areas (branches) covered by at least one programme | Number of social security policy areas covered by at least one programme | Sickness (cash) | Maternity (cash) [1] | Old age [2] | Employment injury [3] | Invalidity | Survivors | Family allowances | Unemployment [4] |
| Egypt | 7 | Semi-comprehensive scope \| 7 | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | None | ● |
| Equatorial Guinea | 7 | Semi-comprehensive scope \| 7 | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | None |
| Eritrea | … | … | … | ▲ | … | … | … | … | … | None |
| Ethiopia | 4 | Very limited scope of legal coverage \| 1 to 4 | ▲ | ▲ | ● | ● | ● | ● | None | ▲ |
| Gabon | 6 | Limited scope of legal coverage \| 5 to 6 | ▲ | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ▲ |
| Gambia | 4 | Very limited scope of legal coverage \| 1 to 4 | None | ▲ | ● | ● | ● | ● | None | None |
| Ghana | 4 | Very limited scope of legal coverage \| 1 to 4 | △ | ▲ | ● | ● | ● | ● | None | None |
| Guinea | 7 | Semi-comprehensive scope \| 7 | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | None |
| Guinea-Bissau | … | … | … | ▲ | ● | ● | ● | ● | … | None |
| Kenya | 4 | Very limited scope of legal coverage \| 1 to 4 | ▲ | ▲ | ● | ● | ● | ● | None | None |
| Lesotho | 3 | Very limited scope of legal coverage \| 1 to 4 | ▲ | ▲ | ● | ● | ● | ● | … | ▲ |
| Liberia | 4 | Very limited scope of legal coverage \| 1 to 4 | None | None | ● | ● | ● | ● | None | None |
| Libya | 6 | Limited scope of legal coverage \| 5 to 6 | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | None | ▲ |
| Madagascar | 6 | Limited scope of legal coverage \| 5 to 6 | ▲ | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | None |
| Malawi | 1 | Very limited scope of legal coverage \| 1 to 4 | △ | ▲ | ● | ● | None | None | None | None |
| Mali | 6 | Limited scope of legal coverage \| 5 to 6 | ▲ | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | None |
| Mauritania | 6 | Limited scope of legal coverage \| 5 to 6 | △ | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | None |

| Country | Number of policy areas covered by at least one programme | | Existence of programme(s) anchored in national legislation | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Number of policy areas (branches) covered by at least one programme | Number of social security policy areas covered by at least one programme | Sickness (cash) | Maternity (cash) [1] | Old age [2] | Employment injury [3] | Invalidity | Survivors | Family allowances | Unemployment [4] |
| Mauritius | 6 | Limited scope of legal coverage \| 5 to 6 | ▲ | ▲ | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | X |
| Morocco | 7 | Semi-comprehensive scope \| 7 | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ▲ |
| Mozambique | 6 | Limited scope of legal coverage \| 5 to 6 | ● | ● | ● | ... | ● | ● | ● | None |
| Namibia | 7 | Semi-comprehensive scope \| 7 | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ▲ |
| Niger | 6 | Limited scope of legal coverage \| 5 to 6 | ▲ | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | None |
| Nigeria | 4 | Very limited scope of legal coverage \| 1 to 4 | △ | ▲ | ● | ● | ● | ● | None | ▲ |
| Réunion | … | … | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... |
| Rwanda | 4 | Very limited scope of legal coverage \| 1 to 4 | ▲ | ▲ | ● | ● | ● | ● | None | ▲ |
| Sao Tome and Principe | 6 | Limited scope of legal coverage \| 5 to 6 | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | None | None |
| Senegal | 5 | Limited scope of legal coverage \| 5 to 6 | △ | ● | ● | ● | None | ● | ● | None |
| Seychelles | 7 | Semi-comprehensive scope \| 7 | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | None | ● |
| Sierra Leone | 4 | Very limited scope of legal coverage \| 1 to 4 | None | None | ● | ● | ● | ● | None | None |
| Somalia | … | … | ... | ▲ | ... | ... | ... | ... | None | None |
| South Africa | 8 | Comprehensive scope of legal coverage \| 8 | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| South Sudan | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | .... | ... | ... | ... | None |
| Sudan | 4 | Very limited scope of legal coverage \| 1 to 4 | None | ▲ | ● | ● | ● | ● | None | None |
| Swaziland | 4 | Very limited scope of legal coverage \| 1 to 4 | None | △ | ● | ● | ● | ● | None | None |

| Country | Number of policy areas covered by at least one programme | | Existence of programme(s) anchored in national legislation | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Number of policy areas (branches) covered by at least one programme | Number of social security policy areas covered by at least one programme | Sickness (cash) | Maternity (cash) [1] | Old age [2] | Employment injury [3] | Invalidity | Survivors | Family allowances | Unemployment [4] |
| Tanzania, United Republic of | 5 | Limited scope of legal coverage \| 5 to 6 | △ | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | None | ▲ |
| Togo | 6 | Limited scope of legal coverage \| 5 to 6 | ▲ | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | None |
| Tunisia | 8 | Comprehensive scope of legal coverage \| 8 | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| Uganda | 4 | Very limited scope of legal coverage \| 1 to 4 | △ | ▲ | ● | ● | ● | ● | None | ▲ |
| Zambia | 4 | Very limited scope of legal coverage \| 1 to 4 | △ | None | ● | ● | ● | ● | None | None |
| Zimbabwe | 4 | Very limited scope of legal coverage \| 1 to 4 | None | ▲ | ● | ● | ● | ● | None | None |
| **Asia** | | | | | | | | | | |
| Afghanistan | … | … | … | ▲ | … | … | … | … | … | None |
| Armenia | 8 | Comprehensive scope of legal coverage \| 8 | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| Azerbaijan | 8 | Comprehensive scope of legal coverage \| 8 | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| Bahrain | 5 | Limited statutory provision \| 5 to 6 | None | ▲ | ● | ● | ● | ● | None | ● |
| Bangladesh | 4 | Very limited scope of legal coverage \| 1 to 4 | ● | ● | ● | ● | None | None | None | ▲ |
| Bhutan | … | … | … | … | ● | ● | ● | ● | … | None |
| Brunei Darussalam | 4 | Very limited scope of legal coverage \| 1 to 4 | △ | ▲ | ● | ● | ● | ● | None | None |
| Cambodia | … | … | … | ▲ | … | … | … | … | … | ▲ |
| China | 8 | Comprehensive scope of legal coverage \| 8 | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| Georgia | 7 | Semi-comprehensive scope \| 7 | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ▲ |

| Country | Number of policy areas covered by at least one programme | | Existence of programme(s) anchored in national legislation | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Number of policy areas (branches) covered by at least one programme | Number of social security policy areas covered by at least one programme | Sickness (cash) | Maternity (cash) [1] | Old age [2] | Employment injury [3] | Invalidity | Survivors | Family allowances | Unemployment [4] |
| Hong Kong, China | 8 | Comprehensive scope of legal coverage \| 8 | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| India | 7 | Semi-comprehensive scope \| 7 | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | None | ● |
| Indonesia | 4 | Very limited scope of legal coverage \| 1 to 4 | △ | ▲ | ● | ● | ● | ● | None | ▲ |
| Iran, Islamic Rep. of | 8 | Comprehensive scope of legal coverage \| 8 | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| Iraq | … | … | … | ▲ | … | … | … | … | … | None |
| Israel | 8 | Comprehensive scope of legal coverage \| 8 | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| Japan | 8 | Comprehensive scope of legal coverage \| 8 | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| Jordan | 6 | Limited scope of legal coverage \| 5 to 6 | △ | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | None | ● |
| Kazakhstan | 8 | Comprehensive scope of legal coverage \| 8 | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| Korea, Dem. People's Rep. of | … | … | … | … | … | … | … | … | … | None |
| Korea, Republic of | 5 | Limited scope of legal coverage \| 5 to 6 | △ | ▲ | ● | ● | ● | ● | None | ● |
| Kuwait | 4 | Very limited scope of legal coverage \| 1 to 4 | . | ▲ | ● | ● | ● | ● | None | None |
| Kyrgyzstan | 8 | Comprehensive scope of legal coverage \| 8 | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| Lao People's Dem. Rep. | 6 | Limited scope of legal coverage \| 5 to 6 | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | None | None |
| Lebanon | 6 | Limited scope of legal coverage \| 5 to 6 | △ | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | None |
| Macau, China | … | … | … | … | … | … | … | … | … | … |
| Malaysia | 4 | Very limited scope of legal coverage \| 1 to 4 | △ | ▲ | ● | ● | ● | ● | None | ▲ |

| Country | Number of policy areas covered by at least one programme | | Existence of programme(s) anchored in national legislation | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Number of policy areas (branches) covered by at least one programme | Number of social security policy areas covered by at least one programme | Sickness (cash) | Maternity (cash) [1] | Old age [2] | Employment injury [3] | Invalidity | Survivors | Family allowances | Unemployment [4] |
| Maldives | … | … | △ | … | ● | … | ● | ● | … | None |
| Mongolia | 8 | Comprehensive scope of legal coverage \| 8 | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| Myanmar[5] | 3 | Very limited scope of legal coverage \| 1 to 4 | ● | ● | ▲ | ● | ▲ | ▲ | Not yet | Not yet |
| Nepal | 4 | Very limited scope of legal coverage \| 1 to 4 | ▲ | ▲ | ● | ● | ● | ● | None | ▲ |
| Occupied Palestinian Territory | … | … | … | ● | … | … | … | … | … | None |
| Oman | 4 | Very limited scope of legal coverage \| 1 to 4 | None | ▲ | ● | ● | ● | ● | None | None |
| Pakistan | 6 | Limited scope of legal coverage \| 5 to 6 | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | None | ▲ |
| Philippines | 6 | Limited scope of legal coverage \| 5 to 6 | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | None | ▲ |
| Qatar | … | Very limited scope of legal coverage \| 1 to 4 | … | ▲ | ● | … | ● | ● | None | None |
| Saudi Arabia | 5 | Limited scope of legal coverage \| 5 to 6 | ▲ | ▲ | ● | ● | ● | ● | None | ○ |
| Singapore | 7 | Semi-comprehensive scope \| 7 | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | None |
| Sri Lanka | 5 | Limited scope of legal coverage \| 5 to 6 | △ | ▲ | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ▲ |
| Syrian Arab Republic | 4 | Very limited scope of legal coverage \| 1 to 4 | None | ▲ | ● | ● | ● | ● | None | ▲ |
| Taiwan, China | 7 | Semi-comprehensive scope \| 7 | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | None | ● |
| Tajikistan | 6 | Limited scope of legal coverage \| 5 to 6 | ● | ● | ● | … | ● | ● | … | ● |
| Thailand | 8 | Comprehensive scope of legal coverage \| 8 | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| Timor-Leste | … | … | … | ▲ | ● | … | … | … | None | None |

| Country | Number of policy areas covered by at least one programme | | Existence of programme(s) anchored in national legislation | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Number of policy areas (branches) covered by at least one programme | Number of social security policy areas covered by at least one programme | Sickness (cash) | Maternity (cash) [1] | Old age [2] | Employment injury [3] | Invalidity | Survivors | Family allowances | Unemployment [4] |
| Turkmenistan | 8 | Comprehensive scope of legal coverage \| 8 | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| United Arab Emirates | … | … | … | ▲ | … | … | … | … | … | ▲ |
| Uzbekistan | 8 | Comprehensive scope of legal coverage \| 8 | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| Viet Nam | 7 | Semi-comprehensive scope \| 7 | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | None | ● |
| Yemen | 5 | Limited scope of legal coverage \| 5 to 6 | ● | ▲ | ● | ● | ● | ● | None | ▲ |
| **Europe** | | | | | | | | | | |
| Albania | 8 | Comprehensive scope of legal coverage \| 8 | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| Andorra | 8 | Comprehensive scope of legal coverage \| 8 | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| Austria | 8 | Comprehensive scope of legal coverage \| 8 | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| Belarus | 8 | Comprehensive scope of legal coverage \| 8 | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| Belgium | 8 | Comprehensive scope of legal coverage \| 8 | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| Bosnia and Herzegovina | 8 | Comprehensive scope of legal coverage \| 8 | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| Bulgaria | 8 | Comprehensive scope of legal coverage \| 8 | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| Croatia | 8 | Comprehensive scope of legal coverage \| 8 | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| Cyprus | 8 | Comprehensive scope of legal coverage \| 8 | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| Czech Republic | 8 | Comprehensive scope of legal coverage \| 8 | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| Denmark | 8 | Comprehensive scope of legal coverage \| 8 | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| Estonia | 8 | Comprehensive scope of legal coverage \| 8 | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |

| Country | Number of policy areas covered by at least one programme | | Existence of programme(s) anchored in national legislation | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Number of policy areas (branches) covered by at least one programme | Number of social security policy areas covered by at least one programme | Sickness (cash) | Maternity (cash) [1] | Old age [2] | Employment injury [3] | Invalidity | Survivors | Family allowances | Unemployment [4] |
| Finland | 8 | Comprehensive scope of legal coverage \| 8 | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| France | 8 | Comprehensive scope of legal coverage \| 8 | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| Germany | 8 | Comprehensive scope of legal coverage \| 8 | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| Greece | 8 | Comprehensive scope of legal coverage \| 8 | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| Guernsey | 8 | Comprehensive scope of legal coverage \| 8 | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| Hungary | 8 | Comprehensive scope of legal coverage \| 8 | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| Iceland | 8 | Comprehensive scope of legal coverage \| 8 | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| Ireland | 8 | Comprehensive scope of legal coverage \| 8 | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| Isle of Man | 8 | Comprehensive scope of legal coverage \| 8 | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| Italy | 8 | Comprehensive scope of legal coverage \| 8 | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| Jersey | 8 | Comprehensive scope of legal coverage \| 8 | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| Kosovo | 8 | Comprehensive scope of legal coverage \| 8 | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| Latvia | 8 | Comprehensive scope of legal coverage \| 8 | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| Liechtenstein | 8 | Comprehensive scope of legal coverage \| 8 | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| Lithuania | 8 | Comprehensive scope of legal coverage \| 8 | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| Luxembourg | 8 | Comprehensive scope of legal coverage \| 8 | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| Malta | 8 | Comprehensive scope of legal coverage \| 8 | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| Moldova, Republic of | 8 | Comprehensive scope of legal coverage \| 8 | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |

| Country | Number of policy areas covered by at least one programme | | Existence of programme(s) anchored in national legislation | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Number of policy areas (branches) covered by at least one programme | Number of social security policy areas covered by at least one programme | Sickness (cash) | Maternity (cash) [1] | Old age [2] | Employment injury [3] | Invalidity | Survivors | Family allowances | Unemployment [4] |
| Monaco | … | … | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| Montenegro | 8 | Comprehensive scope of legal coverage \| 8 | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| Netherlands | 8 | Comprehensive scope of legal coverage \| 8 | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| Norway | 8 | Comprehensive scope of legal coverage \| 8 | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| Poland | 8 | Comprehensive scope of legal coverage \| 8 | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| Portugal | 8 | Comprehensive scope of legal coverage \| 8 | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| Romania | 8 | Comprehensive scope of legal coverage \| 8 | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| Russian Federation | 8 | Comprehensive scope of legal coverage \| 8 | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| San Marino | 8 | Comprehensive scope of legal coverage \| 8 | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| Serbia | 8 | Comprehensive scope of legal coverage \| 8 | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| Slovakia | 8 | Comprehensive scope of legal coverage \| 8 | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| Slovenia | 8 | Comprehensive scope of legal coverage \| 8 | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| Spain | 8 | Comprehensive scope of legal coverage \| 8 | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| Sweden | 8 | Comprehensive scope of legal coverage \| 8 | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| Switzerland | 8 | Comprehensive scope of legal coverage \| 8 | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia | 8 | Comprehensive scope of legal coverage \| 8 | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| Turkey | 7 | Semi-comprehensive scope \| 7 | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | None | ● |

| Country | Number of policy areas covered by at least one programme | | Existence of programme(s) anchored in national legislation | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Number of policy areas (branches) covered by at least one programme | Number of social security policy areas covered by at least one programme | Sickness (cash) | Maternity (cash) [1] | Old age [2] | Employment injury [3] | Invalidity | Survivors | Family allowances | Unemployment [4] |
| Ukraine | 8 | Comprehensive scope of legal coverage \| 8 | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| United Kingdom | 8 | Comprehensive scope of legal coverage \| 8 | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| **Latin America and the Caribbean** | | | | | | | | | | |
| Antigua and Barbuda | 5 | Limited scope of legal coverage \| 5 to 6 | ● | ● | ● | None | ● | ● | None | None |
| Argentina | 8 | Comprehensive scope of legal coverage \| 8 | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| Bahamas | 6 | Limited scope of legal coverage \| 5 to 6 | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | None | None |
| Barbados | 7 | Semi-comprehensive scope \| 7 | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | None | ● |
| Belize | 6 | Limited scope of legal coverage \| 5 to 6 | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | None | None |
| Bermuda | 4 | Very limited scope of legal coverage \| 1 to 4 | ▲ | ▲ | ● | ● | ● | ● | None | None |
| Bolivia, Plurinational State of | 7 | Semi-comprehensive scope \| 7 | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ▲ |
| Brazil | 8 | Comprehensive scope of legal coverage \| 8 | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| British Virgin Islands | 6 | Limited scope of legal coverage \| 5 to 6 | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | None |
| Chile | 8 | Comprehensive scope of legal coverage \| 8 | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| Colombia | 8 | Comprehensive scope of legal coverage \| 8 | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| Costa Rica | 7 | Semi-comprehensive scope \| 7 | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ▲ |
| Cuba | 6 | Limited scope of legal coverage \| 5 to 6 | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | None [6] | None |
| Dominica | 6 | Limited scope of legal coverage \| 5 to 6 | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | None [7] | None |

| Country | Number of policy areas covered by at least one programme | | Existence of programme(s) anchored in national legislation | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Number of policy areas (branches) covered by at least one programme | Number of social security policy areas covered by at least one programme | Sickness (cash) | Maternity (cash) [1] | Old age [2] | Employment injury [3] | Invalidity | Survivors | Family allowances | Unemployment [4] |
| Dominican Republic | 7 | Semi-comprehensive scope \| 7 | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | None |
| Ecuador | 7 | Semi-comprehensive scope \| 7 | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | None [8] | ● |
| El Salvador | 6 | Limited scope of legal coverage \| 5 to 6 | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | None | None |
| Grenada | 6 | Limited scope of legal coverage \| 5 to 6 | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | None | None |
| Guadeloupe | … | … | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | … | … |
| Guatemala | 6 | Limited scope of legal coverage \| 5 to 6 | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | None | None |
| Guyana | 6 | Limited scope of legal coverage \| 5 to 6 | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | None | None |
| French Guiana | … | … | … | … | ● | ● | ● | ● | … | … |
| Haiti | 4 | Very limited scope of legal coverage \| 1 to 4 | None | ▲ | ● | ● | ● | ● | None | None |
| Honduras | 6 | Limited scope of legal coverage \| 5 to 6 | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | None | None |
| Jamaica | 6 | Limited scope of legal coverage \| 5 to 6 | ▲ | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | None |
| Martinique | … | … | … | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | … |
| Mexico | 7 | Semi-comprehensive scope \| 7 | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ▲ |
| Netherlands Antilles | … | … | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | … |
| Nicaragua | 7 | Semi-comprehensive scope \| 7 | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | None |
| Panama | 6 | Limited scope of legal coverage \| 5 to 6 | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | None | ▲ |
| Paraguay | 6 | Limited scope of legal coverage \| 5 to 6 | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ▲ | None |
| Peru | 6 | Limited scope of legal coverage \| 5 to 6 | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | None | ▲ |

| Country | Number of policy areas covered by at least one programme | | Existence of programme(s) anchored in national legislation | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Number of policy areas (branches) covered by at least one programme | Number of social security policy areas covered by at least one programme | Sickness (cash) | Maternity (cash) [1] | Old age [2] | Employment injury [3] | Invalidity | Survivors | Family allowances | Unemployment [4] |
| Puerto Rico | … | … | ● | ● | … | ● | ● | ● | … | … |
| Saint Kitts and Nevis | 6 | Limited scope of legal coverage \| 5 to 6 | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | None | None |
| Saint Lucia | 6 | Limited scope of legal coverage \| 5 to 6 | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | None | None |
| Saint Vincent and the Grenadines | 6 | Limited scope of legal coverage \| 5 to 6 | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | None | None |
| Suriname | … | … | … | … | … | … | … | … | … | None |
| Trinidad and Tobago | 7 | Semi-comprehensive scope \| 7 | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | None |
| Uruguay | 8 | Comprehensive scope of legal coverage \| 8 | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| Venezuela, Bolivarian Rep. of | 7 | Semi-comprehensive scope \| 7 | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | None | ● |
| North America | | | | | | | | | | |
| Canada | 8 | Comprehensive scope of legal coverage \| 8 | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| United States | 8 | Comprehensive scope of legal coverage \| 8 | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| **Oceania** | | | | | | | | | | |
| Australia | 8 | Comprehensive scope of legal coverage \| 8 | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| Fiji | 5 | Limited scope of legal coverage \| 5 to 6 | None | ▲ | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | None |
| Kiribati | 4 | Very limited scope of legal coverage \| 1 to 4 | None | ▲ | ● | ● | ● | ● | None | None |
| Marshall Islands | 3 | Very limited scope of legal coverage \| 1 to 4 | △ | △ | ● | None | ● | ● | None | None |
| Micronesia, Fed. States | 3 | Very limited scope of legal coverage \| 1 to 4 | None | None | ● | None | ● | ● | None | None |

| Country | Number of policy areas covered by at least one programme | | Existence of programme(s) anchored in national legislation | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Number of policy areas (branches) covered by at least one programme | Number of social security policy areas covered by at least one programme | Sickness (cash) | Maternity (cash) [1] | Old age [2] | Employment injury [3] | Invalidity | Survivors | Family allowances | Unemployment [4] |
| Nauru | … | … | ... | .... | ... | .... | ... | ... | ... | None |
| New Zealand | 8 | Comprehensive scope of legal coverage \| 8 | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| Niue | … | … | ... | .... | ... | .... | ... | ... | ... | None |
| Palau Islands | 3 | Very limited scope of legal coverage \| 1 to 4 | None | None | ● | None | ● | ● | None | None |
| Papua New Guinea | 4 | Very limited scope of legal coverage \| 1 to 4 | ▲ | None | ● | ● | ● | ● | None | None |
| Samoa | 4 | Very limited scope of legal coverage \| 1 to 4 | ... | .... | ● | ● | ● | ● | None | None |
| Solomon Islands | 4 | Limited scope of legal coverage \| 5 to 6 | None | None | ● | ● | ● | ● | None | ▲ |
| Tonga | … | No information | … | … | ● | ● | ● | ● | … | None |
| Tuvalu | … | No information | … | … | ● | ● | ● | ● | … | ▲ |
| Vanuatu | 3 | Very limited scope of legal coverage \| 1 to 4 | ▲ | ▲ | ● | None | ● | ● | None | ▲ |

Sources: Main source: SSA (Social Security Administration of the United States); ISSA (International Social Security Association). Social security programs throughout the world (Washington, DC and Geneva): The Americas, 2013; Europe, 2012; Asia and the Pacific, 2012; Africa, 2013. Available at: http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/progdesc/ssptw/ [7 June 2014].
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National legislation.

**Notes**

…: Not available.

**Symbols**

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● At least one programme anchored in national legislation

○ Legislation not yet implemented.

▲ Limited provision (e.g. labour code only).

△ Only benefit in kind (e.g. medical benefit).

1 Additional details in table B.5 Maternity: Key features of main social security programmes (cash benefits) (http://www.social-protection.org/gimi/gess/RessourceDownload.action?ressource.ressourceId=37580).

2 Additional details in table B.6. Old age pensions: Key features of main social security programmes (http://www.social-protection.org/gimi/gess/RessourceDownload.action?ressource.ressourceId=37137).

3 Additional details in table B.4. Employment injury: Key features of main social security programmes (cash benefits) (http://www.social-protection.org/gimi/gess/RessourceDownload.action?ressource.ressourceId=41917)

4 Additional details in table B.3. Unemployment: indicators of effective coverage (http://www.social-protection.org/gimi/gess/RessourceDownload.action?ressource.ressourceId=37697)

5 Myanmar enacted its social security law in 2012. The laws includes provisions for most social security branches including old age, survivors, disability, family benefits and unemployment insurance benefit (section 37), but the country is at the stage of drafting the regulations and provisions are not yet being implemented.

6 Cuba. Family/child benefits: Dependants of young workers conscripted into military service are eligible for assistance from social security. Cash benefits are available for families whose head of household is unemployed due to health, disability or other justifiable causes, and has insufficient income for food and medicine or basic household needs.

7 Dominica. Family/child benefits: Benefits are paid to unemployed single mothers with unmarried children younger than age 18 (age 21 if a full-time student, no limit if disabled) who lack sufficient resources to meet basic needs. (Social assistance benefits are provided under the Old Age, Disability, and Survivors programme).

8 Ecuador. Family/child benefits: No statutory benefits are provided. Mothers assessed as needy with at least one child (younger than age 18) and low-income families receive a monthly allowance under the Bono de Desarrollo Humano programme Definitions The scope of coverage is measured by the number of social security policy areas provided for by law. This indicator can take the value 0 to 8 according to the total number of social security policy areas (or branches) with a programme anchored in national legislation. The eight following branches are taken into consideration: sickness, maternity, old age, survivors, invalidity, child/family allowances, employment injury and unemployment. The number of branches covered by at least one programme provides an overview of the scope of legal social security provision.

**Definitions**

The scope of coverage is measured by the number of social security policy areas provided for by law. This indicator can take the value 0 to 8 according to the total number of social security policy areas (or branches) with a programme anchored in national legislation.
The eight following branches are taken into consideration: sickness, maternity, old age, survivors, invalidity, child/family allowances, employment injury and unemployment.
The number of branches covered by at least one programme provides an overview of the scope of legal social security provision.