Generally, taxes are considered an efficient and equitable source of revenue for the health sector. They may lead to national risk pooling for the whole population and redistribute between high and low risks, and high- and low- income groups. The civil service has the potential to be administratively efficient and control costs.

However, the contribution that taxes make to health-care financing is largely contingent upon national macroeconomic performance and competing demands from other sectors; the quality of governance; the size of the tax base; and the government's human and institutional capacity to collect taxes and supervise the system. In practice, government schemes often tend to be under-funded due to competing public expenditures, which might lead to a shortage of goods and services and to under-the-table payments and lack of efficient governance.

The success of social health insurance schemes depends on the generation of stable resources as revenues, strong support of the population, provision of  a broad package of services, involvement of the social partners and redistribution between risk and income groups. However, schemes are administratively complex and governance and accountability can be problematic. Also, from a macroeconomic point of view, payroll contributions can reduce competitiveness and lead to higher unemployment.

Furthermore, in countries with sizeable informal economies, social health insurance might have an impact on equity if coverage is not universal. It should be emphasized that health care for the workforce is not free and that enterprises and the economy have to bear a respective share of the financial burden. In the case of social health insurance schemes, funding should consist of shared financial resources from both employers and employees. For specific benefits such as maternity benefits, specific rules might apply; for instance, full coverage might be provided through public funds to avoid disadvantages for particular groups.

Specific schemes such as community-based health insurance schemes can be an efficient mechanism to collect non-salary-related contributions and reduce costs for the poorest at the point of delivery. But they often experience problems of coverage and therefore fail to achieve sufficient pooling; they also frequently find it difficult to organize membership across different ethnic groups and struggle with management capacity and inadequacy of resources.

Private for-profit health insurance schemes are also found in many countries, ranging from OECD countries to developing countries such as Peru and the Philippines. If they are not subsidized, they cover the wealthier part of the population and are based on risk-related premiums. Although they might provide a better quality of service in some contexts, their exclusive character and high administrative costs are often criticized.

Overall, there is no single best solution, given the different economic, social, political, cultural and legal environments for effectively mobilizing funds and efficiently applying them. Using different financing mechanisms simultaneously, exploiting synergies, and ensuring their complementarity will allow countries to move faster towards the ultimate goal of universal coverage.