



International
Labour
Organization



issa

INTERNATIONAL SOCIAL SECURITY ASSOCIATION

DEVELOPMENT
PATHWAYS



United
Nations

Department of
Economic and
Social Affairs

► Governance of social protection systems: a learning journey

Module #1: Coordination



▶ **Governance of
social protection systems:
a learning journey**

Module #1: Coordination

Copyright © International Labour Organization 2021
First published 2021

Publications of the International Labour Office enjoy copyright under Protocol 2 of the Universal Copyright Convention. Nevertheless, short excerpts from them may be reproduced without authorization, on condition that the source is indicated. For rights of reproduction or translation, application should be made to ILO Publications (Rights and Licensing), International Labour Office, CH-1211 Geneva 22, Switzerland, or by email: rights@ilo.org. The International Labour Office welcomes such applications. Libraries, institutions and other users registered with reproduction rights organizations may make copies in accordance with the licences issued to them for this purpose. Visit www.ifrro.org to find the reproduction rights organization in your country.

Governance of social protection systems: a learning journey
Module #1: Coordination

ISBN: 978-9-22-035034-8 (Web PDF)

coordination / government structures / social security systems / social protection

The designations employed in ILO publications, which are in conformity with United Nations practice, and the presentation of material therein do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the International Labour Office concerning the legal status of any country, area or territory or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers.

The responsibility for opinions expressed in signed articles, studies and other contributions rests solely with their authors, and publication does not constitute an endorsement by the International Labour Office of the opinions expressed in them.

Reference to names of firms and commercial products and processes does not imply their endorsement by the International Labour Office, and any failure to mention a particular firm, commercial product or process is not a sign of disapproval.

Information on ILO publications and digital products can be found at www.ilo.org/publns

Produced by the ILO in partnership with UNDESA and with technical support from ISSA and Development Pathways.

Graphic and typographic design, manuscript preparation, copy-editing, layout and composition, proofreading, printing, electronic publishing and distribution.

The ILO endeavours to use paper sourced from forests managed in an environmentally sustainable and socially responsible manner.

Cover photo: [Unsplash.com/](https://unsplash.com/) Kraken Images

► Introduction

This learning module is part of a series of working papers “Governance of social protection systems: a learning journey” developed in the context of the project “Achieving SDGs and ending poverty through Universal Social Protection”, implemented from January 2019 until June 2021 under the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development sub-fund of the United Nations Peace and Development Trust Fund (UNPDF). The project is jointly implemented by the Division for Inclusive Social Development of the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN DESA), and the Social Protection Department (SOCPRO) of the International Labour Office (ILO), in the framework of ILO’s Global Flagship Programme for Social Protection Floors and as part of the overall campaign for Universal Social Protection (USP 2030).

The project has pursued a two-fold strategy. In two focus countries, Pakistan and Cambodia, the ILO offices provided technical support to strengthen capacities of institutions and practitioners on different aspects identified as critical in social security governance.

Simultaneously, at global level, the project has developed a knowledge base of good practices as well as learning modules in order to better support policy makers in their capacity to take strategic decisions in the field of social protection. In this sense, it is important to acknowledge the partnership with the International Social Security Association (ISSA) and Development Pathways, which, along with the ILO and UNDESA, has produced a learning approach at the crossroads of policy and technicality. The project has thus attempted to highlight in a practical way the main drivers of different operational components inherent to all systems, starting with three core topics:

- Module #1: Coordination
- Module #2: Information and Communication Technologies & Data
- Module #3: Compliance and Enforcement of Legal Frameworks

In order to deepen this learning journey rooted in reality but driven by the ideal of social protection for all, the project has proceeded in three phases by developing successively:

- A global research, including analysis and case studies, notably in Argentina, Kenya, Mauritius and Fiji, and a specific paper on the Chinese model;
- An online experts’ meeting to share and discuss those learnings with specialists, practitioners and decision-makers in the South;
- Three learning modules bringing together this information in a synthetic form, with a view to the further development of a training programme, notably with the ILO’s International Training Centre in Turin (ITC/ILO).



► Governance of social protection systems: a learning journey

Experts meeting webinar

Date / 25 June 2021

Time / 10:00-11:40 CAT / 16.00-17:40 CST

Register here and select your topic: cutt.ly/splearning

► Virtual event



► Acknowledgements

The series “Governance of social protection systems: a learning journey” was prepared by the department of social protection (SOCPRO) of the ILO under the coordination of Jean-Louis Lambeau with the contributions and policy-driven orientations provided by Valérie Schmitt, Pal Karuna, Christina Behrendt, Veronika Wodsak, André Picard, Maya Stern-Plaza, Kroum Markov, Luisa Fernanda Carmona Llano, Mira Bierbaum, Simeon Bond, Aurélie Klein, Rabia Razzaque, Saad Gilani, Luis Frota, Ingrid Christensen, Jie Yu Koh, Sokgech Heng, Nuno Cunha, Mariko Ouchi, Rodrigo Assumpção, Kagisanyo Kelobang, Patience Matandiko, Valentina Barca, Robert Venne, Oleg Serezhin, Wenyan Yang, Raul Ruggia-Frick, Stephen Kidd, Shea McClanahan, Richard Chirchir, Alexandra Barrantes, Sarina Kidd, David Hillson, Carlos Galian, Dianne Dunkerley, Alia Shahid, Nazar Ali, Hong MI, Qiyini MA, Huilin MIAO, Rong YAN, Ziqi YU.

The authors of the module# 1 on coordination are Raul Ruggia-Frick (ISSA), Shea McClanahan (Development Pathways) and Carlos Galian (Development Pathways).



► Contents

1. Objectives	1
2.1 Coordination taxonomy and the limits of coordination	3
2. Coordination: Concepts, taxonomy and social protection	3
2.2 Coordination, social protection and Recommendation No. 202	4
2.3 Coordination at three levels	6
3. High-level: policy coordination	9
3.1 Indonesia: TPN2K – A think tank to promote coordination	9
3.2 Malawi: Institutional structure with a vague mandate	14
3.3 Chile Crece Contigo (Chile Grows with You): an Intersectoral Programme	17
3.4 High-level policy coordination checklist	22
4. Mid-level: operational coordination	25
4.1 Malawi	26
4.2 Brazil: Bolsa Familia and its integration with education, health and social assistance services	28
4.3 Chile Crece Contigo mid-level coordination	33
4.4 Mid-level: operational coordination checklist	36
5. Street-level: service-delivery coordination	38
5.1 Brazil: Street-level services: social assistance centres	39
5.2 Malawi: Community social support committees	42
5.3 Chile Crece Contigo: Street-level through local networks	43
6. Conclusions and recommendations	48
Bibliography	50



► Acronyms

AEC	Area Executive Committee (Malawi)
BF	Bolsa Família programme
CadÚnico	Cadastro Unico (Brazil)
CCT	conditional cash transfer programme
CRASs	social assistance centres) (Brazil)
CSSCs	community social support committees (Malawi)
DC	District Commissioner (Malawi)
Di Bao	Minimum Income Guarantee Programme (China)
GVH	Group Village Heads (Malawi)
IGD	Índice de Gestão Descentralizada (Brazil)
ILO	International Labour Organization
IT	information technology
KPS	social protection card (Indonesia)
MDS	Ministry of Social Development (Brazil)
MEC	Ministry of Education (Brazil)
MF	Microfinance Programme (Malawi)
MNSSP	Malawi National Social Support Programme (Malawi)
MS	Ministry of Health (Brazil)
MSMEs	micro, small and medium-sized enterprises
NSSP	National Social Support Policy (Malawi)
NSSSC	National Social Support Steering Committee (Malawi)

ODI	Overseas Development Institute
PAIF	Comprehensive Family Protection and Support Services (Brazil)
PRSP	Poverty Reduction and Social Protection Division (Malawi)
PWPs	Public Works Programme (Malawi)
Raskin	Subsidized rice scheme (Indonesia)
SCTP	Social Cash Transfer Programme (Malawi)
SMP	Targeted School Meals Programme (Malawi)
SUAS	Social Assistance System (Brazil)
TNP2K	Indonesian National Team for the Acceleration of Poverty Reduction
UBR	Unified Beneficiary Registry (Malawi)
UDB	Unified Database of Beneficiaries (Indonesia)

▶▶ Everyone believes in coordination, but no one wants to be coordinated."

▶ Sir Michael Jacobs, WHO

▶ 1. Objectives

This learning module aims at highlighting, through case studies, the decisive role of governance in improving coordination between social protection policies in order to achieve coverage gains and the realization of the right to social protection. This module is part of a project that aims to highlight the role of governance in extending the coverage of social protection (including contributory and non-contributory programmes), especially in low- and middle-income countries.

Coordination is defined as “the harmonious functioning of parts for effective results”. The module will focus on the real-world challenges of coordination as a movement of constant adjustment between interacting parts in all social protection policy contexts. All training modules take ILO Conventions and Recommendation 202 as their cornerstone and it is obvious that certain policy choices and institutional contexts are more conducive to overcoming coordination challenges than others. Even if the module highlights the importance of coordination, it must be noted that **coordination by itself is not enough**. Only good policies and strong institutions can ensure social protection rights. However, without coordination, even policies that are good on paper — especially when they involve complex implementation structures and mechanisms — can result in coverage gaps, waste or delays.

This module is mostly practical and focuses on which tools, mechanisms and structures can be put in place in order to improve policy coordination, both between social protection policies and between them and other social interventions. Hence, it does not assess the appropriateness of a given social protection policy but rather (assuming that the policy is in place) examines whether it should be coordinated with other social policies and how to do so most effectively.

From case studies to checklists. The module provides practical examples stemming from case studies, as well as a checklist with guiding questions that can help decision-makers and practitioners in the field of social protection, the staff of ministries and government institutions in charge of social protection policy and delivery, to determine the following:

- ▶ **Rationale.** Why is coordination needed? What obstacles does it help to overcome and what bottlenecks does it eliminate?
- ▶ **Feasibility.** Is it possible given the resources (human, financial, institutional, political) that are available?
- ▶ **Added value.** From a cost-benefit perspective, what additional value does coordination bring?
- ▶ **Actors and stakeholders.** Which stakeholders should participate and why and at what levels should they do so?
- ▶ **Ways of working.** How can coordination among different stakeholders be promoted and facilitated?

A realistic approach to coordination. This module does not assume that aiming for complex coordination is always better. As will be clear from the next section, coordination has costs that are sometimes ignored when countries are being encouraged to put mechanisms or tools in place, without a clear assessment of what is expected to be achieved or whether the bureaucratic system is robust and flexible enough to introduce new ways of working across ministries or agencies. Countries that have very weak local government structures, lacking integrated IT systems and social workers at local levels, may prefer to focus on simple interventions that require little or no coordination, at least initially. Thus, one

key message of this module is that aiming for more coordination is not always optimal. In some countries, less may well be more. In other countries in which the rationale is clear and the context allows it, the checklists provided in this module may help decision-makers to determine what type of coordination is required in their context and what can be done given their capacity constraints.

Avoid one-size-fits-all solutions. This module will avoid prescriptive solutions to coordination, which may have harmed the reform efforts of some countries in the past. Several case studies showcase the risks of establishing coordination committees without a clear mandate of what coordination should look like in practice. Hence, the module warns against encouraging countries to embrace specific institutional solutions, since they may not be ideal. Rather, coordination solutions should fit the local context and correspond to specific and well-defined goals and strategies.

Finally, this module integrates with the other two social protection governance modules, covering the Management Information System (MIS) and the compliance and enforcement of legal frameworks. The MIS is the backbone and a key enabler of most effective coordination efforts since it provides the architecture for sharing and integrating information from different agencies and ministries, supporting the whole social protection delivery chain, from registration to benefit delivery and from feedback to high-level design (through monitoring and evaluation systems). In order to avoid repetition, this module does not explore the technical details of MIS but instead concentrates on the operational decisions related to how different stakeholders may record and share information through IT systems. Similarly, many compliance mechanisms require coordination with third parties, such as the tax authority, the statistics office or the civil registry. To avoid overlaps and repetition, this module does not focus on coordination for compliance but focuses only on the coordination of benefits and services to ensure the fulfilment of social protection rights.



► 2. Coordination: Concepts, taxonomy and social protection

2.1 Coordination taxonomy and the limits of coordination

All government work, not just social protection, is increasingly interconnected. Some examples of spaces requiring coordination across multiple stakeholders include public-private partnerships, working across different levels of government, engaging with other agencies or ministries and outsourcing. Alford and O'Flynn (2012, p. 3) argue that very rarely "does a public sector agency

have control over the whole process of producing public services for which it is responsible". Frederickson (2013) and Kettl (2002) claim that the practice of governing has become increasingly messy and even disarticulated, with blurred boundaries and increasingly interconnected and interwoven relationships. Therefore, the push towards working across silos and with other stakeholders is not a social protection issue but a broader government trend and even an organizational trend, since the same forces apply in the private sector, with an emphasis on project-oriented cross-department work.¹

► **Table 2 – 1** Types of intersectoral coordination (from less to more intensive)

Collaboration	Description	Consolidation	Integration
Standard skills	Contractual agreements for transferring resources	Multi-agency plans and budgets	Formal agreements between agencies
Shared application procedures	Contractual agreement with a management agency	Inter-agency service teams	Shared targets and objectives
Shared case management	Pooled resources	Inter-agency planning / Division of labour	Legislation to regulated shared services by different agencies
Centralized functional management		Shared human and capital resources	Merge certain management systems
			Governance arrangements
			Shared training, funding and resources

There are several classifications or taxonomies that describe different types of coordination. For instance, with reference to social policies targeted at children and families, Winkworth and White (2011) define three types of collaboration: networking, coordination and integration. These three levels depend upon the complexity and intensity of the collaboration. Horwath and Morrison (2007) define five types of collaboration: communication, cooperation, coordination, coalition and integration. In a similar vein, Sandfort and Brinton (2008) argue that there is a continuum from cooperation

to integration of services, with coordination and collaboration in between. Corbett and Noyes (2008), also in relation to social and family policies, define six types of relationship: communication, cooperation, coordination, collaboration, convergence and consolidation. They argue that the last two types — convergence and consolidation — aim at transforming and modifying behaviour. Only complex and integrated interventions can overcome complex problems, according to the authors. Finally, Cunill-Grau (2014) merges different classifications into four types, as shown in **Table 2 – 1**.

¹ Ruben Schabroeck et al., "Making Collaboration across Functions a Reality", McKinsey Quarterly, March 2016.

Coordination is costly, so more is not always better. Cunill-Grau (2014) argues that if one sector or unit completely or almost completely manages a policy, it may be better to avoid integrated management. Lundin (2007) compares two policies — one complex and one simpler — and finds that “the implementation of one of the policies — the complex policy — is enhanced if cooperation between agencies increase. On the other hand, cooperation does not improve implementation of the less complex task”. O’Flynn (2009) goes further, warning against the so-called “cult of collaboration” in public policy: “we run the risk of creating yet another fad word in government circles: a cult of collaboration where everyone believes but few practice”. O’Flynn also recalls that, already in 1975, Schermerhorn had noted that inter-agency cooperation was developing as a panacea for the “coordination gap” in social services, the product of duplication, overlap and fragmentation in an increasingly turbulent and complex environment (Schermerhorn 1975). Collaboration, she concludes, is just one way in which organizations may work together and “others are important and, most likely they better reflect practice in the public policy world where cooperation is often purchased or demanded, where turf is guarded, and where resources and rewards largely remain tied to autonomous organisations”.

2.2 Coordination, social protection and Recommendation No. 202

Policy coherence and coordination is often critical for social protection systems. In recent decades, the portfolio of social protection policies has become increasingly complex, adding new programmes that aim not only at improving income security but also at changing behaviour. Historically, most countries developed traditional contributory social insurance systems, whose mechanisms were more or less known: old-age pensions, sickness, maternity, work-injury and so on. They followed a life-cycle approach without obvious overlaps. In recent decades, many countries have added new programmes that seek to reach those who lack protection through the contributory system: non-contributory old-age pensions, conditional cash transfers, child

benefits, public works programmes, food-related interventions, social work and so on. Cecchini and Martínez (2012, p.120) state:

Conceptually, the comprehensiveness of social protection systems can be considered from two standpoints: that of policies, plans and programmes (supply) and that of individuals, families and communities (demand). As regards the supply of policies and programmes, there are two axes of integration that should be given special consideration during the design, implementation and operation of social protection systems: horizontal (or sectoral) integration and vertical integration (according to the administrative levels at which policies and programmes are implemented).”

Following that image, governments are increasingly aware of the unmet demand for social protection and have recently responded by providing more supply (for example new programmes, many of them targeting specific groups). The downside is that there are new risks of overlaps and waste, while there is still no perfect solution for the problem of low and uneven coverage, particularly for middle-income earners and/or those in precarious work.

The Social Protection Floors Recommendation, 2012 (No. 202) provides the appropriate guidance to avoid these overlaps and the inefficient use of resources in policy design. Recommendation No. 202 provides guidance to Member States for building comprehensive social security systems and extending social security coverage by prioritizing the establishment of national floors of social protection that are accessible to everyone across the life-cycle — not just those in formal employment or, conversely, the poorest of the poor. Recommendation No. 202 complements existing ILO Conventions and Recommendations and aims to ensure that all members of society

enjoy at least a basic level of income and health security in childhood, working age and old age. Paragraph 3(l)–(m) of Recommendation No. 202 establishes the following principles: coherence with social, economic and employment policies; and coherence across institutions responsible for delivery of social protection. That is, policy coherence conducive to the objective of universal social protection is achieved through both internal coordination, within the various mechanisms that make up the social protection system, as well as through the external coordination of social protection with other major public policies. Recommendation No. 202 clearly affirms the pivotal role of social protection “as an important tool to prevent and reduce poverty, inequality, social exclusion and social insecurity, to promote equal opportunity and gender and racial equality, and to support the transition from informal to formal employment”.

Conversely, policy design must factor in the existing capacity for coordination and administration. As previously argued, coordination is costly and it is challenging to move from a traditional and weak administrative structure to a modern, IT-based and flexible bureaucracy. Therefore, countries may prefer to avoid the design of very complex systems that have many integrated policies or require complex beneficiary selection mechanism (such as poverty targeting) unless they have a robust administrative system in place. Over-complex policy designs may lead to misdirected

complaints about “weak coordination” rather than directly challenging whether the policy mix was appropriate for the administrative capacity in place.

This module does not address how to design policy specifically to avoid fragmentation or coordination issues. The starting point of the module is instead to ask whether, given a certain situation with programmes in place, coordination should be promoted and if so, how it can be improved. Certain policy mixes are easier to coordinate than others. For instance, a social protection system with a contributory and a non-contributory old-age pension will require relatively minor alignment of qualifying conditions and benefit levels under each system to ensure that there are no disincentives to contributing (for example if both pensions provide similar benefit levels, workers may normally prefer not to participate in the contributory pension system). On the other hand, a system with a public works programme and a cash transfer programme that target the same groups will necessarily be very difficult to coordinate without leading to overlaps.² Finally, setting up a narrowly targeted conditional cash transfer programme (CCT) in a country with limited administrative capacity would probably fail since it would likely lead to major targeting errors, while monitoring conditions in health and education requires a significant administrative capacity (see discussion of Brazil’s Bolsa Familia and its integration with education, health and social assistance services in Ch. 4 below).

Box 2 – 1 China: Moving towards a more comprehensive social protection system

A new draft Social Assistance Law puts a renewed emphasis on defining groups of beneficiaries and a packaged and multi-layered system. Whereas the Interim Measures defined minimum income guarantee beneficiaries as (almost) the only beneficiary group, the existing draft discards the role of the Minimum Income Guarantee Programme (Di Bao) as a gatekeeper by creating a different and higher low-income line. Families with income between the Di Bao and the new low-income line will be entitled to some benefits, most notably education, health and housing benefits.

On the one hand, this reform goes in the right direction, since it will increase coverage and lead to a more flexible system, as not all programmes will be centred around the same target group. On the other hand, the reform increases the complexity of the system by adding a new layer of beneficiaries – the low-income group –. Additionally, the administrative system already has some challenges in coordinating the education benefit with the Di Bao.

Source: UNICEF, “Five Challenges to Realize the Potential of the Social Assistance Law: Putting Children in the Centre”, 2020 (unpublished).

² In fact, the case studies on Malawi provided in this module below include precisely these two programmes. In theory, the public works programme targets the ultra-poor families that are able to work, while the cash transfer programme targets ultra-poor households without working capacity. However, in practice it is not easy to differentiate between them.

2.3 Coordination at three levels

The case studies and checklist presented in this module are divided into three different levels. This module adapts the framework presented in

the background papers for the Global Research on Social Protection project³ and other relevant frameworks (for example the United Nations Development Group and TRANSFORM).

► **Table 2 – 2 Coordination at three levels of public administration**

Level	Description
High-level: policy coordination	Internal rationale of the social protection system. Overall fit and alignment between social protection system and other socio-economic policies.
Mid-level: operational coordination (programme, organizational, plans, budget, IT)	Tools used by the administrative system to coordinate different programmes. Mid-level institutions or bodies established to monitor coordination on a regular basis. Normally these bodies or committees do not deal with high-level definitions but rather with practical ways of implementing coordination, such as improving coordination procedures, setting common standards across provinces or regions and so on.
Street-level: service-delivery coordination	Linkages at street-level with other programmes or services. The focus is at the point of delivery: how civil servants or local officials coordinate different programmes or services. Coordination between units or service-delivery points.

Coordination will depend upon three fundamental areas:

- **Institutions and structures.** A lot of emphasis has been placed — including through the advice of development partners — on setting up coordination committees or bodies, but these structures are not the only or even necessarily the most powerful mechanisms for improving coordination. These institutions often face resistance stemming from the general “rules of the game” — centralism; political and economic interests, the predominance of market logic in the organization and management of the public sector (including competition); a sectoral approach to budgetary matters and assessments; and vertical intergovernmental relations — that constrain cross-sectoral action.
- **Tools.** These include incentives, IT systems, budgets, plans, indicators and other resources or levers that could be used to enhance coordination. There are also different forms of cultural resistance, particularly in the case of information management, manifested in different agencies’ refusal to exchange information or use shared databases. More political forms of resistance arise from power imbalances among the different sectors and levels of government and from political affinities and ties among political parties.
- **Norms.** Some environments enjoy a more collaborative culture than others. For instance, the Brazilian case study shows how having civil servants with a common background – such as shared educational or professional paths, shared views about the role of social protection and so on – coordinating BF (the CCT) in most states enabled more effective coordination.⁴ Changing the prevailing culture is more difficult than leveraging tools or institutions, but nonetheless it may be beneficial to identify and leverage potential informal coordination channels given that they may be more effective than formal ones.

³ The background papers include a global overview and case studies on Kenya, Argentina and small island States (Mauritius and Fiji).

⁴ Some authors argue that the interpretation of conditionalities in BF was driven by mid-level civil servants who shared the view that they should not be used as a hurdle, but rather as an indicator of vulnerability and public service supply.

The next three sections provide country case studies and lessons learned about experiments to improve coordination at those three levels, recognizing that they are intricately interlinked. The module includes information on Brazil, Chile and Malawi at different levels, so that it is easier to understand how efforts flow from high-level coordination design all the way to street-level coordination at the point of service delivery.

Finally, coordination takes time and it may be necessary for some processes to fail so that better initiatives can emerge (through trial and error or an incremental approach). Several cases are discussed in which early coordination initiatives failed and were replaced by different institutions or solutions that worked much better. Hence, some case studies that show failed initiatives may still lead to learning and become successful in the near future.

Box 2 – 2 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) related to the coordination module

A number of SDGs are relevant to improving coordination in social protection, including:

- ▶ ending poverty – SDG 1
- ▶ ensuring healthy lives and well-being – SDG 3
- ▶ achieving gender equality – SDG 5
- ▶ promoting decent work and economic growth – SDG 8
- ▶ reducing inequality – SDG 10
- ▶ building effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels – SDG 16
- ▶ revitalizing the Global Partnership for Sustainable Development – SDG 17



▶ 3. High-level: policy coordination

High-level coordination refers to definitions, policies, tools and structures that determine how the social protection system should work and the way its different components should fit together. Using Cunill-Grau's taxonomy, it is at this stage that policy makers should determine whether collaboration, convergence, consolidation or integration will be pursued. As already argued, these different levels of coordination are contingent not only on the programmes in place but also on administrative capacity.

One of the most common challenges lies in ensuring coordination between the social protection system and the overall socio-economic strategy (national development plan or similar) of a particular country. In the General Survey concerning the Social Protection Floors Recommendation, 2012 (No. 202), this type of strategic (external) coordination was defined as "Coordination from the policy formulation phase to ensure coherence with social, economic and employment policies".⁵ The social protection system or "sector" operates within the broader economic and fiscal context, but direct coordination is often required with specific policy areas, such as employment and tax policy, for example regarding formalization and contribution and collection; education, health and nutrition policies; water and sanitation; housing; legal aid; financial services; and so on. The policies that are closely implicated with social protection are often referred to as "complementary" policies or interventions.⁶

The next layer involves the internal rationale and coordination of the social protection system as a whole. It is not always obvious how the different pieces — sometimes developed to address particular or even ad hoc needs or risks — fit together. Therefore, it is a challenge to ensure that all programmes fit together following a certain logic or at least do not undermine each other. This module puts the emphasis on this layer.

The following case studies will explore the experiences of Indonesia, Malawi, and Chile in trying to improve high-level coordination. The three countries established new coordinating

institutions but of a different nature. After sharing some lessons learned, the section concludes by providing a checklist for high-level coordination, starting with the basic question of why coordination is actually needed.

3.1 Indonesia: TPN2K – A think tank to promote coordination

The Indonesian social protection system had developed in the 2000s linked to energy subsidy reforms. In 2005, the Government planned a major fuel price increase and at the same time designed an unconditional cash transfer running from October 2005 to December 2006, which benefited 19.1 million households (BLT programme). The BLT programme was reimplemented in 2008 for seven months. In addition, a cash assistance programme for poor students was also introduced in 2008, which provided between 360,000 and 1,000,000 Indonesian rupiah (Rp)⁷ per student per year to more than 3 million students enrolled in elementary and secondary school. A little earlier, a CCT was implemented in some districts that targeted 350,000 households. The benefit level could reach Rp2,800,000 (about US\$200) per household per year and the average benefit was Rp1,400,000. Finally, a rice subsidy programme (known as Raskin) was implemented from the late 1990s.

In this context of dynamic but sparse social assistance programmes, the Indonesian National Team for the Acceleration of Poverty Reduction (TNP2K) was designed in 2010 as a think tank with two objectives:

- ▶ develop policy options to **improve the coherence of poverty alleviation and social protection policies; and**
- ▶ **coordinate and oversee the implementation of various poverty reduction and social protection programmes** and apply more advanced techniques for improving their targeting.

⁵ ILC.108/III/B, Ch. 11, section 11.3.

⁶ McClanahan et al. (2020).

⁷ Between US\$36 and US\$100.



▶ TNP2K montly evaluation meeting, East Manggarai District, 2018

Contrary to other experiences, the TNP2K was not designed as a “coordination body” devoid of content but rather the opposite: a substantive institution that would use evidence and knowledge to improve coordination and coherence. The TNP2K was established by Presidential Regulation Number 15 of 2010. The Minister of Welfare was appointed as First Deputy and the Minister of Finance was Second Deputy. This was not the first attempt to create an institution in charge of coordinating poverty-related interventions. In 2001, a special committee to coordinate poverty alleviation had been established led by the Minister for People’s Welfare. In addition, the Coordinating Team for Poverty Alleviation had also been established. However, these two institutions had not succeeded in shaping policy or improving coordination.

Also, three policy working groups were set up, one for each cluster of the poverty reduction acceleration strategy:

- ▶ Cluster 1: Social assistance programmes
- ▶ Cluster 2: Community-based programmes, under the umbrella of the national programme for community empowerment
- ▶ Cluster 3: Programmes for micro, small and medium-sized enterprises

In parallel, the TNP2K secretariat was established to provide technical support. The Executive Secretary is the Deputy Vice-President for Welfare and Poverty, who manages the TNP2K secretariat on behalf of, and reporting to, the Vice-President. The secretariat’s objectives are the following:

- ▶ **coordinate with government and non-government organizations**, including the


private sector and state-owned companies (BUMN) on their poverty reduction support;

- ▶ **coordinate with the provincial and district poverty teams and promote the work of TNP2K at the regional level;**
- ▶ maintain the database of poverty reduction programmes supported by the Government (including by sector ministries);
- ▶ maintain the database of poverty reduction programmes supported by non-governmental organizations;
- ▶ maintain complaint handling mechanisms;
- ▶ provide technical support and administration to the national team; and
- ▶ undertake strategic communications and external relations for poverty reduction programmes.


The basic structure of the TNP2K and its secretariat is depicted in **Figure 3 – 1**.

► Figure 3 – 1 Organizational structure of the TNP2K and its secretariat

Structure of TNP2K Post 2011



Structure of TNP2K's Secretariat Post 2011



Source: Ikhsan Modjo (2017).

Again, it is clear from this list that the TNP2K combines a coordination role with an information- and knowledge-producing role.

In addition to setting up working groups linked to the three clusters (plus a stand-alone working group on health care assistance), the TNP2K secretariat created two special technical units: the Targeting of Poverty Reduction Programmes Working Group and the Monitoring and Evaluation Working Group for setting up performance measurement systems. The theory of change was that first, the TNP2K would establish a social registry which would be used by all household-based social assistance programmes; and then consolidation of programmes would follow.


In practice, however, the TNP2K focused on four key issues:

▶ **Targeting.** The use of the Unified Database of Beneficiaries (UDB) was supposed to improve how social protection programmes reached the most vulnerable households. About 26 million households were interviewed in July–October 2011, allowing the TNP2K to rank more than 93 million people. The objective was to screen the bottom 40 per cent of the population of Indonesia. In parallel, the TNP2K’s UDB team developed an MIS and worked with ministries and agencies to convince them to use the database, especially for Jamkesmas


(the health care assistance system) and Raskin (the subsidized rice scheme). The UDB team also developed protocols and procedures for data-sharing agreements, data maintenance or security.

- ▶ **Delivery and implementation.** The TNP2K introduced a social protection card (KPS). The hope was that the KPS would help to better integrate major social protection programmes and improve programme delivery. Similarly, the TNP2K worked to reform Raskin so that it was replaced by vouchers that could be used to buy eggs and other products.
- ▶ **A new fuel subsidy reform.** the TNP2K had to turn its attention to a new priority. The Government of Indonesia had decided to reduce the fuel subsidies and the new think tank was put in charge of the design of the future programme that would compensate the poorest households. In this context, TNP2K ended up being the coordinator of the new programme, known as P4S, and had to provide technical support to all ministries and local governments on any topic related to that programme, from communications to complaints mechanisms. In fact, TNP2K was increasingly filling the resource and knowledge gaps of other line ministries.

▶ **Figure 3 – 2 Targeting the effectiveness of the cash assistance programme for poor students, 2017**



► **Figure 3 – 3 Proposed reforms of the national social protection system, 2020–2024**



Source: Rahayu et al. (2018).

► **Support for local government capacity.** The TNP2K also had to take on a coordinating role with local governments. The objective of establishing that link was to build awareness and ensure proper implementation of the changes in social assistance programmes, including the use of the UDB and KPS. For that purpose, an advocacy unit was put in place and mandated to build capacity at the local level and support reforms at the provincial and district levels.

In retrospect, the TNP2K had more success in generating knowledge and improving the delivery and design of existing social protection programmes than in working for coordination or improving targeting. Figure 3 – 2 shows the huge level of exclusion and inclusion errors estimated by TNP2K for the cash assistance for poor students’ programme. In addition, the UDB remains a pure targeting system and has failed, for the time being, to record data on programme

delivery. That is, there is no central record on which programmes reach which households. This is not uncommon: several countries with central registries used for targeting have not managed to centralize information on programmes and their beneficiaries. Systems as consolidated as SISBEN (Colombia) lack that type of information, so that each individual programme uses SISBEN for selecting beneficiaries but there is no procedure in place to consolidate data on all programmes and their beneficiaries. Recently, however, the TNP2K seems to be moving towards a “coordination” agenda. Rahayu et al. (2018) envision a more comprehensive type of social protection system based on a life-cycle approach that aims to cover some gaps (the “missing middle”). However, we will need to wait and see to assess whether TNP2K’s vision is actually operationalized at mid-level.

The main lessons from the TNP2K experience are summarized in **Box 3 – 1**

Box 3 – 1 TNP2K — Lessons learned

- 1. This was not the first effort to reform policy coordination in Indonesia.** Yet, one lesson learned after trying to achieve reform through those institutions was that any policy coordinating institution had to be established at a very high level. Hence, previous institutional failures in promoting coordination can shape future attempts: change takes time.
- 2. TNP2K was placed within the Office of the Vice-President.** In addition, the first Vice-President in charge of the think tank was perceived as a dynamic technocrat, eager to advance reforms. The combination of the political power instilled by the Vice-President and the fact of being outside a particular ministry enhanced the TNP2K's convening power and ability to coordinate.
- 3. TNP2K was designed as an ad hoc, out-of-box and flexible institution to work around some of the constraints on public administration in Indonesia.** By taking this approach, the TNP2K was flexible enough to move from one priority to another in a short period of time and was able to hire very qualified staff. The rationale of the TNP2K was to produce high-level evidence in order to advance reforms that would also contribute to reducing fragmentation and improving coordination between stakeholders. However, the TNP2K has only addressed coordination reforms over the last four or five years. From 2010–2017, it worked mostly on the four areas mentioned above: targeting, programme improvement, the fuel subsidy reform and capacity-building at the local level.
- 4. Evidence is not enough.** The TNP2K realized that producing high-quality evidence would fail, because ministries and agencies cannot be compelled to implement reform even if it has been agreed. There is a process of translating high-level policy reforms into actions and operations that is very resource-intensive. That is, the TNP2K somehow engaged with the mid-level policy development and coordination.
- 5. Services in return for coordination.** Any country that plans to reduce fragmentation and consolidate programmes must acknowledge that such reform will have an adverse effect on some ministries or agencies since they will lose budget control and possibly also human resources. One of the advantages of the TNP2K was that it not only requested and worked for coordination but also provided knowledge services to ministries, thereby enhancing its convening role. According to some stakeholders, the efforts around the development of the UDB and subsequent changes improved the coordination between TNP2K and key implementing ministries, allowing it at a later stage to achieve coordination arrangements with these stakeholders. The recent social protection strategy (Rahayu et al. 2018) will test to what extent the previous phase helped the TNP2K.

3.2 Malawi: Institutional structure with a vague mandate

The Government of Malawi established a new National Social Support Policy (NSSP) in 2012. The Malawi National Social Support Programme (MNSSP) was created to operationalize the NSSP by providing a framework for designing, implementing, coordinating, monitoring and evaluating prioritized support programmes under the policy. The main social protection programmes under the NSSP were the Social Cash Transfer Programme (SCTP), the labour-intensive Public Works Programme (PWP), the targeted School Meals Programme (SMP), the

Village Savings and Loans Programme (VSL) and the Microfinance Programme (MF). The MNSSP gave rise to an institutional network in charge of ensuring strategic and technical guidance.

The **National Social Support Steering Committee (NSSSC)** is responsible for the overall management of the NSSP agenda, including its design, implementation and oversight. It must also ensure the adequate level of resources and the coherence of social protection interventions. The NSSSC includes Principal Secretaries from 15-line ministries, representatives from three main donors and the Executive Director of the Council for Non-Governmental Organizations in Malawi (CONGOMA). The NSSSC is chaired by the Chief Secretary to the Government and is required to meet twice a year.


The National Social Support Technical Committee is responsible for providing technical direction and recommendations on programme implementation. It includes directors of 15 ministries, 3 agencies, CONGOMA, and 13 NGOs or international organizations. The institutional coordination structure for social protection in Malawi is depicted in **Figure 3 – 4**.

The Poverty Reduction and Social Protection Division (PRSP), Economic Planning and Development Department of the Ministry of Finance, Economic Planning and Development, is responsible for coordination of the MNSSP. It also acts as the secretariat of the NSSSC. It has eight staff members: one director, two deputy directors; and five economists, each acting as a desk officer for one of the five MNSSP programmes.

In addition to these two groups and the secretariat, five technical working groups were formed, one for each social protection programme: the SCTP, the PWP, the SMP, the VSL and the MF. Finally, three task forces were established: the MNSSP II Task Force to lead the review of the original MNSSP and support the development of the revised MNSSP II; the Graduation Task

Force, with the participation of donors, the Government and development partners; and the Unified Beneficiary Registry (UBR) Task Force. In spite of this complex institutional set-up, some gaps were obvious. It can be argued that certain weaknesses were caused by design rather than coordination. For instance, the PWP reached only a fraction of ultra-poor households with labour capacity and the SCTP was implemented in select districts only. Yet, there were also important gaps in terms of coordination. In theory, the PWP targeted ultra-poor households with labour capacity, whereas the SCTP provided benefits to ultra-poor households without labour capacity. However, in reality the lines on the ground were blurred, which led to significant implementation challenges and social unrest. A review of the MNSSP (Malawi 2016) found no clear relationships between those two programmes or between each of them and the promotion of education.

► **Figure 3 – 4 Social protection institutional coordination structure in Malawi**



Box 3 – 2 Review of the MNSSP

- ▶ The **Ministry of Finance has limited capacity** to keep all stakeholders accountable and enforce cross-ministerial coordination.
- ▶ **Few concrete policy-level linkages** are found in the MNSSP, despite the NSSP and the MNSSP stressing the importance of cross-programme coordination and linkages and the existence of numerous contacts and overlapping objectives between programmes.
- ▶ **Inadequate conceptualization of intra-MNSSP linkages** in the MNSSP document, as well as limited efforts and resources dedicated to the operationalization of potential linkages, have resulted in few deliberate policy level linkages within the MNSSP system.
- ▶ **The relationship between the SCTP and the SMP has not been conceptualized.** Both programmes aim to increase school enrolment and retention and to improve child nutrition, but they have been designed and implemented in isolation with no explicit analysis of potential synergies. Another example of a policy-level relationship that has not been adequately conceptualized and operationalized is the relationship between the SCT and PWP.
- ▶ The strong resistance by community leaders towards “double dipping” limits the opportunities for complementarities and multidimensionality in the social protection response.
- ▶ The MNSSP consists of largely donor-funded programmes implemented with generally low but varying degrees of utilization of Government systems. The limited utilization of government systems raises concerns over programme ownership and sustainability. Donors contribute to the MNSSP’s fragmentation.
- ▶ **Inadequate resources, infrastructure and staffing levels, especially at district level, were reported across most programmes.** Shortages seem to prevail for all categories of staff, especially at district and community levels. Heavy reliance on community volunteers in many programmes raises concerns about their reliability, sustainability and effectiveness.

Source: Malawi (2016).

Box 3 – 2 summarises the main conclusions related to coordination. The Government acknowledged those weaknesses in the Malawi National Social Support Programme II (MNSSP II), which was approved in 2018. The MNSSP II stated that “the individual programmes [...] worked largely in isolation with their own systems, lines of reporting and accountability mechanisms” and that “individual programmes were primarily accountable to their line ministries and donors, used different targeting approaches, collected different M&E data and adhered to different donor reporting requirements”.

In practice, the MNSSP II introduced two changes. First, it worked to strengthen the PRSP, the secretariat of the NSSSC, by providing more human and financial resources. In addition, the plan sought to “clarify and reinforce the roles, responsibilities and reporting lines with other line ministries involved in delivering social support”. Unfortunately, the plan fell short of defining how that clarification would be done and who would need to define those roles and responsibilities. Second, the MNSSP II aimed to adopt integrated implementation mechanisms and national institutional frameworks, especially harmonized grievance and appeals mechanisms.

Box 3 – 3 Malawi — Lessons learned

- 1. Overly broad representation.** According to some assessments, NSSSC meetings do not work properly and are not convened according to the required schedule. Other stakeholders argue that participation is often delegated to lower-level officials. However, it is more likely that those meetings are not properly organized because the structure involves too many agencies, making the NSSSC an inefficient organization that is unable to advance reforms or coordination in practice. Countries aiming to set up coordination institutions should avoid making them so large that they are inflexible. For instance, the TNP2K includes eight social protection-related agencies — health; public works; education; regional development; social affairs; cooperatives; small and medium-sized enterprises; and the National Development Planning Agency. In addition, there are other service-related agencies, including statistics, technology and finance agencies. As noted above, the NSSSC includes 13 different ministries.
- 2. A “conservative” institutional set-up.** Whereas the TNP2K was designed as an outsider out-of-the-box institution to rethink the social protection system from the outside, the NSSSC, the NSSP and the five technical working groups do the opposite: they seem to be designed to defend the current policy mix and protect the status quo. First, the secretariat designated one economist for each existing social protection programme. Second, the technical working groups are also linked to existing programmes. Third, the line ministries dominate the NSSSC and the NSSP, so that it is unclear how they will advance synergies and change. A critical difference between the Indonesia and Malawi examples is that the technical work in Indonesia is carried out by the TNP2K secretariat, whereas in Malawi it is supposed to happen at the NSSP, a group led by directors of line ministries. It is very difficult to promote reforms through such a committee.
- 3. An under-resourced secretariat.** Whereas the TNP2K has become a key recipient of international donor support, the PRSP secretariat has very limited resources and probably struggled to follow the developments under each social protection programme. This weakness was acknowledged, and the MNSSP II aimed to increase the human and financial resources.
- 4. Coordination without a clear mandate.** The NSSSC does not have a mandate, so that its meetings are not perceived to be relevant. According to the ODI assessment: “Moreover, across the MNSSP actors there is uncertainty about what coordination looks like in practice – at both the policy and the programmatic and operational levels, with the exception of few examples (such as the UBR).” Even if the MNSSP II states that synergies must be found, it is not clear how and what projects or steps will be taken to improve coordination. The mandate seems too vague, except for the grievance and appeals mechanisms. In **Box 3 – 2**, this was mentioned as inadequate conceptualization of what coordination means.

3.3 Chile Crece Contigo (Chile Grows with You): an Intersectoral Programme

In the early 2000s the Government of Chile chose to integrate its social services and social protection benefits. This approach was first used in the design of Chile Solidario, a CCT programme. In March 2006, an Advisory Committee on Child

Policy Reform was established by the President to assess the social protection system for children. The Advisory Committee worked with experts, social networks, think tanks, NGOs, and other stakeholders. In addition, it organized regional and municipal hearings and received inputs from thousands of children through the web.

In October 2006 the new integrated programme, Chile Crece Contigo (Chile Grows with You (ChCC)), was announced. The ChCC programme is defined


as an integrated services network. The underlying rationale is that Early Childhood Development (ECD) is multidimensional and, therefore, the policies aimed at fostering ECD should also be integrated and comprehensive. ChCC was launched in 2007 in 159 municipalities according to their capacities. By 2008, all municipalities were implementing ChCC through local networks, and enshrined into Law 20.379 in 2009, as the Childhood Integrated Protection Subsystem. ChCC first targeted children younger than age 5, but later it was extended to cover up children younger than age 10.

The ChCC programme combined a series of pre-existing services and benefits, and bundled them together, adding some new sub-programmes. Therefore, coordination or integration happened around already existing resources. ChCC is designed as a multi-tiered programme that offers some universal services combined with differentiated benefits and services for more vulnerable children and families (See **Figure 3 – 5**):⁸

- ▶ Universal: information and awareness-raising activities on the importance of caring for children, and stimulation in order to maximize the development potential of children.
- ▶ Children born in the public health system:
 - ▶ Newborn Support Programme (Programa de Apoyo al Recién Nacido (PARN)). It provides in-kind benefits -crib, mobile, mat, breastfeeding pillow, baby carrier, and others-, as well as training materials.⁹
 - ▶ Biopsychosocial Development Support Programme (Programa de Apoyo al Desarrollo Biopsicosocial (PADB)): it is the entry point to the core of ChCC. This component includes regular visits with the aim of providing support around the delivery and after it. A key objective is to assess the vulnerability of the family that may trigger additional benefits and services.

8 A similar idea, but focused on benefits, has been put forward by McClanahan and Gelders in Assessing the potential for multi-tiered child benefits in Viet Nam, 2019.
 9 Source: [Programa de Apoyo al Recién Nacido | Chile Crece Contigo](#).

▶ **Figure 3 – 5 Chile Crece Contigo portfolio of services and benefits**





▶ Chile Crece Contigo, crececontigo.gob.cl

- ▶ Children that belong to the 60 percent most vulnerable population:
 - ▶ Free pre-school education.
 - ▶ Free support for children with disabilities and less than 4 years old.
 - ▶ Family Allowance (Subsidio Único Familiar): a monthly benefit ranging from 13,401 to 2,599 pesos (USD 18.65 to 3.62).¹⁰
- ▶ Children in the 40 percent most vulnerable group:
 - ▶ Preferential access to programmes and services, including mental health, housing, labour-market access, violence prevention, etc.

ChCC is managed by the Social Development Ministry with strong collaboration with the Health and Education Ministries. In addition, the Childhood Ministerial Committee oversees the implementation of ChCC. The Committee is chaired by the Social Development Ministry. The other members are: Health, Education, Labor,

Justice, Housing, Finance, the Woman National Service, and the Presidency. The Ministerial Committee received the technical proposal from the Advisory Committee, modified it, and got it approved, with overwhelming political support.

The sectoral Ministries define the benefits, procedures and service standards, in line with ChCC targets. The implementation mostly relies in ChCC networks at commune level (See Street-level coordination case study for more details). Finally, the Social Development Ministry coordinates ChCC at local level, manages the ChCC budget, evaluates the different components, and develops management tools (See Mid-level and street-level case studies for further details).

From 2007 to 2011, an Executive Secretariat of the ChCC chaired an Intersectoral Technical Committee, which was composed of representatives from the Ministry of Health, Education, Labor, Justice, Housing, as well as other stakeholders including the National network of kindergartens, Integra Foundation (a private provider of pre-school education), the Regional Development Unit, the Ministry of Finance, etc. However, this technical coordination structure was dismantled since it was not efficient.¹¹

¹⁰ Source: [Ley-21283-07-NOV-2020 MINISTERIO DEL TRABAJO Y PREVISIÓN SOCIAL - Ley Chile - Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional \(bcn.cl\)](http://ley-21283-07-nov-2020-ministerio-del-trabajo-y-prevision-social-ley-chile-biblioteca-del-congreso-nacional-bcn.cl)

¹¹ In several countries these inter-ministerial committees were not dynamic enough. Even though the reason is not reported, it is likely that participants may not perceive the added value of meeting with other civil servants without a very clear decision agenda. See Brazil and Malawi for reference.

► **Figure 3 – 6 Pre-School Slots in Chile (2001-2019)**



Source: Estadísticas de la Educación 2001-2019.

The ChCC core, the Biopsychosocial Development Support Programme, is implemented by the Ministry of Health through its primary healthcare centres and hospitals, including maternity units. The decision to implement primarily through the Ministry of Health was based on the pre-existing coverage of the public health system, both in monitoring pregnancies and young children. It was also considered that health services were better equipped to empower families in their parenting role, as well as to find biopsychosocial risks. This contrasts with other case studies, since the coordinating agency -Social Development Ministry- is not the main implementor. Health workers are much more identified with ChCC and its tools than other civil servants: in a 2013 survey, 70 percent of the IT system users were health workers, 23 percent were local officials, and only 7 percent were education civil servants (Bedregal et al. 2013, 36). This is a reminder of how complex it is to ensure balanced participation in integrated or coordinated programmes. Consistent with this leadership by the Ministry of Health (MH), Cunill-Grau et al. (2013) find that the cooperation between the MH and MDS worked better than with the Education Ministry.

This is a brief summary of ChCC impacts:

1. Supply of pre-school education increased sharply in 2009 and grew at a fast pace until 2013, the period of major ChCC investment

growth. From that moment, it has grown a modest pace. From 2001 to 2019, pre-school education supply grew 77 per cent. The gross enrollment rate has increased from 46 to 60.6 percent (See Figure 3 – 7).


2. There was a small reduction in the performance gap between socio-economic groups. In PISA 2018, socio-economically advantaged students outperformed disadvantaged students in reading by 87 score points, slightly below the average difference between those groups (89 score points) across OECD countries. In PISA 2009, the performance gap related to socio-economic status was 92 score points in Chile (and 87 score points on average across OECD countries).¹²
3. A possible consequence was the growth in women's labour force participation rate. From 2010 to 2019 it grew from 54 to 58 percent.¹³
4. The number of visits to pregnant women in psychosocial risk multiplied by 5 from 2007 to 2009 according to the Statistics Department of the Ministry of Health.¹⁴

12 Source: https://www.oecd.org/pisa/publications/PISA2018_CN_CHL.pdf

13 Source: [INE.STAT](#)

14 Source: [VISITAS DOMICILIARIAS INTEGRALES \(minsal.cl\)](#)

► **Figure 3 – 7 Gross Enrolment Rate (%) in Pre-School Education in Chile (1992-2017)**



Source: [Ministerio de Desarrollo Social y Familia, Subsecretaría de Evaluación Social.](#)

Box 3 – 4 briefly discusses the main lessons learnt of Chile Crece Contigo for high-level policy coordination:

Box 3 – 4 Chile Crece Contigo — Lessons learned

- 1. Coordination built upon pre-existing services and benefits.** The development of an integrated, multi-tiered system was not done from scratch, but rather bundling together services that were already in place. The emphasis was put on adding some additional layers and promoting the exchange of information that would trigger additional actions.
- 2. Inter-ministerial groups are not silver bullets.** As it will be clear in in other case studies, the secretariat and the technical working group were dismantled after a few years of implementation.
- 3. Engagement in coordination activities depends upon the importance for the Ministry.** The ChCC shows that it was easier to foster coordination between the Ministry of Social Development and the Ministry of Health than any of them with the Ministry of Education. Incentive for coordination were not the same for each of them.
- 4. Strong emphasis in local coordination.** Contrary to other coordination case studies, the ChCC chose to promote engagement and integration of local services. Whereas in previous examples, the services and benefits package was mostly defined at high level, ChCC preferred to foster local networks and let them assess what services could be offered (see more details below).

3.4 High-level policy coordination checklist

The case studies above offer insights into the conditions under which high-level coordination may be appropriate (or not), as well as the factors that can determine the success or failure of

high-level coordination initiatives. **Table 3 – 1** presents a checklist to be consulted when deciding whether and how to pursue high-level coordination in social protection.

► **Table 3 – 1 Checklist: High-level policy coordination**

Rationale: Why is coordination needed?	
Which specific programmes need better coordination?	Avoid vague calls for improved coordination and specify which programmes need to be linked or coordinated. Otherwise, coordination may be an empty buzzword without a clear direction.
Are there clear overlaps in terms of target populations?	Obviously, there are no problems with overlapping programmes if the central Government and local representatives are aligned. However, we have seen in Malawi two opposite problems when there are potential problems. First, when programmes are designed in isolation without considering the system as a whole, it is easier to create implementation problems. For instance, the SCTP and the PWP target similar populations and the communities in which they operate do not understand their rationale. Second, the central Governments may decide that two different programmes may target the same population in order to obtain multiplying effects. However, if local officials are not aligned, they may decide that programme benefits may need to be distributed in their communities, thereby undermining its design. In this case, the solution may not be to improve coordination in a vacuum but rather to go back to the drawing board and, together with local officials, design better programmes that fit better together.
Are these programmes complex in design, requiring linkages with services or other interventions?	As argued above, the more complex the programme/problem, the higher the need for coordinated interventions: “the benefits of cooperation are likely to more than offset the costs if the task is complex” (Lundin, 2007). The Chile Crece Contigo programme involves a network of services since it aims to address a complex task: early childhood development. The programme includes many different interventions at different stage: from pregnancy to the moment a child turns 9 years old.
Which is more urgent – improving a programme or fine-tuning its linkages with other programmes?	Sometimes coordination is used as a silver bullet when the programme is not being properly implemented or properly designed, as shown above. Before embarking on a coordination process, government agencies and social protection leaders should carefully determine whether coordination is the solution to a particular social protection problem.
Feasibility: Is it possible?	
Is there previous experience in working across Ministries?	Some social protection systems are not robust enough to pursue complex policy objectives that require close coordination between different stakeholders. Social protection agencies should determine whether their capacities are aligned with policy objectives. Some of them will not be equipped to combine complex interventions that connect transfers with other types of interventions, conditions, and so on
Is there experience in providing services to other agencies or ministries? Are there rules of engagement or service contracts?	In a different sphere, social protection stakeholders should determine whether the administrative structure is sophisticated enough to allow for task-oriented and multi-agency work. In some contexts, agencies or ministries can provide services to other agencies under a contract. However, not all countries allow for those clear service-oriented relationships. In Chile, for example, the Ministry of Social Development transfers financial resources to local networks linked to a contract.

Added-value: What would coordination bring?

<p>What are the specific coordination projects?</p>	<p>High-level social protection leaders need to clearly state what specific wins are expected from coordination efforts. Coordination is only successful in the extent to which stakeholders find a clear added value. It is therefore fundamental to “conceptualize” what coordination means in practice: coordination must have clear outputs.</p> <p>What we have seen in Malawi is that when coordination is not translated into specific projects, it is likely to absorb resources without achieving any success.</p>
---	---

Whom: Which stakeholders should participate?

<p>How many agencies are going to be involved?</p>	<p>There may be a trade-off between inclusiveness and effectiveness. Coordination teams with too many stakeholders may become unmanageable.</p>
<p>Is the technical team responsible for cooperation an insider or an outsider?</p>	<p>A key contrast between the case studies was in the nature of the technical teams. Whereas in Malawi the technical team was composed of insiders (directors of line ministries), in Indonesia it was conceived as a think tank of external experts. This different nature partially explains the conservatism versus the eagerness to promote change, respectively.</p>

Ways of Working: How can cooperation be promoted?

<p>Is there enough political support to compel stakeholders to cooperate?</p>	<p>Having a supporter in a powerful political position, such as President or Vice-President, can improve the likelihood for the success of coordination reforms/initiatives. These figures stand to gain from taking credit from successful reforms and can exert pressure on line ministries to advance reforms.</p>
<p>What will line ministries get in return for coordination?</p>	<p>Indonesia provides a good example of what coordination may require. Since line ministries may perceive that coordination is a loss for them (less control over human and financial resources), it may help if the coordination team or institution can offer something in return in terms of knowledge, services, and so on.</p> <p>In that sense, shaping the TNP2K as a think tank instead of a coordination unit helped establish its legitimacy and improved its effectiveness.</p>
<p>How flexible is the coordination body or committee?</p>	<p>On the one hand, when the coordination team or body is composed of civil servants of existing ministries, there is a risk that they will not advance reforms since they may be costly for them. It is easier that they will protect the status quo. In addition, it will be more difficult to engage in new projects that are supplementary to their usual workload.</p> <p>On the other hand, when the coordination team is new and flexible, like the TNP2K, it is more likely to think out of the box, welcome new ideas or projects and take a detached view of the existing system and propose reforms, since it will not need to defend the status quo.</p>



► Programa Chile Crece Contigo, Comunicaciones SSMC, Gobierno de Chile, 2017

¿QUÉ ES CHILE
CRECE CONTIGO?

► 4. Mid-level: operational coordination

In this section, the focus is on mid-level operational coordination between street-level (low-level) service delivery and central government (high-level) planning. In a somewhat similar definition, Pires (2012) focuses on the mid-level bureaucracy: “managers, directors, supervisors and civil servants in general in charge of operationalizing the strategies defined at the top levels of bureaucracy, but also at a distance from the actual implementation of public policies at the ‘Street level’”. Hence, at this middle level we include all the tools and structures used to translate high-level coordination guidelines into concrete steps. These may involve IT solutions (central registries, integration of different databases), joint budgeting, common planning, state or provincial coordination committees, definition of joint procedures, automatic information exchange and so on.

Ambrozio and Andrade (2016) argue that mid-level coordination between civil servants in Brazil was at least as important as presidential support of BF. One of the key challenges for the coordination of social protection programmes is to define the role of mid-level civil servants. In several countries, policies are designed at a central level, with limited inputs from other levels of the administration. In addition, many countries provide the same benefits and services across regions, states or provinces. Mid-level civil servants are therefore left without a clear role in design or implementation, which always

depends upon street-level civil servants. This is what happened in Brazil, where the states were not involved in the BF design and funding was also provided by the federal Government. As the case study shows, in practice it was the mid-level bureaucracy that designed the specific tools that allowed coordination between the Ministry of Education (MEC), the Ministry of Health (MS) and the Ministry of Social Development (MDS), ranging from joint programming and indicators to IT solutions. In addition, BF coordinators at state level played a key role in enhancing implementation procedures: they were placed close enough to street-level implementation and could share their lessons learned with peers in other states.

Another key feature that appears in almost all good practices of social protection coordination involves the development of sound, reliable information systems. The integration — or at least the exchange — of relevant information is also needed to underpin cross-sectoral actions. It is therefore essential for the State to coordinate the work being done at different administrative levels and sectors. This will ensure that social information systems provide the necessary inputs to identify and register target groups and organize the delivery of services and benefits to them in order to increase the effectiveness and scope of the social changes that these systems will bring about (Azevedo et al. 2011).



Box 4 – 1 Argentina — Information exchange between the Ministry of Labour and the Social Security Agency (AFIP)¹⁵

The Federal Administration of Public Resources (AFIP) and the Ministry of Labour initiated a joint project to simplify employers' obligations and reduce the administrative burden related to "work" and "social security", ensuring the quality and consistency of information. The project involves uploading a file each month that makes it possible to fulfil all obligations in a single act and to obtain the following documents in digital form:

- ▶ the paybook required by the Employment Contracts Act at both national and provincial level (this was previously compiled manually and retained by the employer).
- ▶ the certificates of work, services and remuneration that employers were required to hand over to employees at the end of their employment; and
- ▶ the sworn payroll declaration of all payments and contributions to social security, health insurance, occupational risk and life insurance that employers must declare and pay monthly for their employees (this prevents duplicated exchanges of data between different state bodies, simplifying the process through a one-stop shop system, and provides a unique piece of data for all purposes and all state bodies).

The development of this "one-stop shop" for all labour and social security documents through the AFIP website has ensured the effective and efficient administration of information in a centralized form, which is available when needed and in the appropriate form and complete, providing transparency and a single data source for all actors and state bodies involved (public and private).

Source: ISSA, "Digital labour and social security documents - One-stop shop for data (digital payroll): A Case of the Federal Administration of Public Resources, Argentina", 2015.

4.1 Malawi

In Malawi as in many other countries, districts are the middle node of coordination. District councils must coordinate the implementation of social protection policies. The District Commissioner (DC) is the head of the District Council and the focal point for development partners, donors, NGOs and line ministries at the district and subdistrict levels. At the same time, the DC is responsible for reporting back to the national level. There are several groups and committees at district level.

- ▶ The Development and Planning Committee must plan and oversee the implementation of development interventions alongside other service committees under the District Council. The Development and Planning Committee comprises the Chairperson of the Committee, traditional authorities, members

of parliament; interest groups (business, women, farmers, people living with disabilities and religious groups) and the Director of Planning and Development.

- ▶ The District Executive Committee is the principal technical coordination committee chaired by the DC, in which sector heads are represented. There are a range of subcommittees of the District Executive Committee for coordination, all of which report to it. Each subcommittee is chaired by the Director of Planning and Development and comprises sector heads and often NGO and civil society organization representatives.
- ▶ The District Social Support Committee (DSSC) was originally formed in SCTP districts for the implementation and oversight of the SCTP. However, under the new MNSSP II they were embraced as focal points for coordination

¹⁵ This box could also fit under the low-level coordination, since it provides services to clients, but it was decided to put it under mid-level to emphasize the coordination angle between different stakeholders.

between local government agencies, potentially acting as “one-stop shops” for referrals and information on social support and other sectoral programmes.

- ▶ The District Environmental Subcommittee must provide technical advice on the implementation of the PWP.


At least during the implementation of the original MNSSP, it was clear that there was a proliferation of district-level groups or committees, each reporting to its own project or line ministry. In addition, it seems that the district staff have no influence on social protection programmes, so that they are effectively just communication nodes between the actual implementers – at village level – and the designers – at central level. This lack of engagement complicates the monitoring process and ownership, so that focal points for one programme are not interested in other programmes.

DCs do not know which programmes and activities are being carried out in their districts, since there are many ad hoc committees reporting to stand-alone programmes or to line ministries, without going through the DC. At the same time, there is a complex relationship between DCs who report to the Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development and programme-related committees who are linked to other line ministries.

Holmes et al. (2018) found that:

▶ political representatives ... noted that the information which is reported at the full council meeting is largely progress reports. This provides little opportunity to reshape the project in advance or as it is being implemented. Meanwhile, if people question the activities of a particular programme during a full DC meeting, they are informed that these are set centrally and so there is no scope for amendments. This limited scope to discuss the implementation and design of programme is considered to reduce political and district-level ownership and reduce incentives for district level stakeholders to engage with programmes and hold implementers to account."

▶ **Figure 4 – 1 Institutional structures relevant for social protection at the district and subdistrict levels in Malawi**



The DSSC was originally formed in SCTP districts for the implementation and oversight of the SCTP. However, since the donors found them potentially useful, the Government also bought into them, making them “one-stop shops” for social protection policies at district level under

the new plan. According to Holmes et al. (2018), however, local officials were less sanguine about DSSC since they were seen as biased in favour of the SCTP.

The main lessons of Malawi’s experience with mid-level coordination are summarized in **Box 4 – 2**.

Box 4 – 2 Malawi — Lessons learned

- ▶ **Lack of information.** Many social protection programmes are designed at central level, while delivery occurs at street level and in some cases the intermediary nodes may be bypassed. In Malawi, DCs do not know which programmes and activities are being carried out in their districts and there is an unclear matrix relationship between DCs who report to the Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development and programme-related committees who are linked to other line ministries.
- ▶ **Limited ownership leads to lack of interest and knowledge and a lost opportunity for coordination.** Therefore, in order to improve coordination at mid-level, governments need to ensure that all stakeholders are involved in design and implementation. Otherwise, they will just comply with the minimal requirements without engaging in discussions to fine-tune activities or opportunities to exploit synergies.
- ▶ **The risk of donor-promoted coordination bodies.** Since coordination has become a priority for donors, some governments have responded by requesting funding and support for coordination institutions. Some donors advocate their particular institutional solution to improve coordination. Obviously, this creates significant risks of bypassing traditional institutions and may not be sustainable in the long term.

4.2 Brazil: Bolsa Familia and its integration with education, health and social assistance services

Bolsa Familia (BF) is a conditional cash transfer programme that must coordinate with three social services: education, health and social assistance. Under BF, the education system must check children and adolescent school attendance bimonthly. Similarly, in the area of health, children up to 6 years must be measured, weighed and vaccinated, while their mothers must receive prenatal check-ups. Finally, the social assistance system is charged with providing social support

to families that fail to comply with education and health conditions, especially families whose benefits had been cancelled. This is done through social workers and psychologists in social assistance centres at street level (see Chapter 5, section 5.1 for more details).

BF is a centralized programme, with a unique national benefit that is paid directly to beneficiary families, so that states do not participate much in its design or implementation. Municipalities, however, are critical as implementers, both in terms of social registry (Cadastro Unico (CadÚnico)), and the social services linked to the cash benefits. One of the main challenges of the MDS,¹⁶ through the National Department for Citizen Benefit, has been to coordinate across

¹⁶ Subsequently renamed as the Ministry of Citizenship; however, it was known as MDS during the period of review covered in this module.

different levels of government – federal, state and municipalities – as well as with the MS, the MEC and the National Department for Social Assistance (SNAS). **The structures and tools designed by the Government of Brazil offer an interesting example of successful mid-level coordination.** It shows what can be done to operationalize coordination between agencies and middle-level administration. An important element of the Brazilian experience is acknowledging that coordination will not happen without a cost or spontaneously. It will only happen if a stakeholder has the motivation, context, legitimacy and mechanisms to take it forward.

The first mid-level coordination body was the Intersectoral Body for Managing Conditionality, which was active from 2007 to 2011. It was a body composed of mid-level bureaucrats from the MDS, MEC, MS and state and municipality representatives. It was designed to come up with shared views on conditionalities under BF. It did not succeed because the education and health sector felt that the conditionalities were mandates imposed on them from the MDS, which gradually led to a weakening of this coordination body. However, it is likely that some of those debates helped to build a shared vision of how conditionalities should be interpreted and monitored. By 2008, for the first time conditionalities were conceived as indicators of vulnerability, so that non-compliance would put pressure on social services to ensure that beneficiaries would enjoy their rights (Portaria GM/MDS No. 321/2008). Still, some beneficiaries were being excluded when they failed to meet the conditionalities. Finally, this was addressed in a new regulation, which provided that families would only be excluded when the state could not guarantee their access to education, health or social assistance (Portaria GM/MDS No. 251/2012). Other mechanisms were also used to ensure better cooperation with BF than had been provided by the intersectoral body.

Several tools have been used to improve mid-level coordination, as follows.

- ▶ **Multiannual plan.** The 2016–2019 plan includes shared objectives, targets, indicators and activities on education conditionalities, as well as social assistance services. There is integration between those targets and objectives for the BF programme itself, as well as for education and social services. That is, the education sector owns the BF education-related targets and the social assistance services assume the family advisory services

related to BF as their own too. The health sector, however, has not included BF targets and objectives in its sectoral plan.


- ▶ **CadÚnico** is a social registry that identifies and records the socio-economic data of low-income families in Brazil. It was developed in order to support BF but is currently used by many social programmes. CadÚnico is managed at municipal and state level, so that it formally engages and commits to feeding data to the registry, including details on school attendance and the health services provided to BF beneficiaries.
- ▶ **The decentralized management index (IGD)** was designed as an incentive tool to promote engagement at state level with the BF programme. The idea is to provide funding linked to results (pay for performance), so that municipalities and states performing well will receive more funding for BF, health, education or social assistance. Instead of providing funding linked to specific activities, the programme uses a pay-for-performance approach linked to registration under CadÚnico and services provided to BF beneficiaries.
- ▶ **The attendance system** is an education IT system for recording children's and adolescents' attendance. There are more than 55,000 officials at all three levels of government in charge of feeding data to the system and it is compiled every two months, following the agreement between MDS and MEC. There is a state coordinator in charge of mobilizing resources in the municipalities. It must be underlined that the education system was already recording information on attendance before BF, but the programme managed to prioritize the need to target the poorest students and monitor them. According to some stakeholders, coordination between education and BF was relatively easy because there was no conflict or cost for the education sector. Even the information on attendance was already being recorded. It was the emphasis on low-income students that was new.
- ▶ **The health management system** is a web-platform system maintained by local and state officials that was developed in 2005 to record information on health-related conditionalities.
- ▶ **The conditionalities system** integrates information on family support and

conditionalities from three different IT systems: CadÚnico, the attendance system and the health management system. It is used by municipalities to know which families need follow-up, but also MDS can monitor the effectiveness of these services provided by municipalities. Finally, it is used to estimate the IGD and its corresponding payments to states and municipalities.


- ▶ **The State Coordinator** is in charge of the intersectoral coordination and articulation for the monitoring of conditionalities, as well as the promotion of training and technical support to municipal managers in the process of registering low-income families in CadÚnico.

In addition, the case of Brazil shows the importance of mid-level civil servants. According to Ambrozio and Andrade (2016), since the federal Government did not clearly define how coordination would happen at state and local levels, mid-level civil servants were given the responsibility but also the opportunity to experiment by trial and error. Most BF state managers had studied in the same institutions and courses, so that they often knew each other. Thus, informal networks of civil servants helped to define and improve administrative procedures to improve coordination, not based on theoretical ways of working but rather on rules applied on the ground and seen to be successful (see **Figure 4 – 2**).

▶ **Figure 4 – 2 Inter-agency coordination process in Brazil**



► **Figure 4 – 3 Social assistance, health, and education coverage of BF beneficiaries (2005–2016)**



Note: As informações da área de educação e assistência social correspondem ao mês de outubro de cada ano. No caso da saúde, os dados são sempre do segundo semestre de cada ano.

Source: Lício, E. C. (2020).

Figure 4 – 3 shows the evolution of access to services of BF beneficiaries. It shows a significant increase for health, even though it remained flat from 2011 to 2016, as well as a very good performance in education. Unfortunately, social

assistance coverage remains very low, less than 20 per cent. The most recent indicator of health coverage is 77.16 per cent in 2021, with large gaps in big cities like São Paulo or Brasília.



► Registration review at CadÚnico, Brazil, 2020

Box 4 – 3 Brazil: Lessons learned from BF coordination

- ▶ **Coordination is possible.** It shows that even when the programme was designed centrally, with little involvement of state and local governments or other line ministries, coordination can be successful.
- ▶ **Trial and error.** Similarly, to what was observed in Indonesia, BF shows that although some attempts to improve coordination may fail, such failures may lead to better solutions that eventually may work. In Brazil, the Intersectoral Body for Managing Conditionality was the first institutional response to assess how conditionality could be managed in practice, but it eventually disappeared. However, the dialogue may have helped to arrive to a common understanding of conditionalities as indicators of vulnerability, as well as to move towards shared targets and indicators across ministries and the explicit recognition of the state as the ultimate duty bearer for rights holders.
- ▶ **The importance of mid-level bureaucracies.** In the previous section, the role of high-level political support was highlighted. In Brazil, a similar process occurred: every President has embraced and provided their political support, sending a clear signal to the Government. In addition, Brazil shows the importance of mid-level civil servants. Informal networks of civil servants helped to define and improve administrative procedures to improve coordination, not based on theoretical ways of working but rather on rules applied on the ground and seen to be successful.
- ▶ **Including targets in sectoral plans is probably the main mid-level strategy for increasing engagement by the education and health sectors with BF.** In the area of health, the Programa Nacional de Melhoria do Acesso e da Qualidade da Atenção Básica is a results-oriented contract between the federal and state governments. It includes financial incentives linked to health indicators, including one on health and BF. It also requires states to maintain the IT system for health and BF. In addition, the health sector agreed to set a target of 73 per cent coverage of BF families in the Public Action Organizational Contract, the contract mechanism that includes national health targets.
- ▶ **The importance of IT systems as backbones of the social protection policies is a key factor.** CadÚnico, the health management and the attendance system allow the recording and monitoring of whether those targets are being met.
- ▶ **It is easier to integrate robust and consolidated services.** One of the reasons why BF managed to verify and advance education support to children was because the education sector had been working in that direction for a long time. The legacy of a similar programme – known as Bolsa Escola – had left coverage at about 80 per cent. After a few years of BF implementation, it increased to more than 90 per cent. The bottom line is that it is easier to integrate robust and established systems. In contrast, BF showed that new services face greater challenges in starting from scratch. The Integral Family Support Service is responsible for providing social support to families at risk of exclusion, especially those who cannot meet the conditionalities. Even though the social assistance centres (CRASs) have spread widely in the last years to most municipalities, they can only follow about 2,500 to 5,000 families each, leaving a huge gap, especially in very large cities.

4.3 Chile Crece Contigo mid-level coordination

The Chile Crece Contigo programme (ChCC) coordination is operationalized through a series of tools and mechanisms:

Budget transfers through Resources Transfer Agreements. The Ministry of Social Development (MDS) centralizes the financial management of the whole subsystem. It is responsible for transferring resources to implementors -mostly

Ministry of Health and Ministry of Education-, as well as ChCC local networks. **Table 4 – 1** provides an overview of the ChCC investment in the first few years of its existence. In the most recent years, US\$ 68.3 million have been transferred from the MDS to other Ministries (around 45 percent) and local networks (55 percent). Both entities sign a Resources Transfer Agreement that establish bilateral obligations: transfer amount, number of beneficiaries, schedule of transfers, milestones to be met, reporting, and sanctions and penalties (Gobierno de Chile, 2018).

► **Table 4 – 1 Chile Crece Contigo Investment (2007-2010)**

Sector	Programas	Año 2007	Año 2008	Año 2009	Año 2010
Ministerio de Salud	Programas de Apoyo al Desarrollo Biopsicosocial (PADBP)	\$ 1.969.162.000	\$ 6.116.663.000	\$ 14.231.107.000	\$ 14.444.574.000
	Programa de Apoyo al Recién Nacido (PARN)	—	—	\$ 7.741.980.000	\$ 12.366.456.000
	Programa de alimentación complementaria Purita Mamá (PNAC)	—	\$ 4.459.717.899	\$ 8.122.362.001	\$ 8.373.000.000
Ministerio de Planificación	Fondos de Apoyo al Desarrollo Infantil*	\$ 828.000.000	\$ 1.365.541.000	\$ 1.450.205.000	\$ 1.979.458.000
	Fondos de Fortalecimiento Municipal*	\$ 103.500.000	\$ 539.235.000	\$ 572.668.000	\$ 581.258.000
	Material Educativo en Centros de salud	\$ 70.310.000	\$ 625.200.000	\$ 1.498.812.000	\$ 1.636.891.000
Ministerio de Educación	Programa Educativo Masivo	\$ 20.000.000	\$ 195.640.000	\$ 261.462.000	\$ 196.624.000
	Programa de Diagnóstico de Vulnerabilidad preescolar	—	\$ 52.100.000	\$ 74.330.000	\$ 75.455.000
	Educación inicial (JUNJI-INTEGRA)	\$ 64.912.359.000	\$ 113.092.265.000	\$ 125.707.537.000	\$ 174.851.834.000
Inversión total de Chile Crece Contigo		\$ 67.903.331.000	\$ 126.446.361.899	\$ 159.660.473.001	\$ 214.505.550.000

► **Procedures and technical guidelines.**

Since the coordination relies mostly in local networks, mid-level civil servants' role is limited to guide them in connecting services and benefits. For instance, an inter-ministerial team produced a document on "Technical Guidelines for Coordination of between the integrated system ChCC and the National Minors Service". The National Minors Service (SENAME) objectives are the prevention, promotion, protection and restitution of the rights of girls, boys and adolescents whose


rights are violated, as well as protecting the rights of minors who have broken the law. SENAME manages minors' centers. The objective of these Guidelines is to ensure that children living in SENAME centers can access the ChCC programme, as well as to connect the ChCC programme with the SENAME experts in case they suspect the minors may be at risk. The Guidelines include a form to derive a child to SENAME. **Box 4 – 4** shows a list of technical guidelines published by the ChCC national team.

Box 4 – 4 Chile Crece Contigo — Chronology of Technical Guidelines

- 2007** Nola metodológica de la aplicación de la pauta de Evaluación Psicosocial Abreviada (EPSA).
- 2008** Manual de atención personalizada del proceso reproductivo para equipos de salud.
- 2008** Manva! para el apoyo y seguimiento del desarrollo psicosocial de los niños y niñas de 0 a 6 años.
- 2008** Programa de promoción y prevención en salud bucal para niños y niñas preescolares.
- 2009** Nola metodológica para el uso de la Guía de la Gestación.
- 2009** Orientaciones técnicas para la visita domiciliaria integral para el desarrollo psicosocial de la Infancia.
- 2009** Fundamentos para la operación de un Sistema Intersectorial de Protección Social.
- 2009** Manva! del facilitador de talleres de habilidades parentales “Nadie es Perfecto”.
- 2009** Manual! del entrenador de facilitadores grupales “Nadie es Perfecto”.
- 2010** Manva! de lactancia materna, para la aplicación de nuevas normas y conceptos en el desarrollo de las actividades que realizan los servicios de salud.
- 2010** Guía para la promoción del desarrollo Infantil en la gestión local.
- 2010** Nola metodológica complementaria serie “Acompañándole a Descubrir”.
- 2010** Orientaciones técnicas para el apoyo psicosocial en situaciones de emergencias y desastres para familias con niños y niñas de 0 a 5 años.
- 2011** Orientaciones técnicas para la atención psicosocial de los niños y niñas hospitalizados en servicios de neonatología y pediatría.
- 2012** Orientaciones técnicas para las Modalidades de Apoyo al Desarrollo Infantil (MADI).
- 2012** Guía de promoción de paternidad activa y la corresponsabilidad de la crianza para profesionales del sistema Chile Crece Contigo.
- 2013** Programa Nacional de Salud de la Infancia con enfoque Integral.
- 2014** Norma técnica para la supervisión de niños y niñas de 0 a 9 años en la atención primaria de salud.
- 2015** Nota metodológica Programa de Apoyo al Recién Nacido/a.
- 2015** Orientaciones técnicas para la gestión de redes Chile Crece Contigo.
- 2015** Manva! talleres de promoción temprana del desarrollo motor y lenguaje en el primer año de vida.
- 2016** Orientaciones técnicas para la atención en clínicas de lactancia materna.
- 2016** Orientaciones técnicas para la habilitación de espacios públicos Infantiles en su modalidad crianza [HEPH crianza).
- 2017** Manva! operativo de lactancia materna con orientaciones para equipos y usuarios.
- 2017** Orientaciones técnicas del Programa de Apoyo a la Salud Mental Infantil de niños y niñas de 5 a 9 años.
- 2017** Nota técnica para la extensión Chile Crece Contigo.

Source: Gobierno de Chile. (2018).

► **Figure 4 – 4 Chile Crece Contigo structure from high-level to street level**



Source: Gobierno de Chile. (2010).

► **Indicators and Monitoring.** Like in Bolsa Familia, ChCC uses key performance indicators to incentivize compliance with the programme. For instance, it measures the share of children who are visited by psychosocial team or indicator number 9, that measures the average number of visits to families with pregnant women who are at psychosocial risk according to a Quick Psychosocial Assessment (Evaluación psicossocial abreviada, EPSA).¹⁷

In terms of structures, **Figure 4 – 4** shows the main stakeholders at different levels. At regional level, the key stakeholders are the Ministerial

representatives, called SEREMI (Secretarías Regionales Ministeriales), from the Social Development, Health and Education ministries. These focal points must review, assess, and approve any funding proposal coming from local ChCC networks. Therefore, they play a critical role in the allocation of funding. These regional focal points must also provide technical support to the municipal networks, ensuring that they are familiar with the technical guidelines designed at high level, as well as with the IT tools, like the SDRM.

Box 4 – 5 briefly discusses the main lessons learnt of the ChCC programme for mid-level operational coordination:

Box 4 – 5 Chile Crece Contigo — Lessons learned

1. The Resources Transfer Agreements play a double role: coordination and incentives. By separating financial management from the actual implementation, the Government aimed at creating incentives for delivery against funding. It also played a coordination tool, since both Ministries had to agree upon the targets, schedule, reporting, etc.
2. Regional focal points have a clear role. It is unknown to what extent they are adding value, but the structure seems to provide enough clarity.
3. Centrally driven technical guidelines to ensure coordination. A key tool used by Chile Crece Contigo is a series of technical documents that should guide the procedures followed by municipal networks.

¹⁷ Source: catalogo-prestaciones-PADBP_-2019.pdf (crececontigo.gob.cl)

4.4 Mid-level: operational coordination checklist

The case studies above offer insights into the conditions in which mid-level tools and structures can help to operationalize coordination, as well

as the factors that can determine the success or failure of some coordination initiatives. **Table 4 – 2** presents a checklist to consider when deciding whether and how to pursue mid-level coordination in social protection and how to make it operational.

► **Table 4 – 2 Checklist: Mid-level operational coordination**

Coordination structures	
Who are the key stakeholders within each ministry? Who should be involved?	As in the previous section on high-level coordination, the selection of stakeholders is key. In Brazil and Chile, for instance, mid-level coordination was established bilaterally between the MDS and the ministries of education and health. Trying to involve too many players without a real stake in the game can lead to lack of action.
Is there a need for a multi-ministerial forum of civil servants? Would it be time-bound or permanent?	There is a risk of trusting too much in the effectiveness of committees or forums to find synergies and enhance coordination. In practice, they are not always useful or successful. The debate should be influenced by how structured and robust the procedures are. Another element to consider is whether the committee or body needs to be permanent or time-bound. Finally, governments should adopt a “trial-and-error” approach to the coordination of social protection policies in general and the creation of institutions in particular. We have seen that failed experiments may lead to improved solutions.
How will this structure ensure the interest of service-provider ministries?	Several case studies have highlighted one of the main challenges for the social protection sector: how to incentivize and get buy-in from other ministries to engage in defining shared procedures. In some cases, such as education and BF, meeting this challenge was simple since it did not require added workload or costs. In Chile, however, the smoother coordination happened between the Social Development Ministry and the health sector, since the former managed the programme and the budget, and the latter was the main implementor. The involvement of the Ministry of Education was superficial. Hence, it is important to make incentives as clear as possible and determine how they are going to convince reluctant stakeholders to get really involved. Brazil and Chile show that even in successful coordination cases, it is challenging.
What vertical administration levels (state, province, municipality, district and so on) above the front-office need to establish coordination structures?	Several case studies have shown the challenge in involving mid-level administration (states in Brazil or districts in Malawi). They are often left out between centrally designed programmes and delivery points at village or street level. However, in Brazil the social protection system managed to involve them gradually by appointing a state coordinator who was in charge of all the staff recording information on potential beneficiaries and local officials providing services. Mid-level administrators can be critical in designing and improving procedures since they are closer to programme implementation but have a broader perspective than street-level civil servants.
What is the best and lightest institutional set-up for that particular level?	These mid-level structures should be flexible enough to experiment within the constraints set by the higher level and to capture lessons learned that can be shared horizontally and vertically. One of the handicaps of the Malawi case is that districts are mere transmitters of information and data, without any responsibility. In Brazil or Chile, even though states and provinces were not involved in the design of BF and ChCC respectively, they have a clear role as managers of municipalities and centres of knowledge in terms of procedures.

Are there informal networks that can be leveraged in order to enhance coordination between mid-level civil servants?

Governments often rely on formal bodies, but there may be alternative ways to promote coordination and share experiences. In Brazil we have seen that there was an exchange between civil servants at state level due to their similar educational background. This option could be explored in different contexts to work around formal networks.

Tools

What are the specific coordination projects?

As already discussed in the high-level coordination section, establishing a clear understanding of coordination is critical. Otherwise, it remains an elusive and vague buzzword. In Brazil, for instance, it was obvious that the main coordination project was to operationalize conditionalities. Even though the methods of defining and monitoring them were not clear, at least all stakeholders knew what coordination meant and it was therefore easier to translate it into specific projects and procedures.

What are the tools for promoting coordination (for example IT, joint procedures, unique payments and so on)?

We have seen a variety of significant tools in this section:

- ▶ service contracts between ministries
- ▶ common procedures
- ▶ shared targets and indicators
- ▶ interconnection (that is interoperability) between IT systems (for example to enable CCT validation)
- ▶ pay-for-performance contracts
- ▶ shared information systems (for example shared registries) and data-exchange mechanisms
- ▶ common payment platforms



Chile Crece Contigo, crececontigo.gob.cl

► 5. Street-level: service-delivery coordination

Low-level or street-level coordination refers to the structures and tools employed at the point of delivery of benefits and services. Delivery nodes are usually responsible for providing a range of programmes or benefits, not just one programme. In order to capitalize on opportunities and synergies, coordination at that level can make the difference in directing beneficiaries to complementary services and also to avoid duplication and waste. It is important to ensure that at the operational level, local or delivery offices are properly coordinated to ensure equal or consistent benefits and services. In some programmes, benefits may vary by regions or groups, but at least the benefits and services within them should be equivalent.

There are three mechanisms that can promote integrated management at the local level: local government incentives; the creation of opportunities for local coordination efforts; and the increasing tendency to provide family mentoring and support services (which are referred to in different ways in each country).

Finally, decision-makers need to factor in local capacity before pursuing an over-ambitious coordination agenda. Only countries that have enough human and financial resources at street level can aim to provide the sort of social protection services found in Brazil, Chile or developed countries. When local civil servants need to provide services across a wide range of areas, from agriculture to social protection, it is unlikely that much can be done.

Box 5 – 1 Republic of Korea: One-stop service through four social insurance information systems

The case studies shown below focus on service delivery when there is human-to-human interaction, but there are several services that do not require that contact. Integrating those services in order to make them more accessible is also key.

The National Pension Service (NPS) in the Republic of Korea developed a social insurance computer network that connects the databases of the four national social insurance programmes on pensions, health, employment and workers' compensation. In February 2003, the NPS established the Social Insurance Information Centre to allow citizens to access all four social security schemes by visiting (or accessing online) any one of the three administering organizations. By integrating the channels of the four social insurance schemes, citizens no longer need to visit each of the organizations for any service request, whether for registering in one of the four social insurance schemes, making inquiries, changes, requests or submissions or filing claims. Connecting national information resources allowed the simplification and streamlining of various application forms and documents, leading to huge improvements in the efficiency of processes. The initiative is also recognized as ground-breaking service in light of the user-friendly environment it provides for citizens to check their insurance history and status online.

Source: ISSA, "One-Stop Service through Four Social Insurance Information Systems", 2018.

5.1 Brazil: Street-level services: social assistance centres

Brazil established a network of social assistance centres (CRASs) to coordinate interventions in the most vulnerable neighbourhoods in every municipality. The CRASs are the entry points to the social assistance system in Brazil and they aim to improve relationships in the families and the community. By 2019, there were 8,357 CRASs that covered 98.9 per cent of the 5,570 municipalities in Brazil and conduct about 21 million interventions (see **Figure 5 – 1**).

There was a large expansion from 2007 to 2013, when the number of CRASs doubled, from 4,000 to 8,000 offices. Nevertheless, according to the Social Assistance System (SUAS) in Brazil, 1,031 additional CRASs would be needed in order to reach 100 per cent of families in CadÚnico.


CRASs provide single-window services to the most vulnerable families organizing and coordinating different assistance networks and other sectoral services. The main tasks provided by CRASs are:

- ▶ Comprehensive Family Protection and Support Services (PAIF): family social work aimed at protecting and strengthening family relationships, preventing disruptions and promoting their access to rights. They include preventive, protective and proactive actions.
- ▶ Coexistence and bond-strengthening services: this is a life-cycle group service aimed at ensuring spaces to develop relationships of affection and sociability and feelings of belonging and identity.
- ▶ Provide information on social assistance benefits.
- ▶ Register under CadÚnico for all social programmes of the federal Government. CadÚnico not only connects people with BF, it also links with tax-financed pensions, called BPC in Brazil.¹⁸ Even though it is not a contributory programme, it shows how a central registry can provide linkages beyond the usual anti-poverty programmes.¹⁹


18 Source: <https://www.jornalcontabil.com.br/cadunico-8-beneficios-que-voce-tem-direito-ao-se-cadastrar-neste-sistema/>

19 Mauritius is an interesting case, since it has a Single Window for all types of benefits, including social assistance, but all administered by the same Ministry with integrated beneficiary registry across schemes.

▶ **Figure 5 – 1** Number of CRASs and number of municipalities with CRASs (2007–2017)



► **Figure 5 – 2 Share of tasks carried out by CRASs under PAIF**



Source: MDS, *A Vigilância e os serviços de Proteção Social Básica*, 2018.

In order to coordinate interventions at street level, SUAS developed an Integrated Management Procedure. Its objective is to integrate the social assistance services with BF and its key action is that social workers at CRASs should prioritize BF beneficiaries and provide them with social services. In addition, CRASs should focus on monitoring compliance with conditionalities and actively look for potential beneficiaries of social programmes. Unfortunately, the needs exceed the capacities of CRASs, according to its own assessment. In Belo Horizonte, for example, there are 34 CRASs,²⁰ but according to an evaluation carried out in 2011 a total of 75 CRASs would be needed to address all the social assistance needs. Of 196,000 families registered in CadÚnico, only 60,458 lived in areas covered by CRASs in Belo Horizonte in 2014 (31 per cent of the total). According to the protocols, each CRAS should provide services to about 1,000 families. Hence, in Belo Horizonte 34,000 families could be targeted by the network of social assistance centres. Yet there are more than 54,000 extremely poor families in the city, leaving a huge coverage gap. In practice, there seems to be less integration than expected by the integrated protocol, since only 24 per cent of new families under PAIF are BF beneficiaries, showing a certain resistance by CRASs to focus on BF beneficiaries. According to some interviews, the local management of BF was allocated under the Social Policy

Municipal Department, whereas the SUAS social services are under the Social Assistance Municipal Department. This decision may have had an impact, but it seems that in general the coordination of services and BF benefits remains imperfect. According to Tapajós et al. (2010), about 50 per cent of registration for CadÚnico occurs at CRASs, 32 per cent at families' homes and 18 per cent elsewhere. The registration form is filled out by interns, technicians from the programme and teachers from the municipal education network. Community health agents are responsible for 81.8 per cent of the registrations, while employees of outsourced firms account for the rest. Surveys report that 86.9 per cent of municipal education departments develop actions to publicize Bolsa Família and the registration calendar, while in health secretariats this rate is 82.5 per cent. These indicators reveal that high-level policy-makers engage in activities that improve the inclusion of families in the programme. In addition, about 83 per cent of municipalities state that they track BF students who do not meet the minimum frequency and 74 per cent report taking actions in the health sector.

The manager of BF in São Paulo manages a team of 80 employees and 300 BF registrants, all hired through outsourced companies. In an interview, he stated that the one practice to improve coordination and registration of CadÚnico was to involve Eletropaulo (now known as Enel

²⁰ See Brazil, CRAS website, <https://aplicacoes.mds.gov.br/sagi/mops/serv-cras.php?s=1&codigo=310620>

Distribuição São Paulo) so that they could offer registration to CadÚnico to their customers who benefited from the social tariff, since they realized that there were gaps. In exchange, they could use

CadÚnico to find potential beneficiaries of the social tariff. These are specific examples of how cooperation and integration can be successfully implemented at street level.

Box 5 – 2 Lessons learned from BF service-delivery coordination

- 1. CRASs as the backbone of social assistance policies.** Brazil has developed a network of CRASs that allow it to coordinate services and benefits. Since it is estimated that each CRAS can provide services to 1,000 families, the CRAS network can serve more than 8 million families. Therefore, it is not enough to cover the population of BF beneficiaries – 11 million – but it is a significant reach.
- 2. Coordination at street level requires human and financial resources.** The following table describes the human resources structure of the three types of CRASs, depending on where they are located. They have from four to eight staff each, half of whom must be senior staff, while each CRAS should ideally include at least one psychologist. Using this structure, we can estimate that the CRAS network employs about 36,000 people, without taking into account other ad hoc teams. Since there are more than 11 million BF families, each staff member must monitor about 315 families. As stated above, the network is still understaffed, but it offers a glimpse of what level of investment may be needed to provide meaningful services and coordination.

Municípios	Famílias referenciadas	Capacidade de Atendimento Anual	Equipe de referência	Coordenador
Pequeno Porte I	Até 2.500 famílias	500 famílias	02 técnicos com nível superior, sendo um assistente social e outro preferencialmente psicólogo. 02 técnicos com nível médio	As equipes de referência do CRAS devem contar sempre com um coordenador com nível superior, concursado, com experiência em trabalhos comunitários e gestão de programas, projetos, serviços e/ou benefícios socioassistenciais.
Pequeno Porte II	Até 3.500 famílias	700 famílias	03 técnicos com nível superior, sendo dois assistentes sociais e preferencialmente um psicólogo. 03 técnicos com nível médio	
Médio, Grande, Metrópole e DF	A cada 5.000 famílias	1.000 famílias	04 técnicos com nível superior, sendo dois assistentes sociais, um psicólogo e um profissional que compõe o SUAS. 04 técnicos com nível médio	

- 3. Presence in the most isolated and vulnerable areas is needed.** We have seen that the coverage of CRASs still does not reach even 50 per cent of BF families in certain cities and towns. An alternative used in Brazil is the development of flying teams to reach isolated areas. They are normally composed of two senior staff (ideally one psychologist) and two mid-level staff. According to the latest data, there were 1,400 flying teams in 2011–2012. In addition, CRASs own 138 motorboats and 15 sea boats.
- 4. Coordinating benefits and services is still challenging.** Despite the fact that Brazil established the need to integrate them more than 10 years ago, significant gaps and resistance remain. Some CRAS staff seem to reject working on CadÚnico and recording data from families; as noted above, there are still more than 1 million BF families who are not tracked by CRASs.

5.2 Malawi: Community social support committees

At street level, Malawi's implementation and coordination mechanisms are less clear. The administrative structure is divided into districts and those are further divided into traditional authority areas. There are 250 traditional authority areas in the country, so that each traditional authority covers about 72,000 people. Below the level of traditional authorities, there are subtraditional authorities and at a lower level, the country is organized in group village heads (GVHs) from each village that has a hereditary village headman. A GVH is selected by the chiefs and has authority over five or more villages. This means that the GVH area and population varies. There are 3,994 GVHs. Therefore, each GVH covers about 4,500 people.

At the traditional authorities' level, the main institution is the Area Executive Committee (AEC). This includes local civil servants from across sectors, such as agriculture, community development and education. The AEC is elected from all extension workers for a period of three years. The AEC provides technical oversight and advice on project implementation. The AEC also provides technical advice on the implementation of the PWP and the SMP.

At GVH level, the Village Development Committee is responsible for overseeing the implementation of the PWP. According to ODI research, all social programmes should have reported to the Village Development Committee but did not.

Even at street level, we find the community social support committees (CSSC), which are responsible for the implementation of the SCTP. The CSSCs must carry out sensitization and awareness-raising activities, have some influence in beneficiary selection and conduct some beneficiary monitoring and advising. CSSCs are at the level of clusters, with one cluster comprising 800–1,500 households. These committees comprise approximately nine people, selected locally based on their education levels and trustworthiness. The CSSCs are supported by, and report to, extension workers, who then report to representatives of the Ministry of Gender, Children, Disability and Social Welfare at the district level.

Under the MNSSP II, it was decided to strengthen coordination at district level by creating district social support committees, as well as improve coordination at street level by investing in CSSCs as the coordinators of all social protection interventions at GVH level. Donors have started funding capacity-building and training of front-line social workers. According to GIZ, 40 students were enrolled in 2020 in a one-year course on social welfare.

Box 5 – 3 Malawi: Incipient local coordination

- 1. Local coordination is even more difficult when there are many ad hoc donor-funded programmes.** Street-level coordination is already challenging, but it is even more so when donors promote different local structures to support delivery of benefits.
- 2. Trade-off between effectiveness and ownership.** At local level, there is a tension between relying on existing local chiefs or representatives, which leads to nepotism, or avoiding them, which leads to lack of ownership and undermines local governance structures. Under the original MNSSP, the rules of engagement at village level were unclear, so that each programme had its own committee and there was no local coordination. Under the new MNSSP II, a clearer decision has been made: the CSSCs will centralize information at local level. Therefore, Malawi will not rely on local government structures but on an ad hoc committee that was established under the donor-funded cash transfer programme. It will be seen in the medium term whether that decision worked or whether the Government is forced to backtrack and support local government structures, such as the Village Development Committee.
- 3. Complex local coordination demands complex bureaucracy.** Whereas in Brazil we saw that a strong local bureaucracy on social protection has been developed in the last 20 years, the local structures in Malawi are composed of local representatives without grasp of the nuances of these programmes (they are generalists who must make decisions on many other issues, from irrigation to local democracy).

According to current plans, the objective is to extend the cash transfer coverage to 10 per cent of the total population. Given that there are about 4 million households in Malawi, the target is about 400,000 households. In order to reach the coverage of Brazil, Malawi would need about 960 front-line workers, including senior staff and psychologists.

5.3 Chile Crece Contigo: Street-level through local networks

The ChCC programme put local coordination at the center: unlike other assessed programmes that were centralized in nature, ChCC relies in municipal networks to monitor families and provide customized services to children and pregnant women. The municipal ChCC networks include the local education and health representatives, and the chair of the Municipal Development Department. There is a second institutional layer: an expanded network. It is composed of the directors of healthcare centers, the directors of kindergartens, local representatives of the National Minors Service (SENAME), representatives of the National Women Secretariat, etc. (See Figure 5 – 3).

The local network must ensure that all stakeholders are coordinated to achieve the objectives of the ChCC programme. As a first step, they must develop an Opportunity Map, a tool to draw and identify all programmes and benefits available for families and children in the locality. The map should include the following details for each programme: name, institution, contact, specific service or entitlement, beneficiaries and requirements, application schedule, application costs and other details, and funding.

The other critical management tool is the SRDM (Monitoring, Derivation, and Registry System), an IT system to detect risk cases, carry out necessary follow-up and derivations (i.e., case management), and link with the various actions and services of the network with the needs of children, and their families in a timely manner.²¹ The SRDM has the following objectives:

- ▶ Record every contact and services provided to pregnant women, and children;
- ▶ Characterize children and their families.
- ▶ Give vulnerability alerts that will trigger appropriate services and benefits;
- ▶ Promote children's access to the social protection benefits;
- ▶ Record and monitor planned activities; and,
- ▶ Support to the local management of the ChCC network.

One additional feature of the SRDM is that it is integrated with the broader Social Information Integrated System (SIIS-MIDEPLAN), so that it is easy to cross-check SRDM data with the basic Social Protection File (FPS), which characterizes potential social protection beneficiaries. According to the latest data, 85 percent of pregnant women who enter in the ChCC programme has an updated Social Protection File, 90 percent of them belong to the bottom 40 percent in vulnerability, and 45 percent receive Chile Solidario benefits (Gobierno de Chile, 2010).

²¹ Social work case management is a method of providing services whereby a professional social worker assesses the needs of the client and the client's family, when appropriate, and arranges, coordinates, monitors, evaluates, and advocates for a package of multiple services to meet the specific client's complex needs. A professional social worker is the primary provider of social work case management.

► **Figure 5 – 3 Extended ChCC local network**



Los Beneficios o Prestaciones de estas instancias se activan en la medida que los niños y niñas lo requieren.

Source: Gobierno de Chile. (2010).

There are three additional tools: a capacity building programme, a childhood development support fund, and a competitive fund for childhood initiatives. The first one is a national programme designed to exchange knowledge between local networks, supporting the organization of training events. The second is a national programme that provides additional funds beyond the core activities through bilateral agreements with the municipality to support mobile services, including home visits, playrooms, etc. Finally, the third fund is a flexible scheme to finance ad-hoc activities through a competing mechanism.

In 2017 the Government of Chile carried out an internal assessment of local ChCC networks. These were the main findings:

- Unequal access to local services constrained ChCC networks in smaller municipalities, since there was not enough supply.
- Some members of the ChCC networks argued that they should improve articulation with the provincial and regional levels, in order to capitalize shared resources, especially considering that some municipalities cannot provide certain services.
- Turnover in local networks is high and complicates their work.
- Local political support from the mayor is a critical success factor.

Box 5 – 4 discusses the main lessons learnt from the case study.

Box 5 – 4 Chile Crece Contigo — Lessons learned

- ▶ **Highly decentralized delivery systems need to factor in local inequalities.** Poverty, isolation, population density, service supply, etc. determine what local networks can supply, and also the level of demand. Coordinated programmes need to provide differentiated solutions in order to help weaker local networks, or those that may be overwhelmed by demand.
- ▶ **Local political support is key to foster participation and coordination.**
- ▶ **Importance of integration of IT systems.** The SRDM is well integrated with other MDS systems, like the Social Protection File, but it is not well integrated with other systems used by the health sector, adding a burden on users.
- ▶ **High capacity at local level is critical.** Chile has a strong local bureaucracy, including specialized cadres working on education, health, or social protection. This expertise can be capitalized in actual integration of social services. Countries without these human resources will face obstacles when trying to promote coordination at the point of delivery.

5.4 Street-level: service-delivery coordination checklist

The case studies above offer different challenges and strategies to improving service-delivery coordination. In some countries, the focus

is on technology, in others it is on face-to-face interaction with social workers or local representatives. **Table 5 – 1** presents a checklist to consider when deciding whether and how to pursue street-level coordination in social protection.

▶ **Table 5 – 1 Checklist: Street-level service-delivery coordination**

Coordination structures

<p>Are there enough well-trained social workers, psychologists or other social protection bureaucrats?</p>	<p>If not, then coordination objectives at local level should be very limited. It does not make sense to expect complex coordination tasks when there are no specialists on the ground.</p>
<p>Are there local coordination structures for social protection policies? If not, is there a local institution or committee that could centralize information?</p>	<p>Even if there are no specialists, some simple coordination tasks may be commissioned to local committees. However, in many countries it is not clear who should be responsible for coordination at street level. As we have seen, there is a trade-off between avoiding local nepotism (potentially) and ownership and better information (again, potentially).</p> <p>It is important to develop realistic local coordination objectives if local committees are composed of non-experts dealing with many other priorities.</p>
<p>Are local resources aligned with target groups?</p>	<p>We have seen that even in countries with a substantial investment in social assistance services at street level, there is a mismatch between those and the areas where beneficiaries live. Since the poorest families live in isolated areas, it is difficult to reach them all. Governments must strive to extend the geographic coverage of social workers and social assistance counselling as much as possible</p>

Tools

Are there IT systems at local level to track social protection information?	<p>We have seen the example of Brazil, where CadÚnico is integrated with the attendance system or the health system that tracks conditionalities. In Chile de SDRM system is integrated with the Social Protection File, but not with other health-related systems.</p> <p>Regardless of how coordination is designed, local-level officials are the only ones who can monitor and record.</p>
Are there protocols defining what local coordination means in practice?	<p>For instance, in Brazil, after years of lack of clarity, the Government issued a protocol determining that CRASs should prioritize BF beneficiaries, aligning social workers and psychologists' services with cash benefits. The rationale was that these civil servants should support families who were having difficulties complying with conditions. There are pending issues and the protocol is not always met, but it is clear to SUAS and MSD, the two central agencies, what should happen at local level.</p>
Can local officials use other agencies or organizations to capitalize their synergies?	<p>The example of the agreement with Eletropaulo shows how registrants and employees of the utilities company can complement each other's work. Service agreements could be established.</p> <p>In Chile, the Opportunities Map should inform the members of the ChCC network about the supplied services in the locality.</p>
Are there IT tools to support digitalized common service delivery?	<p>The example of the one-stop-shop service of Korea and other similar shows how these systems can support the implementation of digitalized common service delivery channels.</p>



▶ 6. Conclusions and recommendations

The module has reviewed some practical examples stemming from case studies and provided checklists to guide decision-makers and practitioners in the field of social protection, staff from ministries and government institutions in charge of social protection policy and delivery in determining the following high-level coordination questions:

- 1. Rationale:** Why is coordination needed? What obstacles does it help to overcome and what bottlenecks does it eliminate?
- 2. Feasibility:** Is it possible given the resources (human, financial, institutional, political) that are available?
- 3. Added value:** From a cost-benefit perspective, what additional value does coordination bring?
- 4. Actors and stakeholders:** Which stakeholders should participate and why at what levels should they do so?
- 5. Ways of working:** How can coordination among different stakeholders be promoted and facilitated?

Next, the module discussed how some countries have operationalized those coordination objectives using mid-level tools and coordination structures. Using technology and informal networks of civil servants, embedding indicators and targets across line ministries, the module has shown different approaches adapted to local contexts.

Finally, the module showed some case studies of street-level service-delivery coordination, that is, how front-office nodes can improve social protection coordination, using tools and structures. In some countries, this was carried out by building a large network of social assistance centres involving thousands of social workers. In others, technology is being used to offer a one-stop-shop for social security contributors.

While presenting the following recommendations, the module emphasizes that coordination must be realistic and should avoid one-size-fits-all solutions. The key recommendations for policy-makers are set out below.

- 1.** Before embarking on a “coordination effort”, define as clearly as possible what needs to be done across programmes. Vague mandates to improve coordination without a clear objective tend to fail.
- 2.** Coordination projects should take into account resource constraints and the context in general. Policy-makers should avoid copying best practices that will not be feasible in their contexts. For instance, some IT solutions or local presence of social workers may not be an option. In such cases, either an alternative solution is required or perhaps the policy design is not right in the first place.
- 3.** The coordination body may determine how far coordination goes. As the module argued, certain structures may defend the status quo, while others may be more flexible or willing to discuss new approaches.
- 4.** At the mid-level, it is critical to define the roles and responsibilities of administrative levels that are located between the central Government and street-level service-delivery points. They can be key players in improving coordination across geographic areas.
- 5.** Technology can be an important enabler to make coordination real. However, there has to be interconnection (that is interoperability) between IT systems. In several countries, there is a unified

database of potential beneficiaries but there no integration from programmes back to the centre. At the street-level, one-stop-shop portals enable to implement common service delivery systems.

6. Coordination at street level is even more dependent on resources. Without well-trained social workers or IT solutions, social protection services will be limited.
7. Finally, donors should improve their approach to coordination: they should avoid advocating for their particular institutional approach to local coordination, undermining other incipient efforts.



► Bibliography

- Alford, John, and Janine O'Flynn. 2012. *Rethinking Public Service Delivery: Managing with External Providers*. Palgrave Macmillan.
- Ambrozio, Lucas, and Fábio Pereira de Andrade. 2016. "Intersectorialidade no Programa Bolsa Família: Semelhanças e Heterogeneidades à Luz das Atuações dos Burocratas de Médio Escalão Federais e Municipais". *Cadernos de Estudos Desenvolvimento Social em Debate* 26: 127-150.
- Azevedo, Viviane; Cesar Bouillon, and Irrazaval, Ignacio. (2011). "Sistemas Integrados de Información Social: su role en la Protección Social. Centro de Políticas Publicas", Pontifica Universidad Católica de Chile.
- Bedregal, P., Camila Carvallo, A. T. (2013). *Chile Crece Contigo: el Desafío de la Protección Social a la Infancia. Clave de Políticas Públicas Serie: Desafíos en la Educación de Primera Infancia*. Instituto de Políticas Públicas. Universidad Diego Portales.
- Behrendt, Christina, et al. 2016. "Implementing the Principles of Social Protection Floors Recommendation, 2012 (No. 202)". In *Recommendations on Social Protection Floors: Basic Principles for Innovative Solutions*, edited by Tineke Dijkhoff and George Letlhokwa Mpedi. Wolters Kluwer.
- Bronzo, Carla, et al. 2018. "Social Welfare Services as Protective Mechanisms: Exploring Effects and Limits". *Cadernos Gestão Pública e Cidadania* 24 (77): 1-17.
- Cecchini, Simone, et al. 2014. *Sistemas de protección social en América Latina y el Caribe - Una perspectiva comparada*. CEPAL.
- Cecchini, Simone, and Rodrigo Martínez. 2012. *Inclusive Social Protection in Latin America: A Comprehensive, Rights-Based Approach*. ECLAC.
- Corbett, Thomas and Jennifer L. Noyes. (2008). "Human Services Systems Integration: A Conceptual Framework", Working document. 1333-08, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Institute for Research on Poverty.
- Cunill-Grau, Nuria. 2014. "La intersectorialidad en las nuevas políticas sociales: Un acercamiento analítico-conceptual". *Gestión y Política Pública* 23(1): 5-46.
- Cunill-Grau, Nuria, et al. 2015. "Coordinating sectors and institutions for building comprehensive social protection". In *Towards Universal Social Protection: Latin American Pathways and Policy Tools*, 373-413. ECLAC.
- Cunill-Grau, Nuria, et al. 2013. "La cuestión de la colaboración intersectorial y de la integralidad de las políticas sociales: lecciones derivadas del caso del sistema de protección a la infancia en Chile". *Polis* 12 (36): 289-314.
- Espejo, A.; Cortínez, V.; Leyton, C.; Martínez, L.; Tomaselli, A. and Figueroa, N. (2016). *Evaluación de las Redes Comunes del Subsistema de protección integral a la infancia Chile Crece Contigo*. Rimisp - Centro Latinoamericano para el Desarrollo Rural
- Frederickson, H. G., & Ghore, R. K. (2013). *Ethics in public management*. Second edition. Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc.
- Gobierno de Chile. (2010). *Cuatro Años Creciendo Juntos. Memoria de la Instalación del Sistema de Protección Integral a la Infancia Chile Crece Contigo 2006-2010*.
- Gobierno de Chile. (2016). *Orientaciones Técnicas para la Gestión de Redes Chile Crece Contigo*.
- Ikhsan Modjo, Mohamad. 2017. "Poverty Reduction in Indonesia: A Brief Institutional History". *The Indonesian Journal of Development Planning* 1 (3): 170-194.
- ILO. 2019. *Universal Social Protection for Human Dignity, Social Justice and Sustainable Development: General Survey concerning the Social Protection Floors Recommendation, 2012 (No. 202)*. ILC.108/III/B.

- ISSA. 2019. ISSA Guidelines on Information and Communication Technology.
- Holmes, Rebecca, et al. 2018. Strengthening Institutional Coordination of Social Protection in Malawi: An Analysis of Coordination Structures and Options. ODI.
- Horwath, Jan, and Tony Morrison. 2007. "Collaboration, Integration and Change in Children's Services: Critical Issues and Key Ingredients". *Child Abuse & Neglect* 31 (1): 55–69.
- Kettl, Donald. (2002). The Transformation of Governance: Globalization, Devolution, and the Role of Government. *Public Administration Review*. 60. 488 - 497. 10.1111/0033-3352.00112.
- Licio, Elaine Cristina. 2020. "Coordenação do Bolsa Família nos Sistemas de Políticas Públicas: Uma Análise sobre os Instrumentos Mobilizados". In *Coordenação e Relações Intergovernamentais na Políticas Sociais Brasileiras*, edited by Luciana Jaccoud. IPEA.
- Lundin, Martin. 2007. "When Does Cooperation Improve Public Policy Implementation?" *Policy Studies Journal* 35 (4): 629–652.
- McClanahan, Shea, et al. 2020. Global Research on Governance and Social Protection: Case Studies on Mauritius and Fiji. UN/DESA and ILO.
- OECD. 2019. Indonesia's Effort to Phase Out and Rationalise Its Fossil-Fuel Subsidies. A Report on the G20 Peer-Review of Inefficient Fossil-Fuel Subsidies that Encourage Wasteful Consumption in Indonesia.
- O'Flynn, Janine. 2009. "The Cult of Collaboration in Public Policy". *Australian Journal of Public Administration* 68 (1): 112–116.
- . 2019. "Rethinking Relationships: Clarity, Contingency, and capabilities". *Policy Design and Practice* 2(2): 115–136.
- Pires, Roberto Rocha C. 2012. "Burocracias, gerentes e suas 'histórias de implementação': narrativas do sucesso e fracasso de programas federais". In *Implementação de políticas públicas: teoria e prática*, edited by Carlos Aurélio Pimenta de Faria. PUC Minas.
- Malawi, PRSP. 2016. Review of the Malawi National Social Support Programme: A Stakeholder-Driven Review of the Design and Implementation of the Malawi National Social Support Programme (2012–2016).
- Ministerio de Educación de Chile. (2018). Informe de Caracterización de la Educación Parvularia, Descripción estadística del sistema educativo asociado al nivel de Educación Parvularia en Chile. *caracterización-EP-2018.pdf* (mineduc.cl)
- Rahayu, Sri Kusumastuti, et al. 2018. The Future of The Social Protection System in Indonesia: Social Protection for All. Indonesia, TNP2K.
- Ruggia-Frick, Raúl. 2016. "Coordinating Social Programmes: Analysis of Scenarios and Implementation Approaches Based on the ISSA Guidelines on ICT". *International Social Security Review* 69 (3-4); 21–50.
- Sandfort, Jodi, and H. Brinton Milward. (2008). "Collaborative Service Provision in the Public Sector". In *The Oxford Handbook of Inter-organizational Relations*, edited by Steve Cropper et al., Oxford, Oxford University Press.
- Schermerhorn, John R. (1975). "Determinants of Interorganizational Cooperation." *Academy of Management Journal* 18(4):846–856.
- Tapajós, L., Júnia Quiroga, Rovane B. Schwengber Ritzi, and Marcel Frederico de Lima Taga. (2010). "A Importância da Avaliação no Contexto do Bolsa Família". In *Bolsa família 2003-2010: avanços e desafios*, edited by: Jorge Abrahão de Castro, Lúcia Modesto. Brasília: Ipea.
- UNDG. 2016. UNDG Social Protection Coordination Toolkit: Coordinating the Design and Implementation of Nationally Defined Social Protection Floors. ILO.
- UNDP. 2017. Institutional and Coordination Mechanisms: Guidance Note on Facilitating Integration and Coherence for SDG Implementation.
- Winkworth, Gail, and Michael White. (2011). "Australia's Children 'Safe and Well'? Collaborating with Purpose Across Commonwealth Family Relationship and State Child Protection Systems". *Australian Journal of Public Administration*, 70: 1-14. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8500.2010.00706.x>

Governance of social protection systems: a learning journey

Module #1: Coordination

This learning module is part of a series of working papers “Governance of social protection systems: a learning journey” developed in the context of the project “Achieving SDGs and ending poverty through Universal Social Protection”, implemented from January 2019 until June 2021 under the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development sub-fund of the United Nations Peace and Development Trust Fund (UNPDF). The project is jointly implemented by the Division for Inclusive Social Development of the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN DESA), and the Social Protection Department (SOCPRO) of the International Labour Office (ILO), in the framework of ILO’s Global Flagship Programme for Social Protection Floors and as part of the overall campaign for Universal Social Protection (USP 2030) launched in 2016. The project has pursued a two-fold strategy. In two focus countries, Pakistan and Cambodia, technical support was provided through the ILO offices to strengthen capacities of institutions and practitioners on different aspects identified as critical in social security governance. Simultaneously, at global level, the project has developed a knowledge base of good practices as well as learning modules in order to better support policy makers in their capacity to take strategic decisions in the field of social protection, the project has tried to identify and clarify, in a pragmatic and concrete way, the key drivers of different operational components inherent to all systems, starting with three core topics:

- ▶ **Coordination**
- ▶ **Information and Communication Technologies & Data**
- ▶ **Compliance and Enforcement of Legal Frameworks**

ilo.org

International Labour Organization
Route des Morillons 4
1211 Geneva 22
Switzerland