ILO/TF/Aruba/R.2

Aruba

Report to the Government

Alternative policy options for the long-term financial consolidation of the Social Insurance Bank

International Financial and Actuarial Service Social Protection Sector International Labour Organization, Geneva May 2005

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92-2-117283-X (print) 92-2-117284-8 (web pdf)

First published 2005

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Abbreviations and acronyms

AFL Aruban Florin

AOV General Old Age Pension Scheme administered by the SVb

AWW General Widows and Orphans Insurance Scheme administered by the

SVb

CBA Central Bank of Aruba

CBS Central Bureau of Statistics of Aruba

CPI Consumer price index

GAP General average premium

GDP Gross domestic product

ILO International Labour Office

IMF International Monetary Fund

IPO Initial public offering

NAW National average wage

PAYG Pay-as-you-go cost rate (total annual benefit and administration

expenditure divided by total annual insurable earnings)

SNA (United Nations) system of national accounts

SVb Social Security Bank of Aruba (Sociale Verzekerings Bank, Aruba)

Exchange rate

1 United States Dollar = 1.77 Aruban Florin

Foreword

This study focuses on projecting the financial situation of the General Old Age Pension Scheme (AOV) and the General Widows and Orphans Insurance (AWW) scheme, both administered by the Soziale Verzekeringsbank (SVb) of Aruba (social insurance bank of Aruba).

The study is also the follow-up to a previous study undertaken by the ILO in 2003 (International Labour Office: Aruba. Report to the Government. Actuarial review of the General Old-age Pension Scheme and the General Widows and Orphans Insurance Scheme as of 30 April 2003. Geneva, March 2004.) and attempts to widen the view of the potentials and limitations of different reform proposals.

In its base scenario, the study generally repeats the results of the previous study. Improvements in the application of the pension model, in particular with respect to the process of new pensions creation, has slightly altered the results of the study, i.e. the new results confirm the trends of the earlier actuarial valuation but less dramatically. Further, this study focuses on the issue of introducing a fully funded second tier with individual accounts. It is complemented by proposals aiming at improving the foreseeable difficult financial situation of the SVb.

The study addresses some of the financial implications of the different reform proposals, which should allow the Government of Aruba take decisions as to the general direction of pension reform. For reform steps of a parametric nature, this study may be considered sufficient as a basis for the necessary steps. In case of a more structural reform, especially if a second tier, fully funded, with individual accounts, were envisaged, then further feasibility assessments with respect to the institutional organization (and other issues) would be required before actual implementation. The same holds true if the government opted for a defined-benefit second tier.

The study includes a total of 11 sections, an executive summary and four annexes. The main body of the document contains 34 tables and 42 figures. Annexes 1 to 2 contain the most important calculations used for the study, Annex 3 contains information on minimum wages in Europe and Annex 4 provides information on ILO Convention 102, prepared by Ms. Ursula Kulke, ILO.

Acknowledgements

At the request of the Soziale Verzekeringsbank (SVb) of Aruba, the ILO was contracted in 2004 to perform a study on alternative options for the long-term financial consolidation of the SVb, i.e. of its general old age pension scheme (AOV) and the general widows and orphans insurance (AWW).

The Director-General of the ILO appointed Messrs. Wolfgang Scholz, senior economist in the Financial, Actuarial and Statistical Services Branch of the Social Protection Sector of the ILO, and Charles Crevier, actuary, to undertake this study.

Mr. Crevier visited Aruba from 28 September to 7 October 2004, during which time the final terms of reference were discussed, data was collected and alternative policy options for the long-term financial consolidation of the institution were explored.

Mr. Scholz visited Aruba in October 2004 in order to deepen the understanding of the problems underlying the financial future of the SVb and to specify details of the reform options to be modeled. For these purposes, he met with the Minister of Public Health and the Environment as well as the Minister of Finance, the President of the Central Bank of Aruba, the Director of the Central Bureau of Statistics, the social partners and, last but not least, the senior management of the SVb.

The ILO wishes to thank the Central Bureau of Statistics for providing the ILO team with a full set of individual data of the contributors to the SVb. This substantially increases the reliability of the results contained in this report compared to previous reports.

The Director-General of the ILO wishes to express his appreciation to the Director of the Soziale Verzekeringsbank of Aruba, Mr. Raphael Blume. Gratitude is also extended to Mr. Herbert Diaz, who provided the team with data and other valuable information, as well as to the staff of the SVb, the CBA, the CBS, the Ministry of Public Health and the Environment and the Ministry of Finance for their collaboration and assistance provided during the preparation of this study.

The authors wish to thank Mrs. Gehl Crowe for her excellent and non-tiring editing of the final drafts of the report.

Executive summary

Aruba's main institution providing old-age income provision, the Sociale Verzekerings Bank (SVb) is facing financial problems, not in the immediate future, but in the medium to longer term¹.

In accordance with a list of problems/options provided by the management of the SVb (Section 2), this report explores ways to contribute to a rational discussion of what could be done to solve these financial problems and to inform the general public. In order to understand the problems of the SVb's long-term branches (AOV/AWW) within a broader socio-financial context, Section 3 contains a short empirical analysis of the SVb's finances in a social budget framework.

Section 4 explains the demographic, economic and labour market framework upon which all subsequent calculations of the SVb's finances, including reform options, are based. The main assumptions are that net migration to Aruba is assumed to decline to modest levels and the total population grows from around 95,000 in 2003 to around 122,000 by the end of the projection period, 2063. Over the same period, it is assumed that real GDP grows at an annual average of 1.3 percent, while prices continue growing at very moderate levels. Unemployment is assumed to remain at low levels (on average slightly above 5 percent) and workers participate in economic growth through average annual real wage growth of one percent (the labour income share in GDP is assumed constant over time).

The SVb's future financial development was analyzed on the basis of this framework, calculating a status-quo base scenario for reference and various reform options.

Results

The base scenario (Section 5) confirms the trends of the 2004 actuarial report (see footnote 1) which showed the SVb's reserves being exhausted by 2025, the SVb accumulating enormous debt between 2025 and 2063, and relative pension levels deteriorating significantly. In 2003, the SVb's standard flat single pension amounted to 35 percent of the average insured wage, and by 2063 the same rate deteriorates to only 19 percent. These results are dependent on the following core assumptions: the ceiling is indexed annually with the national average wage (NAW), individual pensions equal 70 percent of the minimum wage and the minimum wage is indexed regularly with the CPI; and retirement age is kept constant at age 60. Indexation of the ceiling is not the current practice in Aruba, however this assumption is used here, as a policy of non-indexation of the ceiling is known to be unsustainable (based on theoretical considerations and similar ILO studies in other countries).

The reform scenario, as proposed by the management of the SVb, is explained in Section 6.8. It consists of the following combination of measures, all of which are assumed to start in 2005):

- normal retirement age is raised to 62 years;

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¹See International Labour Office: Aruba. Report to the Government. Actuarial review of the General Old-age Pension scheme and the General Widows and Orphans Insurance Scheme as of 30 April 2003. Geneva, March 2004.

- the annual contribution assessment ceiling is raised to 60,000 AFL and then regularly indexed with average wage development;
- pensions are fully individualized;
- pensions are increased by 6 percent in 2005 and then regularly indexed to the minimum wage/CPI (as in the base case).

Given this scenario, the effects on the AOV are immediate. The PAYG rate declines to seven percent in 2005 and remains at levels below the present legal contribution rate until 2024. The general average premium (GAP) is 10.3 percent, which is 1.2 percentage points below the legal contribution rate and 4.3 percentage points lower than the GAP of the base scenario (Figure 6.23).

This combination of measures is sufficient to maintain the fund financially stable over time (Figure 6.25), and a major reserve would accumulate. From the results, key years in the future evolution of the scheme have been identified:

- contribution revenue alone is sufficient to meet total expenditure until 2025, and the reserve increases;
- from 2026, part of the investment earnings must be used, in addition to contributions, to meet expenditure, and the reserve continues to increase;
- over the entire period of projection, the sum of contributions and investment earnings is sufficient to meet expenditure;
- the reserve is almost 3 billion AFL in 2023, 10 billion AFL in 2043 and around 35 billion AFL in 2063 or 34, 53 and 93 percent of GDP, respectively.

The combination of measures under this scenario even allows for a reduction of the legal contribution rate by two percentage points without running the scheme into deficit (Figure 6.26).

This reform scenario (Section 6.8) appears to bring an effective solution, as the fund remains financially stable over time, and thus ensures the continued availability of the social purposes of the SVb, while simultaneously limiting the scope for differences in benefit rates based on deliberate behavioral decisions of the insured persons.

However, this reform would come with an unacceptably high price with respect to the future relative level of pension benefits. In 2063, with 15 percent, the replacement rate² of a single pension is almost meaningless for almost all retirees (Table 6.11). The suggestion to index pensions with the CPI (by way of fixing the single pension at 70 percent of the minimum wage), raising (and wage-indexing) the ceiling and fully individualizing the premium substantially widens the gap between contributions paid throughout active years and benefits received during retirement for many individuals (Table 3.9 and Section 5).

Control calculations not included in this report show that the reform scenario (Section 6.8) with wage-indexation of benefits (NAW instead of CPI-indexation) would maintain the pension replacement rate but would lead to a financial collapse of the SVb in the near future.

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² Single pension in percent of the national average wage.

Section 6 contains calculations in which the impact of each single measure under the reform was calculated separately. It also contains information on further parametric reform possibilities discussed. These calculations confirm, inter alia, that increasing actual retirement age (without increasing pension entitlements) is the most effective measure to reduce the financial problems of the SVb.

In its financial logic (contributions collected on the basis of wages, flat benefits for everyone independent of contributions paid) the SVb is, over the long run, in danger of violating the principle of equivalency between contributions paid and benefits received. Thus, the report deals with the proposal that the government may want to introduce a component on top of the existing scheme in order to provide additional old-age pension income based on individual (additional) contributions.

This report discusses only a limited number of questions to be addressed in case a fully funded mandated second tier with individual accounts was actually to be introduced (Section 7). At its core is the issue as to the amount of income replacement to be produced in such a tier under different contribution rates³.

According to the nature of second tier pensions, no general assessment can be made with respect to income replacement expected as the annuity varies with the number of years for which contributions were paid. Based on the non-volatile macro-economic assumptions of this report, assuming a man aged 25 in 2005 and retiring at 62 years of age, contributing without interruptions to the second tier, which earns 5.1 percent per annum, with annual administration costs absorbing one fifth of the rate of return, the results suggest the following:

A contribution rate of between six and eight percent is required in order to achieve a replacement rate (in the year of retirement, i.e. 2043) sufficiently high to compensate for the replacement losses under a pure CPI-indexed flat AOV-benefit. For all men younger than 25 in 2005 and therefore having contributed longer, the replacement would be higher. For the majority of older persons who have contributed fewer years, i.e. during a long transition period before scheme maturity⁴, the replacement would be lower. These results are based on gender specific assumptions on life expectancy. In other words, at identical contribution rates the replacement rates for women are lower and therefore women would be the clear losers of this reform approach. This deficiency could only be countered by using unisex life-tables, lifting the annuities for women, and reducing those for men (Table 7.5). These results do not take into account any variations in replacement levels due to volatile financial markets, which have been described elsewhere⁵.

Again, control calculations not included in this report show that the same effect could be achieved for everyone, i.e. without the risk of volatile financial markets, without gender-differentiation and without replacement rates declining during transition, with the measures of the reform scenario (Section 6.8), and by increasing the legal contribution rate to 16.0 percent and wage-indexation of pensions under the AOV.

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³For reasons of simplicity only, for these calculations male- and female-specific assumptions on life expectancy were assumed. Under real life conditions unisex life-tables would have to be applied.

⁴Maturity: All contributors have paid, at retirement, a "full working life".

⁵Most recently, for example: Christian Rieckhoff: Chancen und Risiken einer Altersvorsorge mit Aktienfonds. In Soziale Sicherheit. Zeitschrift für Arbeit und Soziales. AiB Frankfurt. 11/2004; pages 393 to 397.

Under a six percent contribution rate scenario, the second tier would accumulate net reserves in the order of 36, 60 and 66 percent of GDP (3.3 billion AFL, 11 billion AFL and 25 billion AFL) in 2023, 2043 and 2063, respectively, which would be in addition to the reserves accumulated under the reformed AOV (see above).

In assuming that both first (AOV) and second tier would be kept under the one roof of the SVb, which is recommended in a "small-country-case" (clearing house approach), combined accumulated reserves would amount to 77, 117 and 158 percent of GDP (7, 22 and 60 billion AFL) in 2023, 2043 and 2063, respectively⁶. Of course, these significant amounts might raise concern as to how and where to invest these funds productively. Also, more fundamental questions arise as to whether social security should hold "ownership" of such enormous portions of the underlying capital stock of Aruba's economy (Section 7.2).

Conclusions

Whichever reform option is considered, there is no solution to the growing old-age financing problem that would satisfy all stakeholders of the scheme equally. Benefit eligibility conditions will have to be tightened (in particular, by increasing the retirement age) and more money will be needed to finance Aruba's upcoming demographic transition. At the same time, measures have to be taken in order to maintain present relative benefit levels (replacement rates) without upsetting society's consensus on the scheme's highly redistributive design, which has contributed substantially to poverty avoidance in Aruba.

The reform option (Section 6.8) is a step in the right direction, however, it cannot be recommended as the sole measure as it leads to old-age poverty in the medium and longer term (due to CPI-indexation). An amount would have to be added to the reform, which at least maintains present relative pension benefit levels (replacement rates).

One possibility, along the lines as discussed in Aruba, is to add a second tier to the present, reformed, scheme. In order to make this meaningful (in terms of replacement rates of individual annuities to be expected) a contribution rate of at least six percent would be required. At such a rate, together with the reserves accumulated under the reformed first tier (AOV), social security could easily become the monopolistic "owner" of the majority of Aruba's tangible capital stock over the longer term. Also, major problems of investing the accumulated funds effectively and, later, of keeping amounts liquid for payment of benefits, will inevitably occur. An alternative "small solution", i.e. a second tier with a contribution rate of two percent, will not come close to solving the problem of a too low income replacement rate of CPI-indexed flat AOV pensions.

For the same reason, the option to reduce the present legal AOV rate by two percent (to 9.5 percent) and using the two percent for the set-up of a second tier was also dismissed. With 9.5 percent the AOV would, under the reform scenario (Section 6.8), still maintain positive reserves over the full projection period but at the price of a long-term marginalization of the pension replacement rate, to which the two percent second tier would add next to nothing.

Another possibility would be to use the same additional six percent of wages and salaries in order to finance the AOV under present principles (after reform according to Section 6.8), modified however by wage-indexation of pensions (instead of CPI-indexation). For individuals, the balance between lifetime contributions paid and benefits received would not change significantly in comparison to the present situation (Table 3.9) but old-age income expectations for the individual contributor would be much more stable in

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⁶Assumed AOV contribution rate 11.5 percent.

comparison to the income insecurities inherent to a fully funded second tier approach. Under this possibility, gender equality could be maintained and replacement rates would not deteriorate.

Under such a scenario the SVb would maintain a permanently positive reserve over the full projection period accumulating 60, 55 and 45 percent of GDP (5.5 billion AFL, 10.2 billion AFL and 16.9 billion AFL) in 2023, 2043 and 2063, respectively.

For the time being, wage indexation is not possible in practice as a stable statistical environment for the national accounts and, thus, a reliable, consistent and regular estimation of a national average wage (required for wage-indexation of pensions) is not possible. In this respect, administrative improvements are necessary under any reform option adopted.

A six percent increase of the contribution rate (either under a second tier or under a reformed AOV) would, of course, be a drastic measure. Therefore, an incremental introduction would be advisable, and most acceptable to contributors (whether employers and/or workers) in an economy with growing nominal wages. The fact that the AOV would accumulate substantial reserves under this scenario might allow for a careful fine-tuning (reduction) of the legal contribution rate over time. In due time, one could also consider a further increase of the legal retirement age.

Control calculations show that under the reformed AOV (Section 6.8; wage-indexed) a long-term legal contribution rate of 16.0 percent (AOV) would be sufficient to maintain a substantial reserve over the long run.

Questions of efficiency of contribution collection have also been addressed in this report (Section 8). It was not possible, however, to estimate a reliable non-compliance rate of contribution collection. As the tax office, which is in charge of collecting contributions and transferring them to the SVb, is in a process of modernization, it remains to be seen how contribution collection rates will be affected once this process is completed. Thus far, no clear conclusions can be drawn as to whether the government should opt for outsourcing contribution collection to the SVb (or the health insurance or a common institute of both) or whether it should maintain the present organizational arrangement.

Auditing and actuarial valuations of the SVb, and especially the AOV/AWW, will also be necessary in the future. In order to substantiate its own standing within the national discussion, the SVb should take measures to improve its own capacities. It is hoped that this report contributes to such steps (Section 10).

Recommendations

1. Firstly, it is recommended that the proposed reform measures as discussed in Section 6.8 be carried out. This entails raising the contribution assessment ceiling to 60,000 AFL by 1 January 2006 at the latest, ideally increasing the legal retirement age to 62 and fully individualizing contribution payments and pensions simultaneously. However, the recommended increase in the legal retirement age does not necessarily need to occur in 2006 as technically proposed in the ILO model, but it should not be postponed beyond 2008. Full individualization is included despite initial set-up costs as the medium and long-term financial effects will be positive and the SVb has sufficiently high reserves in order to finance this reform component. Again, with respect to the timing of the introduction of individualization, there is some leeway. It may be considered that at least the individualization of contribution payments should occur in 2006. It is not necessary that individualization of pensions occur on that date, as a postponement of two to three years for the individualization of pensions will help to ease the effects of "dual" individualization on certain pensioners.

- 2. Secondly, but of the same importance as (1) above, a regular annual mechanism of ceiling indexation according to the development of the national average wage has to be made effective. If such a mechanism is implemented, a further ad-hoc increase of the ceiling to 75,000 AFL is not recommended as this might upset the currently acceptable balance between contributions paid and benefits received.
- 3. According to the foreseeable timetable, the first indexation of the ceiling (assumed 60,000 AFL in 2006) could take place on 1 January 2007. For this purpose, time-series estimates of Aruba's national average wage (NAW; national accounts methodology) should be available up to at least 2005. It is therefore important that the CBS (national accounting section) prepare this data and, simultaneously, establish a reliable routine for wage estimation in the future. In autumn 2006 a first preliminary estimate of the national average wage in 2006 should be available. Based on this information, details of the adjustment formula (lag structure, etc.) could be determined. The ceiling for the following year should be determined in autumn at the latest. The CBS could analyze the required statistics and prepare the estimates during the work period from spring 2005 to autumn 2006 when, at the latest, the ceiling for 2007 should be made public.
- 4. Assuming that the national average wage is made available, pensions should be indexed accordingly, i.e. based on the development of the NAW. As pensions were increased on 1 January 2005, the next indexation should take place on 1 January 2006. As, according to (3), the required national average wage estimates will not be available in autumn 2005, pension indexation could be based, temporarily, on CPI development (for example [CPI Oct 2004 to Sep 2005] / [CPI Oct 2003 to Sep 2004]⁷). The next indexation (1 January 2007) should be based on the same information (not necessarily exactly the same indexation formula, which still would have to be established) as used for ceiling indexation, i.e. the NAW. Subsequent indexations should also not be based on average insurable earnings as these might be influenced by ceiling adjustments. Only if, after sufficient experience, NAW and insurable average wage prove to develop in parallel, one might use the administrative information available on the insurable wage for pension indexation.
- 5. On 1 January 2006 the AOV contribution rate should be increased by one percentage point, followed by a one-percentage point increase each year until the target rate of 16.0 percent is reached. On 1 January 2006 this could be done by shifting one point from the AWW to the AOV which leaves sufficient room for prudent financing of the AWW expenditure. Calculations suggest that the AOV would require 4.5 percentage points in addition to the present rate of 11.5 percent, however, depending on actual economic, labour market and financial market developments, a slightly lower additional amount might be sufficient.
- 6. Recommendations (1) to (5), together, result in a substantial increase of the SVb's reserves several times above present levels (in percent of GDP). As investment in domestic markets of all accumulated funds might prove difficult or even impossible, the government and/or the SVb should explore, together with the CBA, options (in terms of quantity and quality) of investing parts of the accumulating amounts abroad (US, EU, Asia). An explicit investment policy should also be formulated according to standard rules of efficient financial markets. While the reserves would accumulate under the SVb and, also, the government and/or the SVb would assume final responsibility, investment decisions, as well as general investment policy, should be outsourced to an investment board. Members of the board should be financial market specialists (possibly from Aruba's financial

⁷Or the same period as used for the indexation of the minimum wage (August (t-1): August (t)). See, for example: Sociaal Economische Raad: Aanpassing minimumlonen 2004. Advies. Mimeo. De Sociaal Economische Raad December 2003.

- industry), the CBA, the SVb, employers and trade unions. Particular care must be exercised in formulating the statutes of the board (purpose, membership, voting procedures, etc.).
- 7. Thus far, no clear conclusions can be drawn as to whether the government should opt for outsourcing contribution collection to the SVb (or to the health insurance or to a common institute of both) or whether it should maintain the present organizational arrangement. It is recommended to wait for the results of the tax collection reform measures before considering further steps. In any case, closer institutional collaboration between the SVb and the Tax Office is absolutely necessary in future for a more effective governance of the social security of Aruba, especially in terms of information sharing.

As an annotation to these recommendations, the following needs mentioning. It has been considered in Aruba to change the revenue base of the AOV from contributions to taxation and to complement the tax-financed flat-benefit system with a contribution-financed second tier (this option is not covered by this report). However, one of the implications of the findings of this report is that such a second tier could <u>not</u> be recommended to take the form of a defined-contribution (individual accounts) tier. Instead, a fully funded defined-benefit tier might be recommendable in such a case. Administration of the accumulating funds should be organized as under (6). However, the details of the implementation of such a reform (phasing in, transitory regulations, etc.) would have to be evaluated in a separate study, as the evolvement of the transitional effects might be problematic.

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1. Purpose of the study

This study explores alternative policy options for the Old Age Pension and the Widows and Orphans Insurance Schemes administered by the SVb. It builds upon the financial and actuarial review of the schemes previously undertaken on 30 April 2003⁸, updating the data collected and established at that time.

The 2003 actuarial review already contained results of the long-term impact of a number of possible parametric and policy reforms of the AOV/AWW schemes. Meanwhile, based on those results, the national discussion on pension reform continued triggering the need for more detailed information on some of the policy options addressed in the 2003 review, as well as requiring quantitative information on newly introduced reform options not covered by the 2003 review.

An advantage of this study as compared to the 2003 review is that the calculations can now be based on a large database, which was not available to the team that undertook the 2003 review. This new database includes individual records with information such as age, sex, gross wage and net wage.

It can therefore be assumed that the results of this study are to some extent more reliable than those of the 2003 review. Any deviation from the results of the 2003 study has to be attributed to the updates undertaken since then, and to the better quality of data now available. With respect to reform options that were not address in the 2003 review, the results contained in this study can be considered highly reliable due to the good quality of the above database.

It is therefore hoped that this study contributes to further rationalizing the national discussion on pension reform in Aruba. There is no doubt that the country's pension system needs reform in order to cope with the challenges of demographic changes. Such reforms, as they will affect all, should be undertaken with national consensus. Only social (pension) reforms undertaken in consensus offer future stability in one of the core areas of the socio-economic fabric of Aruba and can, thus, contribute to the social and economic well being of Aruba's population.

⁸International Labour Office, The International Financial and Actuarial Service Social Protection Sector: Aruba – Actuarial review of the General Old-age Pension Scheme and the General Widows and Orphans Insurance Scheme as of 30 April 2003. Report to the Government, March 2004.

2. Tools, outputs and organization of the study

The study covers the following issues:

- a) an up-dated forecast of the demographic and financial development of Aruba's general pension scheme for a period of 60 years, based on a long-term macroeconomic and demographic framework developed in the context of this project;
- b) an up-to-date review of financial experience to date, together with an updated analysis of the present financial status of the schemes;
- c) recommendations for improved efficiency in the contribution collection process based on a review of the present system and methods, especially addressing the question as to whether contribution collection should be undertaken by the tax office or the Social Insurance Bank;
- d) recommendations for a long-term financial strategy incorporating various reform options. Reforms considered include:
 - i. increasing the legal retirement age to 62,
 - ii. a more appropriate allocation of the AOV/AWW contribution rate
 - iii. increasing the wage ceiling, i.e. to 60,000 AFL in a first step,
 - iv. pegging the pension to a fixed 70 percent of the minimum wage; transition to that state should be administered (modeled) such that the annual pension adjustments in 2006 and thereafter take place at a rate one third of that of the minimum wage until the replacement rate of 70 percent is reached taking into account that pensions will be adjusted by six percent as of 1 January 2005.
 - v. individualisation of the old-age pension combined with no further single premium payment for couples above the wage ceiling,
 - vi. redefining the insurable wage from net wage to gross wage, and providing guidelines based on standard international practice,
 - vii. a combination of all reform options mentioned;
- e) advice on the proposal that only legal residents may build-up pension rights under the SVb;
- f) advice on the proposal that an actuarial review should take place every five years, only more frequent if necessary;
- g) advice on the proposal that there should be annual formal auditing and reporting of the collected AOV/AWW premiums through an accountant;
- advice on the proposal that employers must be held responsible when workers do not pay contributions, i.e. enforce the National Ordinance, General Old Age Insurance (Landsverordening Algemene Ouderdomsverzekering AB 1990 GT33), Article 8, Sub-section 3, which is the discount clause of three percent for each year that a worker does not pay her/his contribution;
- i) under the above reforms (see (d)) and other measures, while maintaining a contribution rate of 13.5 percent in order to allow for the introduction of a second tier (see (k)): advice on the feasibility of preserving the PAYG system on a long-

term basis; advice on the recommended amount of the transitory reserve of the fund; advice as to the best form of management for the fund;

- j) an assessment of the impact of using two percent of the existing contribution rate (under the SVb) to finance a mandated fully funded second tier pension scheme;
- advice on the proposal that married persons with a difference of 20 years of age or more and with no more than five years of marriage, will get a single pension instead of a pension for couples;
- l) advice on the SVb's possible role in a second tier scheme;
- m) an analysis of possible economic impacts of the transitory reserve (see (e)), with special consideration of the absorption capacity of Aruba's financial market; of the possibilities to invest in the national and/or foreign economies; of possible impacts on foreign reserves and the US\$ dollar peg; of required rates of return, etc.; provide general recommendations on investment policy;
- n) other general recommendations based on the findings of this report.

Most of the above issues are of a quantitative nature and have been addressed, accordingly, by using the ILO model family, adjusted to the case of Aruba and the SVb's long-term branch specifically. The other issues are more of a qualitative nature and have been addressed using appropriate methods.

In order to cope in a systematic manner with issues (a) to (n) above and to obtain technical information for this report, nine scenarios were calculated with the help of the ILO model family. Out of these, the following six scenarios directly address certain of the issues:

- 1) Base: Base case scenario, addressing (a) and (d), (d-iv) specifically;
- 2) 62: Same as Base but normal retirement age increased to 62, addressing (di):
- 3) 5000: Same as Base but contribution assessment ceiling increased to 60,000 AFL per annum, addressing (d-iii) specifically;
- 4) *Ind:* Same as Base but individual calculation of all old-age pensions, combined with no further single premium payment for couples above the wage ceiling, addressing (d-v) specifically;
- 5) Reform: A combination of the above four scenarios, addressing (d-vii), mainly, and (d-ii);
- 6) Fund: Same as Reform but using a two percent (four percent, six percent, eight percent) contribution rate for an additional fully funded tier, also addressing (k).

The following three scenarios were calculated in order to gain further background information, which was considered necessary for an adequate discussion of the results:

- 7) 65: Same as Base but normal retirement age increased to 65;
- 8) 6250: Same as Base but contribution assessment ceiling increased to 75,000 AFL per annum;

9) Wage: Same as Base but indexation of benefits related to the national average wage (instead of minimum wage).

All scenario results serve as technical background for the outputs of the report.

After explaining the purpose of this study (Section 1) the report continues with a description of its outputs and organization (Section 2).

In Section 3, the financial experience and present financial situation of the schemes under the SVb (issue (b)) are reviewed. The review is included in a discussion of Aruba's full social budget aiming at widening the view of the social finances of Aruba and, thus, helping to avoid narrow pension policy decisions.

Section 4 contains a description of the demographic and economic framework underlying all scenarios.

Section 5 describes the results of the base scenario in detail, followed by Section 6, which describes the findings on the set of reforms described under issue (d).

Section 7, very much dependent on the results of the preceding Section 6, focuses on the proposal of introducing a fully funded tier, along the requirements as laid down under issues (j), (k) and (l). The section contains a separate section on issue (m).

Section 8 contains a discussion of the alternatives to improve the efficiency of contribution collection and of the proposal to re-enforce Article 8, Sub-section 3.

Section 9 focuses on the proposal to limit the build-up of pension entitlements to residents and on the proposal to replace (under certain conditions) pensions for married couples by single pensions. Recommendations on a more appropriate allocation of the AOV/AWW contribution rate are also presented.

Section 10 sets out some general principles for auditing and of actuarially valuing the finances of the SVb.

Section 11, summarizes all findings and conclusions and provides a comprehensive picture of all findings in a systematic and coherent way.

3. Review of the SVb finances in the context of Aruba's social budget and its macro-economic environment

3.1 Review of the SVb finances in the social budget context

Aruba has a relatively high per-capita income, when compared internationally. A substantial amount of its annual GDP is redistributed through the social protection system, which is adequate for its level of per-capita income. Table 3.1 provides an overview of the main revenue and expenditure items of the country's social budget.

Approximately 21 to 22 percent of GDP is spent on total social protection. If spending on education were included, this figure would rise by another four to five points⁹. The main expenditure item in Aruba is health, which absorbs more than 12 percent of GDP, followed by social protection in a more narrow sense (mainly SVb¹⁰) with around 7.5 percent, followed by company pension fund payments with 0.8 percent and housing with 0.3 percent. Almost 95 percent of total social protection spending in 2002 was on health and the SVb, and therefore these areas will determine the future level and dynamics of total social spending in Aruba.

The funds required for approximately two-thirds of total social spending are made available by revenue earmarked for this purpose (14 percent of GDP). The deficit of seven percent of GDP has to be provided either from accumulated "social protection" reserves or out of general government revenue (public transfers). Around 70 percent of the social budget's deficit is explained by the deficit under health.

It is estimated that around 50 percent of total social protection expenditure is financed from contributions¹¹, and the remainder is from property income and general government revenue. The contribution financed share may have increased, as the contribution assessment ceiling under the health insurance was practically doubled from 49,300 AFL per annum in 2003 to 90,000 AFL per annum in 2004.

European experience shows that major countries increased the contribution financed component of their social budgets with increasing labour income shares in GDP. In other words, one can expect that the contribution financed share of social budgets is positively correlated with the labour income share in GDP. The higher the labour income share, the more it can contribute to social security. Given the present situation in Aruba, some contribution rate increases are justifiable, if required.

⁹There are two main traditions of calculating a country's social budget. The European tradition excludes education (assuming it is rather an investment than a social spending) whereas the US-tradition includes it.

¹⁰See, for example: IMF Country report Nr. 03/43. The Kingdom of the Netherlands – Aruba: Statistical Appendix (February 2003).

¹¹See: Central Bureau of Statistics – Aruba: Government sector of Aruba 1997 – 2002. May 2004. P. 11 (Table 2.6).

Table 3.1 The social budget**)

Items	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002
Social expenditure by function	,	AFL million				
Housing and community amenities	17.9	16.0	12.2	12.2	13.7	10.7
Health	196.6	173.9	211.8	239.7	422.7	434.7
Social protection	253.6	281.7	316.5	324.0	251.5	258.2
Total	468.1	471.6	540.5	575.9	687.9	703.6
Company pension funds				28.1	40.9	27.3
Gross total social expenditure	468.1	471.6	540.5	604.0	728.8	730.9
Social protection and health	450.2	455.6	528.3	563.7	674.2	692.9
Social revenue by function			AFL n			
Housing and community amenities	2.9	7.0	6.5	6.6	6.9	6.6
Health	28.1	32.0	45.0	53.1	265.0	266.5
Social protection	227.9	234.3	257.6	273.1	223.5	213.0
Total	256.0	266.3	302.6	326.2	488.5	479.5
Company pension funds	200.0	200.0	202.0	13.9	4.6	8.6
Gross total social revenue	256.0	266.3	302.6	340.1	493.1	488.1
Social protection and health	256.0	266.3	302.6	326.2	488.5	479.5
Balance (Revenue minus expenditure) *)	230.0	200.5			100.5	177.3
	15.0	0.0	AFL n		<i>(</i> 0	4 1
Housing and community amenities	-15.0	-9.0	-5.7	-5.6	-6.8	-4.1
Health	-168.5	-141.9	-166.8	-186.6	-157.7	-168.2
Social protection	-25.7	-47.4	-58.9	-50.9	-28.0	-45.2
Total	-212.1	-205.3	-237.9	-249.7	-199.4	-224.1
Company pension funds	212.1	205.2	227.0	-14.2	-36.3	-18.7
Gross total	-212.1	-205.3	-237.9	-263.9	-235.7	-242.8
Social protection and health	-194.2	-189.3	-225.7	-237.5	-185.7	-213.4
Social expenditure by function		Per c	ent of GDP	in current pr	ices	
Housing and community amenities	0.7	0.5	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.3
Health	7.2	5.8	6.9	7.2	12.4	12.7
Social protection	9.2	9.5	10.3	9.7	7.4	7.5
Total	17.1	15.8	17.5	17.3	20.2	20.6
				0.8	1.2	0.8
Company pension funds				0.0	1.2	0.6
	17.1	15.8	17.5	18.2	21.4	21.4
Company pension funds		15.8 15.3	17.5 17.1			
Company pension funds Gross total social expenditure Social protection and health Social revenue by function		15.3	17.1	18.2	21.4 19.8	21.4
Company pension funds Gross total social expenditure Social protection and health		15.3	17.1	18.2 16.9	21.4 19.8	21.4
Company pension funds Gross total social expenditure Social protection and health Social revenue by function Housing and community amenities Health	16.4	15.3 <i>Per c</i>	17.1 cent of GDP	18.2 16.9 in current pr	21.4 19.8 ices	21.4 20.3
Company pension funds Gross total social expenditure Social protection and health Social revenue by function Housing and community amenities	16.4 0.1	15.3 Per o 0.2	17.1 cent of GDP 0.2	18.2 16.9 in current pr 0.2	21.4 19.8 ices 0.2	21.4 20.3 0.2
Company pension funds Gross total social expenditure Social protection and health Social revenue by function Housing and community amenities Health	0.1 1.0	15.3 Per c 0.2 1.1	17.1 cent of GDP 0.2 1.5	18.2 16.9 in current pr 0.2 1.6	21.4 19.8 ices 0.2 7.8	21.4 20.3 0.2 7.8 6.2 14.0
Company pension funds Gross total social expenditure Social protection and health Social revenue by function Housing and community amenities Health Social protection	0.1 1.0 8.3	15.3 Per c 0.2 1.1 7.9	17.1 cent of GDP 0.2 1.5 8.4	18.2 16.9 in current pr 0.2 1.6 8.2	21.4 19.8 ices 0.2 7.8 6.6	21.4 20.3 0.2 7.8 6.2
Company pension funds Gross total social expenditure Social protection and health Social revenue by function Housing and community amenities Health Social protection Total	0.1 1.0 8.3 9.3	15.3 Per c 0.2 1.1 7.9 8.9	17.1 cent of GDP 0.2 1.5 8.4 9.8	18.2 16.9 in current pr 0.2 1.6 8.2 9.8	21.4 19.8 ices 0.2 7.8 6.6 14.4	21.4 20.3 0.2 7.8 6.2 14.0
Company pension funds Gross total social expenditure Social protection and health Social revenue by function Housing and community amenities Health Social protection Total Company pension funds	0.1 1.0 8.3 9.3 0.0 9.3	15.3 Per c 0.2 1.1 7.9 8.9 0.0	17.1 cent of GDP 0.2 1.5 8.4 9.8 0.0	18.2 16.9 in current pr 0.2 1.6 8.2 9.8 0.4	21.4 19.8 ices 0.2 7.8 6.6 14.4 0.1	21.4 20.3 0.2 7.8 6.2 14.0 0.3
Company pension funds Gross total social expenditure Social protection and health Social revenue by function Housing and community amenities Health Social protection Total Company pension funds Gross total social revenue Social protection and health	0.1 1.0 8.3 9.3 0.0 9.3	15.3 Per c 0.2 1.1 7.9 8.9 0.0 8.9 8.9	17.1 cent of GDP 0.2 1.5 8.4 9.8 0.0 9.8 9.8	18.2 16.9 in current pr 0.2 1.6 8.2 9.8 0.4 10.2 9.8	21.4 19.8 ices 0.2 7.8 6.6 14.4 0.1 14.5 14.4	21.4 20.3 0.2 7.8 6.2 14.0 0.3 14.3
Company pension funds Gross total social expenditure Social protection and health Social revenue by function Housing and community amenities Health Social protection Total Company pension funds Gross total social revenue Social protection and health Balance (Revenue minus expenditure) *)	0.1 1.0 8.3 9.3 0.0 9.3	15.3 Per c 0.2 1.1 7.9 8.9 0.0 8.9 8.9	17.1 cent of GDP 0.2 1.5 8.4 9.8 0.0 9.8 9.8	18.2 16.9 in current pr 0.2 1.6 8.2 9.8 0.4 10.2	21.4 19.8 ices 0.2 7.8 6.6 14.4 0.1 14.5 14.4	21.4 20.3 0.2 7.8 6.2 14.0 0.3 14.3
Company pension funds Gross total social expenditure Social protection and health Social revenue by function Housing and community amenities Health Social protection Total Company pension funds Gross total social revenue Social protection and health Balance (Revenue minus expenditure) * Housing and community amenities	0.1 1.0 8.3 9.3 0.0 9.3 9.3	15.3 Per c 0.2 1.1 7.9 8.9 0.0 8.9 8.9 Per c -0.3	17.1 cent of GDP 0.2 1.5 8.4 9.8 0.0 9.8 9.8 cent of GDP	18.2 16.9 in current pr 0.2 1.6 8.2 9.8 0.4 10.2 9.8 in current pr -0.2	21.4 19.8 ices 0.2 7.8 6.6 14.4 0.1 14.5 14.4 ices -0.2	21.4 20.3 0.2 7.8 6.2 14.0 0.3 14.3 14.0
Company pension funds Gross total social expenditure Social protection and health Social revenue by function Housing and community amenities Health Social protection Total Company pension funds Gross total social revenue Social protection and health Balance (Revenue minus expenditure) * Housing and community amenities Health	0.1 1.0 8.3 9.3 0.0 9.3 9.3	15.3 Per of 0.2 1.1 7.9 8.9 0.0 8.9 Per of -0.3 -4.8	17.1 cent of GDP 0.2 1.5 8.4 9.8 0.0 9.8 9.8 cent of GDP -0.2 -5.4	18.2 16.9 in current pr 0.2 1.6 8.2 9.8 0.4 10.2 9.8 in current pr -0.2 -5.6	21.4 19.8 ices 0.2 7.8 6.6 14.4 0.1 14.5 14.4 ices -0.2 -4.6	21.4 20.3 0.2 7.8 6.2 14.0 0.3 14.3
Company pension funds Gross total social expenditure Social protection and health Social revenue by function Housing and community amenities Health Social protection Total Company pension funds Gross total social revenue Social protection and health Balance (Revenue minus expenditure) * Housing and community amenities Health Social protection	0.1 1.0 8.3 9.3 0.0 9.3 9.3	15.3 Per c 0.2 1.1 7.9 8.9 0.0 8.9 Per c -0.3 -4.8 -1.6	17.1 cent of GDP 0.2 1.5 8.4 9.8 0.0 9.8 9.8 cent of GDP -0.2	18.2 16.9 in current pr 0.2 1.6 8.2 9.8 0.4 10.2 9.8 in current pr -0.2 -5.6 -1.5	21.4 19.8 ices 0.2 7.8 6.6 14.4 0.1 14.5 14.4 ices -0.2 -4.6 -0.8	21.4 20.3 0.2 7.8 6.2 14.0 0.3 14.3 14.0
Company pension funds Gross total social expenditure Social protection and health Social revenue by function Housing and community amenities Health Social protection Total Company pension funds Gross total social revenue Social protection and health Balance (Revenue minus expenditure) *) Housing and community amenities Health Social protection Total	0.1 1.0 8.3 9.3 0.0 9.3 9.3 -0.5 -6.1 -0.9	15.3 Per of 0.2 1.1 7.9 8.9 0.0 8.9 Per of -0.3 -4.8 -1.6 -6.9	17.1 cent of GDP 0.2 1.5 8.4 9.8 0.0 9.8 eent of GDP -0.2 -5.4 -1.9 -7.7	18.2 16.9 in current pr 0.2 1.6 8.2 9.8 0.4 10.2 9.8 in current pr -0.2 -5.6 -1.5 -7.5	21.4 19.8 ices 0.2 7.8 6.6 14.4 0.1 14.5 14.4 ices -0.2 -4.6 -0.8 -5.9	21.4 20.3 0.2 7.8 6.2 14.0 0.3 14.3 14.0 -0.1 -4.9 -1.3 -6.6
Company pension funds Gross total social expenditure Social protection and health Social revenue by function Housing and community amenities Health Social protection Total Company pension funds Gross total social revenue Social protection and health Balance (Revenue minus expenditure) * Housing and community amenities Health Social protection Total Company pension funds	0.1 1.0 8.3 9.3 0.0 9.3 9.3 -0.5 -6.1 -0.9 -7.7	15.3 Per of 0.2 1.1 7.9 8.9 0.0 8.9 Per of -0.3 -4.8 -1.6 -6.9 0.0	17.1 cent of GDP 0.2 1.5 8.4 9.8 0.0 9.8 9.8 cent of GDP -0.2 -5.4 -1.9	18.2 16.9 in current pr 0.2 1.6 8.2 9.8 0.4 10.2 9.8 in current pr -0.2 -5.6 -1.5 -7.5 -0.4	21.4 19.8 ices 0.2 7.8 6.6 14.4 0.1 14.5 14.4 ices -0.2 -4.6 -0.8 -5.9 -1.1	21.4 20.3 0.2 7.8 6.2 14.0 0.3 14.3 14.0 -0.1 -4.9 -1.3
Company pension funds Gross total social expenditure Social protection and health Social revenue by function Housing and community amenities Health Social protection Total Company pension funds Gross total social revenue Social protection and health Balance (Revenue minus expenditure) * Housing and community amenities Health Social protection Total	0.1 1.0 8.3 9.3 0.0 9.3 9.3 -0.5 -6.1 -0.9 -7.7	15.3 Per of 0.2 1.1 7.9 8.9 0.0 8.9 Per of -0.3 -4.8 -1.6 -6.9	17.1 cent of GDP 0.2 1.5 8.4 9.8 0.0 9.8 9.8 cent of GDP -0.2 -5.4 -1.9 -7.7 0.0	18.2 16.9 in current pr 0.2 1.6 8.2 9.8 0.4 10.2 9.8 in current pr -0.2 -5.6 -1.5 -7.5	21.4 19.8 ices 0.2 7.8 6.6 14.4 0.1 14.5 14.4 ices -0.2 -4.6 -0.8 -5.9	21.4 20.3 0.2 7.8 6.2 14.0 0.3 14.3 14.0 -0.1 -4.9 -1.3 -6.6 -0.5

^{*)} A negative balance (deficit) is covered out of reserves or public transfers.

Source: Central Bureau of Statistics – Aruba: Government sector of Aruba 1997 – 2002, tables 2.1 & 2.4; Central Bank of Aruba

^{**}Revenue includes property income, social contributions, other current transfers and other revenue. Expenditure includes compensation of employees, social benefits in cash and in kind, other current transfers, capital transfers, consumption of fixed capital and other expenditure.

Given Aruba's per-capita-GDP of around 22,400US\$¹², the level of its social budget can be considered as adequate. In international comparison, the country's social budget is neither inadequately high nor too low. In 2000, within a list of selected European countries, Aruba ranked second, after Ireland and before Spain. In the mean time, it may have surpassed the level of the year 2000 of Luxembourg, and possibly that of Portugal (Table 3.2).

Table 3.2 The social budget in international comparison

Country	1997	1998	1999	2000		
Country	Per cent of GDP					
Ireland	16.7	15.5	14.8	14.1		
Aruba	17.1	15.8	17.5	18.2		
Spain	21.1	20.6	20.2	20.1		
Luxembourg	22.9	21.7	21.8	21.0		
Portugal	21.6	22.1	22.6	22.7		
Italy	25.5	25.0	25.3	25.2		
Greece	23.3	24.2	25.5	26.4		
Belgium	28.1	27.6	27.4	26.7		
UK	27.7	26.9	26.5	26.8		
The Netherlands	29.4	28.4	28.0	27.4		
Denmark	30.4	30.2	29.8	28.8		
Germany	29.5	29.3	29.6	29.5		
France	30.8	30.5	30.2	29.7		
Europe (12)	27.8	27.4	27.4	27.1		

Source: EUROSTAT; Ministry of Health and Social Security, Germany; ILO.

While the present overall fiscal volume of Aruba's social budget is of no concern, the extraordinarily high spending on health¹³ is. Future developments in health spending will inevitably have an impact on the government's ability to manage contribution rates of the SVb and, thus, on benefit levels available under the SVb's long-term branch.

Table 3.3 shows Aruba's spending on health expenditure in international comparison. For all countries, except Aruba, the table contains total health expenditure irrespective of whether it is financed out of public or private resources. This means the GDP-shares of all countries, except Aruba, are lower when adjusted for private health expenditure. In other words, Aruba's health expenditure share in GDP would most probably rank first in cases where only publicly financed health care would be considered.

The specific factors explaining this high expenditure ratio would, of course, need careful detailed consideration, which is not the subject of this report. But, independent of the possible findings of such research, there is reason to assume considerable scope for economizing within Aruba's health system – not only for reasons of efficiency but also to improve the country's ability to finance its old-age system.

¹²2004: ILO estimate.

¹³In this report the focus is on the long-term branch of the SVb, not on Aruba's health system, however, a full review of the SVb is not possible without, at least, also briefly reviewing health. The reason is that the more Aruba's total social budget expenditure (in percent of GDP) will reach its (politically set) upper limits, the more *old-age* and *health* will have to "compete" for growingly scarce resources. Recommendations with respect to reforms under the SVb cannot be viewed without possible developments in health, and vice versa.

Table 3.3 International comparison of expenditure on health

Country	1998	2001	2002		
Country	Per cent of GDP				
Spain	7.0	7.5	7.6		
Japan	7.5	7.6	7.8		
UK	6.8	7.6	7.7		
Austria	8.0	8.0	7.7		
New Zealand	8.1	8.2	8.5		
Norway	8.6	8.3	8.7		
Italy	7.7	8.4	8.5		
Belgium	8.6	8.7	9.1		
Sweden	7.9	8.7	9.2		
The Netherlands	8.7	8.9	9.1		
Australia	8.6	8.9	9.1		
France	9.3	9.5	9.7		
Canada	9.3	9.7	9.6		
Germany	10.3	10.7	10.9		
Switzerland	10.4	10.9	11.2		
Aruba		12.4	12.7		
USA	12.9	13.9	14.6		

Source: Bundesamt für Statistik, Schweiz (Swiss Federal Statistical Office)

In order to make the problem more tangible, consider the following scenario. Given an estimated labour income share of GDP of less than 60 percent¹⁴, if total health expenditure in Aruba were to be financed solely out of wage-related contributions (without any ceiling), then the contribution rate would have to be in the order of 20 percent – which is around twice the present contribution rate under the SVb's long-term benefit branch (Table 3.4).

Table 3.4 Social security contribution rates 2004

	Employer	Employee	Total			
Scheme	Per cent of gross wage					
	2004					
AOV	8.25	3.25	11.50			
AWW	1.25	0.75	2.00			
Sickness	4.00	0.00	4.00			
Accident	0.70		0.70			
Severance	0.09		0.09			
Health	6.50	1.00	7.50			
Sum	20.79	5.00	25.79			
Contribution assessment ceilings						
	AFL					
SVb	49300					
Health	90000					

Source: SVb

¹⁴Cf. the macro-economic frame, Section 4 of this report.

Within the total social budget of Aruba, the institution SVb¹⁵ plays a prominent but not a dominant financial role (Table 3.5). In 2002, its contribution revenue amounted to 37 percent ¹⁶ of total revenue of the social budget, and total spending (including administration costs) was just over 20 percent of the total social budget. In terms of GDP, the SVb redistributes 5.5 percent in terms of contribution revenue collected from private households and 4.4 percent of GDP in terms of benefits paid to private households.

From 2001 to 2003, the SVb has run at an overall financial surplus. By the end of 2002, the institution's assets amounted to 232 million AFL, which was equivalent to one and a half times total benefits paid. By the end of 2003, total reserves were estimated to amount to 260 million AFL ¹⁷, out of which 145 million AFL was allocated to the SVb's long-term benefit branch (Table 3.6).

At the end of 2002, out of the total assets, 192 million AFL or 83 percent were liquid, i.e. either invested in bonds and time deposits or other current assets.

While focusing on the future financial development of the long-term branch of the SVb, the main thrust of this report is to look at the future development of the reserves and reform policies to preserve a minimum amount of the reserves over time.

¹⁵Tables 3.1 to 3.3 show the social budget of Aruba under a functional classification of revenue and expenditure. Here, the SVb is considered under an institutional view.

¹⁶This figure relates to social budget revenue excluding public transfers; if one includes public transfers the ratio declines to 27 percent of (total) revenue.

¹⁷Preliminary ILO estimate.

Table 3.5 The SVb in the social budget context

Item	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003
Total operational budget of the SVb			•	AFL m	illion	•		
Total contributions	162.7	177.4	179.6	198.2	190.1	172.2	180.7	198.9
Total benefits	152.4	165.1	180.7	178.0	188.1	152.0	152.0	157.2
Administrative and interest costs	12.7	13.3	13.6	12.9	7.6	8.9	11.5	12.0
Administrative costs	9.5	9.9	10.4	9.4	8.8		9.3	9.5
Interest costs	3.2	3.4	3.2	3.5	-1.2		2.2	2.5
Overall Balance	-2.3	-0.9	-14.7	7.3	-5.6	11.3	17.3	29.6
Old age and widowers and orphans insurance				AFL m	illion			
Contributions	110.7	122.1	113.6	134.6	139.7	149.5	150.2	158.9
Benefits	104.1	110.1	118.8	120.7	125.5	135.7	136.7	138.4
Administrative and interest costs	3.3	3.4	3.2	3.0	-1.7	2.3	1.6	2.6
Administrative costs	1.5	1.6	1.9	2.1	2.2		2.4	2.7
Interest costs	1.8	1.8	1.3	0.9	-3.9		-0.8	-0.1
Balance	3.3	8.6	-8.5	10.9	15.8	11.5	11.9	17.9
Sickness and accident insurance				AFL m				
Contributions	50.8	54.0	65.8	62.2	49.7	20.2	29.9	39.1
Benefits	47.8	54.7	61.4	56.4	61.2	15.5	14.7	18.5
Administrative and interest costs	9.8	10.3	10.9	10.6	9.6	10.3	10.4	9.9
Administrative costs	7.9	8.2	8.5	7.5	6.3	6.4	6.5	6.4
Interest costs	1.9	2.1	2.4	3.1	3.3	3.9	3.9	3.5
Balance	-6.8	-11.0	-6.5	-4.8	-21.1	-5.6	4.8	10.7
Severance insurance				AFL m				
Contributions	1.3	1.4	0.2	1.4	0.7	1.6	0.6	0.9
Interest revenues	0.5	0.5	0.6	0.5	0.7	0.9	0.9	0.9
Benefits	0.4	0.3	0.4	0.9	1.4	0.8	0.6	0.3
Administrative costs	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.4
Balance	1.3	1.5	0.3	0.9	-0.3	1.4	0.6	1.0
Total operational budget of the SVb				Per cent of				
Total contributions	6.6	6.5	6.0	6.4	5.7	5.1	5.3	5.5
Total benefits	6.2	6.0	6.1	5.8	5.7	4.5	4.4	4.4 0.3
Administrative and interest costs	0.5 0.4	0.5 0.4	0.5 0.4	0.4 0.3	0.2 0.3	0.3	0.3	
Administrativecosts Interest costs	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.3	0.3		0.3 0.1	0.3 0.1
Overall Balance	-0.1	0.1	-0.5	0.1	-0.2	0.3	0.1	0.1
Total operational budget of the SVb	-0.1	0.0		er cent of so		0.5	0.5	0.0
Total contributions ¹⁾		co 2		-	-	240	27.0	
		69.3	67.4	65.5	55.9	34.9	37.0	
Total benefits ²⁾		35.3	38.3	32.9	31.1	20.9	20.8	
Administrative and interest costs ²		2.8	2.9	2.4	1.3	1.2	1.6	
Overall Balance 3)		5.2	3.2	2.0	8.0	2.4	-2.0	
				Memorand	um items			
All branches of the SVb			В	eneficiaries	by category			
Old age and widowers and orphans insurance	9057	9496	10154	10520	10855	11387	11465	11949
Old age	8000	8351	8922	9237	9506	9942	10225	10640
Widowers and orphans	1057	1145	1232	1283	1349	1445	1240	1309
Sickness and accident insurance		12808	12789	12306	12148	10918	10166	11383
Sickness		11489	11437	11003	10767	9834	9413	10797
Accident		1319	1352	1303	1381	1084	753	586
Severance insurance	113	57	56	415	482	228	174	59
All branches of the SVb	Insured by category							
Old age and widowers and orphans insurance	134526		145053	169207	145472	142149	145032	156889
Old age	57766		62556	74006	61112	60114	61938	73475
Widowers and orphans	76760		82497	95201	84360	82035	83094	83414
Sickness and accident insurance	58004	62054	61404	63582	64037	63366	62278	63733
Sickness	27742	29652	29306	30169	30265	29827	29233	29310
Accident	30262	32402	32098	33413	33772	33539	33045	34423
*! Concerns the same category of insured as those insured for	30262	32402	32098	33413	33772	33539	33045	34423

^{*)} Concerns the same category of insured as those insured for accidents.

1) In per cent of total social budget revenue excluding public transfers.

2) In per cent of total social budget spending.

3) In per cent of total social budget balance.

Source: SVb, ILO.

Table 3.6 Aggregate balance sheet of the SVb

Item	2000	2001	2002	20031)2)		
		AFL n	nillion			
Assets	196.7	206.6	231.9	260.0p		
Investments	76.3	87.6	107.1			
Bonds	36.3	22.3	32.7	•••		
Time deposits	40	65.3	74.4			
Fixed assets	36.7	38.1	39.6			
Current assets	83.7	80.9	85.2			
Capital and liabilities	196.7	206.6	231.9	260.0p		
Current liabilities	45.3	38.2	13.5			
Capital and reserves	151.4	168.4	218.4			

¹⁾ Preliminary ILO estimate.

Source: CBA (2000 to 2002)

3.2 Aruba's macroeconomic and income-distributive environment for social protection financing

In general, over the past decade, the economic conditions for financing Aruba's social budget were quite favorable. Real GDP grew by about one quarter or two to 2.5 percent per annum. Over the same time, the number of employed persons increased on average by about two percent per annum ¹⁸, the number of enterprises increased by about 230 or ten percent (between 1998 and 2004). An average number of 15 employees per enterprise are registered under the SVb, indicating flexibility of Aruba's business sector. Although these estimates are based on various sources of information¹⁹, they provide indication that overall labour productivity growth is low (below one percent per annum), reflecting the fact that Aruba's economy depends mainly on the services industries (tourism, financial services).

The past high influx of migrant labour contributed substantially to economic growth and, thus, the financial environment of social protection. While net migration was regative between 1972 and 1987, the balance of immigration and emigration reversed and remained positive in later years. Since 1988, on average about 1,500 persons (net) per year migrated to Aruba, thus contributing substantially to overall population growth (total population 60,000 in 1989, 95,000 in 2003). Migration contributed to the fact that social expenditure could be kept well under control as it helped to keep Aruba's population young and healthy on average. With growing population density, the country might in future gradually reach absorption limits, either environmentally, socio-economically or politically induced. At that point in time, the financial effects of an ageing population will become evident, having been camouflaged by the positive migration balance of the past.

²⁾ Reserve of the SVb long-term branch: 144.8 million AFL. Source: SVb.

¹⁸Including employment declines in 2001/2002.

¹⁹Although the work of the Central Bureau of Statistics has recently been significantly improved, the statistical reporting system of Aruba still needs substantial further improvements, especially with respect to a consistent framework of national accounting (including essential areas such as a consistent labour market balance and institutionally structured government accounts). See also: International Monetary Fund: The Kingdom of the Netherlands – Aruba: 2002 Article IV Consultation; Staff report; Staff supplement; and Public information Notice on the Executive Board Discussion. IMF Country Report 03/42 (February 2003).

Aruba's primary income distribution²⁰ compares well with countries of similar GDP-percapita levels and labour market structures²¹. Since 1995 per-capita-wages have grown by about four percent annually, while inflation in recent years has remained at around three percent. The labour income share in GDP varies between 55 and 57.5 percent. This is equivalent to between 60 and 63 percent of national income, which is about five percentage points lower than that of Europe, US and Japan. In other words, so far, the labour income share of GDP can be considered sufficient to finance the contributory parts of Aruba's social protection.

Based on the following observations however, problems for social protection financing, seem to arise from wage distribution in combination with the highly redistributive public pension formula:

1. The contribution assessment ceiling has been kept constant for a number of years at a level of 4,108 AFL per month (Table 3.7). At its present (2004) level, the collection of full contributions (i.e. calculated on the basis of full gross wages) occurs from only around 80 percent of all wage earners (Table 3.8; Figure 3.1). All workers earning wages above the ceiling pay contributions only up to the ceiling, therefore their effective contribution rate is lower than the legal rate. Table 3.7 shows that the ceiling relative to the national average wage has declined substantially over the past 10 years, from around 150 percent of the national average wage to around just 110 percent of the national average wage. If not indexed, the ceiling will be at the same level as the national average wage by 2006 at the latest. By the end of 2003, the resulting accumulated loss of contribution income to the AOV (due to non-adjustment of the ceiling in line with general wages (1999-2003)) is estimated at 24 million AFL (compared to a reserve of 145 million AFL by the end of the same year). In 2003 alone the loss amounted to about 0.7 percent of the actual insurable wage base. For a person earning a salary in 2003 at a level of 20 (40) percent²² above the actual ceiling, the implicit contribution rate is 2.25 (3.9) percent lower than for someone earning a salary at the ceiling. For those earning a salary 40 percent above the ceiling in 2003, the implicit contribution rate is at the level of the legal rate of 1997 (9.5 percent).

²⁰See economic frame in Section 4.

²¹See labour market balance in Section 4.

²²Twenty percent above the actual ceiling corresponds to a value achieved in 2003 in case the ceiling had been indexed with wages.

Box 1 Long-term growth considerations

Aruba has a relatively young population of around 95,000 (2003). Its average age is 33.3 years, and dependency ratios are quite favorable and, for the time being, do not pose significant problems to financing social security.

The present unproblematic demographic situation is mainly due to the high influx of immigrants to Aruba over the past 15 years. Over this period, the total population increased by around 35,000, from 60,000 in 1989 to almost 95,000 in 2003.

One of the main reasons for Aruba's attractiveness to foreigners is the country's quite impressive past economic performance. Growth opportunities were also bolstered by immigration. Without a doubt, the stable and reliable legal and social institutions of the country contributed significantly to making this population increase of almost 50 per cent over a period of less than two decades a success.

Recently, the government has taken more control over the influx of foreigners to the country. Indeed, the need to integrate the past high influx is still high on the societal, infra-structural and economic agenda of the country. At present (2003) population-density is about 534 persons per km² and, thus, one of the highest in the world, even when limiting the comparison to small islands. Under the carefully made demographic assumptions of this report, assuming a long-term net immigration of just over 200 persons per year (which is well below past experience) population density is estimated to increase to 680 persons per km².

Under this modest immigration assumption, Aruba's population will undergo the natural process of ageing, the same process that can be observed in almost all countries around the world. It is therefore not at all surprising that in Aruba the same discussion occurring worldwide has started with respect to the problems of financing the growing financial burden with respect to growing old-age/active ratios.

It has been argued that the solution to the future financing problems of ageing societies is economic growth. Indeed, it is easier for individuals to pay high taxes/contributions for redistribution to the non-active parts of the population in a situation of high incomes rather than low incomes.

Economic policies should therefore be growth-oriented, which, in the opinion of most contemporary decision makers, requires low tax/contribution rates rather than high rates.

At the same time, it has been argued by many researchers that ageing of societies, at least when such societies have already reached a state of demographic maturity are prone to reduced growth rates, whereas demographically immature societies may profit from transitionally high growth rates of their labour force and, thus, high economic growth rates.

Others have argued that empirical evidence for the "transition" argument is missing. According to them, future growth of ageing societies depends much more on technological progress, spending on research, institutional arrangements, openness to the world economy etc., i.e. factors that lie outside the demographic sphere.

The answer to the question as to which of the approaches is correct is important for modeling a reasonable long-term economic and labour market scenario for Aruba. When it comes to pension finances, the aspect of prudence of assumptions comes to the fore. Of course, in theory one can propose sufficiently high economic growth rates that would solve all future pension financing problems, however, pension policy has to prepare the system of financing pensions for the possibility of less favorable developments while, at the same time, not basing such decisions on assumptions that are inappropriately pessimistic.

For the purposes of this report, the ILO favours the argument that an ageing population has a dampening impact on economic growth rates, while accepting the fact that Aruba's population is still relatively young and, thus, the country will be able to take advantage of the long-lasting positive, however transitional, effects of the ageing process on its labour force and on labour productivity.

Table 3.7 Key wage indicators of the social protection system

Item	Dimension	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
Ceiling SVb	AFL/month	3'750	3'868	3'998	4'108	4'108	4'108	4'108	4'108	4'108	4'108
Ceiling health insurance	AFL/IIIOIIIII	3 /30	3 808	3 998	4 108	4 108	4 108	4 108	4 108	4 108	7'500
Ceilings as a multiple of the national a	verage wage										
Ceiling SVb	X	1.4	1.5	1.4	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.2	1.1	1.1	1.1
Ceiling health insurance	Λ	1.4	1.3	1.4	1.5	1.3	1.5	1.2	1.1	1.1	2.0
National average wage, gross	AFL/month	2'674	2'667	2'826	3'051	3'227	3'280	3'510	3'603	3'623	3'805
National average wage, net	Al L/IIIOIIIII				2'532	2'687	2'720	2'903	2'971	2'963	3'100
Net relative to gross	Per cent				83.0	83.3	82.9	82.7	82.5	81.8	81.5
Minimum wage	AFL/month	995	1'025	1'060	1'089	1'112	1'200	1'200	1'200	1'200	1'236
MinW relative to net average wage	Per cent				43.0	41.4	44.1	41.3	40.4	40.5	39.9

All figures concerning national average wage (gross, net) ILO estimates.


Source: SVb; ILO.

Table 3.8 Distribution of monthly wages / salaries (2003)

				Gorss v	vage earned	1 in 2003, A	AFL p.a.				
0 -5000	5000 -10000	10000 -15000	15000 -20000	20000 -25000	25000 -30000	30000 -35000	35000 -40000	40000 -45000	45000 -50000	50000+	Average
		Per ce	nt of all wo	rkers who	earned wag	es within th	he above br	ackets		•	wage
20.4	9.6	8.7	9.9	8.2	7.1	5.9	4.8	3.9	3.4	18.3	100%
								Ceiling SVb:	49300		

Source: ILO, based on data provided by the tax office of Aruba.

Figure 3.1 Distribution of monthly wages/salaries (2003)



Source: ILO, based on data provided by the tax office of Aruba.

2. Maintaining the contribution assessment ceiling constant over long periods of time, as in Aruba, in an environment of substantially growing nominal wages not only results in revenue losses for social protection but also functions similar to policy of hidden tax reductions. Meanwhile there are a substantial number of high-income earners in Aruba who have become accustomed to the low ceiling. If the government continues to put off adjusting the ceiling, especially now that the economy, including wages, seems to be recovering, then the number of workers profiting from the continued implicit tax reductions will probably increase rapidly. In terms of political economy, it will become more difficult to increase the ceiling the longer the government waits.

- 3. The fact that the present benefit formula of the SVb's long-term scheme is highly redistributive ²³ (Table 3.9) may account for high income earners' resistance to increases in the contribution assessment ceiling. In order to illustrate the highly redistributive nature of the SVb's long-term scheme, virtual individuals were created and projected pension calculations were made based on the assumption that the individuals worked continuously from age 20 to 60. The projected pension calculations were undertaken based on earnings of:
 - 1. the minimum wage;
 - 2. 75 percent of the national average wage;
 - 3. the national average wage;
 - 4. the ceiling; and
 - 5. twice the ceiling (assuming the ceiling were doubled).

It was then assumed that the individuals pay the present legal contribution rate on these earnings (also in case 5). All individuals were assumed to retire at age 60 and to have a remaining life expectancy of 16 years in the case of a man and 26 years in case of a woman.

Present values of contributions paid and of pensions received were calculated (Table 3.9). The results show that the system is highly redistributive. While the present value of pension benefits for men and women earning the minimum wage is clearly higher than their contribution payments, the same comparison becomes negative for men earning 57 percent or more of the national average wage and women earning 80 percent or more of the national average wage). A man always earning the indexed ceiling²⁴ receives a pension that represents only slightly over one third of his contributions paid and in case of a woman the pension received is slightly over half of the contributions paid. While an adjustment of the ceiling (see footnote 21) is overdue, any such measure will most likely meet resistance from the large group of high income earners (those earning above the present ceiling) for whom the expected pension would be only 20 to 25 percent of contributions paid (men/women in case the ceiling were doubled)²⁵.

The results of the calculations presented in Table 3.9 are, of course, sensitive to the underlying macroeconomic assumptions made, specifically to the assumed discount rate and to the CPI indexation of pensions. However, variations of these assumptions will not change the trend of the results.

From a broader social policy point of view, redistributive elements of pension systems are generally welcomed. The intensity of income redistribution is, of course, a question of social contract and in principle open to public debate. In the case of Aruba, the intensity of redistribution has most obviously helped to avoid poverty among the aged and, also, helps to avoid poverty in the open public.

²³It should be mentioned that perhaps the Minister of Finance might have an institutional interest in the non-adjustment of the ceiling, as pension contributions are deductible from individual income before taxation.

²⁴Indexed regularly with national average wages. This has to be distinguished clearly from *adjustment* of the SVb ceiling to the same level as the health insurance ceiling, and subsequent regular indexation with national average wages.

²⁵As contributions are tax deductible, the estimated redistributive effects on the individual are in reality lower. This observation does not, however, change the general picture.

Table 3.9 Redistributive effects of the pension formula under the AOV

Wage level	Present value of contributions paid (AFL) (1)	Present value of pension received (AFL) (2)	Difference in present value (2 - 1)	Single pension as a percentage of wage level
Standard male worker*	20.000	40.075	11.057	70
Minimum wage	38,808	49,865	11,057	70
75% of average wage	66,551	49,865	-16,687	32
Average wage	88,735	49,865	-38,870	24
Ceiling	146,370	49,865	-96,505	15
Ceiling doubled	292,740	49,865	-242,875	7
Standard female worker*				
Minimum wage	38,808	71,746	32,938	70
75% of average wage	66,551	71,746	5,195	32
Average wage	88,735	71,746	-16,989	24
Ceiling	146,370	71,746	-74,624	15
Ceiling doubled	292,740	71,746	-220,994	7

^{*}These calculations were based on 2003 figures and were undertaken using the ILO pension model under the results of Sections 4 and 5. It has been assumed that a standard worker works without interruption from age 20 and retires at age 60. A male is expected to live 16 years beyond retirement, and a female is expected to live 26 years beyond retirement, hence the greater present value of pensions received by females.

Source: ILO

4. The demographic and economic frame

The demographic and economic frame underlying the calculations under all scenarios is an update of the status quo scenario of the 2003 review²⁶; in fact, the base scenario of this study and the status quo scenario of the 2003 review differ only marginally. The frame is the same for all scenarios with changes only in a few cases, which are described where relevant.

This Section contains a description of the projections of the main demographic, economic and labour market variables underlying the study. The developments assumed have been compiled in a table at the end of this paragraph.

Demography

In 2003, Aruba's population was 94,500 persons, out of which 52 percent were female and 48 percent male. Due to the past waves of immigration around one third of the population was not born in Aruba.

The present total fertility rate is about 1.86, i.e. a cohort of 1000 women of fertile age is assumed to have a total number of 1,860 babies during the cohort's reproductive period of 35 years. This assumption implies that Aruba's population remains slightly below replacement level, which is (over) compensated however by the assumption of net migration (see below).

Life expectancy at birth has been increasing during the past and has been estimated at 72.4 years for men and 77.8 years for women (2003).

For the population projection the fertility rate was assumed constant, whereas the mortality rate is expected to decline further to increase life expectancy to 78.3 years for men and 83.5 years for women by 2050.

Assumptions on fertility and mortality rates are in line with the demographic mainstream assumptions underlying, for example, the regular population projections undertaken by the UN population division.

A crucial assumption for Aruba's future population development is the assumption of (net) immigration. For the projection period it was assumed that between 2003 and 2011 300 persons per year would migrate to Aruba. This number is assumed to scale down linearly between 2011 and 2021 to a constant annual influx of 200 persons until 2063. These assumptions differ significantly from past experience but are nevertheless considered plausible in the context of this study for the following reasons. Firstly, for the past few years the government has pursued a more restrictive policy with respect to granting residence permits²⁷. Secondly, Aruba's population density is already high, even in international comparison, at 534 persons per km2. Even under the conservative assumptions of future population development (fertility, mortality, migration) the population density increases to 680 persons per km2 by the end of the projection period

²⁶See: International Labour Office: Aruba. Report to the Government. Actuarial review of the General Old-age Pension Scheme and the General Widows and Orphans Insurance Scheme as of 30 April 2003. Geneva, March 2004, pp. 5 to 7.

²⁷See: Central Bureau of Statistics – Aruba: Double or Quits. A study on recent migration to Aruba 1993 – 2003. Oranjestad 2004, p. 20.

(2063), which poses a challenge to the development of Aruba's environmental, infrastructural, economic and socio-political structures. Thirdly, the moderate immigration assumption was chosen for reasons of prudence. A possible alternative assumption of continued high (net) immigration would easily lead to the wrong conclusions as to the future financial development of the SVb. It is always possible to construct, on paper, a sufficiently high influx of additional workers from abroad to the Aruban labour market that would, over the projection period, solve all possible financial problems of the SVb. Such an approach is not considered helpful for obvious reasons.

As a result of these assumptions, Aruba's population grows from 95,000 in 2003 to 123,000 in 2063, i.e. by 28,000 persons. At the same time the structure of the population changes as follows: in 2003 about 12 percent of the population are 60 years of age and over, this share increases to around 27 percent until 2030, remaining relatively constant thereafter. At the same time the share of persons aged 14 and younger in the whole population decreases slightly from 24 percent today to 19 percent in 2063. The share of those aged 15 to 59, decreases from 65 percent now to 53 percent in 2063. According to standard practice, these figures imply that there are 5.4 active persons per aged person in 2003. There are only two active persons per aged person from 2030 onwards.²⁸

Labour supply

In the ILO model family, labour supply is a direct result of applying labour market participation rates to the relevant population.

In 2003, the total labour market participation rate is estimated at 67.5 percent of the population aged 15 to 69 (men: 75.7 percent; women: 60.2 percent). The estimated allocation of labour market participation rates over individual ages is indicated in Figure 4.1.


For the projection, male age-specific rates were kept constant. Female prime age rates were assumed to converge linearly to 95 percent of male rates over a period of 25 years (by 2027). Thus, by 2063, the total rate is 68 percent (male: 71 percent; female: 65 percent).²⁹

The age specific participation rates were adjusted in the scenarios 62/65 and *Reform*, which simulate the effects of increases of the normal legal retirement age on SVb pension expenditure.

²⁸These calculations refer to standard demographic ratios; the results shown must not be confused with the scheme-specific demographic ratios under the SVb, which are the relevant figures for analyzing the finances of the SVb. However, in the case of Aruba, the above broad demographic indicators are a relatively good approximation of the development of the respective scheme specific indicators.

²⁹Despite constant single age participation rates, total male participation rates change due to changes in the population structure, and the same effect occurs for total female rates.

Figure 4.1 Labour market participation rates 2003



Source: Aruba Central Bureau of Statistics, ILO.


Economy

In the economic module of the ILO model family it is assumed that long-term growth depends on the growth of the labour force and its productivity.

The development of the labour force is given as a result of population development and labour market participation rates (see above) shown at Figure 4.1. Productivity for the past seven years showed high variance and, more or less, stagnated on average between 1997 and 2003. However, assuming stagnation of labour, productivity was not considered reasonable over the long run. Instead, a steady labour productivity growth of one percent per annum was assumed.

Given these inputs, future real GDP grows at an annual average rate of 1.3 percent per annum. Actual annual growth rates vary according to Figure 4.2.

Figure 4.2 Annual growth rates of GDP, labour force and productivity



Source: ILO.


For price development it was assumed that, over the long run, the GDP deflator and the CPI develop in parallel; and their respective growth rates were assumed to be 2.6 percent

per annum over the long run between 2003 and 2063. This assumption was used for indexing the legal minimum wage, which, in turn, is the basis for indexing SVb pensions.

Accordingly, nominal GDP (GDP in current prices) increases in the long run at an annual average rate of four percent (see Figure 4.2). Nominal GDP sets the outer frame for the development of all nominal variables governing revenue and expenditure of the SVb. Among these, the national average wage (NAW) is prominent as it serves as a reference for other variables. Based on the assumption of a constant labour income share of GDP (about 57 percent), the NAW grows annually at an average rate of 3.7 percent (Figure 4.3).

The NAW is used as a basis for calculating the contribution assessment ceiling of the SVb and, thus, for the development of the scheme specific wages under the SVb. NAW, ceiling, contribution rate and the number of contributors (see below), together, determine the development of the contribution revenue of the SVb.

Figure 4.3 Annual growth rates of the national average wage (NAW)



Source: ILO.

With respect to interest, a real rate of two percent was assumed, and the nominal rate is calculated by adding the inflation rate. Within the model the interest rate is used for calculating the interest income of the fund, discount rates and the annuities to be expected in case a fully funded tier were to be introduced (see below).

Consistent with the other assumptions, it is expected that over the long run unemployment converges to a minimum of five percent of the labour force. Thus, total employment (labour demand), after the unemployment rate converged, is a linear function of the labour force (labour supply).

Thus far, Aruban statistics do not provide a breakdown of total employment into selfemployed and dependent employed. For reasons of consistency the ILO has provided estimates for this report (Table 4.1).

Table 4.1 Demographic and economic frame - core variables 2003 to 2063

Item	Dimension	2003	2013	2023	2033	2043	2053	2063
Population, total	Persons	94529	104353	112449	117486	119608	120562	122329
Males	Persons	45355	50042	53796	55953	56864	57531	58663
Females	Persons	49174	54312	58652	61533	62744	63031	63666
Population aged 15 to 69, total	Persons	68944	77508	80462	78653	78577	80914	80716
Males	Persons	32794	37131	38657	38016	38243	39521	39537
Females	Persons	36150	40377	41805	40637	40334	41393	41179
Labour force, total	Persons	46557	51928	53944	53243	54426	55086	54928
male	Persons	24812	27125	27591	27023	27768	28198	28129
female	Persons	21744	24803	26353	26221	26657	26888	26798
Labour force participation rate, total	%	67.5%	67.0%	67.0%	67.7%	69.3%	68.1%	68.1%
male	%	75.7%	73.1%	71.4%	71.1%	72.6%	71.4%	71.1%
female	%	60.2%	61.4%	63.0%	64.5%	66.1%	65.0%	65.1%
Employed, total	Persons	43163	49335	51242	50574	51699	52328	52177
male	Persons	23301	25961	26407	25863	26577	26988	26922
female	Persons	19862	23374	24835	24711	25122	25339	25255
Self-employed	Persons	5015	5868	6095	6015	6149	6224	6206
Employees	Persons	38148	43468	45147	44558	45550	46104	45971
Unemployed, total	Persons	3394	2592	2702	2670	2727	2758	2750
Male	Persons	1511	1164	1184	1159	1191	1210	1207
Female	Persons	1883	1428	1518	1510	1535	1549	1543
Contributors to the SVb	Persons	36357	41213	42806	42248	43188	43713	43587
GDP, real, growth	%	1.4	2.4	1.4	0.9	1.2	1.1	1.0
GDP deflator / CPI, growth	%	3.8	3.1	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5
GDP, nominal, growth	%	5.2	5.5	4.0	3.4	3.8	3.7	3.5
Labour income share in GDP	%	56.8	56.8	56.8	56.8	56.8	56.8	56.8
Labour income	BlnAFL	2'044	3'500	5'162	7'235	10'503	15'096	21'377
Sum of wages and salaries	BlnAFL	1'658	2'864	4'242	5'959	8'666	12'472	17'676
National average wage (NAW), gross	AFL/mths.	3'623	5'492	7'829	11'144	15'855	22'544	32'041
Minimum wage	AFL/mths.	1'200	1'619	2'081	2'676	3'440	4'422	5'685
Insured sum of wages	BlnAFL	1'342	2'216	3'175	4'476	6'630	9'396	13'335
Ceiling (SVb)	AFL/mths.	4'108	5'668	8'080	11'502	16'364	23'266	33'068
Ceiling (health insurance)	AFL/mths.	4'108	10'823	15'430	21'965	31'249	44'432	63'150

¹⁾ Except 2003, all rates 10-year-geometrical mean. Source: ILO.

5. Base scenario results

This section presents and analyses projections of the AOV and AWW schemes up to 2063 under status-quo legal financing³⁰ and benefits provisions based on the demographic and macroeconomic frame presented in the previous section. Since the surpluses and deficits of both schemes accrue to a single fund, the finances of both have been projected together despite the accounting principle that they should be maintained separately.

The projected revenue and expenditure of the AOV and AWW have been updated from the valuation³¹ in 2003 as new data were available. For this report, a full database of active contributors was accessible thus allowing for more a precise estimation of the impact of certain parametric reform measures. Records were available for all individual jobs for the year 2002 and included the following information: age, sex, gross wage, net wage³² and duration of work during the year.

The main objective of this projection is to identify the underlying trend of the future financial development of the scheme. It serves as analysis as to where the SVb is heading under status quo conditions (no reforms) and as a reference for the reform scenarios. It should be understood that the accuracy of the results relies on the assumptions set. However, most of the indicators calculated on basis of absolute results (e.g. contribution rates, shares in GDP, year of first negative balance, etc.) are relatively resilient to changes in the underlying demographic and economic assumptions.

The following six sub-sections describe the projected revenue and expenditure of the AOV and AWW, specifically contribution income, AOV expenditure, AWW expenditure, administration costs, total expenditure and the reserve.

5.1 Contribution income

Most of the following results were made possible because the relevant data were available for the first time. Prior to this valuation, for the first ILO valuation, projections had been made according to rough estimates based on GDP growth. This method could only produce crude results with respect to problems such as measuring the financial impact of increasing the contribution ceiling or increasing the normal age of retirement.

For this report, a cohort-matrix of the insurable base by sex and single age was built by the multiplication of the jobs matrix with the matrix of wages (salary scale matrix). From this platform, the behavior of the future insurable base was modeled in greater detail than before as a distinction could be made between the demographic effect and the economic effect included in the annual insurable base growth.

Figure 5.1 presents the insurable base growth during the projection period. On average, the insurable base grows at a rate of 3.9 percent per year. Growth is stronger in the first ten


³⁰In modeling terms, status quo implies regular indexation of the contribution assessment ceiling to average wages.

³¹See: International Labour Office: Aruba. Report to the Government. Actuarial review of the General Old-age Pension Scheme and the General Widows and Orphans Insurance Scheme as of 30 April 2003. Geneva, March 2004.

³²Gross wage minus wage tax minus employee social security contributions.

years as the number of contributors is expected to increase rapidly at the beginning of the projection period and remain stagnant thereafter. Three lines are presented in order to disaggregate total growth. As the number of contributors stagnates in the long run, growth of the insurable base is almost entirely due to the average wage growth.

Figure 5.1 Annual growth rates of the insurable base - Base scenario




The insurable base growth is expected to be 5.5 percent in 2005 and then decrease to 3.6 percent over a 10-year period. Long-term growth is assumed to be constant at 3.6 percent from 2015.

The demographic growth represents the financial effect of the number of new contributors on the insurable base. From the macro-economic frame presented in Section 4, it is observed that the number of new contributors will be relatively low. In fact, the average growth will only be 0.3 percent per year for the following 60 years and then stagnate, as the bulk of new contributors will join the system until around 2020.

Figure 5.2 shows the link between the insurable base and GDP growth. Future growth of the insurable base is strongly correlated to GDP growth because wage growth is a core result of GDP growth. It is therefore not surprising to observe similar curves in terms of annual growth.


Figure 5.2 Annual growth rates: insurable base vs. GDP - Base scenario



The insurable base is defined as the sum of annual wages on which contributions should be paid. The revenue of the pension scheme was obtained by applying the AOV contribution rate of 11.5 percent and the AWW contribution rate of two percent to the insurable base.

Figure 5.3 shows the contribution income in millions of AFL of both schemes combined. In 2003, the contribution income is around 159 million and grows to over 1.6 billion in 2063.

Figure 5.3 Contribution income in million AFL - Base scenario



The insurable base presented in this valuation could be considered slightly more optimistic than the insurable base presented in the year 2003 valuation, as the wage growth assumption retained is slightly higher.

5.2 AOV expenditure

The AOV scheme receives the largest share of contribution income, 11.5 percent of insurable wages or approximately 85 percent of the SVb's contribution income. Benefits payable from this scheme are single pensions, pensions paid to married couples ("married pensions") and pensions paid in case of divorce ("split pensions"). Since pensions are payable for life, AOV expenditure increases as more pensioners, who live bnger, and receive larger pensions, are added.

Table 5.1 presents some cost indicators of the future financial development of the AOV in comparison to the present legal contribution rate.

Table 5.1 AOV - GAP and PAYG rates - Base scenario

Legal rate	GAP		PAYG					
2003	2003-2063	2003	2033	2063				
11.5%	14.6%	11.1%	18.1%	13.4%				

The general average premium (GAP) of the scheme is 14.6 percent. This represents the constant contribution rate that, if applied over the period 2003-2063, would be sufficient to meet the expenditure of the scheme over that period³³. It may be considered the constant long-term cost for labour of the AOV. The GAP will be used later in the report to compare various scenarios of the scheme's modifications and sensitivity tests.

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
³³The general average premium is calculated here as the present value of scheme's expenditure of the period 2003-2063 divided by the present value of total insurable earnings for the same period. The initial reserve as at 31 December 2002 is not considered.

One percentage point of the GAP of 14.6 percent is attributable to the assumed increase in life expectancy. In other words, without the assumed life expectancy development, the number of pensioners would be around 1,000, 4,000 and 6,000 lower in 2023, 2043 and 2063, respectively, in which case the GAP would be 13.7 percent.

The pay-as-you-go (PAYG) cost rate represents the contribution rate that would be required to meet the expenditure of the scheme, year after year, in the absence of reserves. In 2003, the PAYG rate is 11.1 percent, thus close to the actual contribution rate devoted to AOV pensions (11.5 percent). However, the PAYG rate is expected to increase in the future and reach 18.1 percent in 2033. The rate will finally decrease and remain relatively constant at 13.4 percent in 2063.

Figure 5.4 compares the present legal contribution rate to the projected PAYG rate for the next six decades. It illustrates that there will be a need to increase the contribution rate in the future as there is a deviation of 3.1 percent between the GAP and the current contribution rate. In other words, if the present contribution rate were increased by around three percentage points now, the AOV could, under the stable demographic and economic conditions as explained in Section 4, continue its operations until 2063 without reform and without running into a negative reserve.

Figure 5.4 AOV PAYG rate and contribution rate - Base scenario



The AOV expenditure expressed as percentage of GDP is presented in Figure 5.5. On average, considering the full projection period, AOV expenditures represent 4.6 percent of total GDP, which is low in international comparison, however compared to the current 3.6 percent share in GDP it is an increase of 25 percent. In terms of annual development, the trend of the GDP share is similar to the expenditure level expressed in terms of the insurable base (PAYG). In fact, the insurable base is highly influenced by GDP as total labour income represents around 57 percent of GDP in the long run (see Section 4).

Figure 5.5 AOV expenditure as a percentage of GDP - Base scenario






Figure 5.6 presents the expenditure growth over the projection years by components. Two factors influence the growth of the AOV expenditures: the number of pensioners, and the average pension. The number of pensioners stabilizes around 2030 and thus the CPI related pension indexation mechanism would be the primary contributor to the increase of AOV expenditures in the second half of the projection period.

Figure 5.6 AOV annual expenditure growth - Base scenario



For comparison, the following two graphs show the major factors contributing to differences in income and expenditure. Figure 5.7 shows the demographic growth difference between the number of contributors and the number of pensioners. The number of contributors is relatively constant and will grow on average by a modest 0.3 percent per year. Due to relatively high growth in the next 30 years (first half of the projection period), the average number of pensioners will grow by 1.8 percent over the full period. The demographic growth gap is thus over three percentage points during the first half of the projection period, close to zero during the second half, and around 1.5 points over the full period.

Figure 5.7 AOV annual demographic growth - Base scenario



The demographic effect adds a substantial financial load to the scheme for the next 30 years. Because of the demographic structure of the population, the scheme gets more expensive as every 100 contributors will have to pay for an increasing number of pensioners.

Figure 5.8 shows the financial growth difference between the average contribution and the average pension. Average contribution growth is relatively constant; it grows at a rate of 3.6 percent per year on average. The average pension grows according to the CPI as the single pension is calculated constant at 70 percent of the minimum wage and grows by 2.4 percent per year³⁴. The transition process to establish the single pension at 70 percent of minimum wage explains the low average pension growth observed from 2006 to 2009. In fact, after an indexation of six percent as of 1 January 2005, pensions are indexed yearly at only one-third of the inflation index until the 70 percent coupling is reached.

Figure 5.8 AOV annual financial growth - Base scenario




Table 5.2 presents standard comparisons between projected wages, pensions and contribution ceilings. As one can see, both the replacement ratios reduce dramatically. In 2003, the replacement rate of the pension over average insured wage is 35.1 percent and

³⁴It should be recalled that the differential in growth rates of average contributions and average pensions basically reflects the real wage growth assumption (real labour productivity growth assumption) made in the macro-economic frame. In other words, the above differential varies with real wage growth.

decreases to 18.8 percent in 2063. This figure could be explained primarily by the pension indexation based on inflation (70 percent of the minimum wage).

Table 5.2 Replacement ratio - Base scenario

	Gross	Average	Minimum	Contribution	Single	AOV	AWW	(5) / (1)	(5) / (2)	AOV Pay
Year	average national	insured				average	average	Replacement	Replacement	as you go
	wage (1)	wage (2)	wage (3)	ceiling (4)	pension (5)	pension (6)	pension (7)	ratio (8)	ratio (9)	rate (10)
2003	3,623	2,567	1,200	4,108	900	846	504	24.8%	35.1%	11.1%
2004	3,805	2,666	1,236	4,108	900	849	506	23.7%	33.8%	10.9%
2005	3,980	2,748	1,279	4,108	954	875	542	24.0%	34.7%	11.3%
2006	4,159	2,868	1,321	4,293	965	885	561	23.2%	33.6%	11.3%
2007	4,341	2,991	1,364	4,481	975	895	566	22.5%	32.6%	11.2%
2008	4,526	3,113	1,407	4,672	985	903	576	21.8%	31.7%	11.2%
2013	5,492	3,725	1,619	5,669	1,133	1,036	689	20.6%	30.4%	12.6%
2023	7,829	5,139	2,081	8,082	1,457	1,322	942	18.6%	28.4%	16.9%
2033	11,144	7,336	2,676	11,505	1,873	1,699	1,128	16.8%	25.5%	18.1%
2043	15,855	10,632	3,440	16,368	2,408	2,158	1,474	15.2%	22.6%	15.1%
2053	22,544	14,891	4,422	23,272	3,096	2,734	1,908	13.7%	20.8%	14.1%
2063	32,041	21,202	5,685	33,076	3,980	3,490	2,413	12.4%	18.8%	13.4%

It is important to mention that under this scenario the real value of individual pensions remains constant at its 2003 level for all future generations of pensioners until 2063. Thus, relative to the growing purchasing power of contributors, the purchasing power of a pension will be substantially reduced. In 2063, the single pension will be only 19 percent of average insured wage compared to 35 percent in 2003. In other words, at given contribution rates the inherent redistributive characteristic of the AOV will be significantly intensified.

It should be noted that the CPI-elasticity of the minimum wage observed for the period 1995 to 2003 was on average only 0.8, implying that the minimum wage was adjusted at rates equaling only four fifths of CPI inflation. This policy is not considered sustainable in the long run as it, sooner or later, destroys the purpose of the minimum wage of being a trusted socio-economic floor for workers. Accordingly, the CPI-elasticity of minimum wages was assumed to be equal to one over the full projection period. More generally speaking, the past elasticity of significantly below one casts light on the more fundamental problems of linking pensions to minimum wages (see Box 2).

Box 2 Pension indexation standards – Consumer price index and minimum wage35

Consumer price index

In most countries around the world, pensions are indexed according to the Consumer Price Index (CPI) or a combination of CPI and wages or wages only. For example, Canadian public pension payments are adjusted to reflect any increases in the cost of living as measured by the Consumer Price Index. Such indexation rules are usually applied during normal or stable economic periods. It is only during highly unstable and volatile economic periods that such rules have to be temporarily abolished36.

The CPI tracks cost changes in common private household expenses. A standardized "basket" of goods, regularly updated in order to reflect new consumption patterns, consists of food, shelter, clothing, transportation, health care and other household expenditures.

In Canada, pensions benefits are adjusted four times a year using a 3-month "moving average method." The moving average method is used to reduce the effect of sharp changes in the CPI. The rate increase is the percentage change of one 3-month period over the previous 3-month period.

For example, these equations show how the CPI was used to calculate the pensions benefits for January 2005:

As long as individual initial pensions are based on individual career earnings, CPI based indexation is generally an adequate method to ensure that pensioners retain their purchasing power during their retirement period. This is because of the internationally accepted and applied methodological and statistical concepts and procedures normally used to calculate consumer price indices. The CPI is not only used for (pension) indexation but also for many other purposes (monetary policy in general; wage negotiations between employers and employees; indexation rules in private contracts; etc.). As the CPI attracts interest from many societal groups and institutions, it is usually very well protected against undue manipulation. In the context of growing real wages, however, if individual pensions are flat (the same for all pensioners, new pensions and pensions in payment alike), as is the case in Aruba, then CPI indexation, in the long run, leads to old-age poverty.

National average wage

Another standard approach that has been applied by many countries is to index pensions with (national average) wages. This approach has two main purposes: firstly, to maintain the individual pensioners' income position relative to the other pensioners over time; and, secondly, to have all pensioners participate in general economic developments. Technically, the indexation formula is most often similar to the above Canadian formula, or an appropriate variation of it. As the correct compilation of a national average wage (SNA concept) is more laborious than in case of the CPI, statistical offices usually publish national average wages less frequently (i.e. semi-annually or annually). Thus, under a wage related indexation regime, pension adjustments can usually be expected at best semi-annually, but usually only annually.

Some countries use indexation formulae, which index pensions on a weighted average rate of CPI- and wage-growth, for example Poland. The logic of the indexation formula is quite similar to the one above, in that the goal is to balance out the two above "extremes", i.e. to find a middle path through mere maintenance of individual pensioners' purchasing power and their full participation in wage increases.

All indexation systems, whether CPI or wage related, are based on the assumption that the trend for nominal average wages always grows faster than prices.

³⁵See Annex 3 for more information on minimum wages in Europe.

³⁶See: Scholz, Wolfgang and Anne Drouin: Regular adjustment of financial parameters of social protection systems in volatile inflationary environments. In: International Social Security Review, Vol. 51, 1/1998; pp. 47 to 71.

Minimum Wage

On the international scene, minimum wage legislation first appeared in New Zealand in 1894 and in the Australian state of Victoria in 1896 after significant "anti-sweating" campaigns. It was subsequently introduced in Great Britain in 1909, and in a number of continental European countries a few years thereafter. In North America, the state of Massachusetts was the first jurisdiction to institute a minimum wage, in 1912. However, the Massachusetts legislation, which only applied to women and minors working in certain industries, contained numerous exceptions and lacked an effective enforcement mechanism, relying solely on public opinion to pressure employers into compliance. Several other American states followed suit, although the history of the minimum wage legislation in the United States was marked, at least in its early stages, by a number of judicial and political setbacks for its proponents.

Throughout the history of the minimum wage there have also been various other differentials. Youth differentials were once very common, and occupational differentials have been, and still are, rather common, for example, domestic and farm workers have generally been excluded from minimum wage provisions or, if not, have only been entitled to a lower minimum rate. Occupations such as restaurant workers, hairdressers, salespersons, and construction workers have also historically been treated separately. In addition, the legislation of almost all jurisdictions allowed the employment of workers with disabilities at rates below the legislated minimum.

Minimum wage is usually highly influenced by political aspects. In Canada, for example, the minimum wage boards are authorized by law to recommend minimum wage rates, after the necessary inquiries, investigation and research, or to establish such rates subject to the approval of the Lieutenant Governor in Council. The rates are reviewed and increased from time to time by minimum wage orders or regulations. In other words, the final decision always rests with the government.

Most national acts do not provide specific guidelines as to how the minimum wage is to be determined but they usually require social and economic variables and developments to be considered, such as:

- any cost of living increase since any previous order or regulation, with respect to the cost to an employee of purchasing the necessities of life, including but not limited to housing, food, clothing, transportation and health care and supplies; and
- (b) economic conditions, including concepts of a reasonable difference between the minimum wage and normal market wages or reasonable returns on private investment.

Minimum wage developments usually reflect a broad combination of economic and political influences. By their construction, they cannot be expected to measure the development of (minimum) living costs in the same objective way as the CPI does. Annex 3 to his report contains an overview of minimum wage regulations in Europe.

5.3 AWW expenditure

The AWW scheme receives a small share of contribution income, two percent of insurable wages or approximately 15 percent of the contribution income. Benefits provided by this scheme are payable to orphans, widows and invalids. Table 5.3 presents indicators of the future financial development of the AOV scheme.

Table 5.3 AWW - GAP and PAYG rates - Base scenario

Legal rate	GAP		PAYG	
2003	2003-2063	2003	2033	2063
2.0%	0.6%	0.9%	0.5%	0.4%

The GAP of the scheme is 0.6 percent, which is substantially lower than the current contribution rate. With regard to PAYG, the rate is 0.9 percent in 2003, 0.5 percent in 2033 and 0.4 percent in 2063.

As a matter of fact, in the long run, under the present contribution rate, the AWW scheme collects at least three times as much contribution income as it actually needs. Given that,

by contrast, the AOV is in need of resources, one might consider a contribution rate shift in the order of one percentage point from the AWW to the AOV, thus improving the financial situation of the AOV while not increasing the overall burden of wage earners. Such a move, however, would not affect the combined AOV/AWW reserve (see below, Section 5.6).

Figure 5.9 compares the present contribution rate and the GAP to the projected PAYG rate for the next six decades. There is a difference of 1.4 percent between the GAP and the current contribution rate. Thus, the AWW could be considered as financially stable over time according to the set of assumptions retained.

Figure 5.9 AWW - PAYG rate and contribution rate - Base scenario





Figure 5.10 shows that the growth in the number of pensioners is predominantly negative. On average, the number of pensioners decreases by 0.3 percent annually for the next 60 years. However, the price-indexation impact will maintain the total growth at 2.4 percent annually.

Figure 5.10 AWW annual expenditure growth - Base scenario



5.4 Administration expenditure


Administration expenses of the SVb are relatively low when compared to most Caribbean islands. They represented about 1.5 percent of contribution income in 2003. The contribution assessment ceiling influences this ratio, which, after non-adjustment for a number of years, is too low. On the other hand, if contribution collection were administered by the SVb, up to a maximum of 0.5 percent might have to be added. When

expressed as a percentage of total benefits paid, administration expenses represent 6.1 percent of the pension expenditure for the AOV scheme and 1.4 percent for the AWW scheme. Administration expenditures are expected to remain at this reasonable level over the projected period. Thus, administration expenses are expected to increase according to pension expenditure for both schemes (AOV and AWW)³⁷.

5.5 Total expenditure

Figure 5.11 presents the expenditure of the AOV, the AWW and the total expenditure expressed in terms of the insurable base. Throughout the projected period, the AWW expenditures remain proportionally very low compared to AOV expenditures.

Figure 5.11 AOV and AWW expenditure as a percentage of insurable base (PAYG) - Base scenario



In total, the PAYG increases until 2033 and then decreases. The increase can be explained by the strong demographic effect of pensioners. Many people will retire and thus increase the ratio of the number of pensioners to the number of contributors. This phenomenon will put pressure on the scheme, as proportionally less contributors will have to pay for a given number of pensioners. As a result, the PAYG increases initially.

The development between 2033 and 2063 is explained by the financial parametric effect of indexation and the number of new pensioners. As the pension indexation is linked to 70 percent of the minimum wage, which is assumed equivalent to being indexed to inflation, average pension growth is permanently lower than average wage growth. The constant disparity between inflation and wage growth (Table 6.2) increases the financial viability of the scheme. The costs, however, have to be borne by pensioners, as the purchasing power of pensioners is kept constant at present (2003) levels. In other words, such a policy does not allow for pensioners' continued participation in growing workers' consumption.

The following two tables present the projected results of the scheme in greater detail. Table 5.4 presents the demographic development in the number of contributors, the number of AOV beneficiaries and the number of AWW beneficiaries. The significant increase in the ratio of pensioners in comparison to contributors strains the ever-increasing financial load on the contributors. From 2003 to 2063, the number of pensioners increases by 20,202,

³⁷Administration costs were linked to pension expenditure for reasons of prudence. In reality, assuming the SVb continues applying modern information technology, administration costs will not correlate significantly with the number of pensions administered. Thus, in reality, it can be expected that administration costs will grow at a lower pace, in line with average wages, allowing for no increase in the number of SVb staff.

while the number of contributors increases by only 9,014. This demographic development can be explained by the ageing of the population.

Table 5.4 Number of contributors and pensioners - Base scenario

		Contributors		Ве	Beneficiaries AOV			neficiaries A	۸W	Beneficiaries	Ratio pensioners to	
Year	Males	Females	Total	Males	Females	Total	Males	Females	Total	Total	contributors	
2003	23,185	19,977	43,163	5,471	5,255	10,725	641	1,033	1,675	12,400	24.8%	
2004	23,486	20,432	43,918	5,615	5,473	11,087	681	1,071	1,752	12,839	25.2%	
2005	23,803	20,894	44,696	5,823	5,735	11,558	718	1,090	1,808	13,366	25.9%	
2006	24,111	21,263	45,373	6,008	6,018	12,026	738	1,099	1,837	13,863	26.5%	
2007	24,429	21,623	46,052	6,255	6,282	12,537	758	1,108	1,866	14,403	27.2%	
2008	24,727	21,993	46,720	6,457	6,616	13,073	769	1,119	1,888	14,961	28.0%	
2013	25,886	23,449	49,335	7,895	8,445	16,340	774	1,057	1,832	18,172	33.1%	
2023	26,470	24,772	51,242	11,566	13,215	24,781	669	837	1,506	26,287	48.4%	
2033	25,997	24,576	50,574	13,466	15,772	29,238	650	727	1,378	30,616	57.8%	
2043	26,668	25,030	51,699	13,039	15,481	28,520	692	790	1,482	30,002	55.2%	
2053	27,083	25,244	52,328	13,673	15,987	29,661	682	773	1,454	31,115	56.7%	
2063	26,996	25,181	52,177	14,666	16,499	31,164	678	760	1,438	32,602	59.7%	

Table 5.5 presents the financial results of the scheme according to the type of benefits. For the AOV benefits, the expenses increase annually by 4.3 percent for single pensions, 4.0 percent for married pensions and 4.2 percent for split pensions. With respect to AWW pensions, expenses increase annually by 2.2 percent for orphan pensions, 2.1 percent for widow pensions and 2.4 percent for invalid pensions. In total, the AOV expenses increase substantially more than the AWW expenses, in fact by 4.2 percent compared to 2.3 percent.

Table 5.5 AOV/AWW benefits - Base scenario

		A	OV			A۱	ΝW		GRAND
Year	Single	Married	Split	Total	Orphans	Widows	Invalids	Total	TOTAL
2003	62,712,271	55,114,688	10,910,966	128,737,925	3,625,132	3,207,833	3,305,044	10,138,009	138,875,934
2004	64,878,977	57,118,875	11,500,844	133,498,696	3,876,301	3,258,316	3,500,176	10,634,793	144,133,489
2005	69,605,468	62,722,113	12,819,309	145,146,890	4,364,615	3,413,173	3,979,879	11,757,668	156,904,557
2006	73,298,133	65,814,275	13,643,372	152,755,780	4,610,653	3,457,255	4,290,524	12,358,431	165,114,212
2007	77,128,917	69,113,516	14,490,979	160,733,413	4,756,124	3,506,919	4,405,195	12,668,238	173,401,651
2008	81,286,911	72,523,605	15,375,192	169,185,708	4,918,027	3,493,885	4,628,708	13,040,620	182,226,328
2013	117,171,436	101,667,355	22,415,226	241,254,017	5,487,697	3,754,680	5,910,119	15,152,496	256,406,513
2023	230,672,968	189,662,728	43,045,333	463,381,029	5,311,301	4,997,324	6,711,191	17,019,816	480,400,845
2033	351,864,658	283,923,995	65,130,306	700,918,959	6,584,882	5,265,325	6,793,836	18,644,042	719,563,001
2043	435,983,731	350,388,805	81,786,509	868,159,045	8,892,842	7,680,916	9,635,762	26,209,520	894,368,565
2053	573,567,924	464,754,441	107,536,065	1,145,858,431	11,251,069	9,848,832	12,208,126	33,308,027	1,179,166,457
2063	763,732,035	634,024,644	143,832,474	1,541,589,154	14,435,673	11,992,120	15,199,627	41,627,420	1,583,216,573

5.6 Investment income and reserves

According to the SVb, the reserve at the end of 2003 is 144 million AFL. This amount includes the financial reserve of both the AOV and the AWW. In the base scenario, while applying a rate of return on investment based on the economic assumptions to the surpluses and deficits of the schemes, the fund is not financially stable over time.


From the results, key years in the future evolution of the scheme were identified:

- Contributions alone are sufficient to meet the total expenditure of the scheme until 2013, and the reserve increases;
- From 2014, in order to meet the scheme's expenditure, part of the investment earnings must be used in addition to contributions, and the reserve is still increasing;
- From 2017, the total of contributions and investment earnings is no longer sufficient to meet the scheme's expenditure and the reserve starts decreasing;

- The reserve is exhausted in 2025.

In Figure 5.12, two graphs are used to show more clearly the projected development of the reserve from 2003 until 2063. The graph on the right hand side shows long term reserve projections. An imminent decline of the reserve can be seen as investment income is no longer available and subsequent deficits lead the scheme into a position of increasing deficits.

Figure 5.12 Reserves from 2003 to 2025 and reserves from 2003 to 2063 - Base scenario



In other words, under status-quo legislation and parameters, the AOV/AWW is able to increase its reserves for the next 10 years, however from this time onwards, the increasing deficits deplete the reserve. While the maximum reserve (in around 2016) would amount to 7.6 percent of GDP, the debt accumulated in 2030 would be around 11 percent of GDP, and about 40 percent by the end of the projection period. By the early 2020s at the latest, the AOV/AWW needs public transfers in order to maintain its social function of paying benefits.

6. Reform scenarios

Parametric reforms have been studied on the basis of the requests received from the Government (see Section 2). The main financial implications for each of the proposed reforms are presented in Table 6.1 in terms of the general average premium (GAP) as of today and projected PAYG cost rates for the years of 2033 and 2063. It should be emphasized that the alternative outcomes shown below should be interpreted with the underlying assumptions in mind.

Table 6.1 Summary of project results for possible policy changes

		First year	General	AOV Pay-a	s-you-go in:
Sco	enario	of negative reserve	Average Premium	2033	2063
1.	Base	2025	14.6%	18.1%	13.3%
2.	Pension indexation based on wage growth	2017	21.9%	26.2%	26.1%
3.	Increase normal retirement age to 62 in 2005	After 2063	12.8%	16.1%	11.9%
4.	Increase normal retirement age to 62 in 2005 and then increase to 65 over a 6-year transition period	After 2063	10.7%	13.1%	9.9%
5.	Increase the annual contribution ceiling to 60,000	2029	13.9%	17.2%	12.6%
6.	Increase the annual contribution ceiling to 75,000	2035	13.3%	16.4%	12.1%
7.	Application of contribution rate to gross wages	2027	14.2%.	17.6%	12.9%
8.	Individualization	After 2063	12.2%	14.6%	10.9%
9.	Reform	After 2063	10.3%	12.4%	9.2%

Note: The specific assumptions mentioned in the relevant section are an important determinant of the cost differences noted above.

This section presents the detailed actuarial analysis of the various parametric reform elements. Each of the individual elements of reform to the base scenario has been altered individually in order to isolate their effects. Section 6.8 describes the reform scenario consisting of several measures.

6.1 Pension indexation based on wage growth

The pension indexation based on wage growth scenario is presented in order to reconcile this valuation with the previous actuarial valuation. In fact, instead of fixing the single pension at 70 percent of minimum wage, this scenario assumes pension indexation based on average wage growth. It can be considered equivalent to the last valuation's base scenario. In the long term, this indexation alternative (in comparison to this report's base case) results in a considerable difference in the expenditure level, explaining the enormous difference in expenditure and deficit between the wage growth scenario and the base scenario presented in Section 5.

Table 6.2 presents the wage growth and inflation assumptions of the macro-economic framework. It is characterized by a significant difference in the respective long-term assumptions, as wage growth is expected to be 3.6 percent continuously and inflation 2.5 percent continuously. The difference in the two growth rates reflects the assumed labour productivity growth of one percent annually.

Table 6.2 Wage growth versus inflation

Year	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2013	2023	2033	2043	2053	2063
Wage growth	0.6%	5.0%	4.6%	4.5%	4.4%	4.3%	3.7%	3.6%	3.6%	3.6%	3.6%	3.6%
Inflation	3.8%	3.5%	3.4%	3.3%	3.2%	3.1%	2.6%	2.5%	2.5%	2.5%	2.5%	2.5%

In its financial logic (its impact on the SVb's finances), this scenario is, thus, equivalent to assuming a scenario in which future economic development occurs without any real wage increase, i.e. average wages grow fully in line with CPI.

Figure 6.1 shows the AOV PAYG rate compared to the legal contribution rate and the GAP. As can be seen, there is a large gap between the contribution rate and the GAP. In fact, the GAP is 21.9 percent, 10.4 percentage points higher than the contribution rate and 7.2 percentage points higher than in the base scenario. In other words, the present scenario shows the development of the base scenario in the case of zero future real wage growth (i.e. no labour productivity growth). As already illustrated in the previous valuation, the PAYG would stabilize at around 26 percent by the end of the projected period.

Figure 6.1 AOV PAYG rate and contribution rate – Pension indexation based on wage growth




Figure 6.2 splits the AOV expenditure growth into its two factors, demographic and financial. In this specific case, only the financial factor affects the financial outcome, as the demographic factor remains unchanged in comparison to the base scenario. The average pension grows substantially faster than in the base scenario due to the assumption of 3.6 percent long-term wage growth. As a result of higher pension benefits, total expenditure will grow substantially over the next 30 years.

Figure 6.2 AOV annual expenditure growth – Pension indexation based on wage growth




Table 6.3 presents standard comparisons between wages and pensions. Under this specific scenario, the average pension grows according to the average (insured) wage as the indexation rate is based on wage growth. As a result, the system replacement ratio, which, given the scheme characteristics, is identical to the standard individual's replacement ratio, remains constant over time and maintains the future value of the pension in relation to wages. Throughout the projected period, the replacement ratios are stable, however, the ratio of single pension over minimum wage is initially 75 percent and increases substantially over time. This significant growth can be explained by the fact the minimum wage is assumed to be indexed to inflation and the single pension indexed to wage growth.

Table 6.3 Replacement ratio – Pension indexation based on wage growth


	Gross	Average	Minimum	Contribution	Single	AOV	AWW	(5) / (1)	(5) / (2)	AOV Pay
Year	average national	insured				average	average	Replacement	Replacement	as you go
	wage	wage	wage	ceiling	pension	pension	pension	ratio	ratio	rate
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
2003	3,623	2,567	1,200	4,108	900	846	504	24.8%	35.1%	11.1%
2004	3,805	2,666	1,236	4,108	900	849	506	23.7%	33.8%	10.9%
2005	3,980	2,748	1,279	4,108	954	875	542	24.0%	34.7%	11.3%
2006	4,159	2,868	1,321	4,293	997	915	579	24.0%	34.8%	11.6%
2007	4,341	2,991	1,364	4,481	1,040	955	604	24.0%	34.8%	11.9%
2008	4,526	3,113	1,407	4,672	1,085	994	634	24.0%	34.9%	12.3%
2013	5,492	3,725	1,619	5,669	1,316	1,204	801	24.0%	35.3%	14.6%
2023	7,829	5,139	2,081	8,082	1,876	1,703	1,213	24.0%	36.5%	21.7%
2033	11,144	7,336	2,676	11,505	2,671	2,423	1,608	24.0%	36.4%	25.8%
2043	15,855	10,632	3,440	16,368	3,800	3,405	2,326	24.0%	35.7%	23.9%
2053	22,544	14,891	4,422	23,272	5,403	4,772	3,331	24.0%	36.3%	24.6%
2063	32,041	21,202	5,685	33,076	7,679	6,735	4,655	24.0%	36.2%	25.8%

As can be seen from Figure 6.3, the reserve is expected to decline substantially and cause serious financial problems. From the results, key years in the future evolution of the scheme were identified:

- Contributions are not sufficient to meet the total expenditure of the scheme in 2009; however, the reserve still continues to increase as investment income compensates for the annual deficits.
- From 2011, the total of contributions and investment earnings is no longer sufficient to meet the scheme's expenditure and the reserve starts decreasing;
- The reserve is exhausted in 2017;

- The reserve would be –1,266 million AFL in 2023, -18,495 million AFL in 2043 and -76,210 million AFL in 2063.

Negative reserves are obviously not possible in the long term as the SVb would not be able to survive under such financial conditions. In similar cases around the world, pension schemes usually receive government transfers, however, it may be interesting to have this theoretical information for overview purposes as it shows the full fiscal costs, including interest to be paid on the negative reserve.



The problematic financial position under wage indexation has been addressed in the 2004 valuation and the updated results demonstrate that these problems remain tangible. Also, the wage-indexation scenario is of importance in the context of this report as it is the only scenario that preserves the level of single pensions relative to the national average wage or the insurable average wage, respectively.

6.2 Increasing the normal retirement age to 62

In the following subsection an increase in the normal retirement age to 62 years is discussed. The legislative adjustment is assumed to be in force at the beginning of 2005 without any transition period. The existing pensioners aged less than 62 years are considered to remain pensioners under this legislative change.

Under to this parametric change, no new pension will be granted for two years after its introduction, as no one will reach the normal retirement age during this transition period. As shown in Figure 6.4, the PAYG rate declines substantially from 2005 to 2007, after which time strong demographic effects will be felt which will increase the AOV expenditure level. The PAYG rate is expected to be 16.1 percent in 2033 and 11.9 percent in 2063.

PAYG rate growth is nevertheless not as significant as in the base scenario. In fact, contributors have to pay contributions for two additional years, providing considerable supplementary funds to the scheme. Also, as the expected life expectancy at 62 is lower, pension payments will be payable for fewer years. In total, the GAP is 12.8 percent, declining by 1.8 percentage points and getting closer to the current contribution rate of 11.5 percent.

Figure 6.4 AOV PAYG rate and contribution rate – Normal retirement age at 62




Figure 6.5 shows the expected effects of the increase in the normal retirement age to 62 years. The number of pensions decreases considerably for two consecutive years in 2005 and 2006 as no new pensioners will enter the scheme. After this two-year transitory period of negative growth in number of pensioners, the AOV expenditure growth becomes similar to that of the base scenario except permanently fewer people will reach the age of 62 years and be entitled to pension benefits.

Figure 6.5 AOV annual expenditure growth – Normal retirement age at 62




Table 6.4 presents standard comparisons between wages and pensions. There will be no major change with respect to average wage and average pension as the increase in the normal retirement age mainly affects the demographic factor. The contributors, however, have to work two more years and are therefore on average older and have earned more income. As a result, the average insured wages are slightly higher in comparison to the base scenario.


Table 6.4 Replacement ratio – Normal retirement age at 62


	Gross	Average	Minimum	Contribution	Single	AOV	AWW	(5) / (1)	(5) / (2)	AOV Pay
Year	average national	insured				average	average	Replacement	Replacement	as you go
	wage	wage	wage	ceiling	pension	pension	pension	ratio	ratio	rate
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
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2005	3,980	2,786	1,279	4,108	954	913	542	24.0%	34.2%	10.7%
2006	4,159	2,910	1,321	4,293	965	925	561	23.2%	33.1%	9.8%
2007	4,341	3,037	1,364	4,481	975	893	566	22.5%	32.1%	9.4%
2008	4,526	3,163	1,407	4,672	985	903	576	21.8%	31.1%	9.4%
2013	5,492	3,804	1,619	5,669	1,133	1,037	689	20.6%	29.8%	10.5%
2023	7,829	5,306	2,081	8,082	1,457	1,322	942	18.6%	27.5%	14.2%
2033	11,144	7,544	2,676	11,505	1,873	1,694	1,128	16.8%	24.8%	16.1%
2043	15,855	10,893	3,440	16,368	2,408	2,167	1,474	15.2%	22.1%	13.5%
2053	22,544	15,320	4,422	23,272	3,096	2,741	1,908	13.7%	20.2%	12.4%
2063	32,041	21,773	5,685	33,076	3,980	3,492	2,413	12.4%	18.3%	11.9%

As can be seen from Figure 6.6, the reserve is expected to increase significantly over the next 25 years. From the results, key years in the future evolution of the scheme were identified:

- Contributions are not sufficient to meet the total expenditure of the scheme in 2020, however, the reserve still continues to increase as investment income offsets annual deficits:
- From 2026, the total of contributions and investment earnings is no longer sufficient to meet scheme expenditure and the reserve starts decreasing;
- From 2044, the total of contributions and investment earnings is sufficient to meet scheme expenditure and the reserve starts increasing again;
- The reserve is expected to be 1,463 million AFL in 2023, 618 million AFL in 2043 and 3,096 million AFL in 2063.

Figure 6.6 Reserve – Normal retirement age at 62





In conclusion, this parametric change can create substantial savings. In interpreting the results, the following points should be kept in mind:

The labour market is assumed to react directly to this parametric change by extending the individual careers accordingly without creating any additional (youth) unemployment. Contributors remain active two years longer and, thus, pay additional revenue during this period. It is worth mentioning that older contributors continue earning higher wages over the full projection period (according to year 2002's salary scale).

- Life expectancy at 62 years is about two years shorter than at age 60 and, thus, benefits have to be paid on shorter periods.

Compared to the base scenario, the SVb can increase its revenue by around 2.1 million AFL in 2005 and 3.3 million AFL in 2010, and decrease its expenditure by approximately 5.8 million AFL in 2005 and 27.9 million AFL in 2010.


The increase in the normal age of retirement has a substantial positive effect on the financial position of the SVb but the general average premium is still considerably higher than the current legal rate. Thus, if only this parametric change were implemented, the contribution rate would still need to be increased in the near future.

6.3 Increasing the normal retirement age to 65

The SVb may consider moving the normal retirement age up to 65 years in order to improve its financial situation more substantially as the positive reserve development under the scenario in Section 6.2 (retirement age 62) could easily be reversed with a slight change in the underlying macroeconomic assumptions.

This scenario involves an increase of the normal age of retirement to 62 in 2005 followed by a series of six biannual increases to 65 years in 2011. Figure 6.7 shows the resulting PAYG rate of the AOV. The improvement in the institution's financial position is obvious as the GAP falls below the present legal contribution rate. The SVb can meet all its financial obligations for at least the next 60 years by increasing the normal retirement age to 65 years (all other assumptions unchanged). Also, significant surpluses are expected for the next 20 years, which would help to build a healthy reserve.

Figure 6.7 AOV PAYG rate and contribution rate – Normal retirement age at 65




The number of new pensions is very low over the six-year transition period and reduces the demographic pressure on the scheme. Simultaneously, contribution income increases to a large extent because contributors have to pay for five additional years (assuming the same labour market assumptions as under the scenario described in Section 6.2). Compared to the base scenario, the SVb increases its revenue by around 2.6 million AFL in 2005, 6.3 million AFL in 2010 and 10.9 million AFL in 2015 and decreases its expenditure by around 5.8 million AFL in 2005, 51.8 million AFL in 2010 and 89.1 million AFL in 2015.

Figure 6.8 shows the expenditure growth produced by increasing the normal retirement age to 65 years in comparison to the base scenario. The main effects of this parametric change are demographic. If the retirement age is raised to 65 years, this will in fact reduce the

number of pensioners between 2005 and 2011, delay the payment of pensions by five years, and reduce the number of new pensioners, as the age condition is more restrictive.

Figure 6.8 AOV annual expenditure growth – Normal retirement age at 65



As already shown in Table 6.4 (under the scenario in Section 6.2), Table 6.5 shows no major changes in average wage and average pension as only the demographic factor is affected by increases in normal retirement age. For a more accurate interpretation of the results, however, it should be mentioned that the model assumes full employment until retirement age and, thus, the average insured wage is even higher than in the previous scenario.

Table 6.5 Replacement ratio – Normal retirement age at 65


	Gross	Average	Minimum	Contribution	Single	AOV	AWW	(5) / (1)	(5) / (2)	AOV Pay
Year	average national	insured				average	average	Replacement	Replacement	as you go
	wage	wage	wage	ceiling	pension	pension	pension	ratio	ratio	rate
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
2003	3,623	2,567	1,200	4,108	900	846	504	24.8%	35.1%	11.1%
2004	3,805	2,666	1,236	4,108	900	849	506	23.7%	33.8%	10.9%
2005	3,980	2,797	1,279	4,108	954	913	542	24.0%	34.1%	10.7%
2006	4,159	2,927	1,321	4,293	965	925	561	23.2%	33.0%	9.8%
2007	4,341	3,061	1,364	4,481	975	916	566	22.5%	31.9%	9.1%
2008	4,526	3,197	1,407	4,672	985	924	576	21.8%	30.8%	8.6%
2013	5,492	3,877	1,619	5,669	1,133	1,039	689	20.6%	29.2%	8.2%
2023	7,829	5,472	2,081	8,082	1,457	1,322	942	18.6%	26.6%	10.9%
2033	11,144	7,771	2,676	11,505	1,873	1,697	1,128	16.8%	24.1%	13.3%
2043	15,855	11,140	3,440	16,368	2,408	2,180	1,474	15.2%	21.6%	11.6%
2053	22,544	15,765	4,422	23,272	3,096	2,749	1,908	13.7%	19.6%	10.1%
2063	32,041	22,391	5,685	33,076	3,980	3,488	2,413	12.4%	17.8%	10.0%

Figure 6.9 demonstrates the fiscal power of increasing retirement age. The impact of such a move remains enormous even if the underlying favorable labour market assumptions were softened. From the results, key years in the future evolution of the scheme were identified:

- Contributions are not sufficient to meet the total expenditure of the scheme from 2030 to 2037, however, the reserve still continues to increase as significant investment income compensate annual deficits;
- From 2038, the total of contributions is again sufficient to meet the scheme's expenditure and the reserve continues to increase over the entire projection period;

- The reserve is expected to be 2,720 million AFL in 2023, 7,268 million AFL in 2043 and 25,505 million AFL in 2063.

Figure 6.9 Reserve – Normal retirement age at 65



The increase in the normal retirement age to 65 appears to be an excellent proposal in order to maintain the scheme financially stable, but, of course, it implies major socioeconomic changes for the Aruban population.

6.4 Increasing the initial contribution ceiling to 60,000 AFL

The current contribution assessment ceiling is set at 4,108 AFL per month and it has not been increased since 1998. The ceiling should be indexed at least every year according to national average wage growth in order to cover the same relative amount of generated total wage volume over time (assuming constant wage distribution). Table 6.6 shows contribution income lost caused by not indexing the contribution ceiling based on wage growth. In 2003 only, lost contribution income is estimated to be almost 7.7 million AFL.

Table 6.6 Contribution income lost due to constant contribution ceiling (in million AFL)

Year	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003
Contribution income lost	1.58	2.23	5.24	6.83	7.68

In other words, in 2003, the SVb's reserve could have been about 23 to 24 million AFL more, not including interest income.

This scenario simulates an increase of the contribution ceiling to 5,000 AFL per month in 2005 and its subsequent annual indexation in line with average gross wages. The GAP decreases by 0.7 percentage points compared to the base scenario. Although this parametric change positively influences the financial situation over the entire projected period, the impact is even more significant at the beginning of the projection period. In fact, the additional income created in 2005 is 10.2 million AFL (AOV and AWW). Figure 6.10 shows the development of the AOV PAYG rate. A significant decline is observed at the time of the introduction of the ceiling's increase.

Figure 6.10 AOV PAYG rate and contribution rate – Initial contribution ceiling at 60,000 AFL





Figure 6.11 shows the insurable base growth split into its two underlying factors, the demographic and the wages factors. The average annual contribution increases dramatically in 2005, as the contribution ceiling is increased to 5,000 AFL per month. In fact, the average insurable wage increases by 9 percent, and in combination with the growing number of contributors, the total insurable base grows by 11 percent. In the long run, growth rates of the insurable base stabilize around 3.6 percent per year as most of the annual increase is fuelled by average wage development.

Figure 6.11 Annual growth rates of the insurable base – Initial contribution ceiling at 60,000 AFL



As can be seen from Table 6.7, the contribution ceiling is increased to 5,000 AFL per month in 2005. The direct effect of this parametric change is that the average insured wage increases by 9 percent. By contrast, the average national wage increases by only 4.6 percent for the same year, however, the increase in the average insured wage leads to an even lower replacement ratio. In 2063, pensioners receive less than one fifth of the average insured wage and only 12.4 percent of the average national wage.


Table 6.7 Replacement ratio – Initial contribution ceiling at 60,000 AFL

,	Gross	Average	Minimum	Contribution	Single	AOV	AWW	(5) / (1)	(5) / (2)	AOV Pay
Year	average national	insured				average	average	Replacement	Replacement	as you go
	wage	wage	wage	ceiling	pension	pension	pension	ratio	ratio	rate
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
2003	3,623	2,567	1,200	4,108	900	846	504	24.8%	35.1%	11.1%
2004	3,805	2,666	1,236	4,108	900	849	506	23.7%	33.8%	10.9%
2005	3,980	2,908	1,279	5,000	954	875	542	24.0%	32.8%	10.7%
2006	4,159	3,035	1,321	5,224	965	885	561	23.2%	31.8%	10.6%
2007	4,341	3,165	1,364	5,453	975	895	566	22.5%	30.8%	10.6%
2008	4,526	3,295	1,407	5,686	985	903	576	21.8%	29.9%	10.5%
2013	5,492	3,943	1,619	6,898	1,133	1,036	689	20.6%	28.7%	11.9%
2023	7,829	5,431	2,081	9,835	1,457	1,322	942	18.6%	26.8%	16.0%
2033	11,144	7,753	2,676	13,999	1,873	1,699	1,128	16.8%	24.2%	17.1%
2043	15,855	11,247	3,440	19,917	2,408	2,158	1,474	15.2%	21.4%	14.3%
2053	22,544	15,744	4,422	28,319	3,096	2,734	1,908	13.7%	19.7%	13.3%
2063	32,041	22,415	5,685	40,248	3,980	3,490	2,413	12.4%	17.8%	12.6%

As can be seen from Figure 6.12, the reserve increases for the next 15 years but declines immensely thereafter. From the results, key years in the future evolution of the scheme were identified:

- Contributions alone are sufficient to meet the total expenditure of the scheme until 2015, and the reserve increases;
- From 2016, part of the investment earnings must be used, in addition to contributions, to meet the scheme's expenditure, and the reserve is still increasing;
- From 2019, the total of contributions and investment earnings is no longer sufficient to meet the scheme's expenditure and the reserve starts decreasing;
- The reserve is exhausted in 2029:
- In absolute terms, the reserve is expected to be 670 million AFL in 2023, -2,779 million AFL in 2043 and -7,674 million AFL in 2063.

Figure 6.12 Reserve – Initial contribution ceiling at 60,000 AFL



The increase of the annual contribution ceiling to 60,000 AFL is a measure providing significant financial improvement to the SVb, however in comparison to the base case, the reserve's first year of negative reserves would only be shifted forward in time by 4 years.

6.5 Increasing the initial contribution ceiling to 75,000 AFL

This scenario is an extension of the previous scenario in order to show the impact of a more substantial increase of the ceiling. In this scenario, the annual contribution ceiling is increased to 75,000 AFL in 2005 and then indexed according to average wage growth.

Figure 6.13 shows the PAYG rate together with the GAP and the present legal rate. The GAP is expected to be 13.3 percent, which is 1.3 and 0.6 percentage points below the base scenario and the scenario described in Section 6.4, respectively.

Figure 6.13 AOV PAYG rate and contribution rate – Initial contribution ceiling at 75,000 AFL





Figure 6.14 shows growth patterns similar to the previous scenario, however the consequence of the contribution ceiling increase is even more significant at the onset of the measure. In fact, in 2005, the total insurable base growth is estimated to be 16 percent, and the average insurable wage growth 14 percent.

Figure 6.14 Annual growth rates of the insurable base– Initial contribution ceiling at 75,000 AFL



As can be seen from Table 6.8, the contribution ceiling is increased to 6,250 AFL per month in 2005. The monthly average insured wage is 3,045 AFL, which is 297 AFL higher than in the base scenario. In terms of replacement ratio, the ratio based on insured wage is very low and would be only 17.0 percent in 2063.

Table 6.8 Replacement ratio – Initial contribution ceiling at 75,000 AFL


	Gross	Average	Minimum	Contribution	Single	AOV	AWW	(5) / (1)	(5) / (2)	AOV Pay
Year	average national	insured		ceiling	pension	average pension	average pension	Replacement	Replacement ratio	as you go
	wage	wage	wage					ratio		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
2003	3,623	2,567	1,200	4,108	900	846	504	24.8%	35.1%	11.1%
2004	3,805	2,666	1,236	4,108	900	849	506	23.7%	33.8%	10.9%
2005	3,980	3,045	1,279	6,250	954	875	542	24.0%	31.3%	10.2%
2006	4,159	3,179	1,321	6,530	965	885	561	23.2%	30.3%	10.2%
2007	4,341	3,316	1,364	6,816	975	895	566	22.5%	29.4%	10.1%
2008	4,526	3,452	1,407	7,107	985	903	576	21.8%	28.5%	10.1%
2013	5,492	4,132	1,619	8,623	1,133	1,036	689	20.6%	27.4%	11.3%
2023	7,829	5,682	2,081	12,293	1,457	1,322	942	18.6%	25.6%	15.3%
2033	11,144	8,109	2,676	17,499	1,873	1,699	1,128	16.8%	23.1%	16.4%
2043	15,855	11,776	3,440	24,896	2,408	2,158	1,474	15.2%	20.4%	13.7%
2053	22,544	16,477	4,422	35,398	3,096	2,734	1,908	13.7%	18.8%	12.7%
2063	32,041	23,456	5,685	50,311	3,980	3,490	2,413	12.4%	17.0%	12.1%


It can be observed from Figure 6.15 that the short-term and medium-term projections are optimistic under this scenario; however, the fund is financially unstable in the long term. From the results, key years in the future evolution of the scheme were identified:

- Contributions alone is sufficient to meet the total expenditure of the scheme until 2017, and the reserve increases;
- From 2018, in order to meet the scheme's expenditure, part of the investment earnings must be used in addition to contributions, and the reserve is still increasing;
- From 2022, the total of contributions and investment earnings is no longer sufficient to meet the scheme's expenditure and the reserve starts decreasing;
- The reserve is exhausted in 2035:
- In absolute terms, the reserve is expected to be 1,080 million AFL in 2023, -947 million AFL in 2043 and -1,388 million AFL in 2063.

In comparison to the base case, the year of the first negative reserve would be shifted forward in time by ten years.

Figure 6.15 Reserve – Initial contribution ceiling at 75,000 AFL





Although this specific parametric measure appears to improve the financial situation of the scheme, one must also consider the relationship between the contributions paid by individuals and the benefits received under the current legislative framework of the SVb. The contribution ceiling may have to be kept at reasonable levels in order to maintain a satisfactory ratio between the contributions paid and the benefits received (Table 3.9).

6.6 Application of contribution rate to gross wages rather than taxable wages

The SVb has addressed the issue of redefining the insurable wage from taxable to gross. It was possible to estimate the effects of such a legislative change based on the data provided by the Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS). The difference between gross wages and taxable wages is estimated to amount to three percent. The definition of taxable wage is gross wage minus all legal tax deductions. For this scenario, it is assumed that the insurable base definition changes taxable wages to gross wages in 2005, i.e. collecting contributions on a three percent higher contribution base.

Figure 6.16 shows a decline in the PAYG rate in 2005. As expected, the impact is observed throughout the projection period. The GAP is 14.2 percent and at the far end of the projection period the PAYG is almost equal to the legal contribution rate.

Figure 6.16 AOV PAYG rate and contribution rate – Application of contribution rate to gross wages rather than taxable wages




Figure 6.17 shows the abrupt increase of around 8.1 percent of the insurable base growth in 2005, of which around two points are attributed to the redefinition of the contributory/taxable wage. The strong influence of this major legislative change in 2005 would have a strong impact throughout the projection period as the contribution base is enlarged by this parametric change.

Figure 6.17 Annual growth rates of the insurable base– Application of contribution rate to gross wages rather than taxable wages




Table 6.9 presents the usual standard comparisons between wages and pensions.

Table 6.9 Replacement ratio – Application of contribution rate to gross wages rather than taxable wages


	Gross	Average	Minimum	Contribution	Single	AOV	AWW	(5) / (1)	(5) / (2)	AOV Pay
Year	average national	insured				average	average	Replacement	Replacement	as you go
	wage (1)	wage (2)	wage (3)	ceiling (4)	pension (5)	pension (6)	pension (7)	ratio (8)	ratio (9)	rate (10)
2003	3,623	2,567	1,200	4,108	900	846	504	24.8%	35.1%	11.1%
2004	3,805	2,666	1,236	4,108	900	849	506	23.7%	33.8%	10.9%
2005	3,980	2,831	1,279	4,108	954	875	542	24.0%	33.7%	11.0%
2006	4,159	2,954	1,321	4,293	965	885	561	23.2%	32.7%	10.9%
2007	4,341	3,080	1,364	4,481	975	895	566	22.5%	31.7%	10.9%
2008	4,526	3,206	1,407	4,672	985	903	576	21.8%	30.7%	10.8%
2013	5,492	3,837	1,619	5,669	1,133	1,036	689	20.6%	29.5%	12.2%
2023	7,829	5,293	2,081	8,082	1,457	1,322	942	18.6%	27.5%	16.4%
2033	11,144	7,556	2,676	11,505	1,873	1,699	1,128	16.8%	24.8%	17.6%
2043	15,855	10,951	3,440	16,368	2,408	2,158	1,474	15.2%	22.0%	14.7%
2053	22,544	15,337	4,422	23,272	3,096	2,734	1,908	13.7%	20.2%	13.7%
2063	32,041	21,838	5,685	33,076	3,980	3,490	2,413	12.4%	18.2%	13.0%

Figure 6.18 shows that this specific parametric change enhances the financial situation of the SVb and maintains the fund stable over time. From the results, key years in the future evolution of the scheme were identified:

- Contributions alone are sufficient to meet the total expenditure of the scheme until 2014, and the reserve increases:
- From 2015, in order to meet the scheme's expenditure, part of the investment earnings must be used in addition to contributions, and the reserve is still increasing;
- From 2018, the total of contributions and investment earnings is no longer sufficient to meet the scheme's expenditure and the reserve starts decreasing;
- The reserve is exhausted in 2027;
- In absolute terms, the reserve is expected to be 440 million AFL in 2023, -3,832 million AFL in 2043 and -11,176 million AFL in 2063.

Under this scenario, the year of the first negative reserve would be shifted forward in time by two years in comparison to the base case.

Figure 6.18 Reserve – Application of contribution rate to gross wages rather than taxable wages



Changing the contribution base could be complex in terms of negotiations with the government and the societal groups. As mentioned in the scenarios creating increases in the contribution ceiling, the pension received is not at all linked to contributions paid and contributors may feel that the scheme is inequitable.

Generally, however, the definition of insurable wage should be independent of the definition of the taxable wage. If not, tax policies might frequently interfere with social revenue policies (and vice versa). In other word, an identical definition might lead to situations where a tax policy cannot be applied as intended for reasons of social protection revenue.

6.7 Individualization

Individualization is the most complex structural reform measure studied in this actuarial valuation. At present, legislation stipulates that married couples pay contributions out of their joint gross wage up to the contribution assessment ceiling. Equally, married couples receive a joint pension. This scenario assumes that both contributions paid and pension benefits received are fully individualized. On the contribution side, two full contributions would be required from a married couple based on each spouse's wage. From the year of enforcement, married contributors also have the obligation to pay their full contributions up to the ceiling. With respect to pension benefit individualization, married pensions are separated into two single pensions and split pensions are upgraded to a single pension. For this scenario, it is assumed that all changes are enforced in 2005. It is worth mentioning that both scenarios, premium payments individualization and pension benefits individualization, are presented separately in Annex 2-16 to 2-21.

An exclusion to this scenario is the case of married pensioners with a difference of more than 20 years between them and married for no more than five years. These couples will only be entitled to one single pension and the younger partner will have to wait until the normal retirement age to receive their own single pension. This exclusion is not significant as we have estimated only 85 such cases among the pensioner population in Aruba.

Figure 6.19 shows the development of the AOV PAYG rate under this scenario. The increase is relatively sharp in 2005 as many married pensions are converted into single pensions; however, the GAP is 12.2 percent, which is 2.4 percentage points under the base scenario.

Figure 6.19 AOV PAYG rate and contribution rate – Individualization




Figure 6.20 shows the enormous expenditure growth in 2005 as the number of pensions increases by around 34 percent due to individualization. In total, expenditure growth in 2005 is about 19 percent as the average pension decreases by 11 percent. This decline in the average pension is the result of separating the married pensions into single pensions. At the end of 2004 there are 1,325 split pensions, 6,372 single pensions and 3,391 married pensions. As a result of individualization, 3,391 new pensions would be added in 2005.

Figure 6.20 AOV annual expenditure growth – Individualization




Figure 6.21 shows the insurable base growth split into its two underlying factors, the demographic and the wages factors. The number of contributors is left unaffected by the assumed change in legislation. The average contributory wage, however, changes quite substantially, as the contribution assessment ceiling in many cases now (starting in 2005) no longer imposes its dampening statistical effect on average contributory wages. In fact, the monthly average insured wage for the base scenario is 2,748 AFL in 2005 and comparatively 3,115 AFL for this scenario. Correspondingly, the average annual contribution increases dramatically in 2005, as the married couples' payment of contributions based on their joint wage (up to the ceiling) is no longer allowed. In fact, the average insurable wage increases by 17 percent, and in combination with the growing number of contributors, the total insurable base grows by 18.5 percent, however, growth rates of the insurable base stabilize over time and stay around 3.6 percent per annum.

Figure 6.21 Annual growth rates of the insurable base–Individualization




Table 6.10 presents the usual standard comparisons between wages and pensions.


Table 6.10 Replacement ratio – Individualization


	Gross	Average	Minimum	Contribution	Single	AOV	AWW	(5) / (1)	(5) / (2)	AOV Pay
Year	average national	insured				average	average	Replacement	Replacement	as you go
	wage	wage	wage	ceiling	pension	pension	pension	ratio	ratio	rate
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
2003	3,623	2,567	1,200	4,108	900	846	504	24.8%	35.1%	11.1%
2004	3,805	2,666	1,236	4,108	900	849	506	23.7%	33.8%	10.9%
2005	3,980	3,115	1,279	4,108	954	890	542	24.0%	30.6%	10.9%
2006	4,159	3,251	1,321	4,293	965	906	561	23.2%	29.7%	10.6%
2007	4,341	3,390	1,364	4,481	975	915	566	22.5%	28.8%	10.3%
2008	4,526	3,529	1,407	4,672	985	925	576	21.8%	27.9%	10.1%
2013	5,492	4,223	1,619	5,669	1,133	1,060	689	20.6%	26.8%	10.6%
2023	7,829	5,825	2,081	8,082	1,457	1,340	942	18.6%	25.0%	13.5%
2033	11,144	8,316	2,676	11,505	1,873	1,696	1,128	16.8%	22.5%	14.6%
2043	15,855	12,052	3,440	16,368	2,408	2,155	1,474	15.2%	20.0%	12.5%
2053	22,544	16,880	4,422	23,272	3,096	2,738	1,908	13.7%	18.3%	11.6%
2063	32,041	24,034	5,685	33,076	3,980	3,488	2,413	12.4%	16.6%	10.9%

It can be seen from Figure 6.22 that this specific parametric change enhances the financial situation of the SVb and creates a substantial reserve. From the results, key years in the future evolution of the scheme were identified:

- Contributions alone are sufficient to meet the total expenditure of the scheme until 2021, and the reserve increases;
- From 2022, in order to meet the scheme's expenditure, part of the investment earnings must be used in addition to contributions, and the reserve is still increasing;
- Over the entire projection period, the total of contributions and investment earnings is sufficient to meet the scheme's expenditure;
- In absolute terms, the reserve is expected to be 1,567 million AFL in 2023, 2,604 million AFL in 2043 and 10,792 million AFL in 2063.

Figure 6.22 Reserve –Individualization





As mentioned in the first report, the provisions surrounding the payment of single and married AOV pensions appear to impact on the behavior of some insured persons nearing the normal retirement age. A well-designed pension system should limit the scope for differences in pension status (eligibility or rate of payment) based on deliberate behavioral decisions of insured persons. The SVb may wish to review the payment of married pensions given the deliberate decision options allowed and the long-term costs of no reform.

6.8 Reform scenario

The reform scenario is a combination of three of the previous parametric options. First, the normal retirement age is increased to 62 years, second, the annual contribution assessment ceiling is adjusted to 60,000 AFL and finally individualization is fully established. According to our simulations, all reforms are assumed to be enforced in 2005.

This scenario has been built according to the demands of SVb officials with a view to enhancing the financial status of the fund and building a substantial reserve. The effects are immediate as the PAYG rate declines to 7 percent in 2005 and remains under the legal contribution rate until 2024. The GAP is 10.3 percent, which is 1.2 percentage points under the legal rate and 4.3 percentage points under the base scenario. Figure 6.23 shows the improved financial situation under this scenario.

It should be noted that while this scenario does solve the financial problems of the fund and build a substantial reserve, as a consequence the retired population would have to pay a high price in terms of significantly reduced pension replacement ratios (see below).

Figure 6.23 AOV PAYG rate and contribution rate - Reform scenario





Figure 6.24 shows the AOV expenditure growth over the next 60 years. Expenditure growth occurs similar to that observed under the individualization scenario. The increase of the normal retirement age to 62 also impact on the expenditure development. As mentioned in Section 6.2, the number of pensions decreases considerably for two consecutive years in 2005 and 2006 as no new pensioners enter the scheme. Subsequent to the two-year transitory period of negative growth in number of pensioners, the AOV expenditure growth stabilizes but less people will always reach the age of 62 (in comparison to 60) and be entitled to pension benefits.

Figure 6.24 AOV annual expenditure growth – Reform scenario



As can be seen from Table 6.11, the contribution assessment ceiling is increased to 5,000 AFL per month in 2005. The direct effect of this parametric change combined with the premium individualization produces a substantial increase of the average insured wage. In fact, the average insured wage increases by 25.3 percent in 2005 and is expected to be 2,666 AFL in 2004 and increase up to 3,341 AFL in 2005. By contrast, the assumption is that the national average wage only increases by 4.6 percent for the same year.


Table 6.11 Replacement ratio – Reform scenario


	Gross	Average	Minimum	Contribution	Single	AOV	AWW	(1) / (5)	(2) / (5)	AOV Pay
Year	average national	insured				average	average	Replacement	Replacement	as you go
	wage	wage	wage	ceiling	pension	pension	pension	ratio	ratio	rate
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
2003	3,623	2,567	1,200	4,108	900	846	504	24.8%	35.1%	11.1%
2004	3,805	2,666	1,236	4,108	900	849	506	23.7%	33.8%	10.9%
2005	3,980	3,341	1,279	5,000	954	890	542	24.0%	28.6%	9.5%
2006	4,159	3,491	1,321	5,224	965	906	561	23.2%	27.6%	8.8%
2007	4,341	3,644	1,364	5,453	975	916	566	22.5%	26.8%	8.6%
2008	4,526	3,796	1,407	5,686	985	926	576	21.8%	26.0%	8.4%
2013	5,492	4,565	1,619	6,898	1,133	1,062	689	20.6%	24.8%	8.8%
2023	7,829	6,357	2,081	9,835	1,457	1,344	942	18.6%	22.9%	11.1%
2033	11,144	9,038	2,676	13,999	1,873	1,699	1,128	16.8%	20.7%	12.4%
2043	15,855	13,062	3,440	19,917	2,408	2,158	1,474	15.2%	18.4%	10.6%
2053	22,544	18,363	4,422	28,319	3,096	2,742	1,908	13.7%	16.9%	9.6%
2063	32,041	26,096	5,685	40,248	3,980	3,491	2,413	12.4%	15.2%	9.2%

The combination of these parametric changes is sufficient to maintain the fund financially stable over time and a major reserve would accumulate (Figure 6.25). From the results, key years in the future evolution of the scheme were identified:

- Over the entire period of projection, the total of contributions and investment earnings is sufficient to meet the scheme's expenditure;
- In absolute terms, the reserve is expected to be 3,131 million AFL in 2023, 9,718 million AFL in 2043 and 34,915 million AFL in 2063.

Figure 6.25 Reserve – Reform scenario





The reform scenario appears to provide an efficient solution in order to maintain the fund financially stable over time. This major reform has the advantage of creating a healthy reserve and consequently ensures the continued existence of the social purposes of the SVb. This reform also limits the scope for differences in eligibility and rate of payment based on deliberate behavioral decisions of insured persons.


Care must be exercised in interpreting these outcomes and one must also keep in mind the underlying assumptions made. The following additional assumptions must also be achievable in order to produce the results previously presented.


- The rate of return on investments has to be at least 4.1 percent net per annum (i.e. after administration costs); and
- The labour market will have to adapt to the increase of the normal retirement age to 62 years by extending all careers by two years.

This reform comes, however, at a high price. In 2063, the replacement rate of the single pension is close to meaningless. In fact, the single pension replaces only 15 percent of the national average wage. The suggestion to fix the single pension at 70 percent of the minimum wage combined with the increase of the contribution ceiling and premium individualization gradually enlarges the gap between contributions paid and benefits received (see underlying assumptions on wage growth and inflation).

The ILO was asked to simulate the financial effects in case the legal contribution rate were reduced by two percentage points to 9.5 percent. Under this scenario, the SVb would also have a permanent positive reserve (Figure 6.26).

Figure 6.26 Reserve – Reform scenario at AOV contribution rate of 9.5 percent





In other words, the reform provides room for alternative uses of parts of the present legal contribution rate, for example reducing labour costs or increasing workers' private consumption or the build-up of a second tier of the same size (two percent contribution rate) or higher indexation of pensions under the present (reformed) scheme.

7. A fully funded tier

Many alternative scenarios have been presented in Section 6 in order to properly address the problems of maintaining the value of individual pensions while also maintaining the scheme's financial stability at constant contribution rates. All scenarios show that there is no magic to rectify the foreseeable situation and that someone will have to pay.

At a first glance, pension indexation based on minimum wage growth could give the impression of being advantageous to other measures. However, this approach to consolidation of the SVb's finances should be considered with great caution as the underlying repercussions for beneficiaries are enormous. The single pension would become practically irrelevant, as the replacement ratio inevitably falls (in our calculations by 50 percent over the 60 year period). This way the principle of equivalency, generally inherent in contribution financed pension schemes, might become fully obsolete in Aruba.

Scenarios such as increasing the contribution ceiling, redefining the insurable base and premium individualization enlarge the contribution base and, thus, tend to further deteriorate the balance between contributions paid and benefits received (under CPI indexation) for the large group of high salary earners.

Thus, precautions must be taken in order to keep a reasonable minimum relationship between contributions paid and benefits received. In other words, the SVb has to maintain a minimum of relative fairness and therefore cannot afford to let replacement rates reduce.

One of the solutions proposed, especially by Aruba's social partners, is the implementation of a mandated fully funded second tier with individual accounts.

7.1 Financial implications of a fully funded tier

Estimates of the development of the reserve under a second tier have been calculated, based on four different contribution rates (two, four, six and eight percent) and the following further assumptions:

- only contributors under 50 years of age would be obliged to enter the scheme, as second tier pensions for older contributors would be close to meaningless;
- the starting year for the creation of the second tier would be 2005;
- the rate of return on investment is equal to the interest rate assumed in the economic frame (Section 4) minus one percent³⁸ for administration cost, i.e. on average four percent net over the 60 year period;
- retirement age is 62 years;
- life-expectancy at retirement is 14 years for men and 24 years for women.

Under the second tier, contributions must be paid on top of the existing or reduced legal AOV rate. Contributors accumulate capital each year and are credited investment income.

³⁸Which is *very* moderate.

At retirement, the accumulated value of the personal account will be transformed into an annuity acting as a pension³⁹.

The regulations that should govern the second tier in detail have deliberately not been specified. The following questions will need to be examined in detail: Who should pay the contribution to the second tier: workers, employers, both? Should the second tier be under the umbrella of the SVb, the SVb using private investment firms' expertise for making investment decisions, or should contributions go directly to competing financial companies? Should financial companies be obliged to establish their own umbrella organization, responsible for collection and investment decisions? Should pension entitlements be in form of monthly payments only, or should lump-sum payments be allowed for? If so, under which conditions? Should investment accounts/pension entitlements be inheritable?

The sole objective of this section of the report is to provide general information on the future size and development of such a fund and give concrete assessments on the income replacement provided by individual additional pensions (under the given model assumptions).

Tables 7.1 to 7.4 show the global financial statements of the fund and the development of the reserve under different assumptions. Depending on the contribution rate, within the next 20 years the accumulated reserves reach between about 12 and almost 50 percent of GDP. By the end of the projection period, these ratios stabilize between 21 and 86 percent. It is worth noting that no expenditure occurs before 2018, as it would be the first year of eligibility.

Table 7.5 presents individual examples of the concrete application of the new tier according to contribution rate, age and sex. For simplicity, gender specific assumptions were made with respect to life expectancy (see above assumptions). If such a tier were actually introduced, the government would have to consider the use of unisex life tables, which is socially appropriate. In that case, the replacement ratios shown in Table 7.5 for men would decline whereas those for women would increase.

As can be seen, female pension annuities are smaller than those of males as women usually contribute less and their life expectancy at 62 is higher than that of men. Annuities also increase with the contribution rate and the number of years contributed. As demonstrated in Sections 5 and 6, the replacement ratio without the second tier support is about 35 percent in 2003 and declines constantly over the projected period because pensions are assumed to be indexed in line with inflation.

The second tier aims to maintain the combined replacement ratio at the above level. This goal can only be achieved for persons (not all, however) with a long (full) contribution record, i.e. about 35 to 40 years after the implementation of the tier. For example, a man aged 25 in 2005 and contributing over 37 years, retiring at 62 in 2042, would receive an annuity replacing almost 16 percent of his income; together with the AOV pension he would receive 31 percent, broadly reflecting today's replacement rates under the AOV alone (Table 7.5).

This replacement would, however, only be achievable at a contribution rate of six percent.

Under the same logic, women would receive less or would have to pay a higher contribution rate (about two additional points according to Table 7.5). All persons with a

³⁹There are different types of annuities. Here, for reasons of simplicity, constant (non-indexed) annuities were assumed.

shorter contribution record (unemployment periods, child rearing periods, etc.) would receive less.

 Table 7.1
 Second tier financial development, contribution rate at two percent

2.0%								
2005	2006	2017	2018	2023	2033	2043	2053	2063
11,880,900	12,953,400	26,507,383	27,386,414	31,892,316	44,930,918	67,033,919	95,042,465	135,077,131
8,695,054	9,476,934	19,327,498	20,057,596	24,020,291	34,215,989	50,294,235	70,857,504	101,046,156
20,575,954	22,430,334	45,834,881	47,444,010	55,912,606	79,146,907	117,328,154	165,899,969	236,123,287
0	0	0	927,988	8,613,136	33,757,886	63,547,223	120,376,578	197,671,908
0	0	0	457,118	4,173,397	18,307,018	37,675,735	72,808,177	118,201,251
0	0	0	1,385,106	12,786,533	52,064,904	101,222,958	193,184,755	315,873,159
0	21,320,208	524,501,936	598,117,749	1,010,398,040	2,019,573,018	3,502,738,327	5,547,988,914	7,979,413,394
20,575,954	22,430,334	45,834,881	46,058,904	43,126,074	27,082,003	16,105,196	-27,284,786	-79,749,872
744,254	2,236,473	27,780,932	30,877,702	46,903,500	91,382,900	169,961,804	249,493,808	363,724,867
21,320,208	45,987,016	598,117,749	675,054,354	1,100,427,614	2,138,037,921	3,688,805,327	5,770,197,935	8,263,388,389
0.52%	1.07%	8.21%	8.91%	12.11%	16.78%	19.94%	21.70%	21.95%
	2005 11,880,900 8,695,054 20,575,954 0 0 0 20,575,954 744,254 21,320,208	2005 2006 11,880,900 12,953,400 8,695,054 9,476,934 20,575,954 22,430,334 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 20,575,954 22,430,334 744,254 2,236,473 21,320,208 45,987,016	2005 2006 2017 11,880,900 12,953,400 26,507,383 8,695,054 9,476,934 19,327,498 20,575,954 22,430,334 45,834,881 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 20,575,954 22,430,334 45,834,881 744,254 2,236,473 27,780,932 21,320,208 45,987,016 598,117,749	2005 2006 2017 2018 11,880,900 12,953,400 26,507,383 27,386,414 8,695,054 9,476,934 19,327,498 20,057,596 20,575,954 22,430,334 45,834,881 47,444,010 0 0 0 927,988 0 0 0 457,118 0 0 0 1,385,106 0 21,320,208 524,501,936 598,117,749 20,575,954 22,430,334 45,834,881 46,058,904 744,254 2,236,473 27,780,932 30,877,702 21,320,208 45,987,016 598,117,749 675,054,354	2005 2006 2017 2018 2023 11,880,900 12,953,400 26,507,383 27,386,414 31,892,316 8,695,054 9,476,934 19,327,498 20,057,596 24,020,291 20,575,954 22,430,334 45,834,881 47,444,010 55,912,606 0 0 0 927,988 8,613,136 0 0 0 457,118 4,173,397 0 0 0 457,118 4,173,397 0 0 0 1,385,106 12,786,533 0 21,320,208 524,501,936 598,117,749 1,010,398,040 20,575,954 22,430,334 45,834,881 46,058,904 43,126,074 744,254 2,236,473 27,780,932 30,877,702 46,903,500 21,320,208 45,987,016 598,117,749 675,054,354 1,100,427,614	2005 2006 2017 2018 2023 2033 11,880,900 12,953,400 26,507,383 27,386,414 31,892,316 44,930,918 8,695,054 9,476,934 19,327,498 20,057,596 24,020,291 34,215,898 20,575,954 22,430,334 45,834,881 47,444,010 55,912,606 79,146,907 0 0 0 927,988 8,613,136 33,757,886 0 0 0 457,118 4,173,397 18,307,018 0 0 0 1,385,106 12,786,533 52,064,904 0 21,320,208 524,501,936 598,117,749 1,010,398,040 2,019,573,018 20,575,954 22,430,334 45,834,881 46,058,904 43,126,074 27,082,003 744,254 2,236,473 27,780,932 30,877,702 46,903,500 91,382,900 21,320,208 45,987,016 598,117,749 675,054,354 1,100,427,614 2,138,037,921	2005 2006 2017 2018 2023 2033 2043 11,880,900 12,953,400 26,507,383 27,386,414 31,892,316 44,930,918 67,033,919 8,695,054 9,476,934 19,327,498 20,057,596 24,020,291 34,215,989 50,294,235 20,575,954 22,430,334 45,834,881 47,444,010 55,912,606 79,146,907 117,328,154 0 0 0 927,988 8,613,136 33,757,886 63,547,223 0 0 0 457,118 4,173,397 18,307,018 37,675,735 0 0 0 1,385,106 12,786,533 52,064,904 101,222,958 0 21,320,208 524,501,936 598,117,749 1,010,398,040 2,019,573,018 3,502,738,327 20,575,954 22,430,334 45,834,881 46,058,904 43,126,074 27,082,003 16,105,196 744,254 2,236,473 27,780,932 30,877,702 46,903,500 91,382,900 169,961,804 21,320	2005 2006 2017 2018 2023 2033 2043 2053 11,880,900 12,953,400 26,507,383 27,386,414 31,892,316 44,930,918 67,033,919 95,042,465 8,695,054 9,476,934 19,327,498 20,057,596 24,020,291 34,215,989 50,294,235 70,857,504 20,575,954 22,430,334 45,834,881 47,444,010 55,912,606 79,146,907 117,328,154 165,899,969 0 0 0 927,988 8,613,136 33,757,886 63,547,223 120,376,578 0 0 0 457,118 4,173,397 18,307,018 37,675,735 72,808,177 0 0 0 1,385,106 12,786,533 52,064,904 101,222,958 193,184,755 0 21,320,208 524,501,936 598,117,749 1,010,398,040 2,019,573,018 3,502,738,327 5,547,988,914 20,575,954 22,430,334 45,834,881 46,058,904 43,126,074 27,082,003 16,105,196 -27,284,786 </td

Table 7.2 Second tier financial development, contribution rate at four percent

Contribution rate		4.0%								
		2005	2006	2017	2018	2023	2033	2043	2053	2063
Contribution										
	Male	23,761,801	25,906,800	53,014,766	54,772,828	63,784,631	89,861,836	134,067,838	190,084,930	270,154,262
F	emale	17,390,107	18,953,869	38,654,996	40,115,191	48,040,581	68,431,977	100,588,469	141,715,008	202,092,312
	Total	41,151,908	44,860,669	91,669,762	94,888,019	111,825,213	158,293,814	234,656,308	331,799,938	472,246,574
Pension expenditures	i									
	Male	0	0	0	1,855,975	17,226,272	67,515,771	127,094,445	240,753,156	395,343,816
F	emale	0	0	0	914,236	8,346,794	36,614,037	75,351,471	145,616,353	236,402,502
	Total	0	0	0	2,770,211	25,573,065	104,129,808	202,445,916	386,369,510	631,746,318
Reserve										
Beginning of the	ne year	0	42,640,416	1,049,003,871	1,196,235,497	2,020,796,080	4,039,146,037	7,005,476,654	11,095,977,827	15,958,826,789
Annual Surplus or	Deficit	41,151,908	44,860,669	91,669,762	92,117,808	86,252,147	54,164,006	32,210,392	-54,569,572	-159,499,744
Investment i	ncome	1,488,508	4,472,946	55,561,864	61,755,403	93,807,001	182,765,800	339,923,608	498,987,615	727,449,733
End of the	ne year	42,640,416	91,974,031	1,196,235,497	1,350,108,708	2,200,855,227	4,276,075,843	7,377,610,654	11,540,395,871	16,526,776,778
Reserve in % of th	e GDP	1.05%	2.13%	16.42%	17.82%	24.21%	33.56%	39.89%	43.41%	43.90%

Table 7.3 Second tier financial development, contribution rate at six percent

6.0%								
2005	2006	2017	2018	2023	2033	2043	2053	2063
35,642,701	38,860,200	79,522,149	82,159,243	95,676,947	134,792,755	201,101,758	285,127,395	405,231,393
26,085,161	28,430,803	57,982,494	60,172,787	72,060,872	102,647,966	150,882,704	212,572,511	303,138,468
61,727,862	67,291,003	137,504,643	142,332,029	167,737,819	237,440,721	351,984,462	497,699,907	708,369,860
0	0	0	2,783,963	25,839,408	101,273,657	190,641,668	361,129,735	593,015,724
0	0	0	1,371,354	12,520,190	54,921,055	113,027,206	218,424,530	354,603,753
0	0	0	4,155,317	38,359,598	156,194,712	303,668,874	579,554,265	947,619,476
0	63,960,624	1,573,505,807	1,794,353,246	3,031,194,119	6,058,719,055	10,508,214,981	16,643,966,741	23,938,240,183
61,727,862	67,291,003	137,504,643	138,176,712	129,378,221	81,246,009	48,315,588	-81,854,358	-239,249,616
2,232,762	6,709,419	83,342,796	92,633,105	140,710,501	274,148,700	509,885,412	748,481,423	1,091,174,600
63,960,624	137,961,047	1,794,353,246	2,025,163,063	3,301,282,841	6,414,113,764	11,066,415,981	17,310,593,806	24,790,165,167
1.57%	3.20%	24.63%	26.73%	36.32%	50.34%	59.83%	65.11%	65.85%
	2005 35,642,701 26,085,161 61,727,862 0 0 61,727,862 2,232,762 63,960,624	2005 2006 35,642,701 38,860,200 26,085,161 28,430,803 61,727,862 67,291,003 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 61,727,862 67,291,003 2,232,762 6,709,419 63,960,624 137,961,047	2005 2006 2017 35,642,701 38,860,200 79,522,149 26,085,161 28,430,803 57,982,494 61,727,862 67,291,003 137,504,643 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1,727,862 67,291,003 137,504,643 2,232,762 6,709,419 83,342,796 63,960,624 137,961,047 1,794,353,246	2005 2006 2017 2018 35,642,701 38,860,200 79,522,149 82,159,243 26,085,161 28,430,803 57,982,494 60,172,787 61,727,862 67,291,003 137,504,643 142,332,029 0 0 0 2,783,963 0 0 0 1,371,354 0 0 0 4,155,317 0 63,960,624 1,573,505,807 1,794,353,246 61,727,862 67,291,003 137,504,643 138,176,712 2,232,762 6,709,419 83,342,796 92,633,105 63,960,624 137,961,047 1,794,353,246 2,025,163,063	2005 2006 2017 2018 2023 35,642,701 38,860,200 79,522,149 82,159,243 95,676,947 26,085,161 28,430,803 57,982,494 60,172,787 72,060,872 61,727,862 67,291,003 137,504,643 142,332,029 167,737,819 0 0 0 2,783,963 25,839,408 0 0 0 1,371,354 12,520,190 0 0 0 4,155,317 38,359,598 0 63,960,624 1,573,505,807 1,794,353,246 3,031,194,119 61,727,862 67,291,003 137,504,643 138,176,712 129,378,221 2,232,762 6,709,419 83,342,796 92,633,105 140,710,501 63,960,624 137,961,047 1,794,353,246 2,025,163,063 3,301,282,841	2005 2006 2017 2018 2023 2033 35,642,701 38,860,200 79,522,149 82,159,243 95,676,947 134,792,755 26,085,161 28,430,803 57,982,494 60,172,787 72,060,872 102,647,966 61,727,862 67,291,003 137,504,643 142,332,029 167,737,819 237,440,721 0 0 0 0 2,783,963 25,839,408 101,273,657 0 0 0 0 1,371,354 12,520,190 54,921,055 0 0 0 4,155,317 38,359,598 156,194,712 0 63,960,624 1,573,505,807 1,794,353,246 3,031,194,119 6,058,719,055 61,727,862 67,291,003 137,504,643 138,176,712 129,378,221 81,246,009 2,232,762 6,709,419 83,342,796 92,633,105 140,710,501 274,148,700 63,960,624 137,961,047 1,794,353,246 2,025,163,063 3,301,282,841 6,414,113,764	2005 2006 2017 2018 2023 2033 2043 35,642,701 38,860,200 79,522,149 82,159,243 95,676,947 134,792,755 201,101,758 26,085,161 28,430,803 57,982,494 60,172,787 72,060,872 102,647,966 150,882,704 61,727,862 67,291,003 137,504,643 142,332,029 167,737,819 237,440,721 351,984,462 0 0 0 2,783,963 25,839,408 101,273,657 190,641,668 0 0 0 1,371,354 12,520,190 54,921,055 113,027,206 0 0 0 4,155,317 38,359,598 156,194,712 303,668,874 0 63,960,624 1,573,505,807 1,794,353,246 3,031,194,119 6,058,719,055 10,508,214,981 61,727,862 67,291,003 137,504,643 138,176,712 129,378,221 81,246,009 48,315,588 2,232,762 6,709,419 83,342,796 92,633,105 140,710,501 274,148,700 509,885,412 <	2005 2006 2017 2018 2023 2033 2043 2053 35,642,701 38,860,200 79,522,149 82,159,243 95,676,947 134,792,755 201,101,758 285,127,395 26,085,161 28,430,803 57,982,494 60,172,787 72,060,872 102,647,966 150,882,704 212,572,511 61,727,862 67,291,003 137,504,643 142,332,029 167,737,819 237,440,721 351,984,462 497,699,907 0 0 0 0 2,783,963 25,839,408 101,273,657 190,641,668 361,129,735 0 0 0 0 1,371,354 12,520,190 54,921,055 113,027,206 218,424,530 0 0 0 4,155,317 38,359,598 156,194,712 303,668,874 579,554,265 0 63,960,624 1,573,505,807 1,794,353,246 3,031,194,119 6,058,719,055 10,508,214,981 16,643,966,741 61,727,862 67,291,003 137,504,643 138,176,712 129,378,221 <td< td=""></td<>

Table 7.4 Second tier financial development, contribution rate at eight percent

Contribution rate	8.0%								
	2005	2006	2017	2018	2023	2033	2043	2053	2063
Contribution									
Male	47,523,602	51,813,600	106,029,532	109,545,657	127,569,263	179,723,673	268,135,677	380,169,861	540,308,524
Female	34,780,214	37,907,738	77,309,992	80,230,382	96,081,163	136,863,955	201,176,939	283,430,015	404,184,623
Total	82,303,816	89,721,338	183,339,524	189,776,039	223,650,425	316,587,628	469,312,615	663,599,876	944,493,147
Pension expenditures									
Male	0	0	0	3,711,950	34,452,544	135,031,543	254,188,891	481,506,313	790,687,631
Female	0	0	0	1,828,472	16,693,587	73,228,073	150,702,941	291,232,706	472,805,004
Total	0	0	0	5,540,422	51,146,131	208,259,616	404,891,832	772,739,019	1,263,492,635
Reserve									
Beginning of the year	0	85,280,832	2,098,007,742	2,392,470,994	4,041,592,159	8,078,292,074	14,010,953,309	22,191,955,655	31,917,653,578
Annual Surplus or Deficit	82,303,816	89,721,338	183,339,524	184,235,617	172,504,294	108,328,012	64,420,783	-109,139,144	-318,999,488
Investment income	2,977,016	8,945,892	111,123,728	123,510,806	187,614,001	365,531,600	679,847,216	997,975,231	1,454,899,467
End of the year	85,280,832	183,948,062	2,392,470,994	2,700,217,417	4,401,710,455	8,552,151,686	14,755,221,308	23,080,791,742	33,053,553,556
Reserve in % of the GDP	2.09%	4.26%	32.84%	35.64%	48.42%	67.12%	79.78%	86.82%	87.80%

Table 7.5 Second tier financial development, individual examples

	Pension	AOV single	Combined	Replacement rate	Replacement rate
Individual cases	annuity at age	pension at age of	pension at age of	at age of	at age of
				retirement	retirement
	of retirement	retirement	retirement	(combined pension	n) (Annuity only)
Contribution rate of 2 %					
Male of 25 years old in 2005	804	2,348	3,152	20.6%	5.3%
Male of 40 years old in 2005	274	1,611	1,885	20.9%	3.9%
Female of 25 years old in 2005	572	2,348	2,920	19.1%	3.7%
Female of 40 years old in 2005	219	1,611	1,830	20.3%	3.1%
Contribution rate of 4 %					
Male of 25 years old in 2005	1,609	2,348	3,957	25.9%	10.5%
Male of 40 years old in 2005	548	1,611	2,159	23.9%	7.8%
Female of 25 years old in 2005	1,144	2,348	3,492	22.8%	7.5%
Female of 40 years old in 2005	438	1,611	2,049	22.7%	6.2%
Contribution rate of 6 %					
Male of 25 years old in 2005	2,413	2,348	4,761	31.1%	15.8%
Male of 40 years old in 2005	823	1,611	2,434	27.0%	11.7%
Female of 25 years old in 2005	1,715	2,348	4,064	26.5%	11.2%
Female of 40 years old in 2005	657	1,611	2,268	25.1%	9.2%
Contribution rate of 8 %					
Male of 25 years old in 2005	3,217	2,348	5,566	36.4%	21.0%
Male of 40 years old in 2005	1,097	1,611	2,708	30.0%	15.6%
Female of 25 years old in 2005	2,287	2,348	4,635	30.3%	14.9%
Female of 40 years old in 2005	876	1,611	2,487	27.6%	12.3%

7.2 Future development of financial sector assets – some tentative observations

Total assets of the non-financial institutions of Aruba, including the mortgage banks, pensions funds (including APFA⁴⁰ and SVb), life insurance companies, finance companies and the Aruban Investment Bank, amounted to 2,558.7 million AFL by the end of 2003⁴¹, which is equivalent to 71 percent of GDP. Out of this, 20 percent were claims on debtors abroad and 80 percent domestic claims. Out of the latter, 30 percent were private sector claims, dominated by mortgages, 26 percent claims on the government⁴² and 44 percent other domestic claims. On the liability side, the consolidated balance sheet of the non-financial institutions is dominated by pension fund provisions (78 percent) and the insurance reserve fund (18 percent).

Furthermore, by the end of 2003 the commercial banks held assets in the order of 3,237 million AFL, equivalent to 90 percent of GDP, which were claims on banks and cash (24 percent), investments (four percent), loans mainly to enterprises, to the owners/constructors of buildings (mortgages) and to individuals (65 percent) and others (seven percent). Liabilities are mainly deposits (83 percent).

Thus, including the relatively small financial assets of the central bank and the treasury, the volume of total assets held by the whole financial sector of Aruba amounted to 6,499.4 million AFL by the end of 2003, equivalent to 181 percent of GDP. Of this total, 27 percent is allocated to foreign debtors and 73 percent to domestic debtors.

Out of the total of 6,499.4 million AFL the SVb assets represent four percent.

As a result of its oligopolistic market structure, as well as the small scale of the domestic banking sector, interest rates in Aruba are generally inflexible. The difference between interest on loans and deposits amounted to six percent in 2003⁴³. The volume of non-performing loans amounts to about one third of regulatory capital⁴⁴, which is equivalent to approximately three percent of total loans⁴⁵.

In 2003, the financial sector held average claims on individuals in the order of 22,000 AFL per inhabitant of legal capacity (equivalent to 12,430US\$ or 9,160€⁴⁶). This figure includes mortgages but excludes private company loans and other loans to private households (for example loans by retail sellers to individuals). At the same time, the average claim of the financial sector per company was 320,000 AFL (181,000US\$ or 133,000€).

Indebtedness of those against whom claims are actually being held are most probably significantly higher than the above estimates as not all persons of legal capacity and not all enterprises have taken up loans from the financial sector, either because they belong to the

⁴⁰Civil servants pension fund.

⁴¹Source: Central Bank of Aruba.

⁴²Including non-financial public enterprises.

⁴³Weighted average interest rate margin. Source: Central Bank of Aruba.

⁴⁴ Source: Central Bank of Aruba.

⁴⁵ILO estimate.

⁴⁶€US\$ exchange rate calculated at official ILO rate (beginning of 2005).

group of surplus units or because of business default rules of the financial sector. For a more complete assessment, the above figures would also need to be related to the income of individuals and the financial structure, turnover and profitability of enterprises in order see where indebtedness might present a critical financial burden to debtors. Such research would, however, go beyond the limits of this report.

The following provisional considerations of possible future developments of the financial sector are to be related to the macro-economic frame of Section 4.

Financial sector claims on the government are equivalent to government debt. Increases in such claims can only ⁴⁷ occur as long as the government issues debt instruments, i.e. as long as it runs deficits. Over recent years, the government has significantly increased its debt/GDP ratio from 28.5 percent in 2000 to 41.5 percent in 2003. One of the reasons for this increase was the high health insurance deficit. Under the assumption that the government maintains the ratio of 41.5 percent stable at its present level, total government debt would increase, over the base case projection, to a level of 15,600 million AFL in 2063. Assuming that the government decreases the debt/GDP ratio back to its 2000 level of 28.5 percent until 2007, then kept it constant, total government debt would increase to 10,700 million AFL in 2063. If the year 2003 ratios were kept constant, the claims of the financial sector of Aruba, including the SVb, on this debt could in 2063 amount to between 5,600 million AFL (constant debt/GDP ratio) and 3,900 million AFL (reduced debt/GDP ratio).

It has been argued that the indebtedness of private households (individuals) in Aruba has reached its upper limits, and that these limits should not be surpassed or sooner or later, severe social and societal problems⁴⁸ may occur. It is therefore assumed that the 2003 GDP ratio of claims of the whole financial sector on individuals remains constant over the projection period (broadly implying that no further increase in the rate at which new private household loans are taken out; details depend on term structure, not considered here in any detail). In 2063, the whole financial sector's daims on individuals would amount to 15,800 million AFL (163,000 AFL per person of legal capacity).

Under similar logic, i.e. the share in GDP of the financial sector's claims on private enterprises kept constant, the total volume of claims would increase to 10,300 million AFL by 2063. Under the assumption that the number of enterprises remains unchanged, claims per company would increase to 3.3 million AFL. In real terms, this would imply a duplication of claims per enterprise⁴⁹. Alternatively, under an assumed duplication of the number of enterprises, real claims per enterprise could be maintained constant over time.

Thus, at present broad trends, domestic assets of the financial sector could in total amount to around 30,000 million AFL in 2063 (excluding other domestic claims)⁵⁰.

⁴⁷Total government debt comprises claims of the financial sector, claims of other domestic sectors (enterprises, private households) and claims of the rest of the world (foreign debt). The financial sector of Aruba can only increase its claims on the government if the government continues running deficits, or in case of acquisition of such claims from the other domestic sectors or from the rest of the world. For simplicity of the argument, the possibility of such acquisitions is ignored.

⁴⁸Meeting ILO with Central Bank of Aruba on 19 October 2004.

⁴⁹Nominal per-firm values deflated with GDP deflator.

⁵⁰These calculations, *not* in any case intended to show *probable* results, were undertaken to show magnitudes of possible developments in the financial sector, and their impact on the indebtedness of

Returning to the issue of the accumulation of funds under the proposed second tier in Section 7.1, a six percent contribution rate is the only rate at which annuities can be calculated that would produce sufficient income replacement. In 2063 the six-percent-fund would have accumulated reserves in the order of 25,000 million AFL (Table 7.4).

According to the logic applied in this section (government and private households must not increase their respective debt/GDP ratios), the only domestic sector to absorb the second tier funds accumulated is the enterprise sector. Instead of being indebted with 10,300 million AFL, it would at least have to accumulate debt in the order of 25,000 million AFL⁵¹.

Obviously, these results imply that all domestic sectors⁵² continue to take up loans, i.e. government, enterprises and private households alike. At any total volume of assets of the financial sector given, there is a linear relationship between the three domestic sectors. If, for example, the government reduces its debt (runs budget surpluses), then the take-up rate of loans in the enterprise sector or of private households (or of both) has to increase accordingly. The calculations for the enterprise sector show that any increase in the financial sector's claims either has to be accompanied by higher indebtedness of existing enterprises or by an increase of the number of enterprises financed by means of initial public offerings (IPOs) of one kind or another⁵³. Mutatis mutandis, the same reasoning applies for private households. In other words, the assumption of the financial sector growing in line with GDP implies that (1) existing companies grow on average (expand their production of goods and services and also through the issuance of shares/bonds/take up of loans), (2) that the net number of companies grows (the implementation of new companies being financed by the issuance of shares/bonds/take up of loans) and (3) that, broadly, the relative number⁵⁴ of private households/individuals taking up loans, while having sufficient income for pay back, remains unchanged over time. The creation of new enterprises, however, requires adequate conditions, for example in terms of skilled labour and taxation, and also a sufficient number of persons with entrepreneurial spirits who successfully master the trial-and-error process of a market economy.

The only way to escape this logic is to accumulate claims on economic sectors (governments, enterprises, private households) located in the rest of the world, i.e. abroad. For a small country in a big world, such as Aruba, this seems to be a natural option, however, the viability of this option, especially when pursued as a long-term strategy, depends heavily on the international markets' long-term acceptance of Aruba's currency. Non-acceptance would be equivalent to putting the exchange rate regime (US\$-peg) at risk. International long-term acceptance of the AFL can only be achieved if Aruba's economy provides goods and services that meet the demand of sectors (individuals) abroad. In other words, Aruba must maintain and improve its tourism industry and related

the main domestic sectors of Aruba (government, private households, enterprises). Under the given macro-economic scenario, the calculated estimates must be considered conservative (low). Experience shows that the capital-GDP-ratio in most industrialized countries increases over time, implying that for any additional amount of GDP produced, the required additional capital stock increases faster.

⁵¹The calculations are presented for 2063 only for reasons of convenience. *Relative* magnitudes apply to all years of the projection horizon.

⁵²For the time being disregarding the rest of the world.

⁵³As there is no stock market in place in Aruba, such public offerings would have to be financed through the issuance of company bonds or direct bank loans.

⁵⁴Relative to the total population.

services as well as, to the maximum sustainable, broaden its industrial base. In the long run, whether it would be sufficient to base Aruba's economy fully on tourism (and oil refinery) can not be discussed with due detail in this report. Whatever the future structure of the economy is, Aruba, as a small country, bases its exchange rate regime on the assessment and evaluation of financial markets abroad. Any significant move by Aruba's financial sector to "ship out" amounts of additional national currency to the international markets might put the exchange rate at risk. While this is not expected to happen, such aspects have to be seriously considered when shaping Aruba's future pension system.

The exchange rate risk can only be reduced to zero by joining either the US\$- or the € currency zones, but of course the price to be paid for such a move would be giving up monetary autonomy.

7.3 Second tier funds – the undecided impact on savings and growth

Given the calculations in Sections 7.1 and 7.2, the question arises as to whether Aruba's economy can in future afford the funds stemming from a second tier. In a modestly growing economy, as assumed in this report, there will always be sufficient surplus units offering savings to the financial sector (inflow to the liabilities side of the financial sector balance sheet). Equally, under the same growth assumption, there will be sufficient numbers of deficit units demanding liquidity (outflow on the assets side of the balance sheet) in order to finance consumption (government and private households; including mortgages) and investment in tangibles and non-tangibles (government, enterprises).

In case the second tier's funds are additional to the present assets (the savings rate increases) under the financial sector (about 180 percent of GDP), they would add between 21 and 85 percent of GDP in the long run (66 percent in case of a six percent contribution rate). The second tier would finally hold "ownership" of between 10 and 40 percent of Aruba's economy. In any case, additional funds would require, but not necessarily result in, a dynamically growing enterprise sector as discussed in Section 7.2 – more in the case of a high contribution rate, less in case of a lower rate.

Another possibility could be that second tier funds are not additional to but would substitute funds accumulating anyway (i.e. the savings rate does not react). In this case, a possible positive growth impact of a second tier would not be an issue.

The question as to whether second tier funds actually boost economic growth rates has been frequently debated, the discussion peaking during the 1990s. Empirical results of research undertaken in different countries seem to support both sides of the argument. A solution to this paradox appears possible when taking into account diverging institutional arrangements in different countries. In order to increase an economy's growth path, institutions (monetary, financial, capital market, labour market, others) have to be designed such that they effectively manage the required savings-to-growth transformation mechanisms. If institutional arrangements are counterproductive in this sense, then the mechanism does not work. In this report, Aruba's respective institutional arrangements are not discussed.

From a pension financing point of view, the main problem to be solved is to maintain the deficit units' long term creditworthiness, i.e. their potential to pay back, in a timely manner, the principal plus the required interest (rate of return) as these payments would constitute pensioners' old-age income. Maintenance of the deficit units' long-term creditworthiness depends, inter alia, on the above issue of institutional design.

8. Improving the efficiency of contribution collection

8.1 International practice⁵⁵

There are two basic ways to organize the collection of social security contributions. Contributions can either be collected parallel to the collection of taxes, or integrated into the collection of taxes. Both the older Western European parallel and the younger US integrated systems were introduced under given historical circumstances. In some countries, where parallel systems worked inefficiently, they were transformed into integrated systems. Recently, some of the Eastern European transition countries and countries of the former Soviet Union have taken steps to move from dual systems to integrated systems. At the same time, however, many of these countries are in the process of introducing new parallel systems as a consequence of new, complementary pension schemes (see below).

An alternative model can be found in countries that rely on funded, individual account approaches as their predominant system for pension provision. In the Asian countries operating provident funds, fund managers collect the contributions directly through an agent. Provident funds, essentially public sector institutions, may be viewed as a type of social insurance institution operating a parallel collection system. However, because of the nature of the scheme, they are very different from a Western European type of social insurance institution and have a lot in common with private sector systems based on fund management. The collection system (not the benefit system) is similar in most countries of Latin America where, again, private fund managers collect contributions directly and independently from the tax collection system.

In Western as well as Eastern Europe, in recent years countries have added complementary defined contribution plans to their core schemes. In the US, there are large voluntary, funded defined contribution plans and individual account systems, in which contributions are paid directly to private fund managers by employers, employees and the self-employed.

In reality, it is difficult to typify collection mechanisms by country. Most countries, in fact, display a combination of collection mechanisms and in a sense are mixed systems, a mixture of parallel and integrated systems. The following table shows a classification of selected countries by their predominant type of collection system.

⁵⁵This section draws substance from a paper by Stanford G. Ross (IMF): Collection of social contributions: Current practice and critical issues. Theme 1 of the International Conference on Changes in the Structure and Organization of Social Security Administration. International Social Security Association (ISSA), Cracow, Poland, 3-4 June 2004.

Table 8.1 Classification of selected countries by predominant type of pension contribution collection agency⁵⁶

Tax collection agencies

Argentina Federal Public Revenue Administration
Canada Customs and Revenue Agency

Hungary Tax agency

Russia Ministry of Tax and Contributions

Sweden National Tax Board

The Netherlands Tax office (for universal social security; see below)
United States Internal Revenue Service, Treasury Department

United Kingdom Board of Inland Revenue

Social security organizations

Belgium National Social Security Office
Brazil National Social Security Institute
Bulgaria National Social Security Institute1)
China Social Insurance Agencies
France Social Security Institutions
Germany Health Insurance Funds
Hong Kong (China) Central Provident Fund

Indonesia Employees Social Security Scheme

Japan Social Insurance Offices

Korea Korea National Pension Corporation
Malaysia Employees Provident Fund

Mexico Social Insurance Institute
Philippines Social Security System
Poland Social Insurance Institution
Singapore Central Provident Fund
Switzerland Administering institutions

The Netherlands UWV - Institution responsible for unemployment insurance and disability

(for work-related pensions; see above)2)

Thailand Social Security Office
Uruguay Social Insurance Bank

1) Planned to be unified with tax collection (merger expected for 1 January 2006).

2) As of 1 January 2006 to be transferred to the tax office.

In reality, the variety of systems used by different countries does not mean that all these systems are working efficiently and effectively. Making social security institutions, notably pension institutions, operate effectively is an enormous task and, when achieved, maintaining effectiveness requires continuous intense quality control of administrative processes.

⁵⁶Excerpt from Stanford G. Ross (IMF): Collection of social contributions: Current practice and critical issues. Theme 1 of the International Conference on Changes in the Structure and Organization of Social Security Administration. International Social Security Association (ISSA), Cracow, Poland, 3-4 June 2004. Appendix 1.

In some parts of the world, pension institutions work with high reliability even if policy issues abound, such as in Japan, the US, and Western Europe. In other parts of the world, having reliable institutions is very problematic even apart from policy issues.

A key consideration in developing pension institutions is to have good design and then strong project management to implement that design. Also, the development and implementation of the design has to be based on administrative fundamentals that need to be respected. The most important among such fundamentals is that government-wide coordination is needed for any collection mechanism, be it integrated or parallel, be it tax or contribution. Modern collection techniques rely on the use of sophisticated information technology and data that must be gathered and shared on a government-wide basis.

From these observations, the following preliminary conclusions may be drawn with respect to integrating or separating tax and contribution collection. Success or failure of any such move depends on (1) the status of modernization of the tax administration; (2) the status of modernization of the social security (pension) administration; (3) the particular culture surrounding revenue collection and taxpayer/contributor compliance, including issues of priority given to tax versus contribution collection.

In systems that are operating on an integrated approach (such as Aruba), the efficiency of contribution collection, of course, depends on the status of modernity of the common institution (See Section 8.2).

The experience of countries initially using parallel systems, which then attempted to integrate revenue collection, is mixed. For example, in Sweden the process of integration worked extremely well because both the social insurance agency and the tax administration were working on highly modern levels so that the task of integration could be narrowly focused on the transfer of collection functions. But, even in countries like the UK, Ireland and Italy, integration took place with a variety of problems on both the social security institution and revenue agency side. Efforts were only successful when the integration process was combined with substantial modernization on both sides.

In Central and Eastern Europe, it is often the case that both the social security institution and the revenue collection agency need significant modernization. In such circumstances, integration of collection activities is far more challenging.

It is apparent that an integration project can be implemented only if the tax administration has modernized to the point where it is effectively using modern information technology and has a reasonably reliable employer-based system for the withholding of personal income taxes. If tax modernization has proceeded to this point, accepting responsibility for the social contribution collection would be reasonable since the basic foundations are present.

It should be mentioned that, although possible in principle, no integration project is known where a social security institution undertook responsibility for tax collection. In the case of Bulgaria, the social insurance institution was essentially modernized, which led to a plan to create a new revenue administration that could modernize tax collection as well as integrate the collection of social contributions. However, the existing tax administration agency was too weak to take responsibility for the integration. It lacked core competencies.

It is difficult to estimate the costs of contribution collection under different collection systems. Under any system, costs arise on the contributors' side and on the collectors' side. Economic efficiency arguments support the view that collection under an integrated system is cheaper than under a parallel system, however this assumption is only true if the integrated system has the basic foundations mentioned above. If a stand-alone contribution collection system is more efficient and more effective than the tax system, then integration is costly. If separation of an integrated system into separate tax and contribution collection

systems provides room for modernization in at least one of the two, then such a move might lead to a more cost-efficient situation than a continued inefficient integrated system.

Based on available empirical information, administrative costs of efficiently working mature public pension systems, if responsible for contribution collection, could and should be kept in the order of 1.5 to 2.5 percent of contributions collected, subject to such concrete circumstances as, for example, the size of the covered population and/or the number of enterprises⁵⁷. Out of this amount, less than half of one percent might be attributable to the very act of contribution collection. This estimate excludes the costs on the employer and/or employee side, which are, however, usually also very low. By contrast, the administration costs of privately managed schemes of individual accounts on a funded basis are much higher. In Latin America they have been calculated to amount to up to 50 percent of collected individual contributions⁵⁸. In the UK, estimates range between 20 and 30 percent, and they might not be much lower in the rest of Europe⁵⁹. It has been argued that high administration costs of private schemes are partially attributable to the specifically high collection costs of such schemes.

8.2 The case of Aruba

Aruba's contribution collection system is integrated with tax collection through the tax revenue office. The SVb receives contributions collected from the tax office as a transfer but is not directly involved in the actual process of contribution collection. The SVb also gets a list from the tax office of all companies that pay their AOV/AWW contribution, however immediate consistency checks of contribution inflow is not possible as the SVb is neither in a position to check the completeness of the list nor the status of the payment balance per company. The SVb also has no access to contributors' individual details.

The ILO has been asked for recommendations for improved efficiency in the contribution collection process based on a review of the present system and methods, especially addressing the question as to whether the tax office or the Social Insurance Bank should undertake contribution collection.

To date, the Tax office is in charge of contribution collection. Under this current situation, the ILO cannot guarantee that the contribution collection process would be more efficient if it were handled directly by the SVb. In terms of mere administration costs, one can reasonably assume that if the SVb takes over the collection process, administration costs will increase even if there is already a system in place for the collection of contributions for the Accident and Sickness scheme.

One area in need of improvement is in terms of the amount of and accessibility of information available to the SVb. At this point, the SVb has very little information about

⁵⁷See, for example, Bundesministerium für Gesundheit (Bonn): Daten des Gesundheitswesens 2001. Nomos Baden-Baden, 2001. P. 382. [Federal Ministry of Health (Bonn, Germany): Health data report 2001].

⁵⁸See: Keeping the promise of Old Age Income Security in Latin America. A Regional Study of Social Security Reforms. Indermit S. Gill, Truman Packard and Juan Yermo with the assistance of Todd Pugatch. Regional Studies Program, The Office of the Chief Economist, Latin America and Caribbean Region, World Bank (2004).

⁵⁹See: Paul Krugman: Social Security: lessons from the British. In: The New York Times; Saturday, January 15, 2005.

contributions, as individual records are not available to SVb managers and it is therefore difficult to clearly evaluate the incoming contributions.

In order to regulate the contribution collection and especially to be able to obtain more detailed information, an annual auditing and reporting of the collected AOV/AWW premiums through an independent accountant is recommended.

Another area of concern is that the existing system does not allow for the enforcement of some legislative parameters. For example, the current method used to collect contributions through the Tax Office does not allow the enforcement of Section 8 of the AOV Ordinance to account for years where no contribution has been paid. In fact, this regulation stipulates that discounts of three percent should apply for each annual contribution payment missed and where the pensioner is negligibly at fault for not having paid his contributions in the past. For each registered annual payment missed, the SVb will save, in nominal terms, about 9,000 AFL in future pension payments as the pension will be discounted. The law should also be enforced in the same manner on employers so that they are held responsible for contribution payments missed in order to inconsistencies between employers and employees.

In order to enforce this regulation, it is absolutely necessary to include individual records and full detailed information on contributions.

The contribution revenue transferred to the SVb in 2002 was based on an (implicit) amount of 1,110.7 million AFL of contributory wages. In the same year, according to information received by the Central Bureau of Statistics, the sum of taxable wages amounted to an estimated 1,310.1 million AFL. Thus, assuming this estimate is reliable and (in principle) fully applicable to SVb contributions, contributions in the order of about 25 million AFL were not collected, which amounts to about 15 percent of AOV/AWW contributions ⁶⁰.

While it is observed that the sum of taxable insurable wages is higher than the sum of SVb insurable wages, in order to explain the gap, a number of factors must be taken into consideration. Firstly, the taxable base needs to be reduced by deductible items such as home mortgages. Secondly, married couples pay their AOV contribution up to the combined amount of their salaries for the total of the wage ceiling. Thirdly, workers above 60 years of age are exempt from contribution, and finally, the non-compliance rate plays a role.

The actual amount of non-compliance, i.e. illegal non-payment of contributions, is unknown. Taking into account the simulative results of the scenarios in Sections 6.6 and 6.7 and the sum of wages earned by workers aged 60 and over, non-compliance might lie in the order of five percent of the insurable wages due, equivalent to one third of the above-mentioned total of 15% (25 million AFL) of contributions lost. This noncompliance rate is of particular concern to the SVb and also to its constituents, as the loss it implies is (quite rightly) unsatisfactory as it increases the pressure on the future finances of the SVb. The SVb, however, as a consequence of the integrated collection system operating in Aruba, is, administratively, put into the role of a mere observer instead of being able to enforce contributors' compliance.

Accordingly, a separation of the contribution collection function from the tax collection function must be considered. In this case the SVb would assume the contribution collection function along with its traditional benefit payment function.

⁶⁰This loss of contributions adds to the SVb's revenue losses due to the non-adjustment of the ceiling.

Among the advantages of such a move would clearly be the fact that the SVb would assume full control over the contribution collection process. In this way, the SVb could concentrate on contribution collection, especially in those cases where compliance is low or zero, and the demographically induced future financial problems of the SVb's long-term branch would be partially solved through enhanced administrative effectiveness. In fact, under the base case assumptions, exhaustion of the reserve could be postponed by six years (from 2023 to 2029) if non-compliance was reduced to zero (from five percent). Of course, the actual additional revenue collected under improved collection effectiveness might be lower due to the cost impact on enterprises operating on the margin of bankruptcy, however, an additional three to five years before the reserve is exhausted can be considered a realistic result of improved collection effectiveness.

Such an organizational move is recommendable unless the modernization of the tax office, which is presently on its way, leads to improvements not only with respect to information technology but also, equally important, to a modernized collection system that takes into account the special revenue collection requirements of social security, which may, in cases, be different from tax revenue. Requirements of mutual cooperation between the tax office administration and the SVb's administration, as addressed in Section 8.1, would have to be fulfilled. Indeed, the actual modernization process of the tax revenue should be undertaken under active participation of the SVb (and the health insurance) in order to incorporate the institution's interests right from the beginning.

If, under the given circumstances, this is impossible or not advisable, then a separation of the contribution collection function (combined for the SVb and the health insurance) should be seriously considered. Before undertaking such a step, a clear project plan, supported by the whole government administration, would have to be set up and the personnel and information technology requirements would have to be assessed. The details of such a plan are beyond the scope of this report.

9. Tightening pension entitlements and better allocation of the contribution rate

9.1 Limiting pension payments to legal residents

Under the current SVb's legislation, some unclear dispositions exist regarding pension entitlements. The Law stipulates that every person who lived on the island is eligible for pension entitlements. In fact, pension entitlements are legally based on a vague residency status. The SVb may want to tighten pension entitlements in order to avoid cases where illegal residents claim pension rights.

According to SVb officials, such cases have been very limited or simply non-existent. The reason is obvious because illegal residents are exposed to imminent sanctions such as deportation. The responsibility of the SVb is certainly not to act as an immigration guardian but in order to be consistent with the existing governmental laws and prevent such ambiguous cases, it is preferable and recommendable to adjust this legal disposition by using the words "legal resident" rather than "who lived on the island".

9.2 More appropriate allocation of the AOV/AWW contribution rate

The ILO has been asked for recommendations on a more appropriate allocation of the AOV/AWW contribution rate. As was seen in Table 5.3, the AWW PAYG rate over the next 60 years will never exceed one percent. In fact, under the base scenario assumptions, the long-term estimates are closer to 0.4 percent, which is 1.6 percentage points less than the AWW legal contribution rate. On the other hand, the AOV branch experiences a PAYG rate considerably higher than its allocated current contribution rate and is in serious need of additional funding.

Table 9.1 Legal contribution rate and PAYG rate

PAYG Rate

Scheme	Legal contribution rate	2003	2013	2023	2033	2043	2053	2063
AWW	2.0%	0.9%	0.8%	0.6%	0.5%	0.5%	0.4%	0.4%
AOV	11.5%	11.1%	12.7%	17.5%	19.4%	16.6%	15.3%	14.5%

Table 9.1 shows that there is a clear imbalance on the contribution rate allocation. The SVb may want to adjust the contribution separation between the AWW and the AOV in order to properly represent their future financial situation. A shift of one percentage point from the AWW contribution rate to the AOV contribution rate should be considered. In this way, more contribution income could be allocated to the AOV as the new contribution rate would be 12.5 percent, and the AWW branch would remain sufficiently financed.

10. Financial auditing routines for the SVb

The ILO has been requested to comment on the proposal to carry out actuarial reviews of the SVb every five years and more frequently only if needed.

The ILO understands that the request does not refer to actuarial reviews as such but to the frequency of such reviews.

Actuarial reviews are generally considered necessary on a regular basis in order to provide information as to whether the broad revenue and expenditure trends of the system under review are sustainable in the long term. The time horizon of such reviews often is over more than one generation, i.e. up to between 50 and 75 years (in this report, the time horizon is 60 years).

There are, however, established procedures that have shorter projection periods, for example five or ten years. The five-year period is the typical period required by governments for mid-term budget planning purposes. Sometimes, especially when governments have implemented explicit development plans, ten-year periods have been used. If pension schemes are subsidized by the budget or in cases where the pension scheme's financial situation is fragile in the sense that government subsidies might be required in the immediate future, then detailed projections focusing on the scheme are required in order to provide strong estimates for the required state transfers. The more the scheme is approaching a financial status indicating a need for state transfers, the more frequent projections of revenue and expenditure have to be carried out, for budgetary reasons. Once state transfers are needed, such calculations are reduced to a one-year time period.

It should be noted that the choice of time periods between one, five and ten years has been mainly as a result of historical factors. In previous times, when modern information technology was not available, it made a substantial difference in effort and resources required whether a projection was made over one, five or ten years. Nowadays, once a computer model is calibrated for projecting one year, it can usually be easily applied for projecting five and ten years. If models for these time periods explicitly use demographic population projection techniques, then they can usually also be expanded to a 50- or 75-year time period. It is not so much the technique that makes the difference between models with different time periods, but mainly the interpretation of the results.

Given this background, it is advisable to have regular annual projections of the SVb's finances. In fact, the SVb itself, in cooperation with the government (especially with respect to agreeing on the underlying demographic and macro-economic assumptions) should be able to carry out actuarial projections of its revenue and expenditure on an annual basis, for example by using the ILO model. In terms of human resources, this would mean the additional employment of two specialists (economist/actuary or equivalent qualification) for the update, maintenance and use of the model.

If the SVb does not feel competent or lacks the staff to carry out such projections on its own, then, at least, there should be annual medium term "trend-based" projections over a time period of 10 to 15 years. This period is recommended as the minimum in order to cover the period of possible critical reserve development as indicated in Figure 5.12. The notion "trend-based" has to be carefully interpreted, however. The main demographic problems of the SVb's old-age benefit branch will, according to the assumptions underlying this report, occur during the next 20 to 30 years (many more pensioners, less additional contributors). A trend-based approach would have to check this assumption on a revolving basis and adjust it according to new information available. In other words, a

simplified trend approach (as opposed to a fully fledged actuarial projection) would also, at least, have to make use of a revolving fine-tuned demographic sub-module.

Under this condition (an adequate model with a 10- to 15- year projection period exists and is regularly being applied), full actuarial reviews might be required only every five years. Under such a rule, the annual valuations would serve as financial guidance and possibly early warnings under given legislation whereas the quinquennial actuarial reviews would check for long-term consistency of the parameters of the scheme.

In any case, the shorter-range projections should also be given official character and be published regularly in a constant format.

Furthermore it is strongly recommended to have the SVb's balance sheet ready and published together with the cashflow sheet and other information on the SVb (contributors, beneficiaries, staff, etc.) by the beginning of every year, which could either be kept separate from the regular projections or be made an integral part thereof.

11. Conclusions and recommendations

11.1 Conclusions

Whichever reform option is adopted, there is no solution to Aruba's growing old-age financing problem that could satisfy all stakeholders of the AOV/AWW scheme equally. Benefit eligibility conditions will have to be tightened (in particular, by increasing the retirement age) and more money will be needed to finance Aruba's demographic transition. At the same time, measures have to be taken in order to maintain present relative benefit levels (replacement rates) necessary in order to avoid future old-age poverty, without upsetting society's consensus on the scheme's highly redistributive design, which has contributed substantially to poverty avoidance in Aruba.

The reform option (Section 6.8) is a step in the right direction, however, it cannot be recommended as the sole measure as it leads to old-age poverty in the medium and longer term (due to assumed CPI-indexation). An amount would have to be added to the reform, which at least maintains present relative pension benefit levels (replacement rates).

One possibility is to add a second tier to the present, reformed, scheme. Such a tier could be designed in different ways (PAYG, funded, mix). In this report only some aspects of a mandated fully funded second tier (individual accounts) were discussed as this design has been discussed in Aruba most intensely. In order to make this tier meaningful (in terms of expected replacement rates of individual annuities), a contribution rate of at least six percent would be required. At such a rate, combined replacement rates (AOV (CPIindexed) and second tier combined) can be expected to maintain the present gross⁶¹ system replacement rate of about 30 percent of the average insurable wage (assuming wageindexation of the ceiling) in the long run.

Another possibility would be to use the same additional six percent of wages and salaries in order to finance the AOV under present principles (after reform along the lines of Section 6.8), modified however by wage-indexation of pensions (instead of CPIindexation). Costs for contributors would be the same but old-age income expectations for the individual contributor would be safe in comparison to the above second tier approach. Under such a scenario, the SVb would have a permanently positive reserve over the full projection period accumulating 60, 55 and 45 percent of GDP in 2023, 2043 and 2063, respectively.

The focus on wage-indexation of pensions is important. Usually, CPI-indexation of pensions is considered socially and economically adequate. This is not the case in Aruba because in cases where CPI-indexation is adequate, individual pensions, at initial payment, are income related, i.e. they reflect the individual wage-earners' actual lifetime income. CPI-indexation, then, guarantees the purchasing power of each individual pension over the lifetime of the pensioner. In Aruba, the individual pension is independent of individual lifetime income, and is flat for everyone. Here, even at the onset of pension payment, the pension is not related to individual income. As long as wages grow at higher rates than the CPI, individual wages at retirement will be increasingly inconsistent with the flat pension level. In other words, the flat pension will have to be increased regularly in line with wages

⁶¹"Gross" relates to single pension in percent of gross insurable wage. In percent of the average net insurable wage the replacement rate is about 37 per cent (2003; ILO estimate). The same rate related, however, to the (estimated) (gross) national average wage is 25 per cent 2003; ILOestimate).

in order to maintain the relative difference between pension and wage levels. In this report, it is proposed to adjust pensions regularly (annually) with wages. This could also be done allowing for longer periods between adjustments, however if this were done, increases would have to be more substantial in order to catch up with wage developments, as it was last done in 1994⁶².

Under both of these options (adding six percentage points to the contribution rate) the balance between contributions paid and benefits received would not differ significantly from that under the present scheme (Table 3.9). Higher contribution payments and higher benefits would generally offset each other.

A six percentage point increase in the contribution rate (either under a second tier or under a reformed AOV) would be, of course, a drastic measure. Therefore, an incremental introduction would be advisable, which in an economy with growing nominal wages might be the most acceptable approach for contributors (whether employers and/or workers). The above-mentioned fact that the AOV would accumulate substantial reserves under this scenario would also allow for a careful fine-tuning (reduced in comparison to these model calculations, especially in case rate of returns were higher than assumed) of the legal contribution rate over time. One could also consider a further careful increase of the legal retirement age in due time, further reducing to some extent the need for contribution rate increases.

Control calculations show that under the reformed AOV (Section 6.8; wage-indexed) a long-term legal rate of 16.0 percent would be sufficient to maintain a substantial reserve in the long term⁶³.

Increasing the contribution rate to a total of 18.0^{64} percent of insurable wages (under both a second tier solution as well as a reformed AOV/AWW solution) might be considered inappropriate by all societal groups of Aruba. This rate would add to the rate for sickness and to the (probably increasing under status-quo) rate for health insurance, however, there is no way of financing adequate old-age incomes at cheap rates. System logic as well as international experience shows that adequate pensions, paid in mature systems with adequate retirement ages, require contribution rates in the order of 20 percent of insurable wages. In concrete cases rates deviate from this average to the lower or more often to the higher, according to system specifications (Table 11.1).

For the time being, all reform scenarios discussed in this report have a serious administrative handicap as, thus far, no reliable, consistent and regular process for the estimation of a national average wage (national accounts concept) is in place. This is required at least for regular wage-indexation of the ceiling. If the ceiling is indexed accordingly, then wage-indexation of pensions can be based on the development of the average insurable wage, as this would closely reflect the development of the national average wage (as long as the ceiling is sufficiently high).

⁶²See: See International Labour Office: Aruba. Report to the Government. Actuarial review of the General Old-age Pension scheme and the General Widows and Orphans Insurance Scheme as of 30 April 2003. Geneva, March 2004, page 1.

 $^{^{63}}$ Calculated as follows: 11.5% (present legal rate AOV) -2% (potential to reduce legal rate after reform (S. 6.8)) + 6.0% (second tier or modified reformed AOV) + 0.5% (safety margin) = 16.0% (total rate; excluding AWW).

⁶⁴Seventeen percent in case one point were shifted from the AWW to the AOV.

Table 11.1 Pension replacement rates in European welfare states1)

Country	Contribution rate for individuals (incl. employers contribution)	Pension- able age	Years of service	Replace - ment rate	1 % contr. buys % replacement	Remarks
France	19.85 %	60 60 65 65	40 35 40 35	45.00 % 25.00 % 45.00 % 45.00 %	2.27 % 1.26 % 2.27 % 2.27 %	Contr. for invalids not included
Luxembourg	16.00 %	60 60 65 65	40 35 40 35	77.35 % 68.45 % 77.35 % 68.45 %	4.83 % 4.28 % 4.83 % 4.28 %	Plus state subsidy equivalent to 8 % contr. Rate
Germany	19.30 %	60 60 63 63	Not p 40 35	ossible 43.0 % 37.6 %	2.23 % 1.95 %	Plus state subsidy equivalent to 5 % contr. Rate
Belgium	19.86 %	60 60 65 65	40 35 40 35	53.33 % 46.67 %	2.69 % 2.35 %	3.5 % contr. rate for invalidity included
Aruba	11.50 %	60	40 35	35.10 % 35.10 %	3.05 % 3.05 %	Based on residency, not on contribution

¹⁾ Data refer to the situation in 1999 / 2000, except Aruba: 2003.

Source: Bureau international du Travail – Genève: Luxembourg. Évaluation actuarielle et financière du régime général d'assurance pension de Grand-Duché de Luxembourg. Remis au Ministère de la sécurité sociale. Geneva 2001. P. 12; Aruba added to the table.

Questions of efficiency of contribution collection have also been addressed in the report (Section 8). Most of the difference between the estimated maximum sum of wages, which could be insured and the lower sum actually insured can be explained by legislation. Noncompliance is mainly related to illegal acts of non-payment of contributions, which is estimated at five percent of the insurable base due. This could be reduced through measures improving the effectiveness of contribution collection. At present the tax office, which is in charge of collecting contributions and transferring them to the SVb, is in a process of modernization. It remains to be seen how this process, when completed, will affect contribution collection in the future. If a factor analysis reveals that collected contributions increased due to higher efficiency, one might attribute the respective increase to higher compliance. In this case, the non-compliance problem would be solved and there would be no need for further action to be taken. Only in the unlikely case that the modernization of the tax collection system would result in a volume of contributions collected that cannot be explained by appropriate factor analysis, then the government might have to reconsider the existing unified tax-/contribution collection system.

Auditing and actuarial valuations of the SVb, and in particular the AOV/AWW, will also be necessary in the future. It is hoped that this report answers a number of questions, but it may also raise new ones. Whatever direction of reform the government might decide to move in, further or renewed detailed calculations will need to be undertaken, based on new data and assumptions. In order to substantiate its own standing within the national discussion, the SVb should take measures to improve its own capacities. It is hoped that this report contributes to such steps.

11.2 Recommendations

- 1. It is recommended, firstly, to carry out the proposed reform measures as discussed in Section 6.8. This means to raise the contribution assessment ceiling to 60,000 AFL at the latest by 1 January 2006, ideally to increase the legal retirement age to 62 and to fully individualize contribution payments and pensions simultaneously. However, the recommended increase in the legal retirement age does not necessarily need to occur in 2006 as proposed in the ILO model, but it should not be postponed beyond 2008. Full individualization is included despite the high initial costs as the medium and long-term financial effects will be positive. Again, with respect to the timing of the introduction of individualization, there is some leeway. It may be considered that at least the individualization of contribution payments should occur in 2006. It is not necessary that individualization of pensions occur on that date, as a postponement of two to three years for the individualization of pensions will help to ease the effects of "dual" individualization on certain pensioners.
- **2.** Secondly, a regular annul mechanism of ceiling indexation according to the development of the national average wage has to be made effective. This is core to any reform.
- 3. According to the foreseeable timetable, the first indexation of the ceiling could take place on 1 January 2007. For this purpose, time-series estimates of Aruba's national average wage (national accounts methodology) should be available up to, at least, 2005. It is therefore important that the Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS; national accounting section) prepares these data and simultaneously establishes a reliable routine for wage estimation in future. In autumn 2006 a first preliminary estimate of the national average wage in 2006 should be available. Based on this information, details of the adjustment formula (lag structure, etc.) could be determined. The ceiling for the following year should be determined in autumn at the latest. The time available for the CBS to analyze the required statistics and prepare the estimates spans from spring 2005 to autumn 2006 when, at the latest, the ceiling for 2007 should be made public.
- 4. Given that the CBS information on the national average wage would be available, pensions should be indexed accordingly, i.e. based on the development of the national average wage. As pensions were increased on 1 January 2005, the next indexation should take place on 1 January 2006. As, according to (3), the required national average wage estimates will not be available in autumn 2005, pension indexation could be based, temporarily, on CPI development (for example [CPI Oct 2004 to Sep 2005] / [CPI Oct 2003 to Sep 2004]). The next indexation (1 January 2007) should be based on the same information (not necessarily exactly the same indexation formula, which would still have to be established) as used for ceiling indexation, i.e. the national average wage. Subsequent indexations should also not be based on average insurable earnings as these might be influenced by ceiling adjustments. Only if, after sufficient experience, national average wage and insurable wage prove to develop in parallel, one might use the administrative information available on the insurable wage for pension indexation.
- 5. On 1 January 2006 the AOV contribution rate should be increased by one percent, followed by a one percentage point increase each year until the target rate of 16 percent is reached. On 1 January 2006 this could be done by shifting one point from the AWW to the AOV, which leaves sufficient room for prudent financing of the AWW expenditure. Calculations suggest that the AOV would require 4.5 percentage points in addition to the present rate of 11.5 percent, however, depending on actual economic, labour market and financial market developments, a slightly lower additional amount might be sufficient.
- **6.** Recommendations (1) to (5), together, result in a substantial increase of the SVb's reserves several times above present levels (in percent of GDP). As investment in domestic markets of all accumulated funds might prove difficult or even impossible, the government and/or

the SVb should explore, together with the central bank, options (in terms of quantity and quality) of investing parts of the accumulating amounts abroad (US, EU). An explicit investment policy also has to be formulated according to standard rules of efficient financial markets. While the reserves would accumulate under the SVb and, also, the government and/or the SVb would assume final responsibility, investment decisions, as well as general investment policy, should be outsourced to an investment board. Members of the board should be financial market specialists (possibly from Aruba's financial industry), the CBA, the SVb, employers and trade unions. Particular care must be exercised in formulating the statutes of the board (purpose, membership, voting procedures, etc.).

7. Thus far, no clear conclusions can be drawn as to whether the government should opt for outsourcing contribution collection to the SVb (or to the health insurance or to a common institute of both) or whether it should maintain the present organizational arrangement. It is recommended to wait for the results of the tax collection reform measures before considering further steps.

As an annotation to these recommendations, the following needs mentioning. It has been considered in Aruba to change the revenue base of the AOV from contributions to taxation and to complement the tax-financed flat-benefit system with a contribution-financed second tier (this option is not covered by this report). However, one of the implications of the findings of this report is that such a second tier could <u>not</u> be recommended to take the form of a defined-contribution (individual accounts) tier. Instead, a fully funded defined-benefit tier might be recommendable in such a case. Administration of the accumulating funds should be organized as under (6). However, the details of the implementation of such a reform (phasing in, transitory regulations, etc.) would have to be evaluated in a separate study, as the evolvement of the transitional effects might be problematic.

There are several reasons why a contribution-defined second tier is not recommended. One reason is that this approach would only provide a combined replacement rate of (around) 30 percent after a long transition period while, during the long transition, those who have to rely fully or mainly on the AOV pension (because of too short a savings period) will be provided with a CPI-indexed pension only. Another important reason is the difficulty of knowing where to place the accumulated reserves with the expectation of receiving reasonable long-term rates of return. The second tier, in combination with the reserves accumulated under the AOV/AWW (reform scenario), would also accumulate historically huge reserves and, thus, social security could become a monopolistic "owner" of the majority of Aruba's tangible capital stock over the longer term.

A "small solution", i.e. a second tier with a contribution rate of two percent is not recommended as this option will not even come close to solving the problem of a very low income replacement rate of AOV pensions. Meaningful pensions require substantial resources (contribution rates) under any financial regime.

Annex 1

Annex 1.1 Population

					Datia of Daysons
Year	Total	Age 0 - 15	Age 16 - 59	Age 60 & over	Ratio of Persons 16-59 To 60 &
					Over
2000	90,511	22,331	58,042	10,139	5.7
2001	91,960	22,281	59,201	10,477	5.7
2002	93,510	22,383	60,302	10,825	5.6
2003	94,529	22,341	60,965	11,222	5.4
2004	95,538	22,317	61,584	11,638	5.3
2005	96,541	22,078	62,306	12,157	5.1
2006 2007	97,537 98,528	21,972 21,878	62,892 63,418	12,673 13,233	5.0 4.8
2007	99,516	21,712	63,987	13,233	4.6
2009	100,500	21,712	64,599	14,360	4.5
2010	101,479	21,442	64,937	15,101	4.3
2011	102,454	21,262	65,393	15,798	4.1
2012	103,412	21,170	65,645	16,598	4.0
2013	104,353	21,019	65,970	17,365	3.8
2014	105,277	20,958	66,162	18,157	3.6
2015	106,180	20,942	66,200	19,038	3.5
2016	107,063	20,936	66,237	19,890	3.3
2017 2018	107,918 108,746	21,033 21,041	66,074 65,889	20,811 21,816	3.2 3.0
2019	109,545	21,172	65,660	22,713	2.9
2020	110,315	21,316	65,226	23,773	2.7
2021	111,052	21,466	64,812	24,774	2.6
2022	111,764	21,618	64,399	25,748	2.5
2023	112,449	21,766	63,996	26,686	2.4
2024	113,102	21,906	63,603	27,593	2.3
2025	113,722	22,034	63,285	28,403	2.2
2026	114,308	22,147	63,138	29,022	2.2
2027 2028	114,861 115,382	22,245 22,327	63,026 62,859	29,590 30,196	2.1 2.1
2029	115,868	22,393	62,821	30,654	2.0
2030	116,321	22,443	62,671	31,207	2.0
2031	116,740	22,477	62,586	31,677	2.0
2032	117,129	22,496	62,603	32,030	2.0
2033	117,486	22,498	62,744	32,244	1.9
2034	117,813	22,483	63,051	32,279	2.0
2035	118,111	22,455	63,310	32,346	2.0
2036 2037	118,380 118,622	22,413 22,359	63,664 64,003	32,303 32,260	2.0 2.0
2037	118,838	22,339	64,392	32,260	2.0
2039	119,031	22,234	64,710	32,086	2.0
2040	119,202	22,172	64,990	32,040	2.0
2041	119,355	22,113	65,210	32,032	2.0
2042	119,489	22,062	65,392	32,036	2.0
2043	119,608	22,020	65,469	32,119	2.0
2044	119,714	21,990	65,520	32,204	2.0
2045 2046	119,810	21,971	65,500 65,524	32,339 32,411	2.0
2046	119,900 119,986	21,965 21,970	65,524 65,555	32,411	2.0 2.0
2048	120,071	21,987	65,602	32,482	2.0
2049	120,158	22,014	65,448	32,696	2.0
2050	120,248	22,051	65,413	32,784	2.0
2051	120,344	22,096	65,384	32,864	2.0
2052	120,448	22,147	65,281	33,020	2.0
2053	120,562	22,202	65,166	33,193	2.0
2054	120,687	22,261 22,321	65,112 64,977	33,314	2.0
2055 2056	120,824 120,973	22,321	64,977 64,920	33,526 33,674	1.9 1.9
2057	121,135	22,436	64,806	33,893	1.9
2058	121,310	22,488	64,773	34,049	1.9
2059	121,496	22,535	64,780	34,181	1.9
2060	121,692	22,575	64,796	34,322	1.9
2061	121,897	22,607	64,904	34,386	1.9
2062	122,110	22,632	64,925	34,554	1.9
2063	122,329	22,649	65,059	34,622	1.9

Annex 1.2 Economic assumptions (percent)

	Nominal GDP	Real GDP	Inflation	Wage	Rate of
Year	growth	growth		growth	return
2003	5.2	1.4	3.8	0.6	5.3
2004	6.4	2.8	3.5	5.0	7.3
2005	6.3	2.8	3.4	4.6	7.2
2006	6.0	2.5	3.3	4.5	6.9
2007	5.8	2.5	3.2	4.4	6.8
2008	5.7	2.5	3.1	4.3	6.6
2009	5.6	2.4	3.0	4.2	6.5
2010	5.2	2.2	2.9	4.0	6.1
2011	5.0	2.1	2.8	3.9	5.9
2012	4.8	2.0	2.7	3.8	5.7
2013 2014	4.6 4.4	1.9 1.8	2.6 2.5	3.7 3.6	5.5 5.4
2015	4.3	1.7	2.5	3.6	5.3
2016	4.2	1.6	2.5	3.6	5.2
2017	4.1	1.5	2.5	3.6	5.1
2018	4.0	1.4	2.5	3.6	5.0
2019	3.9	1.3	2.5	3.6	4.9
2020	3.8	1.2	2.5	3.6	4.7
2021	3.7	1.1	2.5	3.6	4.7
2022	3.6	1.0	2.5	3.6	4.6
2023	3.6	1.0	2.5	3.6	4.5
2024	3.6	1.0	2.5	3.6	4.5
2025	3.5	1.0	2.5	3.6	4.5
2026 2027	3.5	1.0	2.5	3.6	4.5 4.5
2028	3.6 3.2	1.0 0.7	2.5 2.5	3.6 3.6	4.5
2029	3.3	0.7	2.5	3.6	4.3
2030	3.3	0.7	2.5	3.6	4.3
2031	3.4	0.8	2.5	3.6	4.4
2032	3.4	0.9	2.5	3.6	4.4
2033	3.5	1.0	2.5	3.6	4.5
2034	3.6	1.0	2.5	3.6	4.6
2035	3.7	1.1	2.5	3.6	4.6
2036	3.8	1.2	2.5	3.6	4.7
2037 2038	3.8 3.8	1.2 1.2	2.5 2.5	3.6 3.6	4.8 4.8
2039	3.9	1.3	2.5	3.6	4.6 4.8
2040	3.9	1.3	2.5	3.6	4.8
2041	3.9	1.3	2.5	3.6	4.8
2042	3.9	1.3	2.5	3.6	4.8
2043	3.9	1.3	2.5	3.6	4.8
2044	3.9	1.3	2.5	3.6	4.8
2045	3.8	1.2	2.5	3.6	4.8
2046	3.8	1.2	2.5	3.6	4.8
2047	3.8	1.2	2.5	3.6	4.7
2048 2049	3.7	1.1	2.5	3.6	4.7
2050	3.7 3.6	1.1 1.1	2.5 2.5	3.6 3.6	4.6 4.6
2051	3.6	1.0	2.5	3.6	4.6
2052	3.6	1.0	2.5	3.6	4.5
2053	3.5	1.0	2.5	3.6	4.5
2054	3.5	1.0	2.5	3.6	4.5
2055	3.5	0.9	2.5	3.6	4.5
2056	3.5	0.9	2.5	3.6	4.5
2057	3.5	0.9	2.5	3.6	4.5
2058	3.5	1.0	2.5	3.6	4.5
2059 2060	3.5 3.5	0.9 1.0	2.5 2.5	3.6 3.6	4.5 4.5
2060	3.6	1.0	2.5	3.6	4.5 4.5
2062	3.6	1.0	2.5	3.6	4.6
2063	3.6	1.0	2.5	3.6	4.6

Annex 1.3 GDP projections

	Nominal GDP	Nominal GDP	Labour income	Real GDP	Labour	Labour income	National	Insured sum
Year		per capita	share in nominal		income	share in national	average	of wages
	(million AFL)	(million AFL)	GDP	(million AFL)	(million AFL)	income	wage (AFL)	(million AFL)
2000	3,327	36,757	56.7%	2,886	1,885	62.1%	2,720	1,264
2001	3,399	36,958	56.4%	2,866	1,918	62.0%	2,903	1,268
2002	3,421	36,587	56.8%	2,792	1,943	61.9%	2,971	1,310
2003	3,599	38,075	56.8%	2,831	2,044	61.9%	2,963	1,342
2004	3,830	40,088	56.8%	2,910	2,175	61.9%	3,100	1,413
2005	4,072	42,183	56.8%	2,991	2,312	61.9%	3,231	1,483
2006	4,315	44,240	56.8%	3,067	2,450	61.9%	3,371	1,571
2007	4,567	46,351	56.8%	3,144	2,593	61.9%	3,519	1,662
2008 2009	4,827 5,095	48,500 50,695	56.8% 56.8%	3,221 3,300	2,741 2,893	61.9% 61.9%	3,670 3,823	1,754 1,850
2010	5,359	52,809	56.8%	3,372	3,043	61.9%	3,978	1,943
2010	5,625	54,900	56.8%	3,441	3,194	61.9%	4,135	2,034
2012	5,892	56,979	56.8%	3,508	3,346	61.9%	4,294	2,125
2013	6,163	59,059	56.8%	3,575	3,500	61.9%	4,455	2,216
2014	6,436	61,130	56.8%	3,640	3,654	61.9%	4,617	2,309
2015	6,714	63,231	56.8%	3,704	3,812	61.9%	4,785	2,403
2016	6,998	65,359	56.8%	3,764	3,974	61.9%	4,959	2,494
2017	7,285	67,509	56.8%	3,822	4,137	61.9%	5,139	2,592
2018	7,577	69,679	56.8%	3,877	4,303	61.9%	5,325	2,688
2019	7,873	71,866	56.8%	3,928	4,470	61.9%	5,519	2,781
2020	8,169	74,055	56.8%	3,975	4,639	61.9%	5,718	2,880
2021	8,471	76,275	56.8%	4,019	4,810	61.9%	5,925	2,975
2022	8,777	78,531	56.8%	4,061	4,984	61.9%	6,140	3,072
2023 2024	9,090 9,414	80,840 83,233	56.8% 56.8%	4,102 4,142	5,162 5,346	61.9% 61.9%	6,362 6,592	3,175 3,278
2025	9,746	85,697	56.8%	4,182	5,534	61.9%	6,829	3,391
2026	10,090	88,273	56.8%	4,222	5,730	61.9%	7,075	3,508
2027	10,449	90,969	56.8%	4,264	5,933	61.9%	7,329	3,636
2028	10,787	93,493	56.8%	4,293	6,126	61.9%	7,592	3,762
2029	11,141	96,156	56.8%	4,324	6,327	61.9%	7,865	3,887
2030	11,510	98,947	56.8%	4,356	6,536	61.9%	8,146	4,026
2031	11,898	101,915	56.8%	4,391	6,756	61.9%	8,439	4,164
2032	12,308	105,079	56.8%	4,430	6,989	61.9%	8,741	4,314
2033	12,741	108,445	56.8%	4,472	7,235	61.9%	9,054	4,476
2034	13,199	112,034	56.8%	4,518	7,495	61.9%	9,378	4,651
2035 2036	13,684 14,197	115,857 119,929	56.8% 56.8%	4,567 4,621	7,770 8,062	61.9% 61.9%	9,713 10,060	4,843 5,040
2030	14,735	124,220	56.8%	4,677	8,367	61.9%	10,420	5,250
2038	15,298	128,727	56.8%	4,735	8,687	61.9%	10,792	5,466
2039	15,888	133,475	56.8%	4,796	9,022	61.9%	11,178	5,691
2040	16,501	138,431	56.8%	4,857	9,370	61.9%	11,579	5,920
2041	17,141	143,612	56.8%	4,921	9,733	61.9%	11,994	6,153
2042	17,806	149,018	56.8%	4,985	10,111	61.9%	12,424	6,389
2043	18,496	154,637	56.8%	5,049	10,503	61.9%	12,870	6,630
2044	19,210	160,469	56.8%	5,114	10,908	61.9%	13,333	6,872
2045	19,945	166,472	56.8%	5,178	11,326	61.9%	13,813	7,121
2046	20,704	172,674	56.8%	5,242	11,756	61.9%	14,309	7,375
2047 2048	21,480 22,279	179,024 185,547	56.8% 56.8%	5,303 5,364	12,197 12,651	61.9% 61.9%	14,823 15,355	7,640 7,915
2046	23,097	192,224	56.8%	5,364	13,116	61.9%	15,333	8,200
2050	23,935	199,050	56.8%	5,481	13,591	61.9%	16,477	8,478
2051	24,794	206,028	56.8%	5,536	14,079	61.9%	17,068	8,776
2052	25,678	213,191	56.8%	5,592	14,581	61.9%	17,679	9,085
2053	26,585	220,513	56.8%	5,645	15,096	61.9%	18,313	9,396
2054	27,522	228,040	56.8%	5,699	15,628	61.9%	18,969	9,719
2055	28,486	235,765	56.8%	5,753	16,176	61.9%	19,648	10,059
2056	29,486	243,743	56.8%	5,807	16,744	61.9%	20,353	10,402
2057	30,523	251,972	56.8%	5,862	17,332	61.9%	21,081	10,769
2058	31,597	260,470	56.8%	5,918	17,942	61.9%	21,836	11,142
2059 2060	32,709 33,870	269,219 278,322	56.8% 56.8%	5,974 6,032	18,574 19,233	61.9% 61.9%	22,616 23,425	11,543 11,964
2060	35,078	287,768	56.8%	6,032	19,233	61.9%	23,425	12,401
2062	36,335	297,558	56.8%	6,154	20,633	61.9%	25,127	12,869
2063	37,646	307,741	56.8%	6,218	21,377	61.9%	26,026	13,335
	,			-,	,		,,,	, 500

Annex 1.4 GDP growth projections (in percent)

Pear GDP per capita Composite Co		Nominal	Nominal GDF		Labour	National	Insured sum
20002 0.7 -1.0 -2.6 1.3 2.4 3.4 2003 5.2 4.1 1.4 5.2 -0.3 2.4 2005 6.3 5.2 2.8 6.3 4.2 4.9 2006 6.0 4.9 2.5 6.0 4.3 5.9 2007 5.8 4.8 2.5 5.8 4.4 5.8 2009 5.6 4.5 2.4 5.6 4.2 5.5 2009 5.6 4.5 2.4 5.6 4.2 5.5 2010 5.2 4.2 2.2 5.2 4.1 5.0 2011 5.0 4.0 4.7 4.0 4.7 4.1 5.0 2012 4.8 3.8 2.0 4.8 3.8 4.5 2.2 4.1 5.0 2011 4.4 3.5 1.8 4.4 3.6 4.1 4.1 3.6 4.1 4.1 3.6 3.8	Year	GDP	per capita	Real GDP	income		of wages
20002 0.7 -1.0 -2.6 1.3 2.4 3.4 2003 5.2 4.1 1.4 5.2 -0.3 2.4 2005 6.3 5.2 2.8 6.3 4.2 4.9 2006 6.0 4.9 2.5 6.0 4.3 5.9 2007 5.8 4.8 2.5 5.8 4.4 5.8 2009 5.6 4.5 2.4 5.6 4.2 5.5 2009 5.6 4.5 2.4 5.6 4.2 5.5 2010 5.2 4.2 2.2 5.2 4.1 5.0 2011 5.0 4.0 4.7 4.0 4.7 4.1 5.0 2012 4.8 3.8 2.0 4.8 3.8 4.5 2.2 4.1 5.0 2011 4.4 3.5 1.8 4.4 3.6 4.1 4.1 3.6 4.1 4.1 3.6 3.8	2001	2.2	0.5	-0.7	1.8	6.7	0.3
2003 5.2 4.1 1.4 5.2 -0.3 2.4 2004 6.4 5.3 2.8 6.4 4.6 5.3 2006 6.0 4.9 2.5 6.0 4.3 5.9 2007 5.8 4.8 2.5 5.8 4.4 5.8 2008 5.7 4.6 2.5 5.7 4.3 5.6 2009 5.6 4.5 2.4 5.6 4.2 5.5 2010 5.2 4.2 2.2 5.2 4.1 5.0 2011 5.0 4.0 2.1 5.0 4.0 4.7 2013 4.6 3.7 1.9 4.6 3.7 4.3 2013 4.6 3.7 1.9 4.6 3.7 4.3 2014 4.4 3.5 1.8 4.4 3.6 4.2 2015 4.3 3.4 1.7 4.3 3.6 4.1 2016							
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2006 6.0 4.9 2.5 6.0 4.3 5.9 2007 5.8 4.8 2.5 5.8 4.4 5.8 2009 5.6 4.5 2.4 5.6 4.2 5.5 2010 5.2 4.2 2.2 5.2 4.1 5.0 2011 5.0 4.0 2.1 5.0 4.0 4.7 2012 4.8 3.8 2.0 4.8 3.8 4.5 2013 4.6 3.7 1.9 4.6 3.7 4.3 2014 4.4 3.5 1.8 4.4 3.6 4.2 2014 4.4 3.5 1.8 4.4 3.6 4.2 2015 4.3 3.4 1.6 4.2 3.6 3.8 2017 4.1 3.3 1.5 4.1 3.6 3.9 2018 4.0 3.2 1.4 4.0 3.6 3.7 2019 <	2004	6.4	5.3	2.8	6.4	4.6	5.3
2007 5.8 4.8 2.5 5.8 4.4 5.8 2008 5.7 4.6 2.5 5.7 4.3 5.6 2009 5.6 4.5 2.4 5.6 4.2 5.5 2010 5.2 4.2 2.2 5.2 4.1 5.0 2011 5.0 4.0 2.1 5.0 4.0 4.7 2012 4.8 3.8 2.0 4.8 3.8 4.5 2013 4.6 3.7 1.9 4.6 3.7 4.3 2014 4.4 3.5 1.8 4.4 3.6 4.2 2015 4.3 3.4 1.7 4.3 3.6 4.1 2016 4.2 3.4 1.6 4.2 3.6 3.8 2017 4.1 3.3 1.1 3.3 3.6 3.7 2018 4.0 3.2 1.4 4.0 3.6 3.5 20201							
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2011 5.0 4.0 2.1 5.0 4.0 4.7 2012 4.8 3.8 2.0 4.8 3.8 4.5 2013 4.6 3.7 1.9 4.6 3.7 4.3 2014 4.4 3.5 1.8 4.4 3.6 4.2 2016 4.2 3.4 1.6 4.2 3.6 3.8 2017 4.1 3.3 1.5 4.1 3.6 3.9 2018 4.0 3.2 1.4 4.0 3.6 3.7 2019 3.9 3.1 1.3 3.9 3.6 3.5 2020 3.8 3.0 1.2 3.8 3.6 3.5 2021 3.7 3.0 1.1 3.7 3.6 3.6 3.3 2022 3.6 3.0 1.0 3.6 3.6 3.3 2022 3.6 3.0 1.0 3.6 3.6 3.3 <t< td=""><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></t<>							
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2063 3.6 3.4 1.0 3.6 3.6 3.6							

Annex 1.5 Demographic and economic projections

V	Damulatian	l abaum fanaa	Employed	Full time	Employees	Self-	Haamalanad	Contributors	laha
Year	Population	Labour force	population	equivalent jobs		employed	Unemployed	Contributors	Jobs
2000	90,511	45,036	41,918	38,941	37,604	4,314	3,118	36,842	59,825
2001	91,960	45,519	42,237	38,635	37,467	4,771	3,281	35,777	56,177
2002	93,510	46,001	42,557	37,388	37,690	4,867	3,444	35,274	51,894
2003	94,529	46,557	43,163	38,148	38,148	5,015	3,394	36,357	52,633
2004	95,538	47,114	43,918	38,694	38,694	5,224	3,196	36,688	53,554
2005	96,541	47,688	44,696	39,380	39,380	5,316	2,992	37,338	54,503
2006	97,537	48,257	45,373	39,977	39,977	5,397	2,884	37,904	55,329
2007	98,528	48,824	46,052	40,575	40,575	5,477	2,772	38,470	56,156
2008	99,516	49,376	46,720	41,163	41,163	5,557	2,656	39,029	56,971
2009	100,500	49,924	47,387	41,751	41,751	5,636	2,537	39,586	57,784
2010	101,479	50,455	47,939	42,237	42,237	5,702	2,517	40,046	58,457
2011	102,454	50,983	48,439	42,678	42,678	5,761	2,544	40,465	59,067
2012	103,412	51,469	48,900	43,084	43,084	5,816	2,569	40,850	59,629
2013	104,353	51,928	49,335	43,468	43,468	5,868	2,592	41,213	60,160
2014	105,277	52,356	49,742	43,826	43,826	5,916	2,614	41,553	60,656
2015	106,180	52,739	50,105	44,145	44,145	5,959	2,634	41,856	61,098
2016	107,063	53,073	50,422	44,425	44,425	5,997	2,652	42,121	61,485
2017	107,918	53,353	50,687	44,658	44,658	6,029	2,666	42,342	61,808
2018	108,746	53,579	50,901	44,847	44,847	6,054	2,678	42,521	62,069
2019	109,545	53,750	51,062	44,988	44,988	6,073	2,688	42,655	62,265
2020	110,315	53,854	51,160	45,075	45,075	6,085	2,694	42,737	62,385
2021	111,052	53,916	51,218	45,126	45,126	6,092	2,698	42,786	62,455
2022	111,764	53,942	51,242	45,147	45,147	6,095	2,700	42,806	62,484
2023	112,449	53,944	51,242	45,147	45,147	6,095	2,702	42,806	62,485
2024	113,102	53,939	51,237	45,143	45,143	6,094	2,702	42,802	62,478
2025	113,722	53,917	51,215	45,123	45,123	6,091	2,702	42,783	62,452
2026	114,308	53,901	51,198	45,109	45,109	6,089	2,703	42,769	62,432
2027	114,861	53,893	51,190	45,102	45,102	6,089	2,703	42,763	62,422
2028	115,382	53,722	51,027	44,958	44,958	6,069	2,694	42,626	62,223
2029	115,868	53,573	50,886	44,833	44,833	6,052	2,687	42,508	62,050
2030	116,321	53,435	50,756	44,719	44,719	6,037	2,680	42,400	61,892
2031	116,740	53,333	50,658	44,633	44,633	6,025	2,674	42,318	61,773
2032 2033	117,129	53,269	50,598	44,580 44,558	44,580 44,558	6,018	2,671	42,268	61,700 61,670
2033	117,486	53,243 53,257	50,574			6,015 6,017	2,670	42,248	
2034	117,813 118,111	53,257	50,587 50,638	44,570 44,615	44,570 44,615	6,023	2,670 2,673	42,259 42,301	61,686 61,748
2036	118,380	53,403	50,726	44,693	44,693	6,033	2,677	42,375	61,856
2030	118,622	53,516	50,720	44,788	44,093	6,046	2,682	42,465	61,987
2037	118,838	53,644	50,634	44,766	44,766	6,046	2,689	42,465	62,136
2039	119,031	53,793	51,097	45,019	45,019	6,077	2,696	42,685	62,308
2040	119,202	53,944	51,097	45,147	45,147	6,095	2,703	42,805	62,484
2040	119,355	54,103	51,241	45,147	45,280	6,113	2,711	42,932	62,668
2041	119,489	54,266	51,547	45,416	45,416	6,131	2,711	43,061	62,857
2042	119,469	54,426	51,699	45,550	45,550	6,149	2,719	43,188	63,042
2043	119,714	54,580	51,845	45,679	45,679	6,166	2,734	43,310	63,221
2045	119,810	54,714	51,973	45,792	45,792	6,182	2,741	43,417	63,376
2045	119,900	54,837	52,090	45,895	45,895	6,196	2,747	43,515	63,519
2047	119,986	54,933	52,182	45,975	45,975	6,206	2,751	43,591	63,631
2048	120,071	55,012	52,256	46,041	46,041	6,215	2,755	43,653	63,722
2049	120,158	55,067	52,309	46,087	46,087	6,222	2,758	43,697	63,786
2050	120,248	55,098	52,339	46,113	46,113	6,225	2,759	43,722	63,822
2051	120,344	55,108	52,348	46,122	46,122	6,226	2,760	43,730	63,834
2052	120,344	55,106	52,346	46,120	46,120	6,226	2,760	43,728	63,831
2053	120,562	55,086	52,328	46,104	46,104	6,224	2,758	43,713	63,809
2054	120,687	55,060	52,303	46,082	46,082	6,221	2,757	43,692	63,779
2055	120,824	55,026	52,270	46,053	46,053	6,217	2,755	43,665	63,739
2056	120,973	54,995	52,241	46,028	46,028	6,214	2,754	43,641	63,703
2057	121,135	54,966	52,241	46,028	46,003	6,210	2,752	43,617	63,669
2058	121,133	54,940	52,213	45,982	45,982	6,207	2,751	43,597	63,640
2059	121,310	54,913	52,163	45,959	45,959	6,204	2,750	43,575	63,608
2060	121,496	54,913 54,901	52,163	45,959 45,949	45,959 45,949	6,204	2,750	43,566	63,595
2060	121,897	54,901 54,901	52,152	45,949 45,949	45,949 45,949	6,203	2,749	43,566	63,594
2061	121,097	54,901	52,152	45,949 45,955	45,949 45,955	6,203	2,749	43,566	63,602
2062	122,110	54,908 54,928	52,158 52,177	45,955 45,971	45,955 45,971	6,204	2,749 2,750	43,571	63,625
2000	122,020	0-1,020	UZ,177	40,071	10,071	5,200	2,700	10,007	55,525

Annex 1.6 Wage growth by income groups

		Male			Female	
Year	Average	Average salary	Average	Average	Average salary	Average
	salary low	medium	salary high	salary low	medium	salary high
2003	2.0	1.8	0.6	2.0	2.0	1.3
2004	5.2	5.1	1.4	5.2	5.2	2.9
2005	4.7	4.4	1.1	4.7	4.7	2.4
2006	4.5 4.4	4.7	4.4	4.5	4.5	4.5
2007 2008	4.4	4.6 4.4	4.3 4.2	4.4 4.3	4.4 4.3	4.4 4.3
2009	4.2	4.2	4.1	4.2	4.2	4.1
2010	4.1	4.0	4.0	4.1	4.1	4.0
2011	3.9	3.9	3.8	3.9	3.9	3.9
2012	3.8	3.7	3.8	3.8	3.8	3.8
2013	3.7	3.6	3.6	3.7	3.7	3.7
2014	3.6	3.5	3.6	3.6	3.6	3.6
2015	3.6	3.5	3.6	3.6	3.6	3.6
2016	3.6	3.5	3.6	3.6	3.6	3.6
2017	3.6	3.5	3.6	3.6	3.6	3.7
2018	3.6	3.5	3.6	3.6	3.6	3.7
2019	3.6	3.5 3.5	3.7	3.6	3.6	3.7
2020 2021	3.6 3.7	3.5	3.7 3.7	3.6 3.7	3.6 3.7	3.7 3.7
2022	3.7	3.5	3.7	3.7	3.7	3.7
2023	3.7	3.5	3.7	3.7	3.7	3.7
2024	3.7	3.5	3.7	3.7	3.7	3.7
2025	3.7	3.6	3.6	3.7	3.7	3.7
2026	3.7	3.6	3.6	3.7	3.7	3.7
2027	3.7	3.6	3.6	3.7	3.7	3.7
2028	3.6	3.6	3.6	3.6	3.6	3.6
2029	3.6	3.6	3.6	3.6	3.6	3.6
2030	3.6	3.6	3.6	3.6	3.6	3.6
2031	3.6	3.6	3.6	3.6	3.6	3.6
2032 2033	3.6	3.6 3.7	3.6	3.6 3.6	3.6	3.6 3.6
2034	3.6 3.6	3.7	3.6 3.6	3.6	3.6 3.6	3.6
2035	3.6	3.7	3.6	3.6	3.6	3.6
2036	3.6	3.7	3.6	3.6	3.6	3.6
2037	3.6	3.7	3.6	3.6	3.6	3.6
2038	3.6	3.7	3.6	3.6	3.6	3.6
2039	3.6	3.7	3.6	3.6	3.6	3.6
2040	3.6	3.6	3.6	3.6	3.6	3.6
2041	3.5	3.6	3.6	3.5	3.5	3.6
2042	3.5	3.6	3.6	3.5	3.5	3.6
2043 2044	3.5	3.6	3.6	3.5	3.5	3.6
2044	3.5 3.5	3.6 3.6	3.6 3.6	3.5 3.5	3.5 3.5	3.6 3.6
2046	3.5	3.6	3.6	3.5	3.5	3.6
2047	3.5	3.6	3.6	3.5	3.5	3.6
2048	3.5	3.5	3.6	3.5	3.5	3.6
2049	3.6	3.5	3.6	3.6	3.6	3.6
2050	3.6	3.5	3.6	3.6	3.6	3.6
2051	3.6	3.5	3.6	3.6	3.6	3.6
2052	3.6	3.5	3.6	3.6	3.6	3.6
2053	3.6	3.5	3.6	3.6	3.6	3.6
2054 2055	3.6	3.5	3.6	3.6 3.6	3.6	3.6
2055 2056	3.6 3.6	3.5 3.5	3.6 3.6	3.6	3.6 3.6	3.6 3.6
2057	3.6	3.6	3.6	3.6	3.6	3.6
2058	3.6	3.6	3.6	3.6	3.6	3.6
2059	3.6	3.6	3.6	3.6	3.6	3.6
2060	3.6	3.6	3.6	3.6	3.6	3.6
2061	3.6	3.6	3.6	3.6	3.6	3.6
2062	3.6	3.6	3.6	3.6	3.6	3.6
2063	3.6	3.6	3.6	3.6	3.6	3.6

Annex 1.7 Salary scale 65 (AFL per annum)

		Male		I	Female	
Year	Average	Average salary	Average	Average	Average salary	Average
	salary low	medium	salary high	salary low	medium	salary high
2002	10,136	28,160	44,144	I 10,136	20,632	38,784
2003	10,338	28,673		10,338	21,043	39,297
2004	10,876	30,123		10,876	22,138	40,437
2005	11,385	31,453	45,467	11,385	23,175	41,412
2006	11,903	32,939	47,482	11,903	24,229	43,262
2007	12,430	34,446	49,534	12,430	25,302	45,152
2008	12,965	35,959	J1,01 4	12,965	26,391	47,077
2009	13,506	37,477	53.723	13,506	27,491	49,028
2010	14,053	38,992	55 854	14,053	28,605	51,010
2011	14,605	40,501	58,004	14,605	29,728	53,014
2012	15,164	42,019	60,183	15,164	30,865	55,048
2013	15,726	43,534	62,379	15,726	32,010	57,102
2014	16,289	45,059		16,289	33,157	59,172
2015	16,873	46,635	66,923	16,873	34,345	61,321
2016	17,479	48,263	69,339	17,479	35,579	63,556
2017	18,108	49,948	71,858	18,108	36,859	65,881
2018	18,759	51,693	74,479	18,759	38,183	68,288
2019	19,437	53,493	,—	19,437	39,565	70,795
2020	20,144	55,354	80,044	20,144	41,004	73,401
2021	20,881	57,280	82,987	20,881	42,504	76,110
2022	21,647	59,272	00,00.	21,647	44,062	78,920
2023	22,442	61,350	00,100	22,442	45,680	81,832
2024	23,267	63,513	92,455	23,267	47,359	84,846
2025	24,123	65,773	30,020	24,123	49,103	87,969
2026	25,012	68,127	99,300	25,012	50,913	91,200
2027	25,935	70,566	102,696	25,935	52,792	94,542
2028	26,870	73,092	106,606	26,870	54,695	97,940
2029	27,839	75,719	110,439	27,839	56,666	101,452
2030	28,841	78,448	114,401	28,841	58,706	105,080
2031	29,885	81,282	118,496	29,885	60,830	108,841
2032	30,970	84,246	122,733	30,970	63,038	112,739
2033	32,096	87,344	127,118	32,096	65,331	116,779
2034	33,264	90,585	131,656	33,264	67,708	120,965
2035	34,474	93,967	136,355	34,474	70,171	125,302
2036	35,728	97,488	141,219	35,728	72,724	129,799
2037	37,023	101,130	146,252	37,023	75,360	134,451
2038	38,356	104,880	151,461	38,356	78,075	139,259
2039	39,733	108,731	156,853	1 39,733	80,876	144,233
2040	41,151	112,672	,	■ 41,151	83,762	149,374
2041	42,611	116,727	, -	42,611	86,734	154,688
2042	44,117	120,895	,	44,117	89,800	160,188
2043	45,674	125,188	100,100	45,674	92,970	165,885
2044	47,287	129,637	100,501	47,287	96,252	171,790
2045	48,956	134,244	100,000	48,956	99,649	177,908
2046	50,686	139,028	200,551	50,686	103,172	184,254
2047	52,479	143,968	207,752	52,479	106,821	190,832
2048	54,341	149,075	215,217	54,341	110,610	197,659
2049	56,271	154,363	222,955	56,271	114,540	204,737
2050	58,274	159,823	230,973	58,274	118,617	212,077
2051	60,351	165,465	239,278	60,351	122,844	219,683
2052	62,505	171,304	247,884	62,505	127,228	227,566
2053	64,737	177,337	256,799	64,737	131,773	235,732
2054	67,053	183,586	266,036	67,053	136,487	244,194
2055	69,455	190,057	275,600	69,455	141,375	252,960
2056	71,949	196,780	285,507	71,949	146,452	262,049
2057	74,537	203,783	295,766	74,537	151,720	271,466
2058	77,225	211,063	,	77,225	157,192	281,227
2059	80,010	218,619	- ,-	I 80,010	162,860	291,330
2060	82,900	226,495	328,757	I 82,900	168,744	301,800
2061	85,896	234,689	,	85,896	174,842	312,642
2062	88,999	243,195	352,726	88,999	181,158	323,865
2063	92,211	252,032	365,343	92,211	187,696	335,480

 $^{^{65}}$ The insured population is divided by sex and by three different income groups in order to increase the sensibility of our projections.

Annex 1.8 Second tier – Financial statement – Contribution at two percent

	2005	2006	2017	2018	2023	2033	2043	2053	2063
Contribution									
Male	11,880,900	12,953,400	26,507,383	27,386,414	31,892,316	44,930,918	67,033,919	95,042,465	135,077,131
Female	8,695,054	9,476,934	19,327,498	20,057,596	24,020,291	34,215,989	50,294,235	70,857,504	101,046,156
Total	20,575,954	22,430,334	45,834,881	47,444,010	55,912,606	79,146,907	117,328,154	165,899,969	236,123,287
Pension expenditures									
Male	0	0	0	927,988	8,613,136	33,757,886	63,547,223	120,376,578	197,671,908
Female	0	0	0	457,118	4,173,397	18,307,018	37,675,735	72,808,177	118,201,251
Total	0	0	0	1,385,106	12,786,533	52,064,904	101,222,958	193,184,755	315,873,159
Reserve									
Beginning of the year	0	21,320,208	524,501,936	598,117,749	1,010,398,040	2,019,573,018	3,502,738,327	5,547,988,914	7,979,413,394
Annual Surplus or Deficit	20,575,954	22,430,334	45,834,881	46,058,904	43,126,074	27,082,003	16,105,196	-27,284,786	-79,749,872
Investment income	744,254	2,236,473	27,780,932	30,877,702	46,903,500	91,382,900	169,961,804	249,493,808	363,724,867
End of the year	21,320,208	45,987,016	598,117,749	675,054,354	1,100,427,614	2,138,037,921	3,688,805,327	5,770,197,935	8,263,388,389
Reserve in % of the GDP	0.52%	1.07%	8.21%	8.91%	12.11%	16.78%	19.94%	21.70%	21.95%
•	0.52%	1.07%	8.21%	8.91%	12.11%	16.78%	19.94%	21.70%	21.95%
Reserve in % of the GDP Second pillar Monthly pension	1								
Reserve in % of the GDP Second pillar Monthly pension Male	0	0	0	137	232	395	887	1,236	1,516
Reserve in % of the GDP Second pillar Monthly pension	1								
Reserve in % of the GDP Second pillar Monthly pension Male	0 0	0	0	137 120	232 167	395 339	887 680	1,236 963	1,516 1,166
Reserve in % of the GDP Second pillar Monthly pension Male Female AOV monthly pension Male	0 0	0	0 0 1,253	137 120 1,285	232 167 1,457	395 339 1,873	887 680 2,408	1,236 963 3,096	1,516 1,166 3,980
Reserve in % of the GDP Second pillar Monthly pension Male Female AOV monthly pension	0 0	0	0	137 120	232 167	395 339	887 680	1,236 963	1,516 1,166
Reserve in % of the GDP Second pillar Monthly pension Male Female AOV monthly pension Male	0 0	0 0	0 0 1,253	137 120 1,285	232 167 1,457	395 339 1,873	887 680 2,408	1,236 963 3,096	1,516 1,166 3,980
Reserve in % of the GDP Second pillar Monthly pension Male Female AOV monthly pension Male Female	0 0	0 0	0 0 1,253	137 120 1,285	232 167 1,457	395 339 1,873	887 680 2,408	1,236 963 3,096	1,516 1,166 3,980
Reserve in % of the GDP Second pillar Monthly pension Male Female AOV monthly pension Male Female Combined monthly pension	954 954	0 0 965 965	0 0 1,253 1,253	137 120 1,285 1,285	232 167 1,457 1,457	395 339 1,873 1,873	887 680 2,408 2,408	1,236 963 3,096 3,096	1,516 1,166 3,980 3,980
Reserve in % of the GDP Second pillar Monthly pension	954 954 954	0 0 965 965	0 0 1,253 1,253	137 120 1,285 1,285	232 167 1,457 1,457	395 339 1,873 1,873	887 680 2,408 2,408 3,295	1,236 963 3,096 3,096	1,516 1,166 3,980 3,980 5,496
Reserve in % of the GDP Second pillar Monthly pension Male Female AOV monthly pension Male Female Combined monthly pension Male Female	954 954 954 954 954 954	965 965 965	0 0 1,253 1,253 1,253	137 120 1,285 1,285 1,421 1,405	232 167 1,457 1,457 1,689 1,623	395 339 1,873 1,873 2,268 2,212	887 680 2,408 2,408 3,295 3,088	1,236 963 3,096 3,096 4,332 4,058	1,516 1,166 3,980 3,980 5,496 5,146
Reserve in % of the GDP Second pillar Monthly pension Male Female AOV monthly pension Male Female Combined monthly pension Male Female Monthly gross average	954 954 954 954 954 954	965 965 965	0 0 1,253 1,253 1,253	137 120 1,285 1,285 1,421 1,405	232 167 1,457 1,457 1,689 1,623	395 339 1,873 1,873 2,268 2,212	887 680 2,408 2,408 3,295 3,088	1,236 963 3,096 3,096 4,332 4,058	1,516 1,166 3,980 3,980 5,496 5,146

Annex 1.9 Second tier – Financial statement – Contribution at four percent

	2005	2006	2017	2018	2023	2033	2043	2053	2063
Contribution									
Male	23,761,801	25,906,800	53,014,766	54,772,828	63,784,631	89,861,836	134,067,838	190,084,930	270,154,262
Female	17,390,107	18,953,869	38,654,996	40,115,191	48,040,581	68,431,977	100,588,469	141,715,008	202,092,312
Total	41,151,908	44,860,669	91,669,762	94,888,019	111,825,213	158,293,814	234,656,308	331,799,938	472,246,574
Pension expenditures									
Male	0	0	0	1,855,975	17,226,272	67,515,771	127,094,445	240,753,156	395,343,816
Female	0	0	0	914,236	8,346,794	36,614,037	75,351,471	145,616,353	236,402,502
Total	0	0	0	2,770,211	25,573,065	104,129,808	202,445,916	386,369,510	631,746,318
Reserve									
Beginning of the year	0	42,640,416	1,049,003,871	1,196,235,497	2,020,796,080	4,039,146,037	7,005,476,654	11,095,977,827	15,958,826,789
Annual Surplus or Deficit	41,151,908	44,860,669	91,669,762	92,117,808	86,252,147	54,164,006	32,210,392	-54,569,572	-159,499,744
Investment income	1,488,508	4,472,946	55,561,864	61,755,403	93,807,001	182,765,800	339,923,608	498,987,615	727,449,733
End of the year	42,640,416	91,974,031	1,196,235,497	1,350,108,708	2,200,855,227	4,276,075,843	7,377,610,654	11,540,395,871	16,526,776,778
Reserve in % of the GDP	1.05%	2.13%	16.42%	17.82%	24.21%	33.56%	39.89%	43.41%	43.90%
Reserve in % of the GDP	1.05%	2.13%	16.42%	17.82%	24.21%	33.56%	39.89%	43.41%	43.90%
Second pillar Monthly pension	1								
Second pillar Monthly pension Male	0	0	0	273	465	789	1,774	2,472	3,033
Second pillar Monthly pension	1								
Second pillar Monthly pension Male	0	0	0	273	465	789	1,774	2,472	3,033
Second pillar Monthly pension Male Female AOV monthly pension Male	0 0	0 0	0 0 1,253	273 239 1,285	465 333 1,457	789 679 1,873	1,774 1,361 2,408	2,472 1,926 3,096	3,033 2,333 3,980
Second pillar Monthly pension Male Female AOV monthly pension	0	0	0	273 239	465 333	789 679	1,774 1,361	2,472 1,926	3,033 2,333
Second pillar Monthly pension Male Female AOV monthly pension Male	0 0	0 0	0 0 1,253	273 239 1,285	465 333 1,457	789 679 1,873	1,774 1,361 2,408	2,472 1,926 3,096	3,033 2,333 3,980
Second pillar Monthly pension Male Female AOV monthly pension Male Female	0 0	0 0	0 0 1,253	273 239 1,285	465 333 1,457	789 679 1,873	1,774 1,361 2,408	2,472 1,926 3,096	3,033 2,333 3,980
Second pillar Monthly pension Male Female AOV monthly pension Male Female Combined monthly pension	0 0 954 954	0 0 965 965	0 0 1,253 1,253	273 239 1,285 1,285	465 333 1,457 1,457	789 679 1,873 1,873	1,774 1,361 2,408 2,408	2,472 1,926 3,096 3,096	3,033 2,333 3,980 3,980
Second pillar Monthly pension Male Female AOV monthly pension Male Female Combined monthly pension Male	0 0 954 954	0 0 965 965	0 0 1,253 1,253	273 239 1,285 1,285	465 333 1,457 1,457	789 679 1,873 1,873	1,774 1,361 2,408 2,408 4,182	2,472 1,926 3,096 3,096 5,568	3,033 2,333 3,980 3,980
Second pillar Monthly pension Male Female AOV monthly pension Male Female Combined monthly pension Male Female	954 954 954 954 954 954	965 965 965	0 0 1,253 1,253 1,253	273 239 1,285 1,285 1,558	465 333 1,457 1,457 1,921 1,790	789 679 1,873 1,873 2,662 2,552	1,774 1,361 2,408 2,408 4,182 3,769	2,472 1,926 3,096 3,096 5,568 5,021	3,033 2,333 3,980 3,980 7,012 6,312
Second pillar Monthly pension Male Female AOV monthly pension Male Female Combined monthly pension Male Female Monthly gross average	954 954 954 954 954 954	965 965 965	0 0 1,253 1,253 1,253	273 239 1,285 1,285 1,558	465 333 1,457 1,457 1,921 1,790	789 679 1,873 1,873 2,662 2,552	1,774 1,361 2,408 2,408 4,182 3,769	2,472 1,926 3,096 3,096 5,568 5,021	3,033 2,333 3,980 3,980 7,012 6,312

Annex 1.10 Second tier – Financial statement – Contribution at six percent

Contribution rate	6.0%								
	2005	2006	2017	2018	2023	2033	2043	2053	2063
Contribution									
Male	35,642,701	38,860,200	79,522,149	82,159,243	95,676,947	134,792,755	201,101,758	285,127,395	405,231,393
Female	26,085,161	28,430,803	57,982,494	60,172,787	72,060,872	102,647,966	150,882,704	212,572,511	303,138,468
Total	61,727,862	67,291,003	137,504,643	142,332,029	167,737,819	237,440,721	351,984,462	497,699,907	708,369,860
Pension expenditures									
Male	0	0	0	2,783,963	25,839,408	101,273,657	190,641,668	361,129,735	593,015,724
Female	0	0	0	1,371,354	12,520,190	54,921,055	113,027,206	218,424,530	354,603,753
Total	0	0	0	4,155,317	38,359,598	156,194,712	303,668,874	579,554,265	947,619,476
Reserve									
Beginning of the year	0	63,960,624	1,573,505,807	1,794,353,246	3,031,194,119	6,058,719,055	10,508,214,981	16,643,966,741	23,938,240,183
Annual Surplus or Deficit	61,727,862	67,291,003	137,504,643	138,176,712	129,378,221	81,246,009	48,315,588	-81,854,358	-239,249,616
Investment income	2,232,762	6,709,419	83,342,796	92,633,105	140,710,501	274,148,700	509,885,412	748,481,423	1,091,174,600
End of the year	63,960,624	137,961,047	1,794,353,246	2,025,163,063	3,301,282,841	6,414,113,764	11,066,415,981	17,310,593,806	24,790,165,167
Reserve in % of the GDP	1.57%	3.20%	24.63%	26.73%	36.32%	50.34%	59.83%	65.11%	65.85%
Second pillar Monthly pension									
Male	0	0	0	410	697	1,184	2,661	3,708	4,549
Female	0	0	0	359	500	1,018	2,041	2,888	3,499
AOV monthly pension									
Male	954	965	1,253	1,285	1,457	1,873	2,408	3,096	3,980
Female	954	965	1,253	1,285	1,457	1,873	2,408	3,096	3,980
Combined monthly pension									
Male	954	965	1,253	1,695	2,154	3,057	5,069	6,804	8,529
Female	954	965	1,253	1,644	1,957	2,891	4,449	5,984	7,479
Monthly gross average	3,980	4,159	6,330	6,559	7,829	11,144	15,855	22,544	32,041
Replacement rate for new pens	sioners								
Male	24.0%	23.2%	19.8%	25.8%	27.5%	27.4%	32.0%	30.2%	26.6%
Female	24.0%	23.2%	19.8%	25.1%	25.0%	25.9%	28.1%	26.5%	23.3%

Annex 1.11 Second tier – Financial statement – Contribution at eight percent

	2005	2006	2017	2018	2023	2033	2043	2053	206
Contribution									
Male	47,523,602	51,813,600	106,029,532	109,545,657	127,569,263	179,723,673	268,135,677	380,169,861	540,308,52
Female	34,780,214	37,907,738	77,309,992	80,230,382	96,081,163	136,863,955	201,176,939	283,430,015	404,184,62
Total	82,303,816	89,721,338	183,339,524	189,776,039	223,650,425	316,587,628	469,312,615	663,599,876	944,493,14
Pension expenditures									
Male	0	0	0	3,711,950	34,452,544	135,031,543	254,188,891	481,506,313	790,687,63
Female	0	0	0	1,828,472	16,693,587	73,228,073	150,702,941	291,232,706	472,805,00
Total	0	0	0	5,540,422	51,146,131	208,259,616	404,891,832	772,739,019	1,263,492,63
Reserve									
Beginning of the year	0	85,280,832	2,098,007,742	2,392,470,994	4,041,592,159	8,078,292,074	14,010,953,309	22,191,955,655	31,917,653,57
Annual Surplus or Deficit	82,303,816	89,721,338	183,339,524	184,235,617	172,504,294	108,328,012	64,420,783	-109,139,144	-318,999,48
Investment income	2,977,016	8,945,892	111,123,728	123,510,806	187,614,001	365,531,600	679,847,216	997,975,231	1,454,899,46
End of the year	85,280,832	183,948,062	2,392,470,994	2,700,217,417	4,401,710,455	8,552,151,686	14,755,221,308	23,080,791,742	33,053,553,55
D	2.09%	4.26%	32.84%	35.64%	48.42%	67.12%	79.78%	86.82%	87.80
Reserve in % of the GDP	2.09 /6	4.20 /6	02.0170	33.0470	.0.1270	*****	1011070		
Reserve in % of the GDP	2.09 %	4.2076	02.01,0	33.04 //	101.1270				
Second pillar Monthly pension									
Second pillar Monthly pension Male	0	0	0	546	929	1,578	3,548	4,944	6,06
Second pillar Monthly pension									6,06
Second pillar Monthly pension Male Female AOV monthly pension	0	0	0 0	546	929	1,578	3,548	4,944	6,06
Second pillar Monthly pension Male Female	0	0	0	546	929	1,578	3,548	4,944	6,06 4,66
Second pillar Monthly pension Male Female AOV monthly pension	0	0	0 0	546 479	929 666	1,578 1,358	3,548 2,721	4,944 3,851	6,06 4,66 3,98
Second pillar Monthly pension Male Female AOV monthly pension Male Female	0 0 954	0 0	0 0	546 479 1,285	929 666 1,457	1,578 1,358 1,873	3,548 2,721 2,408	4,944 3,851 3,096	6,06 4,66 3,98
Second pillar Monthly pension Male Female AOV monthly pension Male Female	0 0 954	0 0	0 0	546 479 1,285	929 666 1,457	1,578 1,358 1,873	3,548 2,721 2,408	4,944 3,851 3,096	6,06 4,66 3,98 3,98
Second pillar Monthly pension Male Female AOV monthly pension Male Female Combined monthly pension	0 0 954 954	0 0 965 965	0 0 1,253 1,253	546 479 1,285 1,285	929 666 1,457 1,457	1,578 1,358 1,873 1,873	3,548 2,721 2,408 2,408	4,944 3,851 3,096 3,096	6,06 4,66 3,98 3,98
Second pillar Monthly pension Male Female AOV monthly pension Male Female Combined monthly pension Male	0 0 954 954	0 0 965 965	0 0 1,253 1,253	546 479 1,285 1,285	929 666 1,457 1,457	1,578 1,358 1,873 1,873	3,548 2,721 2,408 2,408 5,955	4,944 3,851 3,096 3,096 8,040	6,06 4,66 3,98 3,98
Second pillar Monthly pension Male Female AOV monthly pension Male Female Combined monthly pension Male Female Monthly gross average	954 954 954 954 954 954	965 965 965	0 0 1,253 1,253 1,253	546 479 1,285 1,285 1,831 1,764	929 666 1,457 1,457 2,386 2,123	1,578 1,358 1,873 1,873 3,451 3,230	3,548 2,721 2,408 2,408 5,955 5,129	4,944 3,851 3,096 3,096 8,040 6,947	6,06 4,66 3,98 3,98
Second pillar Monthly pension Male Female AOV monthly pension Male Female Combined monthly pension Male Female	954 954 954 954 954 954	965 965 965	0 0 1,253 1,253 1,253	546 479 1,285 1,285 1,831 1,764	929 666 1,457 1,457 2,386 2,123	1,578 1,358 1,873 1,873 3,451 3,230	3,548 2,721 2,408 2,408 5,955 5,129	4,944 3,851 3,096 3,096 8,040 6,947	6,06 4,66 3,98 3,98 10,04 8,64 32,04

Annex 2.1 AOV financial statement 66 - Base scenario (in AFL)

Vac-	Total		Revenue			Expenditur				
Year	insurable earnings	Contributio	Investment earnings	Total	Benefits	Admin.	Total	Reserve (end of	Expenditure As % of	PAYG cost
2003	1,175,096,93	135,136,14	-	135,136,14	128,737,92	1,985,957	130,723,88	144,000,00	3.6%	11.1%
2004	1,237,881,34	142,356,35	10,781,158	153,137,51	133,498,69	1,839,151	135,337,84	161,799,66	3.5%	10.9%
2005	1,298,714,64	149,352,18	11,783,317	161,135,50	145,146,89	1,999,623	147,146,51	175,788,65	3.6%	11.3%
2006	1,375,869,85	158,225,03	12,197,391	170,422,42	152,755,78	2,104,447	154,860,22	191,350,85	3.6%	11.3%
2007	1,456,106,35	167,452,23	13,074,547	180,526,77	160,733,41	2,214,352	162,947,76	208,929,86	3.6%	11.2%
2008	1,537,559,10	176,819,29	13,981,646	190,800,94	169,185,70	2,330,795	171,516,50	228,214,30	3.6%	11.2%
2009	1,621,572,59	186,480,84	14,894,403	201,375,25	181,041,72	2,494,130	183,535,85	246,053,70	3.6%	11.3%
2010	1,703,876,78	195,945,83	15,024,731	210,970,56	194,395,14	2,678,094	197,073,23	259,951,03	3.7%	11.6%
2011	1,782,989,21	205,043,76	15,130,495	220,174,25	209,147,01	2,881,324	212,028,33	268,096,95	3.8%	11.9%
2012	1,863,758,44	214,332,22	14,915,351	229,247,57	224,727,61	3,095,971	227,823,58	269,520,94	3.9%	12.2%
2013	1,943,098,57	223,456,33	14,363,397	237,819,73	241,254,01	3,323,648	244,577,66	262,763,00	4.0%	12.6%
2014	2,023,740,94	232,730,20	13,361,904	246,092,11	258,034,87	3,554,830	261,589,70	247,265,41	4.1%	12.9%
2015	2,106,184,83	242,211,25	12,070,778	254,282,03	276,214,79	3,805,286	280,020,08	221,527,36	4.2%	13.3%
2016	2,188,574,71	251,686,09	10,258,988	261,945,08	295,425,16	4,069,939	299,495,10	183,977,34	4.3%	13.7%
2017	2,273,198,97	261,417,88	7,868,388	269,286,27	315,657,95	4,348,677	320,006,63	133,256,97	4.4%	14.1%
2018	2,356,778,72	271,029,55	4,867,200	275,896,75	337,935,03	4,655,578	342,590,61	66,563,114	4.5%	14.5%
2019	2,439,573,35	280,550,93	1,189,043	281,739,97	360,816,52	4,970,806	365,787,33 -		4.6%	15.0%
2020	2,525,680,55	290,453,26 -	3,164,583	287,288,68	384,916,17	5,302,816	390,218,99 -	-, ,	4.8%	15.5%
2021	2,609,101,34	300,046,65 -	8,290,879	291,755,77	410,826,61	5,659,773	416,486,38 -		4.9%	16.0%
2022	2,695,114,94	309,938,21	14,274,151	295,664,06	436,958,15	6,019,775	442,977,92 -		5.0%	16.4%
2023	2,783,971,68	320,156,74 -	21,199,721	298,957,02	463,381,02	6,383,791	469,764,82 -		5.2%	16.9%
2024	2,876,586,09	330,807,40 -	29,255,811	301,551,59	490,021,12	6,750,800	496,771,92 -		5.3%	17.3%
2025	2,973,074,91	341,903,61 -	38,179,460	303,724,15	516,292,99	7,112,735	523,405,73 -		5.4%	17.6%
2026	3,075,618,57	353,696,13 -	48,467,501	305,228,63	540,698,75	7,448,962		1,221,087,80	5.4%	17.8%
2027	3,188,083,53	366,629,60 -	59,872,971	306,756,63	563,568,67	7,764,031	571,332,70 -		5.5%	17.9%
2028	3,296,643,95	379,114,05 -	67,243,364	311,870,69	587,013,50	8,087,020	595,100,52 -		5.5%	18.1%
2029	3,407,742,12	391,890,34 -	80,213,603	311,676,74	610,082,19	8,404,827	618,487,01 -		5.6%	18.1%
2030	3,527,860,79	405,703,99 -	93,975,925	311,728,06	633,476,92	8,727,125	642,204,05 -		5.6%	18.2%
2031	3,649,053,06	419,641,10 -	109,987,78	309,653,31	657,644,16	9,060,067	666,704,23 -		5.6%	18.3%
2032	3,780,595,72	434,768,50 -	127,850,89	306,917,61	680,270,55	9,371,780	689,642,33 -		5.6%	18.2%
2033	3,922,633,69	451,102,87 -	147,169,26	303,933,60	700,918,95	9,656,244	710,575,20 -		5.6%	18.1%
2034	4,076,341,04	468,779,22 -	168,238,70	300,540,52	718,513,94	9,898,642	728,412,59 -		5.5%	17.9%
2035	4,244,490,01	488,116,35 -	190,812,18	297,304,16	734,748,28	10,122,295	744,870,58 -		5.4%	17.5%
2036	4,417,385,60	507,999,34 -	214,932,69	293,066,65	750,451,61	10,338,633	760,790,24 -		5.4%	17.2%
2037	4,601,397,31	529,160,69 -	238,746,79	290,413,89	765,210,14	10,541,955	775,752,10 -		5.3%	16.9%
2038	4,790,820,12	550,944,31 -	263,219,58	287,724,73	779,673,72	10,741,213	790,414,94 -		5.2%	16.5%
2039	4,988,437,01	573,670,25 -	289,356,27	284,313,98	794,413,20	10,944,272	805,357,47 -		5.1%	16.1%
2040	5,189,015,71	596,736,80 -	314,673,45	282,063,35	810,583,01	11,167,036	821,750,04 -		5.0%	15.8%
2041	5,393,227,41	620,221,15 -	341,528,71	278,692,44	828,207,92	11,409,846		7,505,443,19	4.9%	15.6%
2042	5,600,136,78	644,015,73 -	369,023,92	274,991,80	847,183,01	11,671,258	858,854,26 -		4.8%	15.3%
2043	5,811,501,32	668,322,65 -	396,679,54	271,643,11	868,159,04	11,960,235	880,119,28 -		4.8%	15.1%
2044	6,023,829,63	692,740,40 -	425,174,66	267,565,74	891,082,64	12,276,043	903,358,69		4.7%	15.0%
2045	6,242,803,43	717,922,39 -	452,325,69	265,596,69	915,613,64	12,613,996		9,996,205,72	4.7%	14.9%
2046	6,465,655,16	743,550,34 -	481,964,86	261,585,47	940,986,20	12,963,542		10,688,569,99	4.6%	14.8%
2047	6,697,932,50	770,262,23 -	509,553,82	260,708,41	965,886,68	13,306,585		11,407,054,85	4.6%	14.6%
2048	6,939,207,08	798,008,81 -	539,555,54	258,453,26	990,736,49	13,648,929		12,152,987,00	4.5%	14.5%
2049	7,189,561,78	826,799,60 -	569,289,25	257,510,34	1,019,366,54	14,043,352		12,928,886,55	4.5%	14.4%
2050 2051	7,432,698,05	854,760,27 -	599,721,01	255,039,26	1,050,219,10	14,468,394		13,738,534,78 14,579,852,36	4.4%	14.3%
	7,693,874,76	884,795,59 -	631,524,83	253,270,76	1,079,713,61	14,874,727			4.4%	14.2%
2052	7,964,774,24	915,949,03 -	666,765,94	249,183,09	1,111,430,35	15,311,674		15,457,411,29	4.4%	14.1%
2053	8,238,108,23	947,382,44 -	701,611,70	245,770,74	1,145,858,43	15,785,974		16,373,284,95	4.4%	14.1%
2054	8,521,087,48	979,925,06 -	741,122,22	238,802,84	1,180,675,87	16,265,638		17,331,423,62	4.3%	14.0%
2055	8,818,579,93	1,014,136,69 -	781,468,18	232,668,51	1,217,478,03	16,772,645		18,333,005,79	4.3%	14.0%
2056	9,119,393,09	1,048,730,20 -	827,678,88	221,051,31	1,255,863,20	17,301,460		19,385,119,14	4.3%	14.0%
2057	9,440,683,02	1,085,678,54 -	875,531,74	210,146,79	1,295,613,21	17,849,078		20,488,434,63	4.3%	13.9%
2058	9,767,714,31	1,123,287,14 -	926,504,41	196,782,73	1,336,547,31	18,413,009		21,646,612,22	4.3%	13.9%
2059	10,118,954,09	1,163,679,72 -	977,908,10	185,771,61	1,376,378,21	18,961,741		22,856,180,57	4.3%	13.8%
2060	10,487,419,90	1,206,053,28 -		167,083,58	1,417,060,20	19,522,198		24,125,679,39	4.2%	13.7%
2061	10,870,846,11	1,250,147,30 -		149,034,00	1,457,222,97	20,075,503		25,453,943,87	4.2%	13.6%
2062	11,280,914,45	1,297,305,16 -		132,388,59	1,498,886,97	20,649,489		26,841,091,73	4.2%	13.5%
2063	11,696,037,71	1,345,044,33 -	1,234,572,45	110,471,88	1,541,589,15	21,237,777	1,062,826,93 -	28,293,446,78	4.2%	13.4%

 $^{^{66}}$ The reserve presented includes only the AOV. The actual SVb reserve includes both AOV and AWW.

Annex 2.2 AWW financial statement⁶⁷ - Base scenario (in AFL)

	Total		Revenue			Expenditure				
Year	insurable earnings	Contribution	Investment earnings	Total	Benefits	Admin.	Total	Reserve (end of year)	Expenditure As % of GDP	PAYG cost
2003	1,175,096,930	23,501,939	_	23,501,939	10,138,009	621,944	10,759,953	_	0.3%	0.9%
2004	1,237,881,342	24,757,627	483,782	25,241,409	10,634,793	652,420	11,287,213	13,954,196	0.3%	0.9%
2005	1,298,714,647	25,974,293	1,489,093	27,463,386	11,757,668	721,306	12,478,974	28,938,608	0.3%	1.0%
2006	1,375,869,855	27,517,397	2,475,961	29,993,358	12,358,431	758,162	13,116,593	45,815,373	0.3%	1.0%
2007	1,456,106,358	29,122,127	3,615,422	32,737,549	12,668,238	777,168	13,445,406	65,107,516	0.3%	0.9%
2008	1,537,559,104	30,751,182	4,853,187	35,604,369	13,040,620	800,013	13,840,633	86,871,252	0.3%	0.9%
2009	1,621,572,595	32,431,452	6,207,410	38,638,862	13,625,933	835,920	14,461,853	111,048,260	0.3%	0.9%
2010	1,703,876,784	34,077,536	7,372,526	41,450,062	14,096,856	864,810	14,961,667	137,536,655	0.3%	0.9%
2011	1,782,989,217	35,659,784	8,704,673	44,364,458	14,414,706	884,310	15,299,015	166,602,098	0.3%	0.9%
2012	1,863,758,445	37,275,169	10,111,420	47,386,589	14,794,979	907,638	15,702,618	198,286,070	0.3%	0.8%
2013 2014	1,943,098,574	38,861,971 40,474,819	11,614,905	50,476,877	15,152,496	929,571	16,082,067	232,680,879	0.3%	0.8% 0.8%
2014	2,023,740,946 2,106,184,832	42,123,697	13,148,319 14,909,973	53,623,138 57,033,669	15,473,159 15,840,256	949,243 971,764	16,422,402 16,812,019	269,881,615 310,103,265	0.3% 0.3%	0.8%
2015	2,188,574,715	43,771,494	16,754,186	60,525,680	16,178,340	992,505	17,170,845	353,458,101	0.3%	0.8%
2017	2,273,198,974	45,463,979	18,640,792	64,104,771	16,398,540	1,006,013	17,404,553	400,158,319	0.2%	0.8%
2018	2,356,778,722	47,135,574	20,615,882	67,751,457	16,640,549	1,020,860	17,661,409	450,248,367	0.2%	0.7%
2019	2,439,573,353	48,791,467	22,639,913	71,431,380	16,782,007	1,029,538	17,811,545	503,868,202	0.2%	0.7%
2020	2,525,680,555	50,513,611	24,636,849	75,150,460	16,894,801	1,036,458	17,931,259	561,087,403	0.2%	0.7%
2021	2,609,101,345	52,182,027	26,925,077	79,107,104	16,980,794	1,041,733	18,022,527	622,171,980	0.2%	0.7%
2022	2,695,114,949	53,902,299	29,376,441	83,278,740	17,047,349	1,045,816	18,093,165	687,357,554	0.2%	0.7%
2023	2,783,971,680	55,679,434	32,086,309	87,765,743	17,019,816	1,044,127	18,063,943	757,059,354	0.2%	0.6%
2024	2,876,586,098	57,531,722	35,205,302	92,737,024	17,039,619	1,045,342	18,084,961	831,711,417	0.2%	0.6%
2025	2,973,074,912	59,461,498	38,356,113	97,817,611	17,054,631	1,046,263	18,100,894	911,428,134	0.2%	0.6%
2026	3,075,618,578	61,512,372	42,090,031	103,602,402	16,929,431	1,038,582	17,968,014	997,062,523	0.2%	0.6%
2027	3,188,083,532	63,761,671	46,166,190	109,927,860	17,151,526	1,052,207	18,203,733	1,088,786,650	0.2%	0.6%
2028 2029	3,296,643,959 3,407,742,128	65,932,879 68,154,843	46,965,099 51,502,192	112,897,978 119,657,035	17,377,868 17,587,426	1,066,093 1,078,949	18,443,961 18,666,374	1,183,240,667 1,284,231,328	0.2% 0.2%	0.6% 0.5%
2030	3,527,860,792	70,557,216	56,132,326	126,689,542	17,367,426	1,076,949	19,040,287	1,391,880,583	0.2%	0.5%
2031	3,649,053,063	72,981,061	61,704,326	134,685,387	18,142,247	1,112,986	19,255,233	1,507,310,737	0.2%	0.5%
2032	3,780,595,727	75,611,915	67,928,126	143,540,040	18,301,787	1,122,773	19,424,560	1,631,426,217	0.2%	0.5%
2033	3,922,633,697	78,452,674	74,632,056	153,084,730	18,644,042	1,143,770	19,787,812	1,764,723,135	0.2%	0.5%
2034	4,076,341,047	81,526,821	82,040,201	163,567,022	19,132,949	1,173,763	20,306,713	1,907,983,445	0.2%	0.5%
2035	4,244,490,012	84,889,800	90,105,621	174,995,421	19,725,477	1,210,113	20,935,591	2,062,043,275	0.2%	0.5%
2036	4,417,385,608	88,347,712	98,900,058	187,247,770	20,365,422	1,249,373	21,614,795	2,227,676,250	0.2%	0.5%
2037	4,601,397,311	92,027,946	107,633,720	199,661,666	21,108,133	1,294,936	22,403,070	2,404,934,847	0.2%	0.5%
2038	4,790,820,122	95,816,402	116,823,867	212,640,269	21,903,975	1,343,759	23,247,735	2,594,327,381	0.2%	0.5%
2039 2040	4,988,437,019	99,768,740	126,951,998	226,720,738	22,783,500	1,397,716	24,181,216	2,796,866,904	0.2%	0.5% 0.5%
2040	5,189,015,718 5,393,227,412	103,780,314 107,864,548	136,945,479 147,836,334	240,725,793 255,700,882	23,617,779 24,500,927	1,448,897 1,503,076	25,066,676 26,004,003	3,012,526,021 3,242,222,900	0.2% 0.2%	0.5%
2042	5,600,136,786	112,002,736	159,226,500	271,229,236	25,383,591	1,557,226	26,940,817	3,486,511,318	0.2%	0.5%
2043	5,811,501,320	116,230,026	170,901,188	287,131,215	26,209,520	1,607,895	27,817,414	3,745,825,119	0.2%	0.5%
2044	6,023,829,631	120,476,593	183,135,407	303,611,999	26,952,142	1,653,453	28,605,595	4,020,831,523	0.1%	0.5%
2045	6,242,803,437	124,856,069	194,975,244	319,831,313	27,629,561	1,695,011	29,324,572	4,311,338,264	0.1%	0.5%
2046	6,465,655,160	129,313,103	208,071,654	337,384,757	28,291,045	1,735,592	30,026,636	4,618,696,385	0.1%	0.5%
2047	6,697,932,508	133,958,650	220,486,121	354,444,771	29,037,869	1,781,408	30,819,276	4,942,321,880	0.1%	0.5%
2048	6,939,207,083	138,784,142	234,183,441	372,967,582	29,809,967	1,828,774	31,638,741	5,283,650,721	0.1%	0.5%
2049	7,189,561,789	143,791,236	247,999,720	391,790,956	30,548,629	1,874,089	32,422,718	5,643,018,959	0.1%	0.5%
2050 2051	7,432,698,050	148,653,961	262,303,260	410,957,221	31,141,248	1,910,445	33,051,693	6,020,924,487	0.1%	0.4%
2052	7,693,874,763 7,964,774,240	153,877,495 159,295,485	277,399,738 294,239,009	431,277,234 453,534,494	31,896,921 32,648,411	1,956,804 2,002,906	33,853,725 34,651,317	6,418,347,996 6,837,231,172	0.1% 0.1%	0.4% 0.4%
2053	8,238,108,233	164,762,165	311,113,963	475,876,128	33,308,027	2,043,372	35,351,399	7,277,755,901	0.1%	0.4%
2054	8,521,087,481	170,421,750	330,263,599	500,685,348	33,991,330	2,085,291	36,076,621	7,742,364,628	0.1%	0.4%
2055	8,818,579,933	176,371,599	350,012,950	526,384,549	34,739,720	2,131,203	36,870,923	8,231,878,254	0.1%	0.4%
2056	9,119,393,090	182,387,862	372,620,639	555,008,501	35,429,662	2,173,530	37,603,192	8,749,283,562	0.1%	0.4%
2057	9,440,683,024	188,813,660	396,219,787	585,033,447	36,180,423	2,219,587	38,400,010	9,295,916,999	0.1%	0.4%
2058	9,767,714,314	195,354,286	421,504,956	616,859,242	36,905,334	2,264,059	39,169,393	9,873,606,849	0.1%	0.4%
2059	10,118,954,094	202,379,082	447,309,933	649,689,015	37,719,799	2,314,024	40,033,824	10,483,262,040	0.1%	0.4%
2060	10,487,419,908	209,748,398	477,945,839	687,694,238	38,606,482	2,368,420	40,974,902	11,129,981,375	0.1%	0.4%
2061	10,870,846,115	217,416,922	509,566,401	726,983,323	39,585,727	2,428,495	42,014,222	11,814,950,476	0.1%	0.4%
2062	11,280,914,452	225,618,289	542,506,717	768,125,006	40,627,616	2,492,412	43,120,028	12,539,955,454	0.1%	0.4%
2063	11,696,037,718	233,920,754	578,775,927	812,696,681	41,627,420	2,553,748	44,181,168	13,308,470,967	0.1%	0.4%

 $^{^{67}}$ The reserve presented includes only the AWW. The actual SVb reserve includes both AOV and AWW.

Annex 2.3 Demographic projection⁶⁸ - Base scenario

_		AO	/			AW	/W		GRAND
Year	Single	Married	Split	Total	Orphans	Widows	Invalids	Total	TOTAL
2003	6,175	3,288	1,262	10,725	955	396	324	1,675	12,400
2004	6,372	3,391	1,325	11,087	1,008	396	348	1,752	12,839
2005	6,631	3,529	1,398	11,558	1,048	389	371	1,808	13,366
2006	6,902	3,653	1,471	12,026	1,065	395	376	1,837	13,863
2007	7,179	3,811	1,547	12,537	1,086	389	391	1,866	14,403
2008	7,503	3,944	1,626	13,073	1,099	384	405	1,888	14,961
2009	7,783	4,083	1,698	13,564	1,098	379	417	1,894	15,458
2010	8,187	4,273	1,792	14,251	1,082	367	421	1,871	16,122
2011	8,574	4,440	1,880	14,893	1,056	368	430	1,855	16,748
2012	9,007	4,650	1,978	15,634	1,042	364	435	1,841	17,475
2013	9,423	4,846	2,071	16,340	1,034	365	433	1,832	18,172
2014	9,865	5,036	2,167	17,068	1,007	367	437	1,810	18,878
2015	10,367	5,243	2,271	17,881	981	374	435	1,790	19,672
2016	10,848	5,437	2,370	18,655	963	381	425	1,768	20,423
2017	11,352	5,667	2,476	19,494	929	384	424	1,736	21,231
2018	11,909	5,914	2,590	20,413	894	385	417	1,695	22,108
2019	12,390	6,139	2,690	21,218	862	387	412	1,661	22,879
2020	12,988	6,386	2,808	22,183	837	380	404	1,621	23,804
2021	13,519	6,646	2,918	23,083	813	377	394	1,584	24,666
2022	14,043	6,885	3,023	23,951	787	372	384	1,542	25,493
2023	14,541	7,116	3,124	24,781	768	362	376	1,506	26,287
2024	15,035	7,321	3,220	25,576	764	354	364	1,482	27,058
2025	15,460	7,507	3,304	26,271	745	343	349	1,437	27,708
2026	15,768	7,643	3,366	26,777	742	341	340	1,424	28,200
2027	16,035	7,775	3,422	27,231	737	341	333	1,410	28,641
2028	16,341	7,899	3,482	27,723	740	338	323	1,401	29,123
2029	16,542	8,001	3,526	28,069	745	333	320	1,398	29,467
2030	16,799	8,131	3,581	28,511	750	327	313	1,390	29,901
2031	17,042	8,206	3,627	28,875	755	319	305	1,380	30,254
2032	17,201	8,263	3,661	29,124	760	311	302	1,374	30,498
2033	17,256	8,305	3,678	29,238	765	311	301	1,378	30,616
2034	17,220	8,284	3,675	29,179	770	311	303	1,385	30,565
2035	17,214	8,268	3,677	29,159	775	313	306	1,394	30,553
2036	17,154	8,216	3,667	29,037	779	317	310	1,406	30,444
2037	17,097	8,168	3,657	28,922	783	321	314	1,419	30,341
2038	16,987	8,119	3,640	28,747	787	327	320	1,435	30,181
2039 2040	16,925 16,867	8,075 8,050	3,629 3,621	28,630 28,538	790 793	333 339	324 328	1,447 1,460	30,077 29,998
2040	16,828	8,050 8,044	3,617	28,489	793 796	344	326 331	1,460	29,998
						348			
2042	16,807	8,039	3,616	28,462	797		333	1,479	29,941
2043 2044	16,838	8,059	3,623	28,520	798 799	349	334	1,482	30,002
2044	16,881 16,967	8,075 8,101	3,632 3,647	28,587 28,715	799 798	350 349	334 333	1,483 1,481	30,070 30,195
2045	17,000	8,131	3,654	28,713	796 797	350	334	1,481	30,195
2047	17,000	8,141	3,660	28,838	796	350	334	1,479	30,203
2048	17,057	8,155	3,662	28,867	794	353	334	1,480	30,347
2049	17,180	8,225	3,687	29,093	791	349	331	1,472	30,564
2050	17,130	8,268	3,697	29,195	789	349	331	1,469	30,664
2051	17,230	8,306	3,707	29,193	789 787	349	330	1,467	30,760
2052	17,372	8,371	3,726	29,468	785	348	329	1,461	30,929
2053	17,481	8,432	3,747	29,661	783	345	326	1,454	31,115
2054	17,549	8,489	3,762	29,800	782	344	325	1,451	31,252
2055	17,664	8,578	3,787	30,029	781	341	323	1,445	31,474
2056	17,749	8,638	3,805	30,193	780	340	322	1,441	31,634
2057	17,856	8,737	3,832	30,425	779	337	320	1,436	31,861
2058	17,947	8,792	3,851	30,589	780	335	319	1,433	32,022
2059	18,019	8,842	3,867	30,728	780	333	318	1,431	32,160
2060	18,086	8,902	3,884	30,872	781	332	318	1,431	32,303
2061	18,117	8,929	3,892	30,938	782	333	319	1,434	32,372
2062	18,207	8,984	3,912	31,103	784	331	318	1,433	32,536
									32,602
2063	18,235	9,009	3,920	31,164	786	333	320	1,438	32,

⁶⁸ Number of pensions.

Annex 2.4 AOV financial statement⁶⁹ – Wage indexation (in AFL)

	Total		Revenue			Expenditure				
Year	insurable earnings	Contribution	Investment earnings	Total	Benefits	Admin.	Total	Reserve (end of year)	Expenditure As % of GDP	PAYG cost
2003			earriings							
2003	1,175,096,930 1,237,881,342	135,136,147 142,356,354	- 10,781,158	135,136,147 153,137,512	128,737,925 133,498,696	1,985,957 1,839,151	130,723,882 135,337,847	144,000,000 161,799,665	3.6% 3.5%	11.1% 10.9%
2005	1,298,714,647	149,352,184	11,783,317	161,135,502	145,146,890	1,999,623	147,146,513	175,788,654	3.6%	11.3%
2006	1,375,869,855	158,225,033	12,022,911	170,247,945	157,847,957	2,174,600	160,022,557	186,014,042	3.7%	11.6%
2007	1,456,106,358	167,452,231	12,351,283	179,803,514	171,505,403	2,362,752	173,868,155	191,949,401	3.8%	11.9%
2008	1,537,559,104	176,819,297	12,295,932	189,115,229	186,275,400	2,566,232	188,841,632	192,222,998	3.9%	12.3%
2009	1,621,572,595	186,480,848	11,896,562	198,377,411	201,553,345	2,776,709	204,330,054	186,270,355	4.0%	12.6%
2010	1,703,876,784	195,945,830	10,621,861	206,567,691	218,741,964	3,013,509	221,755,474	171,082,573	4.1%	13.0%
2011	1,782,989,217	205,043,760	9,042,525	214,086,285	237,851,479	3,276,772	241,128,252	144,040,606	4.3%	13.5%
2012	1,863,758,445	214,332,221	6,881,109	221,213,331	258,282,047	3,558,235	261,840,282	103,413,655	4.4%	14.0%
2013	1,943,098,574	223,456,336	4,075,480	227,531,816	280,204,888	3,860,256	284,065,145	46,880,326	4.6%	14.6%
2014	2,023,740,946	232,730,209	549,582	233,279,790	302,847,565	4,172,194	307,019,760 -	26,859,643	4.8%	15.2%
2015	2,106,184,832	242,211,256 -	3,760,808	238,450,448	327,584,395	4,512,982	332,097,377 -		4.9%	15.8%
2016	2,188,574,715	251,686,092 -	8,989,894	242,696,198	354,031,053	4,877,326	358,908,379 -	236,718,753	5.1%	16.4%
2017	2,273,198,974	261,417,882 -	15,172,580	246,245,302	382,221,948	5,265,699	387,487,647 -	377,961,098	5.3%	17.0%
2018 2019	2,356,778,722	271,029,553 -	22,425,635	248,603,918	413,452,463	5,695,948	419,148,411 -	548,505,591	5.5%	17.8%
2019	2,439,573,353 2,525,680,555	280,550,936 - 290,453,264 -	30,797,255 40,190,674	249,753,681 250,262,590	446,027,205 480,742,858	6,144,715 6,622,977	452,171,921 - 487,365,835 -	750,923,831 988,027,076	5.7% 6.0%	18.5% 19.3%
2020	2,609,101,345	300,046,655 -	51,220,313	248,826,342	518,404,298	7,141,822	525,546,120 -		6.2%	20.1%
2022	2,695,114,949	309,938,219 -	63,847,311	246,090,908	557,064,831	7,674,431	564,739,262 -	1,583,395,208	6.4%	21.0%
2023	2,783,971,680	320,156,743 -	78,369,172	241,787,571	596,834,231	8,222,316	605,056,547 -		6.7%	21.7%
2024	2,876,586,098	330,807,401 -	95,326,327	235,481,075	637,639,210	8,784,467	646,423,677 -		6.9%	22.5%
2025	2,973,074,912	341,903,615 -	113,821,418	228,082,196	678,728,182	9,350,532	688,078,713 -		7.1%	23.1%
2026	3,075,618,578	353,696,137 -	135,464,952	218,231,184	718,109,570	9,893,071	728,002,641 -		7.2%	23.7%
2027	3,188,083,532	366,629,606 -	159,615,315	207,014,291	756,161,299	10,417,293	766,578,592 -	3,886,939,061	7.3%	24.0%
2028	3,296,643,959	379,114,055 -	173,054,461	206,059,595	795,674,328	10,961,646	806,635,974 -	4,487,515,440	7.5%	24.5%
2029	3,407,742,128	391,890,345 -	200,965,792	190,924,552	835,397,760	11,508,898	846,906,657 -	5,143,497,545	7.6%	24.9%
2030	3,527,860,792	405,703,991 -	230,676,030	175,027,961	876,296,239	12,072,337	888,368,576 -		7.7%	25.2%
2031	3,649,053,063	419,641,102 -	265,796,904	153,844,198	919,019,980	12,660,923	931,680,903 -		7.8%	25.5%
2032	3,780,595,727	434,768,509 -	305,376,190	129,392,318	960,347,327	13,230,271	973,577,598 -		7.9%	25.8%
2033	3,922,633,697	451,102,875 -	348,651,550	102,451,325	999,598,919	13,771,023	1,013,369,942 -		8.0%	25.8%
2034 2035	4,076,341,047	468,779,220 -	396,576,090	72,203,130 39,279,574	1,035,149,755	14,260,791	1,049,410,546 -		8.0% 7.9%	25.7% 25.5%
2036	4,244,490,012 4,417,385,608	488,116,351 - 507,999,345 -	448,836,777 505,754,390	2,244,955	1,069,338,430 1,103,332,539	14,731,793 15,200,114	1,084,070,222 - 1,118,532,654 -		7.9%	25.3%
2037	4,601,397,311	529,160,691 -	563,173,807	-34,013,116	1,136,499,547	15,657,041	1,152,156,588 -		7.8%	25.0%
2038	4,790,820,122	550,944,314 -	623,559,587	-72,615,273	1,169,778,872	16,115,515		13,972,743,890	7.8%	24.8%
2039	4,988,437,019	573,670,257 -	689,465,465	-115,795,207	1,204,030,258	16,587,381	1,220,617,639 -		7.7%	24.5%
2040	5,189,015,718	596,736,808 -	755,097,033	-158,360,225	1,241,039,739	17,097,244	1,258,136,983 -	16,725,653,944	7.6%	24.2%
2041	5,393,227,412	620,221,152 -	826,148,536	-205,927,384	1,280,920,637	17,646,665	1,298,567,302 -	18,230,148,630	7.6%	24.1%
2042	5,600,136,786	644,015,730 -	900,546,336	-256,530,605	1,323,585,794	18,234,444	1,341,820,237 -	19,828,499,473	7.5%	24.0%
2043	5,811,501,320	668,322,652 -	977,161,140	-308,838,488	1,370,135,156	18,875,733	1,389,010,889 -		7.5%	23.9%
2044	6,023,829,631	692,740,408 -	1,057,672,792	-364,932,385	1,420,589,674	19,570,822	1,440,160,497 -		7.5%	23.9%
2045	6,242,803,437	717,922,395 -	1,136,642,458	-418,720,062	1,474,505,738	20,313,600	1,494,819,338 -		7.5%	23.9%
2046 2047	6,465,655,160	743,550,343 -	1,223,711,162	-480,160,818	1,530,729,342	21,088,167	1,551,817,509 -		7.5%	24.0%
2047	6,697,932,508	770,262,238 - 798,008,815 -	1,307,499,268 1,399,527,150	-537,237,029	1,587,155,077	21,865,519	1,609,020,595 - 1,667,128,592 -		7.5% 7.5%	24.0% 24.0%
2049	6,939,207,083 7,189,561,789	826,799,606 -	1,492,989,130	-601,518,335 -666,189,524	1,644,473,424 1,709,118,118	22,655,168 23,545,748	1,732,663,866 -		7.5%	24.0%
2050	7,432,698,050	854,760,276 -	1,590,319,523	-735,559,247	1,778,657,084	24,503,755	1,803,160,839 -		7.5%	24.1%
2051	7,693,874,763	884,795,598 -	1,693,423,758	-808,628,160	1,847,095,197	25,446,596	1,872,541,793 -		7.6%	24.3%
2052	7,964,774,240	915.949.038 -	1,808,142,140	-892,193,102	1,920,566,968	26,458,784	1,947,025,751 -		7.6%	24.4%
2053	8,238,108,233	947,382,447 -	1,924,236,321	-976,853,874	2,000,058,634	27,553,904	2,027,612,538 -		7.6%	24.6%
2054	8,521,087,481	979,925,060 -	2,055,697,167	-1,075,772,107	2,081,638,979	28,677,800	2,110,316,779 -		7.7%	24.8%
2055	8,818,579,933	1,014,136,692 -	2,192,281,990	-1,178,145,297	2,168,189,413	29,870,166	2,198,059,579 -		7.7%	24.9%
2056	9,119,393,090	1,048,730,205 -	2,348,345,995	-1,299,615,789	2,259,115,834	31,122,818	2,290,238,652 -		7.8%	25.1%
2057	9,440,683,024	1,085,678,548 -	2,512,379,502	-1,426,700,955	2,354,129,349	32,431,777	2,386,561,126 -		7.8%	25.3%
2058	9,767,714,314	1,123,287,146 -	2,688,898,345	-1,565,611,199	2,452,996,146	33,793,820	2,486,789,965 -		7.9%	25.5%
2059	10,118,954,094	1,163,679,721 -	2,870,464,589	-1,706,784,868	2,551,564,980	35,151,758		67,465,605,759	7.9%	25.6%
2060	10,487,419,908	1,206,053,289 -	3,084,743,822	-1,878,690,533	2,653,459,939	36,555,519	2,690,015,458 -		7.9%	25.6%
2061 2062	10,870,846,115 11,280,914,452	1,250,147,303 - 1,297,305,162 -	3,307,144,571 3,539,765,730	-2,056,997,268 -2,242,460,568	2,756,161,340	37,970,390	2,794,131,730 - 2,902,973,875 -		8.0%	25.7%
2062	11,696,037,718	1,345,044,338 -		-2,450,781,523	2,863,524,393 2,974,768,065	39,449,482			8.0%	25.7% 25.8%
2003	11,090,037,718	1,340,044,336 -	3,795,825,861	-2,400,781,023	2,514,700,005	40,982,036	3,015,750,101 -	01,491,400,514	8.0%	25.8%

 $^{^{69}}$ The reserve presented includes only the AOV. The actual SVb reserve includes both AOV and AWW.

Annex 2.5 Demographic projection⁷⁰ - Wage indexation

		AOV						GRAND	
Year	Single	Married	Split	Total	Orphans	Widows	Invalids	Total	TOTAL
2003	6,175	3,288	1,262	10,725	955	396	324	1,675	12,400
2004	6,372	3,391	1,325	11,087	1,008	396	348	1,752	12,839
2005	6,631	3,529	1,398	11,558	1,048	389	371	1,808	13,366
2006	6,902	3,653	1,471	12,026	1,065	395	376	1,837	13,863
2007	7,179	3,811	1,547	12,537	1,086	389	391	1,866	14,403
2008	7,503	3,944	1,626	13,073	1,099	384	405	1,888	14,961
2009	7,783	4,083	1,698	13,564	1,098	379	417	1,894	15,458
2010	8,187	4,273	1,792	14,251	1,082	367	421	1,871	16,122
2011	8,574	4,440	1,880	14,893	1,056	368	430	1,855	16,748
2012	9,007	4,650	1,978	15,634	1,042	364	435	1,841	17,475
2013	9,423	4,846	2,071	16,340	1,034	365	433	1,832	18,172
2014	9,865	5,036	2,167	17,068	1,007	367	437	1,810	18,878
2015	10,367	5,243	2,271	17,881	981	374	435	1,790	19,672
2016	10,848	5,437	2,370	18,655	963	381	425	1,768	20,423
2017	11,352	5,667	2,476	19,494	929	384	424	1,736	21,231
2018	11,909	5,914	2,590	20,413	894	385	417	1,695	22,108
2019	12,390	6,139	2,690	21,218	862	387	412	1,661	22,879
2020	12,988	6,386	2,808	22,183	837	380	404	1,621	23,804
2021	13,519	6,646	2,918	23,083	813	377	394	1,584	24,666
2022	14,043	6,885	3,023	23,951	787	372	384	1,542	25,493
2023	14,541	7,116	3,124	24,781	768	362	376	1,506	26,287
2024	15,035	7,321	3,220	25,576	764	354	364	1,482	27,058
2025	15,460	7,507	3,304	26,271	745	343	349	1,437	27,708
2026	15,768	7,643	3,366	26,777	742	341	340	1,424	28,200
2027	16,035	7,775	3,422	27,231	737	341	333	1,410	28,641
2028	16,341	7,899	3,482	27,723	740	338	323	1,401	29,123
2029	16,542	8,001	3,526	28,069	745	333	320	1,398	29,467
2030	16,799	8,131	3,581	28,511	750	327	313	1,390	29,901
2031	17,042	8,206	3,627	28,875	755	319	305	1,380	30,254
2032	17,201	8,263	3,661	29,124	760	311	302	1,374	30,498
2033	17,256	8,305	3,678	29,238	765	311	301	1,378	30,616
2034	17,220	8,284	3,675	29,179	770	311	303	1,385	30,565
2035	17,214	8,268	3,677	29,159	775	313	306	1,394	30,553
2036	17,154	8,216	3,667	29,037	779	317	310	1,406	30,444
2037	17,097	8,168	3,657	28,922	783	321	314	1,419	30,341
2038	16,987	8,119	3,640	28,747	787	327	320	1,435	30,181
2039	16,925	8,075	3,629	28,630	790	333	324	1,447	30,077
2040	16,867	8,050	3,621	28,538	793	339	328	1,460	29,998
2041	16,828	8,044	3,617	28,489	796	344	331	1,471	29,960
2042	16,807	8,039	3,616	28,462	797	348	333	1,479	29,941
2043	16,838	8,059	3,623	28,520	798	349	334	1,482	30,002
2044	16,881	8,075	3,632	28,587	799	350	334	1,483	30,070
2045	16,967	8,101	3,647	28,715	798	349	333	1,481	30,195
2046	17,000	8,131	3,654	28,784	797	350	334	1,481	30,265
2047	17,037	8,141	3,660	28,838	796	350	334	1,479	30,317
2048	17,050	8,155	3,662	28,867	794	353	334	1,480	30,347
2049	17,180	8,225	3,687	29,093	791	349	331	1,472	30,564
2050	17,230	8,268	3,697	29,195	789	349	331	1,469	30,664
2051	17,281	8,306	3,707	29,293	787	349	330	1,467	30,760
2052	17,372	8,371	3,726	29,468	785	348	329	1,461	30,929
2053	17,481	8,432	3,747	29,661	783	345	326	1,454	31,11
2054	17,549	8,489	3,762	29,800	782	344	325	1,451	31,25
2055	17,664	8,578	3,787	30,029	781	341	323	1,445	31,474
2056	17,749	8,638	3,805	30,193	780	340	322	1,441	31,634
2057	17,856	8,737	3,832	30,425	779	337	320	1,436	31,86
2058	17,947	8,792	3,851	30,589	780	335	319	1,433	32,02
2059	18,019	8,842	3,867	30,728	780	333	318	1,431	32,160
2060	18,086	8,902	3,884	30,872	781	332	318	1,431	32,303
2061	18,117	8,929	3,892	30,938	782	333	319	1,434	32,372
2062	18,207	8,984	3,912	31,103	784	331	318	1,433	32,536
2063	18,235	9,009	3,920	31,164	786	333	320	1,438	32,602

⁷⁰ Number of pensions.

Annex 2.6 AOV financial statement⁷¹ - Retirement at age 62 (in AFL)

	Total		Revenue			Expenditure		5	- "	D41/0
Year	insurable earnings	Contribution	Investment earnings	Total	Benefits	Admin.	Total		Expenditure As % of GDP	PAYG cost
2003	1,175,096,930	135,136,147	_	135,136,147	128,737,925	1,985,957	130,723,882	144,000,000	3.6%	11.1%
2003	1,237,881,342	142,356,354	10,781,158	153,137,512	133,498,696	1,839,151	135,337,847	161,799,665	3.5%	10.9%
2005	1,316,327,162	151,377,624	12,064,174	163,441,798	139,349,537	1,919,756	141,269,293	183,972,170	3.5%	10.7%
2006	1,396,140,470	160,556,154	13,437,767	173,993,921	135,272,450	1,863,587	137,136,038	220,830,053	3.2%	9.8%
2007	1,478,784,861	170,060,259	15,954,754	186,015,013	136,908,934	1,886,133	138,795,067	268,049,999	3.0%	9.4%
2008	1,562,621,943	179,701,523	18,802,547	198,504,071	144,323,252	1,988,276	146,311,529	320,242,542	3.0%	9.4%
2009	1,648,991,752	189,634,051	21,804,528	211,438,579	155,045,230	2,135,988	157,181,218	374,499,903	3.1%	9.5%
2010	1,732,681,138	199,258,331	23,838,212	223,096,543	166,497,382	2,293,759	168,791,142	428,805,305	3.1%	9.7%
2011	1,816,587,773	208,907,594	26,119,085	235,026,679	178,059,488	2,453,045	180,512,533	483,319,451	3.2%	9.9%
2012	1,901,280,709	218,647,282	28,275,632	246,922,914	191,044,920	2,631,940	193,676,860	536,565,505	3.3%	10.2%
2013	1,984,318,529	228,196,631	30,290,751	258,487,382	205,393,034	2,829,607	208,222,641	586,830,246	3.4%	10.5%
2014	2,068,632,708	237,892,761	31,932,263	269,825,025	220,491,594	3,037,613	223,529,207	633,126,063	3.5%	10.8%
2015	2,153,521,296	247,654,949	33,631,446	281,286,395	236,679,261	3,260,623	239,939,884	674,472,575	3.6%	11.1%
2016	2,240,750,611	257,686,320	34,984,519	292,670,839	253,230,250	3,488,639	256,718,888	710,424,526	3.7%	11.5%
2017	2,329,484,606	267,890,730	35,880,401	303,771,131	271,054,384	3,734,194	274,788,578	739,407,078	3.8%	11.8%
2018	2,418,189,213	278,091,760	36,370,153	314,461,913	289,833,076	3,992,899	293,825,976	760,043,016	3.9%	12.2%
2019	2,508,620,927	288,491,407	36,351,156	324,842,563	309,603,869	4,265,273	313,869,142	771,016,436	4.0%	12.5%
2020	2,598,492,443	298,826,631	35,661,721	334,488,352	331,413,136	4,565,729	335,978,866	769,525,923	4.1%	12.9%
2021	2,688,338,051	309,158,876	34,709,534	343,868,410	353,753,059	4,873,496	358,626,555	754,767,778	4.2%	13.3%
2022	2,781,863,030	319,914,248	33,231,420	353,145,668	377,265,225	5,197,413	382,462,637	725,450,808	4.4%	13.7%
2023	2,874,606,006	330,579,691	31,229,515	361,809,206	402,586,165	5,546,248	408,132,413	679,127,602	4.5%	14.2%
2023	2,971,289,231	341,698,262	28,720,056	370,418,317	428,055,801	5,897,131	433,952,933	615,592,986	4.6%	14.6%
2024	3,071,765,765	353,253,063	25,332,276	378,585,339	453,740,093	6,250,972	459,991,065	534,187,260	4.0%	15.0%
2025	3,176,752,767	365,326,568	21,402,586	386,729,154	479,615,440	6,607,445	486,222,886	434,693,529	4.7 %	15.0%
2020	3,287,144,564	378,021,625	16,681,465	394,703,090	505,107,168	6,958,633	512,065,802	317,330,817	4.0%	15.6%
2027		390,329,307		400,686,690	528,620,708		535,903,277		5.0%	15.8%
	3,394,167,886 3,509,997,548		10,357,383	400,000,090		7,282,569	558,054,228	182,114,230	5.0%	
2029		403,649,718	4,508,227	406, 157,945	550,470,643	7,583,585		32,217,947	5.0%	15.9%
2030	3,631,329,358	417,602,876 -	2,078,568		572,855,590 594,805,365	7,891,973	580,747,562 -	133,005,307		16.0%
2031	3,757,245,160	432,083,193 -	9,463,812	422,619,382		8,194,365	602,999,730 -	313,385,655	5.1%	16.0%
2032	3,893,804,095	447,787,471 -	17,758,605	430,028,866	617,088,966	8,501,356	625,590,322 -	508,947,111	5.1%	16.1%
2033	4,033,937,948	463,902,864 -	26,989,303	436,913,561	640,155,782	8,819,137	648,974,919 -	721,008,469	5.1% 5.1%	16.1%
2034	4,184,507,262	481,218,335 -	37,234,858	443,983,477	661,557,518	9,113,979	670,671,497 -	947,696,489		16.0%
2035	4,345,857,780	499,773,645 -	48,399,272	451,374,373	680,831,164	9,379,503	690,210,668 -		5.0%	15.9%
2036	4,518,669,262	519,646,965 -	60,371,792	459,275,173	696,877,159	9,600,562	706,477,721 -		5.0%	15.6%
2037	4,704,232,612	540,986,750 -	72,459,045	468,527,705	711,480,620	9,801,747	721,282,368 -		4.9%	15.3%
2038	4,894,962,314	562,920,666 -	84,802,174	478,118,492	725,497,804	9,994,856	735,492,660 -		4.8%	15.0%
2039	5,095,730,668	586,009,027 -	97,649,312	488,359,714	738,503,174	10,174,025	748,677,199 -		4.7%	14.7%
2040	5,302,143,403	609,746,491 -	110,067,174	499,679,318	751,193,646	10,348,856	761,542,502 -		4.6%	14.4%
2041	5,515,930,905	634,332,054 -	122,772,753	511,559,301	764,141,541	10,527,233	774,668,774 -		4.5%	14.0%
2042	5,732,945,046	659,288,680 -	135,427,766	523,860,914	778,535,058	10,725,526	789,260,583 -		4.4%	13.8%
2043	5,953,966,028	684,706,093 -	147,855,934	536,850,159	794,408,372	10,944,205	805,352,577 -		4.4%	13.5%
2044	6,178,971,766	710,581,753 -	160,302,520	550,279,233	811,688,445	11,182,265	822,870,710 -		4.3%	13.3%
2045	6,409,744,784	737,120,650 -	171,956,948	565,163,702	831,160,365	11,450,521	842,610,886 -		4.2%	13.1%
2046	6,643,515,379	764,004,269 -	184,325,680	579,678,589	852,789,744	11,748,499	864,538,244 -		4.2%	13.0%
2047	6,883,209,873	791,569,135 -	195,746,646	595,822,490	876,133,019	12,070,089	888,203,107 -		4.1%	12.9%
2048	7,127,651,851	819,679,963 -	207,980,820	611,699,143	900,396,542	12,404,356	912,800,899 -		4.1%	12.8%
2049	7,382,576,728	848,996,324 -	219,953,080	629,043,244	924,270,738	12,733,260	937,003,998 -		4.1%	12.7%
2050	7,646,165,667	879,309,052 -	231,920,317	647,388,735	948,195,326	13,062,859	961,258,185 -		4.0%	12.6%
2051	7,918,529,044	910,630,840 -	244,188,403	666,442,437	976,158,433	13,448,094	989,606,526 -		4.0%	12.5%
2052	8,188,883,127	941,721,560 -	257,702,912	684,018,647	1,006,564,941	13,866,991	1,020,431,932 -		4.0%	12.5%
2053	8,475,623,411	974,696,692 -	270,939,114	703,757,578	1,035,674,299	14,268,017	1,049,942,316 -		3.9%	12.4%
2054	8,772,820,371	1,008,874,343 -	285,786,144	723,088,199	1,067,173,811	14,701,972	1,081,875,782 -		3.9%	12.3%
2055	9,075,081,568	1,043,634,380 -	300,840,580	742,793,800	1,101,536,172	15,175,366	1,116,711,538 -	7,051,734,720	3.9%	12.3%
2056	9,388,729,199	1,079,703,858 -	318,052,617	761,651,241	1,136,338,258	15,654,819	1,151,993,077 -		3.9%	12.3%
2057	9,718,604,845	1,117,639,557 -	335,773,998	781,865,559	1,173,230,794	16,163,071	1,189,393,864 -		3.9%	12.2%
2058	10,055,927,621	1,156,431,676 -	354,592,944	801,838,732	1,211,730,731	16,693,467	1,228,424,198 -		3.9%	12.2%
2059	10,414,116,768	1,197,623,428 -	373,499,553	824,123,875	1,251,586,061	17,242,536	1,268,828,597 -		3.9%	12.2%
2060	10,781,670,868	1,239,892,150 -	396,033,579	843,858,571	1,292,573,926	17,807,207	1,310,381,133 -	9,187,417,611	3.9%	12.2%
2061	11,172,921,026	1,284,885,918 -	418,853,820	866,032,098	1,332,266,062	18,354,028	1,350,620,090 -		3.9%	12.1%
2062	11,583,610,172	1,332,115,170 -	442,083,844	890,031,326	1,372,708,914	18,911,191	1,391,620,105 -	10,173,594,381	3.8%	12.0%
2063	12,011,419,445	1,381,313,236 -	467,216,506	914,096,730	1,412,426,858	19,458,367	1,431,885,225 -	10,691,382,876	3.8%	11.9%

 $^{^{71}}$ The reserve presented includes only the AOV. The actual SVb reserve includes both AOV and AWW.

Annex 2.7 Demographic projection⁷² - Retirement at age 62

		AO\				AW			GRAND
Year	Single	Married	Split	Total	Orphans	Widows	Invalids	Total	TOTAL
2003	6,175	3,288	1,262	10,725	955	396	324	1,675	12,400
2004	6,372	3,391	1,325	11,087	1,008	396	348	1,752	12,839
2005	6,083	3,266	1,291	10,639	1,048	389	371	1,808	12,447
2006	5,802	3,139	1,256	10,197	1,065	395	376	1,837	12,03
2007	6,069	3,268	1,326	10,663	1,086	389	391	1,866	12,529
2008	6,345	3,384	1,394	11,124	1,099	384	405	1,888	13,01
2009	6,624	3,531	1,466	11,621	1,098	379	417	1,894	13,51
2010	6,943	3,655	1,539	12,137	1,082	367	421	1,871	14,00
2011	7,218	3,784	1,606	12,607	1,056	368	430	1,855	14,46
2012	7,613	3,963	1,694	13,270	1,042	364	435	1,841	15,11
2013	7,989	4,120	1,776	13,885	1,034	365	433	1,832	15,71
2014	8,407	4,318	1,869	14,594	1,007	367	437	1,810	16,40
2015	8,808	4,503	1,955	15,266	981	374	435	1,790	17,05
2016	9,227	4,679	2,043	15,949	963	381	425	1,768	17,71
2017	9,701	4,869	2,139	16,710	929	384	424	1,736	18,44
2018	10,154	5,046	2,230	17,430	894	385	417	1,695	19,12
2019	10,627	5,259	2,327	18,213	862	387	412	1,661	19,87
2020	11,151	5,488	2,432	19,072	837	380	404	1,621	20,69
2021	11,598	5,695	2,523	19,816	813	377	394	1,584	21,40
2022	12,160	5,924	2,632	20,716	787	372	384	1,542	22,25
2023	12,653	6,166	2,733	21,552	768	362	376	1,506	23,05
2024	13,139	6,386	2,829	22,355	764	354	364	1,482	23,83
2025	13,598	6,599	2,921	23,118	745	343	349	1,437	24,55
2026	14,054	6,787	3,010	23,851	742	341	340	1,424	25,27
2027	14,441	6,959	3,087	24,487	737	341	333	1,410	25,89
2028	14,713	7,080	3,142	24,935	740	338	323	1,401	26,33
2029	14,944	7,197	3,192	25,334	745	333	320	1,398	26,73
2030	15,216	7,307	3,247	25,769	750	327	313	1,390	27,15
2031	15,383	7,395	3,285	26,063	755	319	305	1,380	27,44
2032	15,607	7,513	3,334	26,455	760	311	302	1,374	27,82
2033	15,819	7,576	3,376	26,770	765	311	301	1,378	28,14
2034	15,948	7,620	3,404	26,973	770	311	303	1,385	28,35
2035	15,975	7,650	3,417	27,042	775	313	306	1,394	28,43
2036	15,913	7,619	3,410	26,942	779	317	310	1,406	28,34
2037	15,883	7,593	3,407	26,882	783	321	314	1,419	28,30
2038	15,800	7,531	3,392	26,723	787	327	320	1,435	28,15
2039	15,722	7,473	3,378	26,573	790	333	324	1,447	28,02
2040	15,594	7,416	3,357	26,367	793	339	328	1,460	27,82
2041 2042	15,513	7,365	3,342	26,219	796 797	344	331 333	1,471	27,69
2042	15,437	7,332	3,329	26,098		348 349	333 334	1,479	27,57
2043	15,380 15,343	7,319 7,308	3,321 3,315	26,020 25,967	798 799	350	334	1,482 1,483	27,50 27,45
2044				26,007	798	349	333		
2045	15,365	7,323	3,320				334	1,481	27,48 27,54
2047	15,400 15,479	7,335 7,359	3,325 3,338	26,061 26,176	797 796	350 350	334	1,481 1,479	27,54
2047	15,506	7,339	3,344	26,238	796 794	353	334	1,479	27,00
2049	15,541	7,388	3,349	26,288	791	349	331	1,472	27,76
2049	15,553	7,414	3,350	26,318	789	349	331	1,469	27,78
2051	15,685	7,417	3,376	26,547	787	349	330	1,467	28,01
2052	15,739	7,533	3,387	26,659	785	348	329	1,461	28,12
2053	15,739	7,533 7,576	3,398	26,770	783 783	345	329	1,461	28,22
2054	15,893	7,646	3,419	26,958	782	344	325	1,451	28,41
2055	16,011	7,713	3,419	27,165	782 781	341	323	1,431	28,6
2055	16,011	7,713	3,442	27,103	780	340	323	1,445	28,76
2057	16,212	7,773	3,439	27,568	779	337	320	1,436	29,00
205 <i>1</i> 2058	16,306	7,869	3,508	27,366	779 780	335	319	1,430	29,00
2059	16,421	8,036	3,536	27,747	780 780	333	318	1,433	29,10
2060	16,421	8,036 8,094	3,536	27,994 28,172	780 781	333 332	318	1,431	29,42
2060	16,520		3,557 3,576	28,172	781 782	332	318	1,431	29,60
2061	16,672	8,146 8,208	3,576	28,474	782 784	331	318	1,434	29,73
2062 2063					784 786				
2003	16,708	8,235	3,604	28,547	100	333	320	1,438	29,98

⁷² Number of pensions.

Annex 2.8 AOV financial statement⁷³ – Retirement at age 65 (in AFL)

	Total		Revenue			Expenditure		_		
Year	insurable <u>earnings</u>	Contribution	Investment earnings	Total	Benefits	Admin.	Total	Reserve (end of year)	Expenditure As % of GDP	PAYG cost
2003	1,175,096,930	135,136,147	_	135,136,147	128,737,925	1,985,957	130,723,882	144,000,000	3.6%	11.1%
2004	1,237,881,342	142,356,354	10,781,158	153,137,512	133,498,696	1,839,151	135,337,847	161,799,665	3.5%	10.9%
2005	1,321,527,695	151,975,685	12,085,429	164,061,114	139,349,537	1,919,756	141,269,293	184,591,486	3.5%	10.7%
2006	1,404,339,272	161,499,016	13,512,207	175,011,223	135,272,450	1,863,587	137,136,038	222,466,671	3.2%	9.8%
2007	1,490,579,984	171,416,698	16,221,510	187,638,208	133,608,692	1,840,667	135,449,358	274,655,520	3.0%	9.1%
2008	1,579,086,093	181,594,901	19,616,841	201,211,741	134,733,839	1,856,167	136,590,006	339,277,256	2.8%	8.6%
2009	1,670,203,853	192,073,443	23,644,378	215,717,821	138,741,735	1,911,382	140,653,117	414,341,960	2.8%	8.4%
2010	1,758,871,528	202,270,226	27,097,467	229,367,693	142,608,184	1,964,649	144,572,832	499,136,820	2.7%	8.2%
2011	1,847,821,635	212,499,488	31,309,095	243,808,583	146,265,689	2,015,036	148,280,725	594,664,678	2.6%	8.0%
2012	1,934,882,484	222,511,486	35,812,495	258,323,981	153,314,357	2,112,143	155,426,500	697,562,159	2.6%	8.0%
2013	2,022,195,789	232,552,516	40,479,083	273,031,599	164,111,132	2,260,885	166,372,017	804,221,741	2.7%	8.2%
2014	2,110,302,608	242,684,800	44,974,433	287,659,233	174,876,235	2,409,191	177,285,426	914,595,548	2.8%	8.4%
2015	2,200,621,265	253,071,445	49,943,550	303,014,995	187,143,276	2,578,188	189,721,464	1,027,889,079	2.8%	8.6%
2016	2,291,263,424	263,495,294	54,811,303	318,306,597	200,820,353	2,766,611	203,586,964	1,142,608,712	2.9%	8.9%
2017	2,384,180,602	274,180,769	59,388,588	333,569,357	215,252,587	2,965,438	218,218,024	1,257,960,045	3.0%	9.2%
2018	2,477,388,898	284,899,723	63,789,417	348,689,140	230,600,173	3,176,874	233,777,047	1,372,872,137	3.1%	9.4%
2019	2,572,392,558	295,825,144	67,874,418	363,699,562	246,166,018	3,391,318	249,557,336	1,487,014,363	3.2%	9.7%
2020	2,668,417,215	306,867,980	71,400,215	378,268,195	262,945,986	3,622,488	266,568,474	1,598,714,084	3.3%	10.0%
2021	2,765,221,160	318,000,433	75,249,439	393,249,872	280,577,673	3,865,392	284,443,065	1,707,520,891	3.4%	10.3%
2022	2,864,395,833	329,405,521	78,986,144	408,391,664	299,091,330	4,120,446	303,211,776	1,812,700,779	3.5%	10.6%
2023	2,964,797,577	340,951,721	82,769,838	423,721,559	319,592,419	4,402,880	323,995,299	1,912,427,039	3.6%	10.9%
2024	3,067,738,471	352,789,924	86,869,403	439,659,327	340,510,755	4,691,063	345,201,818	2,006,884,548	3.7%	11.3%
2025	3,175,065,521	365,132,535	90,277,246	455,409,781	362,524,516	4,994,337	367,518,853	2,094,775,476	3.8%	11.6%
2026	3,284,735,308	377,744,560	94,194,764	471,939,324	386,317,891	5,322,127	391,640,018	2,175,074,783	3.9%	11.9%
2027	3,399,576,474	390,951,294	97,928,411	488,879,705	410,189,225	5,650,992	415,840,217	2,248,114,271	4.0%	12.2%
2028	3,509,606,618	403,604,761	94,159,502	497,764,263	434,225,815	5,982,133	440,207,948	2,305,670,586	4.1%	12.5%
2029	3,624,888,869	416,862,220	97,313,779	514,175,999	458,370,998	6,314,770	464,685,768	2,355,160,816	4.2%	12.8%
2030	3,745,872,136	430,775,296	99,711,289	530,486,584	481,993,573	6,640,208	488,633,781	2,397,013,619	4.2%	13.0%
2031	3,874,407,890	445,556,907	102,877,468	548,434,375	503,449,007	6,935,790	510,384,796	2,435,063,198	4.3%	13.2%
2032	4,008,892,727	461,022,664	106,234,704	567,257,367	523,119,416	7,206,780	530,326,196	2,471,994,370	4.3%	13.2%
2033	4,155,066,153	477,832,608	109,487,204	587,319,812	543,330,333	7,485,217	550,815,550	2,508,498,632	4.3%	13.3%
2034	4,308,428,077	495,469,229	112,948,922	608,418,151	563,039,776	7,756,745	570,796,521	2,546,120,262	4.3%	13.2%
2035	4,472,367,571	514,322,271	116,520,406	630,842,677	583,006,795	8,031,821	591,038,617	2,585,924,322	4.3%	13.2%
2036	4,642,360,925	533,871,506	120,250,009	654,121,515	603,731,479	8,317,336	612,048,815	2,627,997,022	4.3%	13.2%
2037	4,822,045,051	554,535,181	123,240,819	677,776,000	622,660,939	8,578,119	631,239,058	2,674,533,964	4.3%	13.1%
2038	5,011,573,507	576,330,953	126,313,986	702,644,940	639,287,083	8,807,169	648,094,253	2,729,084,651	4.2%	12.9%
2039	5,210,864,364	599,249,402	130,167,508	729,416,910	652,497,437	8,989,162	661,486,599	2,797,014,962	4.2%	12.7%
2040	5,421,074,352	623,423,550	133,883,134	757,306,685	664,197,604	9,150,350	673,347,954	2,880,973,692	4.1%	12.4%
2041	5,636,305,009	648,175,076	138,636,259	786,811,335	675,286,955	9,303,123	684,590,079	2,983,194,949	4.0%	12.1%
2042	5,859,996,956	673,899,650	144,131,404	818,031,054	685,305,525	9,441,145	694,746,670	3,106,479,332	3.9%	11.9%
2043	6,088,990,102	700,233,862	150,285,952	850,519,813	694,950,055	9,574,013	704,524,068	3,252,475,078	3.8%	11.6%
2044	6,325,428,164	727,424,239	157,417,930	884,842,169	704,866,765	9,710,631	714,577,396	3,422,739,851	3.7%	11.3%
2045	6,566,952,260	755,199,510	164,730,889	919,930,399	716,454,148	9,870,265	726,324,413	3,616,345,837	3.6%	11.1%
2046	6,814,440,678	783,660,678	173,599,464	957,260,142	729,797,862	10,054,096	739,851,957	3,833,754,022	3.6%	10.9%
2047	7,066,520,992	812,649,914	182,361,474	995,011,388	744,772,768	10,260,398	755,033,166	4,073,732,244	3.5%	10.7%
2048	7,325,180,876	842,395,801	192,596,234	1,034,992,035	762,162,511	10,499,969	772,662,480	4,336,061,799	3.5%	10.5%
2049	7,588,791,445	872,711,016	203,260,816	1,075,971,832	781,941,740	10,772,458	792,714,198	4,619,319,433	3.4%	10.4%
2050	7,859,558,514	903,849,229	214,592,833	1,118,442,063	803,685,667	11,072,014	814,757,681	4,923,003,815	3.4%	10.4%
2051	8,136,441,098	935,690,726	226,806,900	1,162,497,626	826,554,756	11,387,072	837,941,828	5,247,559,613	3.4%	10.3%
2052	8,424,254,644	968,789,284	240,700,519	1,209,489,803	849,194,343	11,698,967	860,893,310	5,596,156,106	3.4%	10.2%
2053	8,721,865,697	1,003,014,555	254,931,195	1,257,945,750	872,081,098	12,014,267	884,095,365	5,970,006,491	3.3%	10.1%
2054	9,029,914,094	1,038,440,121	271,284,286	1,309,724,406	899,378,392	12,390,330	911,768,722	6,367,962,175	3.3%	10.1%
2055	9,340,047,659	1,074,105,481	288,261,458	1,362,366,939	929,334,900	12,803,027	942,137,927	6,788,191,187	3.3%	10.1%
2056	9,667,215,981	1,111,729,838	307,740,567	1,419,470,404	957,994,089	13,197,852	971,191,941	7,236,469,651	3.3%	10.0%
2057	10,007,358,640	1,150,846,244	328,234,390	1,479,080,634	989,221,306	13,628,055	1,002,849,361	7,712,700,923	3.3%	10.0%
2058	10,357,973,728	1,191,166,979	350,251,253	1,541,418,232	1,023,464,707	14,099,811	1,037,564,518	8,216,554,637	3.3%	10.0%
2059	10,723,310,230	1,233,180,676	372,803,796	1,605,984,473	1,058,110,885	14,577,116	1,072,688,001	8,749,851,108	3.3%	10.0%
2060	11,106,673,947	1,277,267,504	399,510,153	1,676,777,657	1,094,812,062	15,082,731	1,109,894,794	9,316,733,971	3.3%	10.0%
2061	11,502,429,999	1,322,779,450	427,163,341	1,749,942,791	1,133,042,022	15,609,408	1,148,651,430	9,918,025,333	3.3%	10.0%
2062	11,920,056,238	1,370,806,467	456,058,400	1,826,864,868	1,172,484,984	16,152,796	1,188,637,780	10,556,252,420	3.3%	10.0%
2063	12,351,973,471	1,420,476,949	487,925,142	1,908,402,092	1,212,866,972	16,709,120	1,229,576,093	11,235,078,419	3.3%	10.0%

 $^{^{73}}$ The reserve presented includes only the AOV. The actual SVb reserve includes both AOV and AWW.

Annex 2.9 Demographic projection⁷⁴ - Retirement at age 65

		AO\				GRAND			
Year	Single	Married	Split	Total	Orphans	Widows	Invalids	Total	TOTAL
2003	6,175	3,288	1,262	10,725	955	396	324	1,675	12,40
2004	6,372	3,391	1,325	11,087	1,008	396	348	1,752	12,83
2005	6,083	3,266	1,291	10,639	1,048	389	371	1,808	12,44
2006	5,802	3,139	1,256	10,197	1,065	395	376	1,837	12,03
2007	5,768	3,118	1,266	10,153	1,086	389	391	1,866	12,01
2008	5,765	3,113	1,281	10,159	1,099	384	405	1,888	12,04
2009	5,756	3,102	1,293	10,151	1,098	379	417	1,894	12,04
2010	5,752	3,084	1,303	10,139	1,082	367	421	1,871	12,01
2011	5,743	3,060	1,310	10,113	1,056	368	430	1,855	11,96
2012	6,008	3,188	1,373	10,569	1,042	364	435	1,841	12,41
2013	6,310	3,294	1,436	11,040	1,034	365	433	1,832	12,87
2014	6,563	3,405	1,493	11,461	1,007	367	437	1,810	13,27
2015	6,931	3,562	1,571	12,064	981	374	435	1,790	13,85
2016	7,270	3,697	1,641	12,608	963	381	425	1,768	14,37
2017	7,646	3,868	1,720	13,234	929	384	424	1,736	14,97
2018	7,998	4,023	1,792	13,814	894	385	417	1,695	15,50
2019	8,368	4,170	1,866	14,404	862	387	412	1,661	16,00
2020	8,788	4,330	1,947	15,065	837	380	404	1,621	16,68
2021	9,184	4,476	2,022	15,682	813	377	394	1,584	17,20
2022	9,596	4,657	2,103	16,356	787	372	384	1,542	17,89
2023	10,056	4,854	2,193	17,102	768	362	376	1,506	18,60
2024	10,438	5,028	2,269	17,734	764	354	364	1,482	19,2
2025	10,931	5,223	2,362	18,516	745	343	349	1,437	19,9
2026	11,355	5,432	2,448	19,235	742	341	340	1,424	20,6
2027	11,773	5,621	2,530	19,924	737	341	333	1,410	21,3
2028	12,165	5,804	2,609	20,578	740	338	323	1,401	21,9
2029	12,552	5,962	2,685	21,200	745	333	320	1,398	22,5
2030	12,873	6,105	2,750	21,728	750	327	313	1,390	23,1
2031	13,083	6,199	2,795	22,077	755	319	305	1,380	23,4
2032	13,254	6,292	2,835	22,381	760	311	302	1,374	23,7
2033	13,467	6,378	2,879	22,725	765	311	301	1,378	24,1
2034	13,581	6,444	2,908	22,933	770	311	303	1,385	24,3
2035	13,751	6,538	2,948	23,237	775	313	306	1,394	24,6
2036	13,912	6,579	2,981	23,471	779	317	310	1,406	24,8
2037	13,994	6,603	3,000	23,597	783	321	314	1,419	25,0
2038	13,978	6,614	3,004	23,596	787	327	320	1,435	25,0
2039	13,878	6,567	2,989	23,435	790	333	324	1,447	24,8
2040	13,813	6,526	2,969	23,433	790	339	324	1,447	24,0
2040	13,700	6,452	2,979	23,109	793 796	344	331	1,471	24,7
2041					796 797				
	13,593	6,383	2,937	22,912		348	333	1,479	24,3
2043	13,437	6,315	2,909	22,661	798	349	334	1,482	24,1
2044	13,332	6,255	2,888	22,474	799	350	334	1,483	23,9
2045	13,239	6,215	2,870	22,324	798	349	333	1,481	23,8
2046	13,170	6,197	2,858	22,224	797	350	334	1,481	23,7
2047	13,125	6,182	2,849	22,156	796	350	334	1,479	23,6
2048	13,138	6,195	2,850	22,183	794	353	334	1,480	23,6
2049	13,169	6,207	2,854	22,231	791	349	331	1,472	23,7
2050	13,245	6,233	2,866	22,343	789	349	331	1,469	23,8
2051	13,274	6,265	2,872	22,411	787	349	330	1,467	23,8
2052	13,315	6,281	2,877	22,473	785	348	329	1,461	23,9
2053	13,336	6,304	2,881	22,521	783	345	326	1,454	23,9
2054	13,476	6,383	2,909	22,768	782	344	325	1,451	24,2
2055	13,543	6,437	2,923	22,903	781	341	323	1,445	24,3
2056	13,612	6,488	2,938	23,039	780	340	322	1,441	24,4
2057	13,724	6,566	2,962	23,252	779	337	320	1,436	24,6
2058	13,855	6,640	2,989	23,483	780	335	319	1,433	24,9
2059	13,946	6,709	3,010	23,664	780	333	318	1,431	25,0
2060	14,080	6,807	3,041	23,928	781	332	318	1,431	25,3
2061	14,186	6,876	3,065	24,126	782	333	319	1,434	25,5
2062	14,310	6,980	3,096	24,385	784	331	318	1,433	25,8
2063	14,416	7,038	3,119	24,573	786	333	320	1,438	26,01

⁷⁴ Number of pensions.

Annex 2.10 AOV financial statement⁷⁵ - Contribution ceiling at 60,000 AFL (in AFL)

Total _		Revenue			Expenditure				
insurable earnings	Contribution	Investment earnings	Total	Benefits	Admin.	Total	Reserve (end of year)	Expenditure As % of GDP	PAYG cost
1,175,096,930	135,136,147	-	135,136,147	128,737,925	1,985,957	130,723,882	144,000,000	3.6%	11.1%
1,237,881,342	142,356,354	10,781,158	153,137,512	133,498,696	1,839,151	135,337,847	161,799,665	3.5%	10.9%
1,374,080,935	158,019,308	12,091,343	170,110,650	145,146,890	1,999,623	147,146,513	184,763,802	3.6%	10.7%
1,456,031,531	167,443,626	13,125,917	180,569,543	152,755,780	2,104,447	154,860,228	210,473,118	3.6%	10.6%
1,541,236,053	177,242,146	14,691,402	191,933,548	160,733,413	2,214,352	162,947,764	239,458,901	3.6%	10.6%
1,627,653,556	187,180,159	16,336,382	203,516,541	169,185,708	2,330,795	171,516,503	271,458,940	3.6%	10.5%
1,716,751,376	197,426,408	18,048,304	215,474,712	181,041,723	2,494,130	183,535,853	303,397,799	3.6%	10.7%
1,803,912,652	207,449,955	18,881,048	226,331,003	194,395,140	2,678,094	197,073,234	332,655,568	3.7%	10.9%
1,887,625,550	217,076,938	19,768,876	236,845,814	209,147,012	2,881,324	212,028,335	357,473,047	3.8%	11.2%
1,973,067,438	226,902,755	20,367,831	247,270,586	224,727,611	3,095,971	227,823,581	376,920,052	3.9%	11.5%
2,056,913,087	236,545,005	20,674,976	257,219,981	241,254,017	3,323,648	244,577,665	389,562,367	4.0%	11.9%
2,142,091,881	246,340,566	20,540,421	266,880,987	258,034,877	3,554,830	261,589,707	394,853,647	4.1%	12.2%
2,229,121,866	256,349,015	20,232,196	276,581,211	276,214,794	3,805,286	280,020,081	391,414,777	4.2%	12.6%
2,316,017,512	266,342,014	19,439,748	285,781,762	295,425,166	4,069,939	299,495,105	377,701,434	4.3%	12.9%
2,405,215,022	276,599,728	18,080,137	294,679,864	315,657,958	4,348,677	320,006,635	352,374,664	4.4%	13.3%
2,493,195,401	286,717,471	16,144,908	302,862,379	337,935,039	4,655,578	342,590,617	312,646,425	4.5%	13.7%
2,580,282,424	296,732,479	13,544,858	310,277,337	360,816,528	4,970,806	365,787,335	257,136,427	4.6%	14.2%
2,670,826,232	307,145,017	10,238,139	317,383,156	384,916,175	5,302,816	390,218,992	184,300,591	4.8%	14.6%
2,758,523,874	317,230,246	6,300,086	323,530,332	410,826,613	5,659,773	416,486,386	91,344,537	4.9%	15.1%
2,848,905,143	327,624,091	1,575,380	329,199,472	436,958,150	6,019,775	442,977,925 -	22,433,916	5.0%	15.5%
2,942,360,598	338,371,469 -	3,972,431	334,399,038	463,381,029	6,383,791	469,764,820 -	, ,	5.2%	16.0%
3,039,833,347	349,580,835 -	10,453,254	339,127,581	490,021,124	6,750,800	496,771,924 -		5.3%	16.3%
3,141,516,622	361,274,412 -	17,806,838	343,467,573	516,292,998	7,112,735	523,405,733 -		5.4%	16.7%
3,249,636,895	373,708,243 - 387,352,737 -	26,240,389	347,467,854	540,698,751	7,448,962	548,147,713 - 571,332,703 -		5.4% 5.5%	16.9% 17.0%
3,368,284,666 3,482,855,949	400,528,434 -	35,636,255 42,728,891	351,716,481 357,799,543	563,568,672 587,013,502	7,764,031 8,087,020	595,100,522 -		5.5%	17.0%
3,600,205,960	414,023,685 -	53,481,599	360,542,087	610,082,190	8,404,827	618,487,017 -		5.6%	17.1%
3,727,147,753	428,621,992 -	64,998,646	363,623,345	633,476,925	8,727,125	642,204,050 -	1,689,504,896	5.6%	17.2%
3,855,326,464	443,362,543 -	78,301,241	365,061,303	657,644,165	9,060,067	666,704,232 -		5.6%	17.2%
3,994,735,092	459,394,536 -	93,147,295	366,247,240	680,270,550	9,371,780	689,642,330 -		5.6%	17.3%
4,145,368,688	476,717,399 -	109,230,225	367,487,174	700,918,959	9,656,244	710,575,203 -		5.6%	17.1%
4,308,425,218	495,468,900 -	126,731,091	368,737,809	718,513,949	9,898,642	728,412,592 -		5.5%	16.9%
4,486,920,928	515,995,907 -	145,427,385	370,568,522	734,748,289	10,122,295	744,870,585 -		5.4%	16.6%
4,670,487,136	537,106,021 -	165,326,835	371,779,186	750,451,611	10,338,633	760,790,244 -	3,780,618,849	5.4%	16.3%
4,865,847,110	559,572,418 -	184,971,451	374,600,967	765,210,148	10,541,955	775,752,102 -	4,181,769,984	5.3%	15.9%
5,066,848,049	582,687,526 -	205,065,342	377,622,183	779,673,728	10,741,213	790,414,940 -	4,594,562,741	5.2%	15.6%
5,276,339,993	606,779,099 -	226,374,911	380,404,188	794,413,205	10,944,272	805,357,477 -	5,019,516,030	5.1%	15.3%
5,488,875,218	631,220,650 -	246,950,502	384,270,148	810,583,013	11,167,036	821,750,049 -	5,456,995,932	5.0%	15.0%
5,705,065,444	656,082,526 -	268,639,334	387,443,192	828,207,920	11,409,846	839,617,766 -	5,909,170,507	4.9%	14.7%
5,923,952,450	681,254,532 -	290,741,675	390,512,857	847,183,010	11,671,258	858,854,268 -	6,377,511,917	4.8%	14.5%
6,147,467,281	706,958,737 -	312,885,296	394,073,441	868,159,045	11,960,235	880,119,280 -	6,863,557,756	4.8%	14.3%
6,371,923,143	732,771,161 -	335,616,743	397,154,419	891,082,648	12,276,043	903,358,691 -		4.7%	14.2%
6,603,440,000	759,395,600 -	357,220,721	402,174,879	915,613,646	12,613,996	928,227,641 -		4.7%	14.1%
6,839,037,192	786,489,277 -	380,724,927	405,764,351	940,986,208	12,963,542	953,949,750 -		4.6%	13.9%
7,084,400,571	814,706,066 -	402,535,673	412,170,393	965,886,686	13,306,585	979,193,271 -		4.6%	13.8%
7,339,268,177	844,015,840 -	426,161,265	417,854,576	990,736,490	13,648,929	1,004,385,419 -		4.5%	13.7%
7,603,632,143	874,417,696 -	449,487,815	424,929,881	1,019,366,540	14,043,352	1,033,409,892 -		4.5%	13.6%
7,860,252,701	903,929,061 -	473,305,633	430,623,428	1,050,219,104	14,468,394	1,064,687,498 -	-,,,	4.4%	13.5%
8,135,931,000	935,632,065 -	498,142,868	437,489,198	1,079,713,611	14,874,727		11,497,197,133	4.4%	13.5%
8,421,857,689	968,513,634 -	525,610,400	442,903,234	1,111,430,354	15,311,674		12,181,035,927	4.4%	13.4%
8,710,257,822	1,001,679,649 -	552,699,070	448,980,580	1,145,858,431	15,785,974		12,893,699,752	4.4%	13.3%
9,008,890,755	1,036,022,437 -	583,399,999	452,622,437 457,432,437	1,180,675,876	16,265,638		13,638,018,830	4.3%	13.3%
9,322,789,270	1,072,120,766 - 1,108,625,176 -	614,688,329		1,217,478,030	16,772,645 17,301,460		14,414,837,067	4.3%	13.2%
9,640,218,919 9,979,568,252	1,108,625,176 -	650,520,901 687,568,636	458,104,275 460,081,713	1,255,863,206 1,295,613,219	17,301,460		15,229,897,458 16,083,278,042	4.3% 4.3%	13.2% 13.2%
10,324,983,228	1,187,373,071 -	726,982,063	460,391,008	1,336,547,311	18,413,009		16,977,847,353	4.3%	13.1%
10,696,416,269	1,230,087,871 -	766,626,414	463,461,456	1,376,378,215	18,961,741		17,909,725,853	4.3%	13.1%
11,086,163,762	1,274,908,833 -	813,695,348	461,213,484	1,417,060,208	19,522,198		18,885,094,775	4.2%	13.0%
11,491,801,977	1,321,557,227 -	861,433,563	460,123,664	1,457,222,973	20,075,503		19,902,269,586	4.2%	12.9%
11,925,903,186	1,371,478,866 -	910,261,401	461,217,465	1,498,886,976	20,649,489	1,519,536,464		4.2%	12.7%
12,365,415,718	1,422,022,808 -	963,432,266	458,590,542	1,541,589,154	21,237,777	1,562,826,931 -		4.2%	12.6%

 $^{^{75}}$ The reserve presented includes only the AOV. The actual SVb reserve includes both AOV and AWW.

Annex 2.11 Demographic projection⁷⁶ - Contribution ceiling at 60,000 AFL

		AO	V			AW	W		GRAND
Year	Single	Married	Split	Total	Orphans	Widows	Invalids	Total	TOTAL
2003	6,175	3,288	1,262	10,725	955	396	324	1,675	12,400
2003	6,372	3,391	1,325	11,087	1,008	396	348	1,752	12,400
2004	6,631	3,529	1,323	11,558	1,008	389	371	1,808	13,366
2006	6,902	3,653	1,396	12,026	1,048	395	376	1,837	13,863
2007	7,179	3,811	1,547	12,537	1,086	389	391	1,866	14,403
2007	7,179	3,944	1,626	13,073	1,086	384	405	1,888	14,403
2009 2010	7,783	4,083	1,698	13,564	1,098	379 367	417 421	1,894	15,458
	8,187	4,273	1,792	14,251	1,082			1,871	16,122
2011	8,574	4,440	1,880	14,893	1,056	368	430	1,855	16,748
2012	9,007	4,650	1,978	15,634	1,042	364	435	1,841	17,475
2013	9,423	4,846	2,071	16,340	1,034	365	433	1,832	18,172
2014	9,865	5,036	2,167	17,068	1,007	367	437	1,810	18,878
2015	10,367	5,243	2,271	17,881	981	374	435	1,790	19,672
2016	10,848	5,437	2,370	18,655	963	381	425	1,768	20,423
2017	11,352	5,667	2,476	19,494	929	384	424	1,736	21,231
2018	11,909	5,914	2,590	20,413	894	385	417	1,695	22,108
2019	12,390	6,139	2,690	21,218	862	387	412	1,661	22,879
2020	12,988	6,386	2,808	22,183	837	380	404	1,621	23,804
2021	13,519	6,646	2,918	23,083	813	377	394	1,584	24,666
2022	14,043	6,885	3,023	23,951	787	372	384	1,542	25,493
2023	14,541	7,116	3,124	24,781	768	362	376	1,506	26,287
2024	15,035	7,321	3,220	25,576	764	354	364	1,482	27,058
2025	15,460	7,507	3,304	26,271	745	343	349	1,437	27,708
2026	15,768	7,643	3,366	26,777	742	341	340	1,424	28,200
2027	16,035	7,775	3,422	27,231	737	341	333	1,410	28,641
2028	16,341	7,899	3,482	27,723	740	338	323	1,401	29,123
2029	16,542	8,001	3,526	28,069	745	333	320	1,398	29,467
2030	16,799	8,131	3,581	28,511	750	327	313	1,390	29,901
2031	17,042	8,206	3,627	28,875	755	319	305	1,380	30,254
2032	17,201	8,263	3,661	29,124	760	311	302	1,374	30,498
2033	17,256	8,305	3,678	29,238	765	311	301	1,378	30,616
2034	17,220	8,284	3,675	29,179	770	311	303	1,385	30,565
2035	17,214	8,268	3,677	29,159	775	313	306	1,394	30,553
2036	17,154	8,216	3,667	29,037	779	317	310	1,406	30,444
2037	17,097	8,168	3,657	28,922	783	321	314	1,419	30,341
2038	16,987	8,119	3,640	28,747	787	327	320	1,435	30,181
2039	16,925	8,075	3,629	28,630	790	333	324	1,447	30,077
2040	16,867	8,050	3,621	28,538	793	339	328	1,460	29,998
2041	16,828	8,044	3,617	28,489	796	344	331	1,471	29,960
2042	16,807	8,039	3,616	28,462	797	348	333	1,479	29,941
2043	16,838	8,059	3,623	28,520	798	349	334	1,482	30,002
2044	16,881	8,075	3,632	28,587	799	350	334	1,483	30,070
2045	16,967	8,101	3,647	28,715	798	349	333	1,481	30,195
2046	17,000	8,131	3,654	28,784	797	350	334	1,481	30,265
2047	17,037	8,141	3,660	28,838	796	350	334	1,479	30,317
2048	17,050	8,155	3,662	28,867	794	353	334	1,480	30,347
2049	17,180	8,225	3,687	29,093	791	349	331	1,472	30,564
2050	17,230	8,268	3,697	29,195	789	349	331	1,469	30,664
2051	17,281	8,306	3,707	29,293	787	349	330	1,467	30,760
2052	17,372	8,371	3,726	29,468	785	348	329	1,461	30,929
2053	17,481	8,432	3,747	29,661	783	345	326	1,454	31,115
2054	17,549	8,489	3,762	29,800	782	344	325	1,451	31,252
2055	17,664	8,578	3,787	30,029	781	341	323	1,445	31,474
2056	17,749	8,638	3,805	30,193	780	340	322	1,441	31,634
2057	17,856	8,737	3,832	30,425	779	337	320	1,436	31,861
2058	17,947	8,792	3,851	30,589	780	335	319	1,433	32,022
2059	18,019	8,842	3,867	30,728	780	333	318	1,431	32,160
2060	18,086	8,902	3,884	30,872	781	332	318	1,431	32,303
2061	18,117	8,929	3,892	30,938	782	333	319	1,434	32,372
2062	18,207	8,984	3,912	31,103	784	331	318	1,433	32,536
2063	18,235	9,009	3,920	31,164	786	333	320	1,438	32,602

⁷⁶ Number of pensions.

Annex 2.12 AOV financial statement⁷⁷ - Contribution ceiling at 75,000 AFL (in AFL)

		Total		Revenue			Expenditure				
Co	ontribution	insurable		Investment					Reserve	Expenditure	PAY
Year	rate	eamings	Contribution	eamings	Total	Benefits	Admin.	Total	(end of year)	As % of GDP	α
2003	11.5%	1,175,096,930	135,136,147	-	135,136,147	128,737,925	1,985,957	130,723,882	144,000,000	3.6%	11.1
2004	11.5%	1,237,881,342	142,356,354	10,781,158	153,137,512	133,498,696	1,839,151	135,337,847	161,799,665	3.5%	10.9
2005	11.5%	1,438,834,552	165,465,973	12,355,994	177,821,967	145,146,890	1,999,623	147,146,513	192,475,119	3.6%	10.2
2006	11.5%	1,525,005,965	175,375,686	13,924,084	189,299,770	152,755,780	2,104,447	154,860,228	226,914,662	3.6%	10.2
2007	11.5%	1,614,583,819	185,677,139	16,082,174	201,759,313	160,733,413	2,214,352	162,947,764	265,726,211	3.6%	10.1
2008	11.5%	1,705,362,553	196,116,694	18,363,123	214,479,817	169,185,708	2,330,795	171,516,503	308,689,525	3.6%	10.1
2009	11.5%	1,798,920,352	206,875,840	20,764,422	227,640,263	181,041,723	2,494,130	183,535,853	352,793,935	3.6%	10.2
2010	11.5%	1,890,321,720	217,386,998	22,203,701	239,590,698	194,395,140	2,678,094	197,073,234	395,311,399	3.7%	10.4
2011	11.5%	1,978,046,990	227,475,404	23,766,999	251,242,403	209,147,012	2,881,324	212,028,335	434,525,467	3.8%	10.7
2012	11.5%	2,067,557,069	237,769,063	25,069,310	262,838,373	224,727,611	3,095,971	227,823,581	469,540,258	3.9%	11.0
2013	11.5%	2,155,315,663	247,861,301	26,118,820	273,980,121	241,254,017	3,323,648	244,577,665	498,942,714	4.0%	11.3
2014	11.5%	2,244,421,851	258,108,513	26,733,516	284,842,029	258,034,877	3,554,830	261,589,707	522,195,037	4.1%	11.7
2015	11.5%	2,335,399,572	268,570,951	27,274,609	295,845,560	276,214,794	3,805,286	280,020,081	538,020,516	4.2%	12.0
2016	11.5%	2,426,146,842	279,006,887	27,362,807	306,369,693	295,425,166	4,069,939	299,495,105	544,895,105	4.3%	12.3
2017	11.5%	2,519,228,955	289,711,330	26,893,614	316,604,944	315,657,958	4,348,677	320,006,635	541,493,414	4.4%	12.
2018	11.5%	2,610,911,702	300,254,846	25,878,541	326,133,387	337,935,039	4,655,578	342,590,617	525,036,183	4.5%	13.
2019	11.5%	2,701,579,052	310,681,591	24,208,518	334,890,109	360,816,528	4,970,806	365,787,335	494,138,958	4.6%	13.
2020	11.5%	2,795,797,343	321,516,694	21,804,140	343,320,834	384,916,175	5,302,816	390,218,992	447,240,800	4.8%	14.0
2021	11.5%	2,887,021,229	332,007,441	18,889,537	350,896,978	410,826,613	5,659,773	416,486,386	381,651,392	4.9%	14.4
2022	11.5%	2,980,985,968	342,813,386	15,248,010	358,061,396	436,958,150	6,019,775	442,977,925	296,734,864	5.0%	14.9
2023	11.5%	3,078,230,727	353,996,534	10,885,200	364,881,733	463,381,029	6,383,791	469,764,820	191,851,777	5.2%	15.3
2024	11.5%	3,179,725,432	365,668,425	5,758,712	371,427,137	490,021,124	6,750,800	496,771,924	66,506,990	5.3%	15.
2025	11.5%	3,285,738,802	377,859,962 -	245,978	377,613,984	516,292,998	7,112,735	523,405,733 -	79,284,759	5.4%	15.
2026	11.5%	3,398,521,927	390,830,022 -	7,086,401	383,743,620	540,698,751	7,448,962	548,147,713 -	243,688,852	5.4%	16.
2027	11.5%	3,522,348,926	405,070,126 -	14,756,484	390,313,643	563,568,672	7,764,031	571,332,703 -	424,707,912	5.5%	16.
2028	11.5%	3,641,970,600	418,826,619 -	21,615,863	397,210,756	587,013,502	8,087,020	595,100,522 -	622,597,678	5.5%	16.
2029	11.5%	3,764,604,479	432,929,515 -	30,465,150	402,464,366	610,082,190	8,404,827	618,487,017 -	838,620,330	5.6%	16.
2030	11.5%	3,897,338,028	448,193,873 -	40,055,679	408,138,194	633,476,925	8,727,125	642,204,050 -		5.6%	16.
2031	11.5%	4,031,489,971	463,621,347 -	51,033,060	412,588,287	657,644,165	9,060,067	666,704,232 -	1,326,802,131	5.6%	16.
2032	11.5%	4,177,697,428	480,435,204 -	63,289,540	417,145,664	680,270,550	9,371,780	689,642,330 -	1,599,298,797	5.6%	16.
2033	11.5%	4,335,801,476	498,617,170 -	76,595,206	422,021,964	700,918,959	9,656,244	710,575,203 -	1,887,852,036	5.6%	16.
2034 2035	11.5%	4,507,012,439	518,306,430 -	91,032,227	427,274,204	718,513,949	9,898,642	728,412,592 -		5.5%	16.
2036	11.5%	4,694,562,838	539,874,726 -	106,398,948	433,475,778	734,748,289	10,122,295	744,870,585 -	2,500,385,230	5.4%	15.
2037	11.5%	4,887,488,344	562,061,160 -	122,672,563	439,388,597	750,451,611	10,338,633	760,790,244 -	2,821,786,878	5.4%	15.
2038	11.5% 11.5%	5,092,802,115 5,303,942,603	585,672,243 - 609,953,399 -	138,734,913 155,065,607	446,937,330 454,887,793	765,210,148 779,673,728	10,541,955 10,741,213	775,752,102 - 790,414,940 -	3,150,601,650 3,486,128,798	5.3%	15. 14.
2039	11.5%	5,523,792,464	635,236,133		463,010,353	794,413,205	10,741,213	805,357,477 -		5.2% 5.1%	14.
2040	11.5%	5,746,736,369	660,874,682 -	188,724,796	472,149,886	810,583,013	11,167,036	821,750,049 -		5.0%	14.
2040	11.5%	5,973,317,128	686,931,470 -	205,971,175	480,960,294	828,207,920	11,409,846	839,617,766 -		4.9%	14.
2041	11.5%	6,202,566,173	713,295,110 -	223,435,908	489,859,202	847,183,010	11,671,258	858,854,268 -	4,905,728,623	4.8%	13.
2042	11.5%	6,436,572,075	740,205,789 -	240,839,161	499,366,628	868,159,045	11,960,235	880,119,280 -	5,286,481,276	4.8%	13.
2043	11.5%	6,671,488,460	767,221,173	258,613,579	508,607,594	891,082,648	12,276,043	903,358,691 -	5,681,232,373	4.7%	13.
2045	11.5%	6,913,834,693	795,090,990 -	275,446,511	519,644,478	915,613,646	12,613,996	928,227,641 -		4.7%	13
2046	11.5%	7,160,426,711	823.449.072 -	293,673,893	529,775,179	940,986,208	12,963,542	953,949,750 -	6,513,990,107	4.6%	13.
2047	11.5%	7,417,013,749	852,956,581 -	310,514,494	542,442,087	965,886,686	13,306,585	979,193,271 -		4.6%	13.
2048	11.5%	7,683,518,845	883,604,667 -	328,655,978	554,948,690	990,736,490	13,648,929	1,004,385,419 -		4.5%	13.
2049	11.5%	7,959,846,720	915,382,373 -	346,472,051	568,910,322	1,019,366,540	14,043,352	1,033,409,892 -	7,864,677,591	4.5%	13.
2050	11.5%	8,227,961,137	946,215,531 -	364,602,039	581,613,491	1,050,219,104	14,468,394	1,064,687,498 -	8,347,751,598	4.4%	12
2051	11.5%	8,515,978,329	979,337,508 -	383.448.799	595,888,709	1,079,713,611	14.874.727	1,094,588,337 -		4.4%	12
2052	11.5%	8,814,668,600	1,013,686,889 -	404,232,687	609,454,202	1,111,430,354	15,311,674	1,126,742,028 -		4.4%	12
2053	11.5%	9,115,834,848	1,048,321,008 -	424,652,814	623,668,194	1,145,858,431	15,785,974	1,161,644,405 -		4.4%	12
2054	11.5%	9,427,722,828	1,084,188,125 -	447,781,257	636,406,869	1,180,675,876	16,265,638	1,196,941,515 -		4.3%	12
2055	11.5%	9,755,485,247	1,121,880,803 -	471,285,068	650,595,735	1,217,478,030	16,772,645	1,234,250,675 -		4.3%	12
2056	11.5%	10,086,977,184	1,160,002,376 -	498,199,065	661,803,312	1,255,863,206	17,301,460	1,273,164,666 -		4.3%	12
2057	11.5%	10,441,678,374	1,200,793,013 -	525,962,348	674,830,665	1,295,613,219	17,849,078	1,313,462,297 -		4.3%	12
2058	11.5%	10,802,745,020	1,242,315,677 -	555,444,067	686,871,610	1,336,547,311	18,413,009	1,354,960,320 -		4.3%	12
2059	11.5%	11,191,460,499	1,287,017,957 -		702,032,393	1,376,378,215	18,961,741	1,395,339,956 -		4.3%	12
2060	11.5%	11,599,449,439	1,333,936,686 -	620,032,321	713,904,364	1,417,060,208	19,522,198	1,436,582,406 -		4.2%	12
2061	11.5%	12,024,161,356	1,382,778,556 -	655,394,152	727,384,404	1,457,222,973	20,075,503	1,477,298,476 -		4.2%	12.
2062	11.5%	12,478,965,278	1,435,081,007 -	691,355,895	743,725,112	1,498,886,976	20,649,489	1,519,536,464 -		4.2%	12.
2063	11.5%	12,939,531,149	1,488,046,082 -	730,363,018	757,683,065	1,541,589,154	21,237,777	1,562,826,931 -		4.2%	12.

 $^{^{77}}$ The reserve presented includes only the AOV. The actual SVb reserve includes both AOV and AWW.

Annex 2.13 Demographic projection⁷⁸ - Contribution ceiling at 75,000 AFL

		AOY				AW			GRAND
Year	Single	Married	Split	Total	Orphans	Widows	Invalids	Total	TOTAL
2003	6,175	3,288	1,262	10,725	955	396	324	1,675	12,400
2004	6,372	3,391	1,325	11,087	1,008	396	348	1,752	12,839
2005	6,631	3,529	1,398	11,558	1,048	389	371	1,808	13,366
2006	6,902	3,653	1,471	12,026	1,065	395	376	1,837	13,863
2007	7,179	3,811	1,547	12,537	1,086	389	391	1,866	14,403
2008	7,503	3,944	1,626	13,073	1,099	384	405	1,888	14,961
2009	7,783	4,083	1,698	13,564	1,098	379	417	1,894	15,458
2010	8,187	4,273	1,792	14,251	1,082	367	421	1,871	16,122
2011	8,574	4,440	1,880	14,893	1,056	368	430	1,855	16,748
2012	9,007	4,650	1,978	15,634	1,042	364	435	1,841	17,47
2013	9,423	4,846	2,071	16,340	1,034	365	433	1,832	18,172
2014	9,865	5,036	2,167	17,068	1,007	367	437	1,810	18,87
2015	10,367	5,243	2,271	17,881	981	374	435	1,790	19,672
2016	10,848	5,437	2,370	18,655	963	381	425	1,768	20,42
2017	11,352	5,667	2,476	19,494	929	384	424	1,736	21,23
2018	11,909	5,914	2,590	20,413	894	385	417	1,695	22,10
2019	12,390	6,139	2,690	21,218	862	387	412	1,661	22,87
2020	12,988	6,386	2,808	22,183	837	380	404	1,621	23,80
2021	13,519	6,646	2,918	23,083	813	377	394	1,584	24,66
2022	14,043	6,885	3,023	23,951	787	372	384	1,542	25,49
2023	14,541	7,116	3,124	24,781	768	362	376	1,506	26,28
2024	15,035	7,321	3,220	25,576	764	354	364	1,482	27,05
2025	15,460	7,507	3,304	26,271	745	343	349	1,437	27,70
2026	15,768	7,643	3,366	26,777	742	341	340	1,424	28,20
2027	16,035	7,775	3,422	27,231	737	341	333	1,410	28,64
2028	16,341	7,899	3,482	27,723	740	338	323	1,401	29,12
2029	16,542	8,001	3,526	28,069	745	333	320	1,398	29,46
2030	16,799	8,131	3,581	28,511	750	327	313	1,390	29,90
2031	17,042	8,206	3,627	28,875	755	319	305	1,380	30,25
2032	17,201	8,263	3,661	29,124	760	311	302	1,374	30,49
2033	17,256	8,305	3,678	29,238	765	311	301	1,378	30,61
2034	17,220	8,284	3,675	29,179	770	311	303	1,385	30,56
2035	17,214	8,268	3,677	29,159	775	313	306	1,394	30,55
2036 2037	17,154	8,216	3,667	29,037	779	317	310	1,406	30,44
	17,097	8,168	3,657	28,922	783	321	314	1,419	30,34
2038	16,987	8,119	3,640	28,747	787	327	320	1,435	30,18
2039	16,925	8,075	3,629	28,630	790	333	324	1,447	30,07
2040 2041	16,867	8,050	3,621	28,538	793	339	328	1,460	29,99
2041	16,828	8,044	3,617	28,489	796 797	344	331	1,471	29,96
2042	16,807	8,039	3,616	28,462		348	333	1,479	29,94
2043	16,838	8,059	3,623	28,520	798	349	334	1,482	30,00
2044	16,881	8,075	3,632	28,587	799 798	350	334	1,483	30,07
2045	16,967	8,101	3,647	28,715		349	333	1,481	30,19
2046	17,000	8,131	3,654	28,784	797 796	350 350	334 334	1,481	30,26
2047	17,037 17,050	8,141	3,660 3,662	28,838 28,867	796 794	350 353	334	1,479	30,31 30,34
2048		8,155						1,480	
2050	17,180 17,230	8,225	3,687	29,093	791 789	349 349	331	1,472	30,56
2050	17,230	8,268 8,306	3,697 3,707	29,195 29,293	789 787	349	331 330	1,469 1,467	30,66 30,76
2051	17,372	8,371	3,707	29,293	787 785	349	329	1,467	30,76
2052						345			
2054	17,481	8,432	3,747	29,661	783	344	326	1,454	31,11 31,25
2054	17,549 17,664	8,489 8,578	3,762 3,787	29,800 30,029	782 781	344 341	325 323	1,451 1,445	
2055 2056									31,47
	17,749	8,638	3,805	30,193	780	340	322	1,441	31,63
2057	17,856	8,737	3,832	30,425	779	337	320	1,436	31,86
2058	17,947	8,792	3,851	30,589	780	335	319	1,433	32,02
2059	18,019	8,842	3,867	30,728	780	333	318	1,431	32,16
2060	18,086	8,902	3,884	30,872	781	332	318	1,431	32,30
2061	18,117	8,929	3,892	30,938	782	333	319	1,434	32,37
2062	18,207	8,984	3,912	31,103	784	331	318	1,433	32,53
2063	18,235	9,009	3,920	31,164	786	333	320	1,438	32,60

⁷⁸ Number of pensions.

Annex 2.14 AOV financial statement⁷⁹ - Application of contribution rate to gross wages rather than taxable wages (in AFL)

		Total		Revenue			Expenditure				
V	Contribution	insurable	Contribution	Investment	Tatal	Danafi-	A alone in	Tatal	Reserve	Expenditure	PA
Year	rate	eamings	Contribution	eamings	Total	Benefits	Admin.	Total	(end of year)	As % of GDP	α
2003	11.5%	1,175,096,930	135,136,147	- 40.704.450	135,136,147	128,737,925	1,985,957	130,723,882	144,000,000	3.6%	11.1
2004	11.5%	1,237,881,342	142,356,354	10,781,158	153,137,512	133,498,696	1,839,151	135,337,847	161,799,665	3.5%	10.9
2005	11.5%	1,337,676,086	153,832,750	11,942,554 12,676,764	165,775,304 175,648,549	145,146,890	1,999,623	147,146,513 154,860,228	180,428,456	3.6%	11.0
2006	11.5%	1,417,145,951	162,971,784		186,383,632	152,755,780	2,104,447		201,216,777	3.6%	10.9 10.9
2007 2008	11.5% 11.5%	1,499,789,548	172,475,798	13,907,834		160,733,413	2,214,352	162,947,764	224,652,645 250,453,358	3.6% 3.6%	10.8
2009	11.5%	1,583,685,877 1,670,219,773	182,123,876 192,075,274	15,193,340 16,515,233	197,317,216 208,590,507	169,185,708 181,041,723	2,330,795 2,494,130	171,516,503 183,535,853	275,508,013	3.6%	11.0
2010	11.5%	1,754,993,087	201,824,205	17,004,572	218,828,778	194,395,140	2,678,094	197,073,234	297,263,556	3.7%	11.2
2011	11.5%	1,836,478,893	211,195,073	17,510,244	228,705,317	209,147,012	2,881,324	212,028,335	313,940,538	3.8%	11.
2012	11.5%	1,919,671,198	220,762,188	17,711,584	238,473,772	224,727,611	3,095,971	227,823,581	324,590,728	3.9%	11.
2013	11.5%	2,001,391,531	230,160,026	17,599,503	247,759,529	241,254,017	3,323,648	244,577,665	327,772,592	4.0%	12.
2014	11.5%	2,084,453,174	239,712,115	17,042,408	256,754,523	258,034,877	3,554,830	261,589,707	322,937,408	4.1%	12.
2015	11.5%	2,169,370,377	249,477,593	16,255,789	265,733,383	276,214,794	3,805,286	280,020,081	308,650,710	4.2%	12.
2016	11.5%	2,254,231,956	259,236,675	14,968,041	274,204,716	295,425,166	4,069,939	299,495,105	283,360,322	4.3%	13
2017	11.5%	2,341,394,943	269,260,418	13,108,503	282,368,921	315,657,958	4,348,677	320,006,635	245,722,608	4.4%	13
2018	11.5%	2,427,482,083	279,160,440	10,657,598	289,818,038	337,935,039	4,655,578	342,590,617	192,950,028	4.5%	14.
2019	11.5%	2,512,760,554	288,967,464	7,537,457	296,504,921	360,816,528	4,970,806	365,787,335	123,667,614	4.6%	14
2020	11.5%	2,601,450,972	299,166,862	3,727,405	302,894,266	384,916,175	5,302,816	390,218,992	36,342,889	4.8%	15
2021	11.5%	2,687,374,386	309,048,054 -	780,995	308,267,060	410,826,613	5,659,773	416,486,386 -	71,876,437	4.9%	15
2022	11.5%	2,775,968,397	319,236,366 -	6,108,409	313,127,957	436,958,150	6,019,775	442,977,925 -	201,726,405	5.0%	16
2023	11.5%	2,867,490,831	329,761,446 -	12,314,918	317,446,528	463,381,029	6,383,791	469,764,820 -	354,044,698	5.2%	16
2024	11.5%	2,962,883,681	340,731,623 -	19,548,327	321,183,297	490,021,124	6,750,800	496,771,924 -	529,633,325	5.3%	16
2025	11.5%	3,062,267,159	352,160,723 -	27,650,397	324,510,326	516,292,998	7,112,735	523,405,733 -	728,528,732	5.4%	17
2026	11.5%	3,167,887,136	364,307,021 -	36,968,405	327,338,616	540,698,751	7,448,962	548,147,713 -	949,337,830	5.4%	17.
2027	11.5%	3,283,726,038	377,628,494 -	47,322,096	330,306,399	563,568,672	7,764,031	571,332,703 -	1,190,364,134	5.5%	17
2028	11.5%	3,395,543,278	390,487,477 -	54,537,007	335,950,470	587,013,502	8,087,020	595,100,522 -	1,449,514,186	5.5%	17
2029	11.5%	3,509,974,392	403,647,055 -	66,345,950	337,301,105	610,082,190	8,404,827	618,487,017 -	1,730,700,098	5.6%	17
2030	11.5%	3,633,696,616	417,875,111 -	78,931,572	338,943,539	633,476,925	8,727,125	642,204,050 -	2,033,960,609	5.6%	17
2031	11.5%	3,758,524,655	432,230,335 -	93,524,964	338,705,372	657,644,165	9,060,067	666,704,232 -	2,361,959,469	5.6%	17
2032	11.5%	3,894,013,599	447,811,564 -	109,809,194	338,002,370	680,270,550	9,371,780	689,642,330 -	2,713,599,430	5.6%	17.
2033	11.5%	4,040,312,708	464,635,961 -	127,435,251	337,200,711	700,918,959	9,656,244	710,575,203 -	3,086,973,922	5.6%	17.
2034	11.5%	4,198,631,279	482,842,597 -	146,639,562	336,203,035	718,513,949	9,898,642	728,412,592 -	3,479,183,478	5.5%	17
2035	11.5%	4,371,824,713	502,759,842 -	167,188,257	335,571,585	734,748,289	10,122,295	744,870,585 -	3,888,482,478	5.4%	17
2036	11.5%	4,549,907,176	523,239,325 -	189,106,378	334,132,947	750,451,611	10,338,633	760,790,244 -	4,315,139,775	5.4%	16
2037	11.5%	4,739,439,230	545,035,511 -	210,746,670	334,288,841	765,210,148	10,541,955	775,752,102 -	4,756,603,036	5.3%	16
2038	11.5%	4,934,544,726	567,472,643 -	232,938,458	334,534,186	779,673,728	10,741,213	790,414,940 -	5,212,483,791	5.2%	16
2039	11.5%	5,138,090,130	590,880,365 -	256,562,371	334,317,994	794,413,205	10,944,272	805,357,477 -	5,683,523,274	5.1%	15
2040	11.5%	5,344,686,190	614,638,912 -	279,412,632	335,226,279	810,583,013	11,167,036	821,750,049 -	6,170,047,043	5.0%	15
2041	11.5%	5,555,024,234	638,827,787 -	303,580,765	335,247,022	828,207,920	11,409,846	839,617,766 -	6,674,417,788	4.9%	15
2042	11.5%	5,768,140,890	663,336,202 -	328,271,485	335,064,717	847,183,010	11,671,258	858,854,268 -	7,198,207,339	4.8%	14
2043	11.5%	5,985,846,359	688,372,331 -	353,060,772	335,311,559	868,159,045	11,960,235	880,119,280 -	7,743,015,059	4.8%	14
2044	11.5%	6,204,544,520	713,522,620 -	378,558,481	334,964,139	891,082,648	12,276,043	903,358,691 -	8,311,409,612	4.7%	14
2045	11.5%	6,430,087,541	739,460,067 -	402,824,690	336,635,377	915,613,646	12,613,996	928,227,641 -	8,903,001,876	4.7%	14
2046	11.5%	6,659,624,815	765,856,854 -	429,272,866	336,583,988	940,986,208	12,963,542	953,949,750 -	9,520,367,639	4.6%	14
2047	11.5%	6,898,870,483	793,370,106 -	453,856,008	339,514,098	965,886,686	13,306,585		10,160,046,812	4.6%	14
2048	11.5%	7,147,383,296	821,949,079 -	480,539,902	341,409,177	990,736,490	13,648,929	1,004,385,419 -		4.5%	14
2049	11.5%	7,405,248,643	851,603,594 -	506,938,631	344,664,962	1,019,366,540	14,043,352	1,033,409,892 -		4.5%	14
2050	11.5%	7,655,678,991	880,403,084 -	533,926,468	346,476,616	1,050,219,104	14,468,394	1,064,687,498 -		4.4%	13
2051	11.5%	7,924,691,006	911,339,466 -	562,101,307	349,238,159	1,079,713,611	14,874,727	1,094,588,337 -		4.4%	13
2052	11.5%	8,203,717,467	943,427,509 -	593,291,763	350,135,746	1,111,430,354	15,311,674	1,126,742,028 -		4.4%	13
2053	11.5%	8,485,251,480	975,803,920 -	624,093,589	351,710,331	1,145,858,431	15,785,974	1,161,644,405 -		4.4%	13
2054	11.5%	8,776,720,106	1,009,322,812 -	659,010,271	350,312,541	1,180,675,876	16,265,638	1,196,941,515 -		4.3%	13
2055	11.5%	9,083,137,331	1,044,560,793 -	694,631,109	349,929,684	1,217,478,030	16,772,645	1,234,250,675 -		4.3%	13
2056	11.5%	9,392,974,883	1,080,192,112 -	735,426,811	344,765,300	1,255,863,206	17,301,460	1,273,164,666 -		4.3%	13
2057	11.5%	9,723,903,515	1,118,248,904 -	777,640,243	340,608,662	1,295,613,219	17,849,078	1,313,462,297 -		4.3%	13
2058	11.5%	10,060,745,744	1,156,985,761 -	822,578,952	334,406,809	1,336,547,311	18,413,009	1,354,960,320 -		4.3%	13
2059	11.5%	10,422,522,716	1,198,590,112 -	867,843,197	330,746,915	1,376,378,215	18,961,741	1,395,339,956 -		4.3%	13
2060	11.5%	10,802,042,505	1,242,234,888 -	921,601,271	320,633,617	1,417,060,208	19,522,198	1,436,582,406 -		4.2%	13
2061	11.5%	11,196,971,499	1,287,651,722 -	976,225,832	311,425,890	1,457,222,973	20,075,503	1,477,298,476 -		4.2%	13
2062	11.5%	11,619,341,886	1,336,224,317 -	1,032,213,104	304,011,213	1,498,886,976	20,649,489	1,519,536,464 -		4.2%	13
2063	11.5%	12,046,918,850	1,385,395,668 -	1,093,266,935	292,128,732	1,541,589,154	21,237,777	1,562,826,931 -	25,047,263,742	4.2%	13

 $^{^{79}}$ The reserve presented includes only the AOV. The actual SVb reserve includes both AOV and AWW.

Annex 2.15 Demographic projection⁸⁰ - Application of contribution rate to gross wages rather than taxable wages

		AO				AW			GRAND
Year	Single	Married	Split	Total	Orphans	Widows	Invalids	Total	TOTAL
2003	6,175	3,288	1,262	10,725	955	396	324	1,675	12,400
2004	6,372	3,391	1,325	11,087	1,008	396	348	1,752	12,839
2005	6,631	3,529	1,398	11,558	1,048	389	371	1,808	13,366
2006	6,902	3,653	1,471	12,026	1,065	395	376	1,837	13,863
2007	7,179	3,811	1,547	12,537	1,086	389	391	1,866	14,403
2008	7,503	3,944	1,626	13,073	1,099	384	405	1,888	14,961
2009	7,783	4,083	1,698	13,564	1,098	379	417	1,894	15,458
2010	8,187	4,273	1,792	14,251	1,082	367	421	1,871	16,122
2011	8,574	4,440	1,880	14,893	1,056	368	430	1,855	16,748
2012	9,007	4,650	1,978	15,634	1,042	364	435	1,841	17,475
2013	9,423	4,846	2,071	16,340	1,034	365	433	1,832	18,172
2014	9,865	5,036	2,167	17,068	1,007	367	437	1,810	18,878
2015	10,367	5,243	2,271	17,881	981	374	435	1,790	19,672
2016	10,848	5,437	2,370	18,655	963	381	425	1,768	20,423
2017	11,352	5,667	2,476	19,494	929	384	424	1,736	21,231
2018	11,909	5,914	2,590	20,413	894	385	417	1,695	22,108
2019	12,390	6,139	2,690	21,218	862	387	412	1,661	22,879
2020	12,988	6,386	2,808	22,183	837	380	404	1,621	23,804
2021	13,519	6,646	2,918	23,083	813	377	394	1,584	24,666
2022	14,043	6,885	3,023	23,951	787	372	384	1,542	25,493
2023	14,541	7,116	3,124	24,781	768	362	376	1,506	26,287
2024	15,035	7,321	3,220	25,576	764	354	364	1,482	27,058
2025	15,460	7,507	3,304	26,271	745	343	349	1,437	27,708
2026	15,768	7,643	3,366	26,777	742	341	340	1,424	28,200
2027	16,035	7,775	3,422	27,231	737	341	333	1,410	28,641
2028	16,341	7,899	3,482	27,723	740	338	323	1,401	29,123
2029	16,542	8,001	3,526	28,069	745	333	320	1,398	29,467
2030	16,799	8,131	3,581	28,511	750	327	313	1,390	29,901
2031	17,042	8,206	3,627	28,875	755	319	305	1,380	30,254
2032	17,201	8,263	3,661	29,124	760	311	302	1,374	30,498
2033	17,256	8,305	3,678	29,238	765	311	301	1,378	30,616
2034	17,220	8,284	3,675	29,179	770	311	303	1,385	30,565
2035	17,214	8,268	3,677	29,159	775	313	306	1,394	30,553
2036	17,154	8,216	3,667	29,037	779	317	310	1,406	30,444
2037	17,097	8,168	3,657	28,922	783	321	314	1,419	30,341
2038	16,987	8,119	3,640	28,747	787	327	320	1,435	30,181
2039	16,925	8,075	3,629	28,630	790	333	324	1,447	30,077
2040	16,867	8,050	3,621	28,538	793	339	328	1,460	29,998
2041	16,828	8,044	3,617	28,489	796	344	331	1,471	29,960
2042	16,807	8,039	3,616	28,462	797	348	333	1,479	29,941
2043	16,838	8,059	3,623	28,520	798	349	334	1,482	30,002
2044	16,881	8,075	3,632	28,587	799	350	334	1,483	30,070
2045	16,967	8,101	3,647	28,715	798	349	333	1,481	30,195
2046	17,000	8,131	3,654	28,784	797	350	334	1,481	30,265
2047	17,037	8,141	3,660	28,838	796	350	334	1,479	30,317
2048	17,050	8,155	3,662	28,867	794	353	334	1,480	30,347
2049	17,180	8,225	3,687	29,093	791	349	331	1,472	30,564
2050	17,230	8,268	3,697	29,195	789	349	331	1,469	30,664
2051	17,281	8,306	3,707	29,293	787	349	330	1,467	30,760
2052	17,372	8,371	3,726	29,468	785	348	329	1,461	30,929
2053	17,481	8,432	3,747	29,661	783	345	326	1,454	31,11
2054	17,549	8,489	3,762	29,800	782	344	325	1,451	31,252
2055	17,664	8,578	3,787	30,029	781	341	323	1,445	31,474
2056	17,749	8,638	3,805	30,193	780	340	322	1,441	31,634
2057	17,856	8,737	3,832	30,425	779	337	320	1,436	31,86
2058	17,947	8,792	3,851	30,589	780	335	319	1,433	32,02
2059	18,019	8,842	3,867	30,728	780	333	318	1,431	32,160
2060	18,086	8,902	3,884	30,872	781	332	318	1,431	32,303
2061	18,117	8,929	3,892	30,938	782	333	319	1,434	32,372
2062	18,207	8,984	3,912	31,103	784	331	318	1,433	32,536
2063	18,235	9,009	3,920	31,164	786	333	320	1,438	32,602

⁸⁰ Number of pensions.

Annex 2.16 AOV financial statement⁸¹ – **Contribution individualization** (in AFL)

Total			Revenu			Expenditur		_	Expenditur	DAV
Year	insurabl earning	Contributio	Investmen earning	Total	Benefit	Admin	Total	Reserv (end of	Expenditur As % of	PAY cost
2003	1,175,096,93	135,136,14	-	135,136,14	128,737,92	1,985,95	130,723,88	144,000,00	3.6%	11.1%
2004	1,237,881,34	142,356,35	10,781,15	153,137,51	133,498,69	1,839,15	135,337,84	161,799,66	3.5%	10.9%
2005	1,557,635,76	179,128,11	12,842,04	191,970,16	145,146,89	1,999,62	147,146,51	206,623,31	3.6%	9.4%
2006	1,650,533,62	189,811,36	15,385,87	205,197,24	152,755,78	2,104,44	154,860,22	256,960,32	3.6%	9.4%
2007	1,747,120,08	200,918,81	18,617,48	219,536,29	160,733,41	2,214,35	162,947,76	313,548,85	3.6%	9.3%
2008	1,845,081,56	212,184,37	22,036,91	234,221,29	169,185,70	2,330,79	171,516,50	376,253,64	3.6%	9.3%
2009	1,946,081,39	223,799,36	25,655,82	249,455,18	181,041,72	2,494,13	183,535,85	442,172,98	3.6%	9.4%
2010	2,044,886,00	235,161,89	28,144,05	263,305,94	194,395,14	2,678,09	197,073,23	508,405,68	3.7%	9.6%
2011	2,139,781,57	246,074,88	30,858,33	276,933,21	209,147,01	2,881,32	212,028,33	573,310,56	3.8%	9.9%
2012	2,236,637,11	257,213,26	33,335,21	290,548,48	224,727,61	3,095,97	227,823,58	636,035,47	3.9%	10.2%
2013	2,331,683,17	268,143,56	35,597,37	303,740,94	241,254,01	3,323,64	244,577,66	695,198,74	4.0%	10.5%
2014	2,428,240,46	279,247,65	37,401,94	316,649,59	258,034,87	3,554,83	261,589,70	750,258,63	4.1%	10.8%
2015	2,526,896,24	290,593,06	39,264,84	329,857,91	276,214,79	3,805,28	280,020,08	800,096,46	4.2%	11.1%
2016	2,625,399,72	301,920,96	40,681,38	342,602,34	295,425,16	4,069,93	299,495,10	843,203,71	4.3%	11.4%
2017	2,726,512,57	313,548,94	41,504,84	355,053,79	315,657,95	4,348,67	320,006,63	878,250,86	4.4%	11.7%
2018	2,826,245,69	325,018,25	41,774,39	366,792,65	337,935,03	4,655,57	342,590,61	902,452,90	4.5%	12.1%
2019	2,924,966,12	336,371,10	41,342,26	377,713,37	360,816,52	4,970,80	365,787,33	914,378,93	4.6%	12.5%
2020	3,027,605,11	348,174,58	40,064,01	388,238,60	384,916,17	5,302,81	390,218,99	912,398,55	4.8%	12.9%
2021	3,127,017,73	359,607,03	38,391,46	397,998,50	410,826,61	5,659,77	416,486,38	893,910,67	4.9%	13.3%
2022	3,229,472,46	371,389,33	35,998,12	407,387,45	436,958,15	6,019,77	442,977,92	858,320,20	5.0%	13.7%
2023 2024	3,335,412,04	383,572,38	32,940,47	416,512,86	463,381,02	6,383,79	469,764,82	805,068,25	5.2%	14.1%
2024	3,445,905,57	396,279,14	29,257,65	425,536,79	490,021,12	6,750,80	496,771,92	733,833,12	5.3% 5.4%	14.4%
2025	3,561,172,07	409,534,78 423,629,57	24,564,14 19,241,11	434,098,93	516,292,99 540,698,75	7,112,73 7,448,96	523,405,73 548,147,71	644,526,32 539,249,30	5.4%	14.7% 14.9%
2020	3,683,735,45 3,818,232,63	439,096,75	13,114,35	442,870,69 452,211,10	563,568,67	7,764,03	571,332,70	420,127,70	5.5%	15.0%
2028	3,948,108,77	454,032,50	5,703,44	459,735,95	587,013,50	8,087,02	595,100,52	284,763,13	5.5%	15.1%
2029	4,081,134,83	469,330,50 -	1,647,61	467,682,89	610,082,19	8,404,82	618,487,01	133,959,01	5.6%	15.1%
2030	4,225,033,98	485,878,90 -	9,890,98	475,987,92	633,476,92	8,727,12	642,204,05 -	32,257,11	5.6%	15.2%
2031	4,370,335,28	502,588,55 -	19,234,27	483,354,28	657,644,16	9,060,06	666,704,23 -	215,607,06	5.6%	15.3%
2032	4,528,366,63	520,762,16 -	29,768,61	490,993,54	680,270,55	9,371,78	689,642,33 -	414,255,84	5.6%	15.2%
2033	4,699,122,42	540,399,07 -	41,374,94	499,024,13	700,918,95	9,656,24	710,575,20 -	625,806,91	5.6%	15.1%
2034	4,883,960,65	561,655,47 -	54,046,70	507,608,77	718,513,94	9,898,64	728,412,59 -	846,610,73	5.5%	14.9%
2035	5,086,300,48	584,924,55 -	67,624,63	517,299,91	734,748,28	10,122,29	744,870,58 -	1,074,181,39	5.4%	14.6%
2036	5,294,388,14	608,854,63 -	82,071,72	526,782,91	750,451,61	10,338,63	760,790,24 -	1,308,188,73	5.4%	14.4%
2037	5,515,845,03	634,322,17 -	96,593,94	537,728,23	765,210,14	10,541,95	775,752,10 -	1,546,212,59	5.3%	14.1%
2038	5,743,696,42	660,525,08 -	111,445,29	549,079,79	779,673,72	10,741,21	790,414,94 -	1,787,547,74	5.2%	13.8%
2039	5,981,173,07	687,834,90 -	127,009,62	560,825,27	794,413,20	10,944,27	805,357,47 -	2,032,079,94	5.1%	13.5%
2040	6,222,099,54	715,541,44 -	142,177,13	573,364,31	810,583,01	11,167,03	821,750,04 -	2,280,465,67	5.0%	13.2%
2041	6,467,169,26	743,724,46 -	157,985,09	585,739,36	828,207,92	11,409,84	839,617,76 -	2,534,344,07	4.9%	13.0%
2042	6,715,296,00	772,259,04 -	174,037,97	598,221,06	847,183,01	11,671,25	858,854,26 -	2,794,977,27	4.8%	12.8%
2043	6,968,668,78	801,396,91 -	190,111,38	611,285,52	868,159,04	11,960,23	880,119,28 -	3,063,811,03	4.8%	12.6%
2044	7,223,108,29	830,657,45 -	206,544,16	624,113,28	891,082,64	12,276,04	903,358,69 -	3,343,056,43	4.7%	12.5%
2045	7,485,552,02	860,838,48 -	222,278,09	638,560,38	915,613,64	12,613,99	928,227,64 -	3,632,723,69	4.7%	12.4%
2046	7,752,621,16	891,551,43 -	239,178,78	652,372,64	940,986,20	12,963,54	953,949,75 -	3,934,300,79	4.6%	12.3%
2047 2048	8,030,761,09 8,319,674,86	923,537,52 - 956,762,60 -	254,968,85 271,817,92	668,568,67 684,944,68	965,886,68 990,736,49	13,306,58 13,648,92	979,193,27 - 1,004,385,41 -	4,244,925,39 4,564,366,12	4.6% 4.5%	12.2% 12.1%
2049	8,619,353,55	991,225,65 -	288,386,92	702,838,73	1,019,366,54	14,043,35	1,033,409,89 -	4,894,937,28	4.5%	12.1%
2050	8,910,254,43	1,024,679,26 -	305,219,33	719,459,92	1,050,219,10	14,468,39	1,064,687,49 -	5,240,164,85	4.4%	11.9%
2051	9,222,758,86	1,060,617,26 -	322,647,12	737,970,14	1,079,713,61	14,874,72	1,094,588,33 -	5,596,783,04	4.4%	11.9%
2052	9,546,880,70	1,097,891,28 -	341,688,61	756,202,66	1,111,430,35	15,311,67	1,126,742,02 -	5,967,322,40	4.4%	11.8%
2053	9,873,806,39	1,135,487,73 -	360,415,47	775,072,26	1,145,858,43	15,785,97	1,161,644,40 -		4.4%	11.8%
2054	10,212,331,82	1,174,418,16 -	381,439,49	792,978,66	1,180,675,87	16,265,63	1,196,941,51 -		4.3%	11.7%
2055	10,568,162,06	1,215,338,63 -	402,779,59	812,559,04	1,217,478,03	16,772,64	1,234,250,67 -	7,179,549,03	4.3%	11.7%
2056	10,927,995,14	1,256,719,44 -	427,037,40	829,682,03	1,255,863,20	17,301,46	1,273,164,66 -		4.3%	11.7%
2057	11,312,676,02	1,300,957,74 -	452,029,85	848,927,89	1,295,613,21	17,849,07	1,313,462,29 -		4.3%	11.6%
2058	11,704,232,81	1,345,986,77 -	478,502,20	867,484,57	1,336,547,31	18,413,00	1,354,960,32 -		4.3%	11.6%
2059	12,125,283,26	1,394,407,57 -	505,015,61	889,391,96	1,376,378,21	18,961,74	1,395,339,95 -		4.3%	11.5%
2060	12,567,094,67	1,445,215,88 -	536,256,63	908,959,24	1,417,060,20	19,522,19	1,436,582,40 -		4.2%	11.4%
2061	13,026,919,54	1,498,095,74 -	567,736,65	930,359,08	1,457,222,97	20,075,50	1,477,298,47 -		4.2%	11.3%
2062	13,519,009,60	1,554,686,10 -	599,683,29	955,002,80	1,498,886,97	20,649,48	1,519,536,46 -	10,720,086,00	4.2%	11.2%
2063	14,017,233,85	1,611,981,89 -	634,213,30	977,768,59	1,541,589,15	21,237,77	1,562,826,93 -	11,305,144,34	4.2%	11.1%

 $^{^{81}}$ The reserve presented includes only the AOV. The actual SVb reserve includes both AOV and AWW.

Annex 2.17 Demographic projection⁸² – Contribution individualization

		AOV	1			GRAND			
Year	Single	Married	Split	Total	Orphans	Widows	Invalids	Total	TOTAL
2003	6,175	3,288	1,262	10,725	955	396	324	1,675	12,400
2004	6,372	3,391	1,325	11,087	1,008	396	348	1,752	12,839
2005	6,630	3,528	1,398	11,557	1,048	389	371	1,808	13,365
2006	6,906	3,653	1,471	12,031	1,065	395	376	1,837	13,868
2007	7,195	3,811	1,547	12,554	1,086	389	391	1,866	14,420
2008	7,536	3,946	1,626	13,108	1,099	384	405	1,888	14,996
2009	7,839	4,087	1,698	13,624	1,098	379	417	1,894	15,519
2010	8,272	4,279	1,793	14,344	1,082	367	421	1,871	16,215
2011	8,694	4,449	1,881	15,025	1,056	368	430	1,855	16,880
2012	9,169	4,662	1,980	15,812	1,042	364	435	1,841	17,653
2013	9,635	4,863	2,075	16,572	1,034	365	433	1,832	18,404
2014	10,132	5,058	2,171	17,361	1,007	367	437	1,810	19,171
2015	10,696	5,271	2,276	18,243	981	374	435	1,790	20,033
2016	11,246	5,470	2,377	19,093	963	381	425	1,768	20,861
2017	11,825	5,706	2,484	20,016	929	384	424	1,736	21,753
2018	12,465	5,961	2,600	21,026	894	385	417	1,695	22,722
2019	13,035	6,194	2,703	21,932	862	387	412 404	1,661	23,593
2020 2021	13,729	6,450	2,823	23,002	837	380		1,621	24,623
2021	14,361 14,992	6,719 6,968	2,935 3,044	24,015 25,003	813 787	377 372	394 384	1,584 1,542	25,599 26,545
2023	15,601	7,209	3,044	25,003 25,958	767 768	362	364 376	1,542	26,545
2024	16,210	7,425	3,147	26,881	764	354	364	1,482	28,363
2025	16,752	7,623	3,334	27,709	745	343	349	1,437	29,146
2026	17,180	7,770	3,400	28,349	742	341	340	1,424	29,773
2027	17,566	7,913	3,459	28,937	737	341	333	1,410	30,348
2028	17,989	8,048	3,523	29,561	740	338	323	1,401	30,962
2029	18,306	8,161	3,570	30,037	745	333	320	1,398	31,435
2030	18,674	8,302	3,629	30,605	750	327	313	1,390	31,994
2031	19,024	8,386	3,679	31,090	755	319	305	1,380	32,469
2032	19,286	8,452	3,716	31,455	760	311	302	1,374	32,828
2033	19,438	8,503	3,736	31,678	765	311	301	1,378	33,055
2034	19,492	8,491	3,737	31,719	770	311	303	1,385	33,105
2035	19,566	8,482	3,742	31,790	775	313	306	1,394	33,184
2036	19,579	8,436	3,734	31,749	779	317	310	1,406	33,156
2037	19,585	8,394	3,727	31,705	783	321	314	1,419	33,124
2038	19,530	8,350	3,712	31,591	787	327	320	1,435	33,025
2039	19,513	8,310	3,703	31,525	790	333	324	1,447	32,972
2040	19,491	8,287	3,696	31,474	793	339	328	1,460	32,934
2041	19,480	8,284	3,694	31,457	796	344	331	1,471	32,928
2042	19,480	8,281	3,693	31,453	797	348	333	1,479	32,932
2043	19,524	8,301	3,701	31,527	798	349	334	1,482	33,009
2044	19,575	8,318	3,710	31,603	799	350	334	1,483	33,086
2045	19,661	8,344	3,726	31,731	798	349	333	1,481	33,211
2046	19,690	8,373	3,733	31,796	797	350	334	1,481	33,277
2047	19,721	8,382	3,739	31,842	796	350	334	1,479	33,321
2048	19,723	8,396	3,740	31,860	794	353	334	1,480	33,340
2049 2050	19,841 19,877	8,465	3,765	32,072 32,159	791 789	349 349	331 331	1,472	33,544
2051	19,913	8,506 8,543	3,775 3,784	32,139	789 787	349	330	1,469 1,467	33,628 33,707
2052	19,989	8,607	3,803	32,398	785	348	329	1,461	33,860
2053	20,084				783 783	345	329		34,029
2054	20,084	8,668 8,724	3,823 3,838	32,575 32,700	782	344	325	1,454 1,451	34,029
2055	20,139	8,812	3,862	32,700	782 781	341	323	1,445	34,152
2056	20,242	8,872	3,880	33,070	780	340	323	1,441	34,511
2057	20,418	8,971	3,906	33,295	779	337	320	1,436	34,731
2058	20,505	9,026	3,925	33,455	780	335	319	1,433	34,888
2059	20,505	9,026	3,925	33,594	780 780	333	318	1,433	35,025
2060	20,645	9,137	3,958	33,740	780 781	332	318	1,431	35,023
2061	20,682	9,165	3,966	33,813	782	333	319	1,434	35,248
2062	20,779	9,222	3,986	33,988	784	331	318	1,433	35,421
2063	20,819	9,248	3,995	34,062	786	333	320	1,438	35,500

⁸² Number of pensions.

Annex 2.18 AOV financial statement⁸³ – **Benefits individualization** (in AFL)

	Total _		Revenue			Expenditure				
Year	insurable earnings	Contribution	Investment earnings	Total	Benefits	Admin.	Total	Reserve (end of year)	Expenditure As % of GDP	PAYO
1001	- carmigo	Continuation	- Carriirigo	7000		7.0.1	1000	(ond or your)	710 70 01 021	
2003	1,175,096,930	135,136,147	-	135,136,147	128,737,925	1,985,957	130,723,882	144,000,000	3.6%	11.19
2004	1,237,881,342	142,356,354	10,781,158	153,137,512	133,498,696	1,839,151	135,337,847	161,799,665	3.5%	10.99
2005	1,374,080,935	158,019,308	11,616,040	169,635,348	158,339,059	2,181,366	160,520,425	170,914,588	3.9%	11.79
2006	1,456,031,531	167,443,626	11,810,198	179,253,824	163,371,139	2,250,690	165,621,829	184,546,583	3.8%	11.49
2007	1,541,236,053	177,242,146	12,690,955	189,933,101	168,133,487	2,316,299	170,449,786	204,029,897	3.7%	11.19
2008	1,627,653,556	187,180,159	13,851,605	201,031,764	173,526,453	2,390,596	175,917,048	229,144,612	3.6%	10.89
2009	1,716,751,376	197,426,408	15,265,328	212,691,736	182,239,617	2,510,633	184,750,250	257,086,098	3.6%	10.89
2010	1,803,912,652	207,449,955	16,075,756	223,525,711	193,445,327	2,665,009	196,110,336	284,501,473	3.7%	10.99
2011	1,887,625,550	217,076,938	17,057,421	234,134,359	204,770,676	2,821,033	207,591,709	311,044,124	3.7%	11.09
2012	1,973,067,438	226,902,755	17,913,302	244,816,057	217,916,607	3,002,139	220,918,745	334,941,436	3.7%	11.29
2013	2,056,913,087	236,545,005	18,630,724	255,175,729	231,050,746	3,183,082	234,233,827	355,883,337	3.8%	11.49
2014	2,142,091,881	246,340,566	19,083,275	265,423,841	244,887,262	3,373,701	248,260,963	373,046,215	3.9%	11.69
2015	2,229,121,866	256,349,015	19,500,569	275,849,583	260,323,689	3,586,362	263,910,050	384,985,748	3.9%	11.89
2016	2,316,017,512	266,342,014	19,606,330	285,948,344	276,158,097	3,804,505	279,962,602	390,971,491	4.0%	12.19
2017	2,405,215,022	276,599,728	19,313,793	295,913,520	293,607,177	4,044,893	297,652,070	389,232,940	4.1%	12.4
2018	2,493,195,401	286,717,471	18,598,692	305,316,164	312,966,121	4,311,593	317,277,714	377,271,390	4.2%	12.79
2019	2,580,282,424	296,732,479	17,394,719	314,127,198	331,784,289	4,570,842	336,355,131	355,043,457	4.3%	13.09
2020	2,670,826,232	307,145,017	15,619,396	322,764,413	353,646,856	4,872,033	358,518,889	319,288,981	4.4%	13.49
2021	2,758,523,874	317,230,246	13,408,104	330,638,349	375,721,015	5,176,139	380,897,153	269,030,177	4.5%	13.89
2022	2,848,905,143	327,624,091	10,620,143	338,244,235	398,397,183	5,488,538	403,885,721	203,388,691	4.6%	14.29
2023	2,942,360,598	338,371,469	7,246,076	345,617,545	421,476,988	5,806,498	427,283,486	121,722,750	4.7%	14.59
2024	3,039,833,347	349,580,835	3,242,352	352,823,187	444,980,742	6,130,299	451,111,040	23,434,896	4.8%	14.89
2025	3,141,516,622	361,274,412 -	1,462,123	359,812,288	467,911,100	6,446,200	474,357,300 -	91,110,115	4.9%	15.19
2026	3,249,636,895	373,708,243 -	6,826,864	366,881,379	488,744,158	6,733,208	495,477,366 -	219,706,102	4.9%	15.29
2027		387,352,737 -		374,511,565			516,570,619 -		4.9%	15.3
	3,368,284,666 3,482,855,949	400,528,434 -	12,841,172	382,356,268	509,550,768	7,019,851		361,765,156	5.0%	
2028 2029	3,482,855,949	414,023,685 -	18,172,167 25,196,910	388,826,776	531,856,002 552,488,455	7,327,140 7,611,384	539,183,142 - 560,099,839 -	518,592,030 689,865,094		15.5° 15.6°
2029			32,852,400			7,930,585	583,588,933 -		5.0%	
	3,727,147,753 3,855,326,464	428,621,992 - 443,362,543 -		395,769,591	575,658,348			877,684,435 1,082,512,486	5.1%	15.7
2031			41,690,701	401,671,842	598,257,963	8,241,930	606,499,893 -		5.1%	15.7
2032	3,994,735,092	459,394,536 -	51,591,819	407,802,716	619,496,242	8,534,520	628,030,762 -	1,302,740,531	5.1%	15.79
2033	4,145,368,688	476,717,399 -	62,351,847	414,365,552	638,759,178	8,799,897	647,559,075 -	1,535,934,054	5.1%	15.6
2034	4,308,425,218	495,468,900 -	74,009,866	421,459,034	655,044,620	9,024,254	664,068,874 -	1,778,543,894	5.0%	15.4
2035	4,486,920,928	515,995,907 -	86,430,295	429,565,611	672,491,476	9,264,611	681,756,087 -	2,030,734,369	5.0%	15.2
2036	4,670,487,136	537,106,021 -	99,610,038	437,495,983	688,137,357	9,480,158	697,617,515 -	2,290,855,901	4.9%	14.9
2037	4,865,847,110	559,572,418 -	112,631,003	446,941,414	704,171,729	9,701,056	713,872,785 -	2,557,787,272	4.8%	14.7
2038	5,066,848,049	582,687,526 -	125,883,280	456,804,246	719,062,399	9,906,198	728,968,597 -	2,829,951,623	4.8%	14.4
2039	5,276,339,993	606,779,099 -	139,824,939	466,954,160	735,434,978	10,131,756	745,566,734 -	3,108,564,196	4.7%	14.1
2040	5,488,875,218	631,220,650 -	153,262,645	477,958,005	752,563,014	10,367,721	762,930,735 -	3,393,536,927	4.6%	13.9
2041	5,705,065,444	656,082,526 -	167,329,627	488,752,899	770,929,127	10,620,742	781,549,869 -	3,686,333,897	4.6%	13.7
2042	5,923,952,450	681,254,532 -	181,586,918	499,667,613	790,044,542	10,884,087	800,928,629 -	3,987,594,912	4.5%	13.5
2043	6,147,467,281	706,958,737 -	195,814,623	511,144,114	811,588,453	11,180,888	822,769,340 -	4,299,220,138	4.4%	13.4
2044	6,371,923,143	732,771,161 -	210,359,500	522,411,662	833,780,140	11,486,612	845,266,753 -	4,622,075,229	4.4%	13.3
2045	6,603,440,000	759,395,600 -	224,142,656	535,252,944	857,914,017	11,819,094	869,733,110 -	4,956,555,396	4.4%	13.2
2046	6,839,037,192	786,489,277 -	239,034,619	547,454,659	881,025,749	12,137,494	893,163,243 -	5,302,263,981	4.3%	13.1
2047	7,084,400,571	814,706,066 -	252,732,320	561,973,746	904,123,199	12,455,697	916,578,896 -	5,656,869,131	4.3%	12.9
2048	7,339,268,177	844,015,840 -	267,416,815	576,599,026	926,943,353	12,770,080	939,713,433 -	6,019,983,538	4.2%	12.8
2049	7,603,632,143	874,417,696 -	281,823,813	592,593,884	956,027,548	13,170,760	969,198,307 -	6,396,587,962	4.2%	12.7
2050	7,860,252,701	903,929,061 -	296,438,033	607,491,028	982,174,932	13,530,980	995,705,912 -	6,784,802,846	4.2%	12.7
2051	8,135,931,000	935,632,065 -	311,507,680	624,124,385	1,008,843,372	13,898,379	1,022,741,752 -	7,183,420,212	4.1%	12.6
2052	8,421,857,689	968,513,634 -	328,075,417	640,438,218	1,038,605,715	14,308,402	1,052,914,117 -	7,595,896,111	4.1%	12.5
2053	8,710,257,822	1,001,679,649 -	344,278,353	657,401,297	1,069,834,033	14,738,620	1,084,572,653 -	8,023,067,468	4.1%	12.5
2054	9,008,890,755	1,036,022,437 -	362,557,818	673,464,619	1,100,258,605	15,157,766	1,115,416,370 -	8,465,019,219	4.1%	12.4
2055	9,322,789,270	1,072,120,766 -	381,034,371	691,086,395	1,134,638,465	15,631,402	1,150,269,867 -	8,924,202,691	4.0%	12.3
2056	9,640,218,919	1,108,625,176 -	402,147,568	706,477,608	1,167,865,445	16,089,155	1,183,954,599 -	9,401,679,682	4.0%	12.3
2057	9,979,568,252	1,147,650,349 -	423,808,600	723,841,749	1,204,617,256	16,595,468	1,221,212,723 -	9,899,050,657	4.0%	12.2
2058	10,324,983,228	1,187,373,071 -	446,707,410	740,665,661	1,240,127,787	17,084,680	1,257,212,467 -		4.0%	12.2
2059	10,696,416,269	1,230,087,871 -	469,465,957	760,621,914	1,275,853,160	17,576,853	1,293,430,013 -		4.0%	12.1
2060	11,086,163,762	1,274,908,833 -	496,464,136	778,444,697	1,312,889,153	18,087,081	1,330,976,234 -		3.9%	12.0
2061	11,491,801,977	1,321,557,227 -	523,492,304	798,064,923	1,348,110,510	18,572,310	1,366,682,819 -		3.9%	11.9
2062	11,925,903,186	1,371,478,866 -	550,808,528	820,670,339	1,388,371,976	19,126,974	1,407,498,950		3.9%	11.8
	11.323.303.100	1.071.470.000 -	JJU,000,JZ0	020,010,009	1,500,57 1,370	13,120,3/4	1, 1 01,430,330 -	12,000,000,007	J.J/0	11.0

 $^{^{83}}$ The reserve presented includes only the AOV. The actual SVb reserve includes both AOV and AWW.

Annex 2.19 Demographic projection⁸⁴ – Benefits individualization

-		AOV				GRAND			
Year	Single	Married	Split	Total	Orphans	Widows	Invalids	Total	TOTAL
2003	6,175	3,288	1,262	10,725	955	396	324	1,675	12,400
2004	6,372	3,391	1,325	11,087	1,008	396	348	1,752	12,839
2005	14,822	-	-	14,822	1,048	389	371	1,808	16,630
2006	15,035	-	-	15,035	1,065	395	376	1,837	16,872
2007	15,307	-	-	15,307	1,086	389	391	1,866	17,173
2008	15,637	-	-	15,637	1,099	384	405	1,888	17,524
2009	15,947	-	-	15,947	1,098	379	417	1,894	17,84
2010	16,453	-	-	16,453	1,082	367	421	1,871	18,324
2011	16,948	-	-	16,948	1,056	368	430	1,855	18,803
2012	17,571	-	-	17,571	1,042	364	435	1,841	19,413
2013	18,170	_	-	18,170	1,034	365	433	1,832	20,002
2014	18,803	-	_	18,803	1,007	367	437	1,810	20,614
2015	19,519	_	_	19,519	981	374	435	1,790	21,309
2016	20,222			20,222	963	381	425	1,768	21,303
2016	20,222	-	-	20,222	929	384	423	1,786	21,990
2017	21,865	-	-		894	385	424		23,560
		-	-	21,865				1,695	
2019	22,642	-	-	22,642	862	387	412	1,661	24,303
2020	23,578	-	-	23,578	837	380	404	1,621	25,200
2021	24,473	-	-	24,473	813	377	394	1,584	26,05
2022	25,352	-	-	25,352	787	372	384	1,542	26,89
2023	26,202	-	-	26,202	768	362	376	1,506	27,709
2024	27,026	-	-	27,026	764	354	364	1,482	28,50
2025	27,761	-	-	27,761	745	343	349	1,437	29,19
2026	28,324	-	-	28,324	742	341	340	1,424	29,74
2027	28,843	-	-	28,843	737	341	333	1,410	30,25
2028	29,407	-	-	29,407	740	338	323	1,401	30,80
2029	29,836	-	-	29,836	745	333	320	1,398	31,23
2030	30,366	-	-	30,366	750	327	313	1,390	31,75
2031	30,823	-	-	30,823	755	319	305	1,380	32,20
2032	31,170	-	-	31,170	760	311	302	1,374	32,54
2033	31,384	-	-	31,384	765	311	301	1,378	32,76
2034	31,424	-	-	31,424	770	311	303	1,385	32,80
2035	31,499	-	-	31,499	775	313	306	1,394	32,89
2036	31,469	-	-	31,469	779	317	310	1,406	32,87
2037	31,440	_	-	31,440	783	321	314	1,419	32,85
2038	31,343	-	_	31,343	787	327	320	1,435	32,77
2039	31,298	_	_	31,298	790	333	324	1,447	32,74
2040	31,268			31,268	793	339	328	1,460	32,72
2040	31,200		-	31,274	795 796	344	331	1,471	32,74
		-	-						
2042	31,291	-	-	31,291	797	348	333	1,479	32,77
2043	31,386	-	-	31,386	798	349	334	1,482	32,86
2044	31,482	-	-	31,482	799	350	334	1,483	32,96
2045	31,629	-	-	31,629	798	349	333	1,481	33,10
2046	31,712	-	-	31,712	797	350	334	1,481	33,19
2047	31,774	-	-	31,774	796	350	334	1,479	33,25
2048	31,804	-	-	31,804	794	353	334	1,480	33,28
2049	32,026	-	-	32,026	791	349	331	1,472	33,49
2050	32,122	-	-	32,122	789	349	331	1,469	33,59
2051	32,212	-	-	32,212	787	349	330	1,467	33,67
2052	32,375	-	-	32,375	785	348	329	1,461	33,83
2053	32,556	-	-	32,556	783	345	326	1,454	34,01
2054	32,686	-	-	32,686	782	344	325	1,451	34,13
2055	32,905	-	-	32,905	781	341	323	1,445	34,35
2056	33,061	-	-	33,061	780	340	322	1,441	34,50
2057	33,288	-	-	33,288	779	337	320	1,436	34,72
2058	33,450	_	_	33,450	780	335	319	1,433	34,88
2059	33,590	_	_	33,590	780 780	333	318	1,433	35,02
2060	33,737	-	-	33,737	780 781	332	318	1,431	35,02
		-	-						
2061	33,811	-	-	33,811	782	333	319	1,434	35,24
2062	33,986	-	-	33,986	784	331	318	1,433	35,42
2063	34,061	-	-	34,061	786	333	320	1,438	35,49

⁸⁴ Number of pensions.

Annex 2.20 AOV financial statement⁸⁵ – **Individualization** (in AFL)

Total insurable		Revenue Investment				Expenditure		Popor :	PAYG	
Year	earnings	Contribution	earnings	Total_	Benefits	Admin.	Total		Expenditure As % of GDP	cost
2002	1,110,662,730	127,726,214	-	127,726,214	126,435,000	1,752,000	128,187,000	-	3.8%	11.5%
2003	1,175,096,930	135,136,147	-	135,136,147	128,737,925	1,985,957	130,723,882	144,000,000	3.6%	11.1%
2004	1,237,881,342	142,356,354	10,781,158	153,137,512	133,498,696	1,839,151	135,337,847	161,799,665	3.5%	10.9%
2005	1,472,201,770	169,303,204	12,017,065	181,320,268	158,339,059	2,181,366	160,520,425	182,599,508	3.9%	10.9%
2006	1,559,663,658	179,361,321	13,016,219	192,377,539	163,371,139	2,250,690	165,621,829	209,355,218	3.8%	10.6%
2007	1,650,618,450	189,821,122	14,784,554	204,605,676	168,133,487	2,316,299	170,449,786	243,511,108	3.7%	10.3%
2008	1,742,951,957	200,439,475	16,892,289	217,331,764	173,526,453	2,390,596	175,917,048	284,925,824	3.6%	10.1%
2009	1,838,188,282	211,391,652	19,328,644	230,720,297	182,239,617	2,510,633	184,750,250	330,895,870	3.6%	10.1%
2010	1,931,486,970	222,121,002	21,035,258	243,156,259	193,445,327	2,665,009	196,110,336	377,941,794	3.7%	10.2%
2011	2,021,167,535	232,434,267	23,015,563	255,449,830	204,770,676	2,821,033	207,591,709	425,799,915	3.7%	10.3%
2012	2,112,726,216	242,963,515	24,911,863	267,875,378	217,916,607	3,002,139	220,918,745	472,756,547	3.7%	10.5%
2013	2,202,664,894	253,306,463	26,728,846	280,035,309	231,050,746	3,183,082	234,233,827	518,558,029	3.8%	10.6%
2014	2,294,079,774	263,819,174	28,293,273	292,112,447	244,887,262	3,373,701	248,260,963	562,409,512	3.9%	10.8%
2015 2016	2,387,536,821	274,566,734 285,307,255	29,974,127	304,540,861 316,701,253	260,323,689 276,158,097	3,586,362 3,804,505	263,910,050 279,962,602	603,040,323	3.9%	11.1% 11.3%
2016	2,480,932,650 2,576,861,332	296,339,053	31,393,998 32,435,175	328,774,228	293,607,177	4,044,893	297,652,070	639,778,974 670,901,132	4.0%	11.6%
2017	2,671,605,972	307,234,687	33,104,412	340,339,098	312,966,121	4,311,593	317,277,714	693,962,517	4.1% 4.2%	11.9%
2019	2,765,460,618	318,027,971	33,307,061	351,335,032	331,784,289	4,570,842	336,355,131	708,942,418	4.3%	12.2%
2020	2,863,070,340	329,253,089	32,905,251	362,158,340	353,646,856	4,872,033	358,518,889	712,581,869	4.4%	12.5%
2021	2,957,634,788	340,128,001	32,257,080	372,385,080	375,721,015	5,176,139	380,897,153	704,069,796	4.5%	12.9%
2022	3,055,138,408	351,340,917	31,130,949	382,471,866	398,397,183	5,488,538	403,885,721	682,655,941	4.6%	13.2%
2023	3,155,864,952	362,924,469	29,580,954	392,505,423	421,476,988	5,806,498	427,283,486	647,877,878	4.7%	13.5%
2024	3,260,851,148	374,997,882	27,665,189	402,663,071	444,980,742	6,130,299	451,111,040	599,429,908	4.8%	13.8%
2025	3,370,229,295	387,576,369	25,048,965	412,625,334	467,911,100	6,446,200	474,357,300	537,697,942	4.9%	14.1%
2026	3,486,471,125	400,944,179	22,149,088	423,093,268	488,744,158	6,733,208	495,477,366	465,313,845	4.9%	14.2%
2027	3,613,959,565	415,605,350	18,808,531	434,413,881	509,550,768	7,019,851	516,570,619	383,157,106	4.9%	14.3%
2028	3,737,021,897	429,757,518	13,892,102	443,649,620	531,856,002	7,327,140	539,183,142	287,623,585	5.0%	14.4%
2029	3,862,960,972	444,240,512	9,820,838	454,061,350	552,488,455	7,611,384	560,099,839	181,585,095	5.0%	14.5%
2030	3,999,125,533	459,899,436	5,159,672	465,059,108	575,658,348	7,930,585	583,588,933	63,055,271	5.1%	14.6%
2031	4,136,507,118	475,698,319 -	71,747	475,626,571	598,257,963	8,241,930	606,499,893 -	67,818,051	5.1%	14.7%
2032	4,285,621,738	492,846,500 -	5,959,520	486,886,980	619,496,242	8,534,520	628,030,762 -	208,961,833	5.1%	14.7%
2033 2034	4,446,633,668	511,362,872 -	12,419,442	498,943,429 512,059,448	638,759,178	8,799,897	647,559,075 -	357,577,478	5.1% 5.0%	14.6%
2034	4,620,873,816 4,811,484,745	531,400,489 - 553,320,746 -	19,341,041 26,622,704	526,698,041	655,044,620 672,491,476	9,024,254 9,264,611	664,068,874 - 681,756,087 -	509,586,903 664,644,949	5.0%	14.4% 14.2%
2036	5,007,476,376	575,859,783 -	34,216,737	541,643,046	688,137,357	9,480,158	697,617,515 -	820,619,417	4.9%	13.9%
2037	5,216,069,045	599,847,940 -	41,727,657	558,120,284	704,171,729	9,701,056	713,872,785 -	976,371,919	4.8%	13.7%
2038	5,430,795,658	624,541,501 -	49,202,016	575,339,485	719,062,399	9,906,198	728,968,597 -	1,130,001,031	4.8%	13.4%
2039	5,654,810,954	650,303,260 -	56,781,919	593,521,341	735,434,978	10,131,756	745,566,734 -	1,282,046,423	4.7%	13.2%
2040	5,882,183,700	676,451,126 -	63,976,557	612,474,568	752,563,014	10,367,721	762,930,735 -	1,432,502,590	4.6%	13.0%
2041	6,113,674,750	703,072,596 -	71,244,748	631,827,848	770,929,127	10,620,742	781,549,869 -	1,582,224,611	4.6%	12.8%
2042	6,348,223,847	730,045,742 -	78,407,087	651,638,655	790,044,542	10,884,087	800,928,629 -	1,731,514,585	4.5%	12.6%
2043	6,587,823,240	757,599,673 -	85,383,628	672,216,044	811,588,453	11,180,888	822,769,340 -	1,882,067,881	4.4%	12.5%
2044	6,828,515,155	785,279,243 -	92,345,342	692,933,901	833,780,140	11,486,612	845,266,753 -	2,034,400,733	4.4%	12.4%
2045	7,076,740,295	813,825,134 -	98,830,026	714,995,107	857,914,017	11,819,094	869,733,110 -	2,189,138,736	4.4%	12.3%
2046	7,329,361,378	842,876,558 -	105,648,118	737,228,441	881,025,749	12,137,494	893,163,243 -	2,345,073,538	4.3%	12.2%
2047	7,592,667,196	873,156,728 -	111,739,760	761,416,968	904,123,199	12,455,697	916,578,896 -	2,500,235,466	4.3%	12.1%
2048	7,866,172,125	904,609,794 -	118,026,796	786,582,998	926,943,353	12,770,080	939,713,433 -	2,653,365,902	4.2%	11.9%
2049	8,149,970,142	937,246,566 -	123,990,986	813,255,580	956,027,548	13,170,760	969,198,307 -	2,809,308,629	4.2%	11.9%
2050	8,425,585,447	968,942,326 -	129,884,095	839,058,232	982,174,932	13,530,980	995,705,912 -	2,965,956,309	4.2%	11.8%
2051	8,721,651,115	1,002,989,878 -	135,761,229	867,228,649	1,008,843,372	13,898,379	1,022,741,752 -	3,121,469,412	4.1%	11.7%
2052	9,028,738,349	1,038,304,910 -	142,065,833	896,239,077	1,038,605,715	14,308,402	1,052,914,117 -	3,278,144,452	4.1%	11.7%
2053 2054	9,338,585,312 9,659,365,979	1,073,937,311 - 1,110,827,088 -	148,019,073 154,652,738	925,918,238 956,174,349	1,069,834,033 1,100,258,605	14,738,620 15,157,766	1,084,572,653 - 1,115,416,370 -	3,436,798,867 3,596,040,889	4.1% 4.1%	11.6% 11.5%
2054	9,996,598,577	1,149,608,836 -	161,146,946	988,461,891	1,134,638,465	15,631,402	1,1150,269,867 -	3,757,848,864	4.1% 4.0%	11.5%
2056	10,337,595,472	1,188,823,479 -	168,526,392	1,020,297,088	1,167,865,445	16,089,155	1,183,954,599 -	3,921,506,376	4.0%	11.5%
2057	10,701,804,508	1,230,707,518 -	175,881,353	1,054,826,165	1,204,617,256	16,595,468	1,221,212,723 -	4,087,892,934	4.0%	11.4%
2058	11,072,521,852	1,273,340,013 -	183,471,454	1,089,868,559	1,240,127,787	17,084,680	1,257,212,467 -	4,255,236,843	4.0%	11.4%
2059	11,470,681,545	1,319,128,378 -	190,651,673	1,128,476,705	1,275,853,160	17,576,853	1,293,430,013 -	4,420,190,151	4.0%	11.3%
2060	11,888,368,390	1,367,162,365 -	199,121,440	1,168,040,924	1,312,889,153	18,087,081	1,330,976,234 -	4,583,125,461	3.9%	11.2%
2061	12,323,014,094	1,417,146,621 -	207,074,311	1,210,072,310	1,348,110,510	18,572,310	1,366,682,819 -	4,739,735,970	3.9%	11.1%
2062	12,787,860,882	1,470,604,001 -	214,563,002	1,256,040,999	1,388,371,976	19,126,974	1,407,498,950 -	4,891,193,920	3.9%	11.0%
2063	13,258,437,854	1,524,720,353 -	222,275,839	1,302,444,515	1,425,662,372	19,640,707	1,445,303,079 -	5,034,052,484	3.8%	10.9%

 $^{^{85}}$ The reserve presented includes only the AOV. The actual SVb reserve includes both AOV and AWW.

Annex 2.21 Demographic projection⁸⁶ – Individualization

		AOV				GRAND			
Year	Single	Married	Split	Total	Orphans	Widows	Invalids	Total	TOTAL
2003	6,175	3,288	1,262	10,725	955	396	324	1,675	12,40
2004	6,372	3,391	1,325	11,087	1,008	396	348	1,752	12,83
2005	14,822	-	-	14,822	1,048	389	371	1,808	16,63
2006	15,035	-	-	15,035	1,065	395	376	1,837	16,87
2007	15,307	-	-	15,307	1,086	389	391	1,866	17,17
2008	15,637	-	-	15,637	1,099	384	405	1,888	17,52
2009	15,947	-	-	15,947	1,098	379	417	1,894	17,84
2010	16,453	-	-	16,453	1,082	367	421	1,871	18,32
2011	16,948	-	-	16,948	1,056	368	430	1,855	18,80
2012	17,571	-	-	17,571	1,042	364	435	1,841	19,4
2013	18,170	-	-	18,170	1,034	365	433	1,832	20,00
2014	18,803	_	_	18,803	1,007	367	437	1,810	20,6
2015	19,519		_	19,519	981	374	435	1,790	21,3
2016	20,222	_	_	20,222	963	381	425	1,768	21,99
2017	20,999		_	20,999	929	384	424	1,736	22,7
2018	21,865			21,865	894	385	417	1,695	23,5
2019	22,642		_	22,642	862	387	417	1,661	24,30
2019	23,578	-	-	23,578	837	380	404		
		-	-					1,621	25,2
2021	24,473	-	-	24,473	813	377	394	1,584	26,0
2022	25,352	-	-	25,352	787	372	384	1,542	26,8
2023	26,202	-	-	26,202	768	362	376	1,506	27,7
2024	27,026	-	-	27,026	764	354	364	1,482	28,5
2025	27,761	-	-	27,761	745	343	349	1,437	29,1
2026	28,324	-	-	28,324	742	341	340	1,424	29,7
2027	28,843	-	-	28,843	737	341	333	1,410	30,2
2028	29,407	-	-	29,407	740	338	323	1,401	30,8
2029	29,836	-	-	29,836	745	333	320	1,398	31,2
2030	30,366	-	-	30,366	750	327	313	1,390	31,7
2031	30,823	-	-	30,823	755	319	305	1,380	32,2
2032	31,170	-	-	31,170	760	311	302	1,374	32,5
2033	31,384	-	-	31,384	765	311	301	1,378	32,7
2034	31,424	-	-	31,424	770	311	303	1,385	32,8
2035	31,499	-	-	31,499	775	313	306	1,394	32,8
2036	31,469	-	-	31,469	779	317	310	1,406	32,8
2037	31,440	-	-	31,440	783	321	314	1,419	32,8
2038	31,343	_	_	31,343	787	327	320	1,435	32,7
2039	31,298	-	_	31,298	790	333	324	1,447	32,7
2040	31,268	_	_	31,268	793	339	328	1,460	32,7
2041	31,274		_	31,274	796	344	331	1,471	32,7
2042	31,291		_	31,291	797	348	333	1,479	32,7
2042	31,386	-	-	31,386	798	349	334	1,479	32,7
2043		-	-		798 799	350	334		
	31,482	-	-	31,482				1,483	32,9
2045	31,629	-	-	31,629	798	349	333	1,481	33,1
2046	31,712	-	-	31,712	797	350	334	1,481	33,1
2047	31,774	-	-	31,774	796	350	334	1,479	33,2
2048	31,804	-	-	31,804	794	353	334	1,480	33,2
2049	32,026	-	-	32,026	791	349	331	1,472	33,4
2050	32,122	-	-	32,122	789	349	331	1,469	33,5
2051	32,212	-	-	32,212	787	349	330	1,467	33,6
2052	32,375	-	-	32,375	785	348	329	1,461	33,8
2053	32,556	-	-	32,556	783	345	326	1,454	34,0
2054	32,686	-	-	32,686	782	344	325	1,451	34,1
2055	32,905	-	-	32,905	781	341	323	1,445	34,3
2056	33,061	-	-	33,061	780	340	322	1,441	34,5
2057	33,288	-	-	33,288	779	337	320	1,436	34,7
2058	33,450	-	-	33,450	780	335	319	1,433	34,8
2059	33,590	-	-	33,590	780	333	318	1,431	35,0
2060	33,737	-	-	33,737	781	332	318	1,431	35,1
2061	33,811	_	-	33,811	782	333	319	1,434	35,2
2062	33,986	_	_	33,986	784	331	318	1,434	35,4
2062	34,061	-	-	34,061	786	333	320	1,433	35,4
2003	34,001	-	-	34,001	100	333	320	1,430	35,4

⁸⁶ Number of pensions.

Annex 2.22 AOV financial statement⁸⁷ – Reform (in AFL)

	Total			Expenditure						
Voor	insurable	Contribution	Investment earnings	Total	Ponofito	Admin	Total	Reserve	Expenditure	PAYG
Year	earnings	Contribution		<u>Total</u>	Benefits	Admin.	Total	(end of year)	As % of GDP	cost
2003	1,175,096,930	135,136,147	-	135,136,147	128,737,925	1,985,957	130,723,882	144,000,000	3.6%	11.1%
2004 2005	1,237,881,342 1,578,845,760	142,356,354 181,567,262	10,781,158 12,805,975	153,137,512 194,373,238	133,498,696 148,539,989	1,839,151 2,046,368	135,337,847 150,586,357	161,799,665 205,586,545	3.5%	10.9% 9.5%
2006	1,674,938,235	192,617,897	15,672,466	208,290,363	145,040,991	1,998,164	147,039,155	266,837,754	3.7% 3.4%	8.8%
2007	1,774,406,811	204,056,783	19,742,445	223,799,228	150,250,426	2,069,932	152,320,359	338,316,623	3.4%	8.6%
2008	1,875,245,661	215,653,251	24,247,808	239,901,059	155,489,404	2,142,107	157,631,511	420,586,171	3.3%	8.4%
2009	1,979,052,988	227,591,094	29,221,314	256,812,407	164,387,688	2,264,695	166,652,383	510,746,196	3.3%	8.4%
2010	2,079,514,867	239,144,210	33,154,728	272,298,938	173,836,317	2,394,864	176,231,182	606,813,952	3.3%	8.5%
2011	2,180,182,636	250,721,003	37,688,160	288,409,163	183,031,531	2,521,543	185,553,074	709,670,042	3.3%	8.5%
2012	2,281,721,232	262,397,942	42,312,344	304,710,286	194,803,964	2,683,726	197,487,690	816,892,637	3.4%	8.7%
2013	2,381,217,434	273,840,005	47,052,030	320,892,035	206,358,276	2,842,905	209,201,181	928,583,491	3.4%	8.8%
2014	2,482,177,779	285,450,445	51,596,818	337,047,262	219,439,484	3,023,119	222,462,603	1,043,168,151	3.5%	9.0%
2015	2,583,739,180	297,130,006	56,678,514	353,808,520	232,644,630	3,205,040	235,849,670	1,161,127,000	3.5%	9.1%
2016	2,688,019,908	309,122,289	61,697,774	370,820,063	246,583,479	3,397,069	249,980,548	1,281,966,515	3.6%	9.3%
2017	2,794,037,872	321,314,355	66,449,225	387,763,581	262,202,948	3,612,252	265,815,200	1,403,914,896	3.6%	9.5%
2018	2,899,947,018	333,493,907	71,058,880	404,552,787	277,974,136	3,829,524	281,803,660	1,526,664,023	3.7%	9.7%
2019 2020	3,007,836,598 3,114,983,308	345,901,209 358,223,080	75,358,493 79,027,436	421,259,702 437,250,516	295,349,083 314,632,606	4,068,891 4,334,551	299,417,973 318,967,157	1,648,505,751 1,766,789,110	3.8%	10.0% 10.2%
2021	3,222,073,493	370,538,452	83,063,168	453,601,620	333,091,780	4,588,855	337,680,635	1,882,710,095	3.9% 4.0%	10.5%
2022	3,333,542,587	383,357,398	86,972,206	470,329,603	354,778,806	4,887,627	359,666,433	1,993,373,264	4.0%	10.8%
2023	3,444,142,223	396,076,356	90,924,435	487,000,790	376,475,114	5,186,528	381,661,642	2,098,712,413	4.2%	11.1%
2024	3,559,477,578	409,339,921	95,261,256	504,601,178	398,639,389	5,491,875	404,131,264	2,199,182,327	4.3%	11.4%
2025	3,679,464,057	423,138,367	98,900,178	522,038,545	421,179,664	5,802,402	426,982,066	2,294,238,806	4.4%	11.6%
2026	3,804,919,608	437,565,755	103,218,650	540,784,405	444,211,995	6,119,708	450,331,703	2,384,691,508	4.5%	11.8%
2027	3,936,921,639	452,745,989	107,522,491	560,268,479	466,614,928	6,428,343	473,043,271	2,471,916,716	4.5%	12.0%
2028	4,065,065,473	467,482,529	103,833,066	571,315,596	486,672,573	6,704,668	493,377,241	2,549,855,070	4.6%	12.1%
2029	4,203,809,154	483,438,053	108,099,378	591,537,431	506,622,011	6,979,503	513,601,514	2,627,790,987	4.6%	12.2%
2030	4,349,229,853	500,161,433	111,877,475	612,038,908	528,027,239	7,274,393	535,301,632	2,704,528,263	4.7%	12.3%
2031	4,500,319,220	517,536,710	116,841,562	634,378,273	547,547,730	7,543,318	555,091,048	2,783,815,488	4.7%	12.3%
2032	4,664,280,943	536,392,308	122,284,407	658,676,715	569,636,454	7,847,624	577,484,078	2,865,008,125	4.7%	12.4%
2033	4,832,704,792	555,761,051	127,809,608	683,570,659	591,019,525	8,142,209	599,161,734	2,949,417,051	4.7%	12.4%
2034 2035	5,013,883,405 5,208,077,960	576,596,592 598,928,965	133,839,781 140,378,111	710,436,372 739,307,076	610,821,181 628,430,574	8,415,008 8,657,604	619,236,188 637,088,179	3,040,617,235 3,142,836,132	4.7% 4.7%	12.4% 12.2%
2036	5,416,031,222	622,843,591	147,690,794	770,534,385	642,849,384	8,856,246	651,705,630	3,261,664,887	4.6%	12.2%
2037	5,639,299,037	648,519,389	154,750,528	803,269,917	658,369,808	9,070,063	667,439,871	3,397,494,933	4.5%	11.8%
2038	5,868,727,059	674,903,612	162,466,484	837,370,096	671,902,137	9,256,492	681,158,630	3,553,706,399	4.5%	11.6%
2039	6,110,068,538	702,657,882	171,608,182	874,266,064	685,765,460	9,447,481	695,212,941	3,732,759,522	4.4%	11.4%
2040	6,358,026,508	731,173,048	180,816,528	911,989,577	698,383,565	9,621,315	708,004,880	3,936,744,219	4.3%	11.1%
2041	6,614,610,506	760,680,208	191,550,906	952,231,114	712,452,714	9,815,139	722,267,853	4,166,707,480	4.2%	10.9%
2042	6,874,948,029	790,619,023	203,287,654	993,906,677	727,247,145	10,018,955	737,266,100	4,423,348,057	4.1%	10.7%
2043	7,139,915,774	821,090,314	215,756,263	1,036,846,577	743,273,199	10,239,739	753,512,939	4,706,681,696	4.1%	10.6%
2044	7,409,560,299	852,099,434	229,301,962	1,081,401,397	760,137,230	10,472,067	770,609,298	5,017,473,795	4.0%	10.4%
2045	7,686,124,909	883,904,365	242,695,273	1,126,599,637	779,642,209	10,740,779	790,382,987	5,353,690,445	4.0%	10.3%
2046	7,966,246,994	916,118,404	257,950,291	1,174,068,695	799,908,486	11,019,978	810,928,464	5,716,830,676	3.9%	10.2%
2047	8,253,363,487	949,136,801	272,624,562	1,221,761,363	822,316,775	11,328,687	833,645,461	6,104,946,578	3.9%	10.1%
2048 2049	8,546,104,986 8,851,282,939	982,802,073 1,017,897,538	289,158,673 306,175,860	1,271,960,747 1,324,073,398	843,736,822 865,345,806	11,623,781 11,921,478	855,360,603 877,267,285	6,521,546,721	3.8% 3.8%	10.0% 9.9%
2050	9,166,800,441	1,054,182,051	324,190,362	1,378,372,413	886,820,940	12,217,332	899,038,271	6,968,352,834 7,447,686,975	3.8%	9.8%
2051	9,492,731,903	1,091,664,169	343,487,063	1,435,151,232	914,960,206	12,604,993	927,565,200	7,955,273,008	3.7%	9.8%
2052	9,816,253,598	1,128,869,164	365,171,617	1,494,040,781	940,280,365	12,953,818	953,234,183	8,496,079,605	3.7%	9.7%
2053	10,159,312,859	1,168,320,979	387,218,070	1,555,539,049	966,312,808	13,312,455	979,625,264	9,071,993,391	3.7%	9.6%
2054	10,514,864,648	1,209,209,434	412,404,822	1,621,614,257	995,694,747	13,717,237	1,009,411,984	9,684,195,663	3.7%	9.6%
2055	10,876,453,766	1,250,792,183	438,584,774	1,689,376,957	1,026,666,066	14,143,915	1,040,809,981	10,332,762,640	3.7%	9.6%
2056	11,251,826,237	1,293,960,017	468,622,006	1,762,582,023	1,056,942,898	14,561,025	1,071,503,923	11,023,840,740	3.6%	9.5%
2057	11,646,737,217	1,339,374,780	500,189,577	1,839,564,356	1,091,397,890	15,035,696	1,106,433,586	11,756,971,510	3.6%	9.5%
2058	12,050,772,058	1,385,838,787	534,167,707	1,920,006,494	1,124,644,119	15,493,714	1,140,137,833	12,536,840,171	3.6%	9.5%
2059	12,480,048,571	1,435,205,586	569,108,086	2,004,313,671	1,161,583,515	16,002,611	1,177,586,126	13,363,567,716	3.6%	9.4%
2060	12,920,667,692	1,485,876,785	610,539,923	2,096,416,707	1,197,137,606	16,492,424	1,213,630,030	14,246,354,393	3.6%	9.4%
2061	13,390,001,999	1,539,850,230	653,715,521	2,193,565,750	1,232,840,100	16,984,281	1,249,824,382	15,190,095,762	3.6%	9.3%
2062	13,882,804,190	1,596,522,482	699,162,450	2,295,684,932	1,269,862,514	17,494,322	1,287,356,836	16,198,423,857	3.5% 3.5%	9.3%
2063	14,396,244,641	1,655,568,134	749,617,350	2,405,185,483	1,304,791,823	17,975,528	1,322,767,351	17,280,841,990	3.070	9.2%

 $^{^{87}}$ The reserve presented includes only the AOV. The actual SVb reserve includes both AOV and AWW.

Annex 2.23 Demographic projection⁸⁸ – Reform

_		AOV				GRAND			
Year	Single	Married	Split	Total	Orphans	Widows	Invalids	Total	TOTAL
2003	6,175	3,288	1,262	10,725	955	396	324	1,675	12,40
2004	6,372	3,391	1,325	11,087	1,008	396	348	1,752	12,83
2005	13,905	-	-	13,905	1,048	389	371	1,808	15,71
2006	13,336	-	-	13,336	1,065	395	376	1,837	15,17
2007	13,664	-	-	13,664	1,086	389	391	1,866	15,53
2008	13,994	-	-	13,994	1,099	384	405	1,888	15,88
2009	14,365	-	-	14,365	1,098	379	417	1,894	16,25
2010	14,762	-	-	14,762	1,082	367	421	1,871	16,63
2011	15,120	-	-	15,120	1,056	368	430	1,855	16,97
2012	15,676	-	-	15,676	1,042	364	435	1,841	17,51
2013	16,193	-	-	16,193	1,034	365	433	1,832	18,02
2014	16,812	-	-	16,812	1,007	367	437	1,810	18,62
2015	17,403	-	-	17,403	981	374	435	1,790	19,19
2016	18,012	-	-	18,012	963	381	425	1,768	19,78
2017	18,705	-	-	18,705	929	384	424	1,736	20,44
2018	19,368	-	-	19,368	894	385	417	1,695	21,06
2019	20,102	-	-	20,102	862	387	412	1,661	21,76
2020	20,920	-	_	20,920	837	380	404	1,621	22,54
2021	21,635	-	_	21,635	813	377	394	1,584	23,21
2022	22,514	_	_	22,514	787	372	384	1,542	24,05
2023	23,342	_	_	23,342	768	362	376	1,506	24,84
2024	24,147			24,147	764	354	364	1,482	25,62
2024	24,147	-	-	24,147	745	343	349	1,462	26,36
2025	25,681		-	25,681	743	343	349	1,424	27,10
2020	26,353	-	-	26,353	737	341	333	1,424	27,76
2027	26,847	-	-		740	338	323		28,24
2028	27,297	-	-	26,847 27,297	740 745	333	323	1,401 1,398	
		-	-						28,69
2030	27,790	-	-	27,790	750	327	313	1,390	29,18
2031	28,146	-	-	28,146	755	319	305	1,380	29,52
2032	28,602	-	-	28,602	760	311	302	1,374	29,97
2033	28,983	-	-	28,983	765	311	301	1,378	30,36
2034	29,253	-	-	29,253	770	311	303	1,385	30,63
2035	29,389	-	-	29,389	775	313	306	1,394	30,78
2036	29,353	-	-	29,353	779	317	310	1,406	30,75
2037	29,352	-	-	29,352	783	321	314	1,419	30,77
2038	29,246	-	-	29,246	787	327	320	1,435	30,68
2039	29,144	-	-	29,144	790	333	324	1,447	30,59
2040	28,977	-	-	28,977	793	339	328	1,460	30,43
2041	28,861	-	-	28,861	796	344	331	1,471	30,33
2042	28,763	-	-	28,763	797	348	333	1,479	30,24
2043	28,702	-	-	28,702	798	349	334	1,482	30,18
2044	28,660	-	-	28,660	799	350	334	1,483	30,14
2045	28,702	-	-	28,702	798	349	333	1,481	30,18
2046	28,753	-	-	28,753	797	350	334	1,481	30,23
2047	28,861	-	-	28,861	796	350	334	1,479	30,34
2048	28,913	-	-	28,913	794	353	334	1,480	30,39
2049	28,951	-	-	28,951	791	349	331	1,472	30,42
2050	28,967	-	-	28,967	789	349	331	1,469	30,43
2051	29,180	-	-	29,180	787	349	330	1,467	30,64
2052	29,276	-	-	29,276	785	348	329	1,461	30,7
2053	29,372	_	_	29,372	783	345	326	1,454	30,82
2054	29,546	_	_	29,546	782	344	325	1,454	30,99
2055	29,741	-	-	29,741	782 781	341	323	1,451	30,9
2056	29,741	-	-	29,741	780	341	323	1,445	31,16
		-	-						31,5
2057	30,128	-	-	30,128	779 780	337	320	1,436	
2058	30,304	-	-	30,304	780	335	319	1,433	31,7
2059	30,552	-	-	30,552	780	333	318	1,431	31,9
2060	30,733	-	-	30,733	781	332	318	1,431	32,10
2061	30,892	-	-	30,892	782	333	319	1,434	32,32
2062	31,056	-	-	31,056	784	331	318	1,433	32,49
2063	31,144	-	-	31,144	786	333	320	1,438	32,58

⁸⁸ Number of pensions.

Annex 3 Legal minimum wages in countries of the European Union

Country	Official term	Method of estimation	Scope and exemptions	Level (January 2003)	Rates for special groups, etc.	Adjustment	Affected workers
Belgium	RMMMG (revenue minimum mensuel moyen garanti)	General pay agreement (CCT Nos 21, 35, 43, 50)	Private sector. Not applicable to subsidized workers (apprentices), family members in family business and workers with less than 1 month employment	1209.33€/mth for workers over 21 years of age and at least 1 year employment with the company; tapering off with less employment	Minimum wage is reduced for youth at a rate of 6% per year below 21 (a person aged 20 receives 94%, a person aged 16 70% of the rate of a person aged 21)	Index santé	
France	SMIC (salaire minimum interprofessionn el de croissance)	Law. Art. L.141-1 – L.141-7, Code de Travail.	Economy. Applies to home workers and child minders living with the family. Not for agricultural workers, seamen, and workers paid in-kind.	6.83€/h. Minimum monthly payment is calculated taking into account working time reduction.	80 % of normal rate for youth aged 16-17 years; 90% for youth aged 17-18 years. Only during first 6 months of employment with the company	Three methods: 1) 1 July, annually, according to bipartite committee on pay agreements; 2) Order of ministerial council; 3) after 2 % price increase from reference value	13.6 % of all workers in the private sector (2000)
Greece	National minimum wage	National collective agreement	Private sector of economy	White collar workers: 518.30€/mth; Blue collar workers: 23.20€/day	Varying rates according to civil status and professional experience	According to national collective agreements	
Ireland	National Minimum Wage/ National Minimum Hourly Rate of Pay	By law. National Minimum Wage Act, 2000.	Whole economy, all workers with few exceptions (e.g. apprentices; family members).	6,35€/h	For persons aged 17 and younger 70% of normal rate. When 18 and over, but first employment: 4,77€/h in first year, in second year 5.37€/h. Apprentices aged 18 and over receive between 75 and 90% of normal rate.	Government / national minimum wage commission	13.5 % of all employed

Source: ILO compilation and German-English translation from Pete Burgess: Mindeststandards für Arbeitseinkommen - ein europäischer Vergleich (Minimum standards for work related incomes – Europe compared). In: WSI-Mitteilungen 7/2003.

Annex 4 ILO Convention No. 102

Convention No. 102

The ILO social security Conventions serve as worldwide agreed guidelines for national social policies and when ratified, they prevent the countries from backsliding.

In 2005, the ILO has eight up-to date social security Conventions. The flagship Convention of these eight Conventions is the *Social Security (Minimum Standards) Convention, 1952 (No. 102)*⁸⁹ as it is the only Convention, which sets minimum standards for all the nine branches of social security ⁹⁰ and lays down basic social security principles. The other up-to date Conventions either set higher standards for the different branches of social security or deal with social security rights of migrant workers.

Due to its universality and flexibility, Convention No. 102 is relevant for all ILO member States, irrespective of their legal system or their level of economic development.

Convention No. 102 is built up on the basis that there is no right model for social security, and that social security schemes grow and evolve over time. Each society must determine how best to ensure income security. These choices will reflect their social and cultural values, their history, their institutions and their level of economic development. The Convention therefore does not prescribe certain behaviour of the member States, it rather fixes a set of minimum objectives built on commonly agreed principles, which fix the social floor for all the member States.

The minimum objectives relate to the percentage of the population protected by social security schemes, conditions for entitlement and period of entitlement to a benefit, as well as the level of benefits and, in case of pensions, their regular review and adjustment.

The principles anchored in the Convention are:

- guarantee of defined minimum benefits for beneficiaries who meet the qualifying conditions.
- participation of the protected persons in the administration of the schemes,
- general responsibility of the state for the due provision for the benefits and the proper administration of the institutions,
- collective financing of the benefits by way of insurance contributions or taxation.

The Convention does not prescribe how to reach these objectives but leaves certain flexibility to the member States. They can be reached through:

- universal schemes.
- social insurance schemes with earnings related or flat rate components or both,

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⁸⁹ Cited in this text as Convention No. 102.

⁹⁰ The nine branches of social security are: medical care, sickness benefits, unemployment benefit, old-age benefit, employment injury benefit, family benefit, maternity benefits, invalidity benefit and survivors' benefit.

social assistance schemes.

Also the choice of the nature of the administration of the schemes is left to the member States and they can choose between:

- public schemes,
- private schemes.

The relevance of the Convention was re-confirmed at the general discussion on social security during the International Labour Conference of the ILO in 2001 as the world community, represented by governments, employers' and workers' organizations of the ILO member States, decided that ILO activities should be anchored in the relevant social security standards⁹¹. It was further decided by the ILO Governing Body in 2002 that Convention No. 102 is an up-to-date Convention, whose ratification is encouraged⁹².

Convention No. 102 with regard to pension reform in Aruba

With regard to the old-age pension reform in Aruba, the following minimum objectives and principles of Convention No. 102 should serve as a guideline:

- According to Article 26 (1) of the Convention, the retirement age may be set up to the age of 65 years. However, taking into account demographic changes and the need for financial sustainability of pension schemes, the Convention authorizes that this age may be increased if the government concerned can prove that even though the pensionable age is set at a level higher than 65, the number of residents of that age or over is equal to at least 10 per cent of the total population aged between 15 years and the higher pensionable age (Article 26 (2) of the Convention).
- Furthermore, in case of flat-rate pensions, the pension should amount to at least 40 per cent of the wage of an unskilled worker after 30 years of contributions or employment (see Article 28 (a) in conjunction with Article 29 (1a), Article 66 and the Schedule to Part XI of the Convention). In case of earnings-related pensions, the old-age pension should amount to at least 40 per cent of the former earnings of the beneficiary after 30 years of contributions or employment (see Article 28 (a) in conjunction with Article 29 (1a), Article 65 and the Schedule to Part XI of the Convention).
- The above stipulated replacement rate may also be fulfilled by the application of a multi tier system. In this case, the pensions of the different tiers added together should amount to at least 40 per cent of the former earnings of the beneficiary. As mentioned above, the provisions of the convention may be applied by public or private schemes or by a combination of both. However, it should be noted that private schemes are only in accordance with the requirements of the Convention if they comply with the above-mentioned principles, in particular with the principle of defined benefits, the solidarity principle, the principle of participation of the protected persons in the management of the schemes and the overall responsibility of the state for the due provision of the benefits and proper administration of the scheme. And within this context, it should also be kept in mind that, in pay-as-you-

⁹¹ Resolution and Conclusions concerning Social Security, ILC, 89th session, 2001, in *Social* Security – A New Consensus – ILO, Geneva, 2001, p. 5.

⁹² GB.283//10/2 (March 2002).

go defined benefit pension schemes, risk is borne collectively. Statutory pension schemes must guarantee adequate benefit levels and ensure national solidarity through sharing of risk. The requirements of the Convention cannot be met without some sharing of risk. Pure individual savings schemes can therefore not provide the required retirement security.

- For persons who do not fulfill a qualifying period of 30 years of contributions or employment, a reduced pension shall be paid after 15 years of contributions or employment (see Article 29 (2a) of the Convention).
- In case the beneficiary is engaged in any gainful activity, or in receipt of another social security benefit, Article 26 (3) and Article 69 (c) of the Convention authorize the reduction or suspension of the pension.
- According to Article 71 (1) of the Convention, pensions may be financed by social security contributions paid by employees and/or employer, by general taxation or through a combination of these.
- In addition, Articles 65 (10) and 66 (8) of the Convention obliges states to review and adjust pensions in view of any substantial changes in the general level of earnings brought about by changes in the cost-of-living.