

Australian Government AusAID



### Conditional cash transfer schemes

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21<sup>st</sup> May 2013

www.ausaid.gov.au

### **Session Objectives**

 To provide an overview of what CCTs are, benefits and challenges

 To consider their relevance to the Laos context

### **Session Overview**

### Presentation

- What is a conditional cash transfer and the rationale?
- Two classifications of CCTs
- Impacts of CCTs
- CCT challenges
- Questions to consider
- Plenary discussion

### WHAT IS A CONDITIONAL CASH TRANSFER AND WHY?

### What is a CCT?

- Cash transfer programs usually for households rather than individuals
- Targeted usually at poor families therefore a form of poor relief – but not always
- Cash usually given to female caregiver
- Receipt of the cash is conditional on fulfilling certain behaviours in education and health
  - Education: usually school attendance on 80-85% of school days
  - Health: periodic check ups, growth monitoring and vaccinations for children less than 5; perinatal care for mothers and attendance by mothers at health information talks

### **Rationale for CCTs**

- Families do not invest sufficiently in their children because they do not understand benefits of education and health; or they do not care about their children sufficiently
  - But, is this correct?
- Conditions put in place to build support for unpopular poverty targeted programs
  - Middle class more willing to finance programs through taxes if believe that poor are working for their cash

### TWO CLASSIFICATIONS OF CCTs

### Classification #1: Poor Relief or Human Development

#### • Poor relief:

- Main objective is to tackle poverty directly in families by providing a cash benefit;
- Try to add something additional to the cash transfer by using conditions to change behaviour among beneficiaries

#### Human development programs:

- Main focus is to encourage school attendance or use of health services rather than directly tackling family poverty
- Therefore, much smaller cash benefits


#### **Example of poor relief program:** Brazil's *Bolsa Familia* scheme

- Is part of Brazil's "Zero Hunger" program
- Two types of benefit:
  - All very poor families with or without children receive US\$36 per month, and not linked to condition
  - All very poor and poor families receive a variable benefit depending on number and age of children

#### Total income:

- *Very poor* families: US\$36 to US\$108 per month
- Poor families: US\$12 to US\$72 per month


#### **Example of Human Development Scheme:** Bangladesh Female Secondary School Stipend (to 2009)



Provided around US\$0.50 per month, often directly to girl

Focus on tackling gender discrimination not poverty

### **Classification #2: Punitive, Facilitative or Non-Compliance**



### **Punitive and Facilitative CCTs**

- Punitive (hard): eg. Mexico's Oportunidades
  - Belief that poverty is the fault of poor people
  - Fiszbein and Schady (2009): parents hold "persistently misguided beliefs" on value of health and education
  - Beneficiaries punished by immediate withdrawal of cash

#### • Facilitative (soft): eg. Brazil's Bolsa Familia


- Belief that poverty is the result of unjust structures
- Monitoring conditions used to find most vulnerable families and provide them with increased resources
- Very difficult to remove families from program: people given 5 warnings & if comply, full benefits are returned

### WHAT ARE THE IMPACTS OF CCTs?

## Condition or Cash: Which is responsible for the impact of CCTs?

- CCTs have significant impacts on education & health
- But, so do unconditional transfers:
  - South Africa pension led to 8% increase in enrolment among poorest 20%
  - In Brazil, Rural Pension led to 20% decrease in the enrolment gap among girls aged 12-14
- Is there any evidence that the use of conditions results in an <u>additional</u> impact?
  - Educational impacts
  - Health and nutrition

### **Use of Transfers**



Source: IFPRI, 2008

### Education: Ecuador Bono de Desarrollo Humano

- Created two groups for study as some beneficiaries believed program was conditional & others did not
- Divided beneficiaries into "poor" and "non-poor"
- Found that:
  - Among poor, similar increase in school enrolment between two groups therefore conditionality had no impact; cash was the driver
  - Among non-poor, increase in school enrolment greatest among those who believed benefit was conditional

### Education: Mexico Oportunidades

- Some households didn't receive monitoring forms & were unaware of conditions – good for study purposes
- Results:
  - No impact on primary school (high attendance already)
  - Impact only found in transition to secondary school
- Challenges:
  - Small sample: 261 households unaware of conditions....60 households examined in transition to secondary school;
  - Explanation may be result of differences in characteristics of households that received and did not receive forms;

### Education: Other Examples

- Kenya CT-OVC programme:
  - Implementation difficulties so results not clearcut but evaluation demonstrates no additional impact of condition in either health or education.
- Morocco CCT for Rural Education:
  - No impact of condition
- Burkina Faso
  - Condition had impact on children enrolling in school
  - Unconditional grant had greater impact on children already in school

### **CCT CHALLENGES**

### **Human Rights Concerns**

- Is withdrawing social transfer benefit because of noncompliance compatible with *right to social security?*
- In reality, most vulnerable families are the most likely not to comply (eg. grandparents caring for children)
- Often reasons are not because of lack of desire to send children to school
  - Families in need of additional household income
  - Sexual abuse & bullying in school is a common reason
  - Illness (more likely with older carers)
  - Domestic violence should child/woman be punished?
  - Floods or lack of transport

### **Perverse Incentives from Conditions**

- *Nicaragua:* condition imposed that children need to maintain weight or grow for parents to receive cash
  - Families over-fed children before health visits
  - Condition was removed after evaluation
- Brazil Bolsa Alimenticao: Children on program lost weight
  - Parents may have thought that children need to be underweight to remain on program
- What is effect of changing message that 100% school attendance is compulsory and replacing with 80-85%?
  - Unknown because impact on attendance is not evaluated

### Psychological Impacts on Children: Example of Zomba Cash Transfer in Malawi

- Girls subjected to conditions significantly more likely to suffer from psychological distress
  - Likelihood of girl on CCT suffering psychological distress increased by 3 percentage points for each additional dollar received
- There are high levels of sexual abuse and bullying at schools in Malawi; and, potentially, girls on the conditional program were more likely to attend school when ill as conditions were very punitive

### **Administrative Complexity of CCTs**

- Many countries do not enforce compliance due to challenges of monitoring conditions
  - Chile, Ecuador, Honduras, Dominican Republic, Paraguay, Ghana
- Requires a highly complex MIS, with significant flows of information, especially if appeals included
  - **Mexico:** takes four months to remove payment, without appeals
- Kenya: significant challenges in monitoring conditions
  - Transfer information by paper and vehicle and forms often late
  - Takes many months to withdraw payment, and done inconsistently
  - Many people not informed of reason for loss of payment: no checks and balances and no appeals
  - Conditionality forms piling up in office of data-entry clerks

### **Burdens on Health & Education Staff**

- Pressures put on education and health staff
  - Often already over-worked
  - Kenya: medical staff refused to participate
- Teachers and health workers become enforcement agents for another program
  - Nicaragua: teachers sometimes falsified records so that child's absence is not recorded; they do not want to punish the child or don't want a problem with the parents
  - Similar challenge found in Argentina, Bangladesh, Brazil, Colombia and Mexico

### QUESTIONS TO CONSIDER

### Are CCTs an appropriate policy response for your country?

- What are main reasons why parents don't send their children to school / take them for health checks? Attitude? Financial constraints? Analyze the reasons for low uptake of services
- Are basic services in place and accessible for beneficiaries? Are the services providing a minimally acceptable quality of service?
- Does your country have the administrative capacity and budget to monitor compliance & apply sanctions?
- Where is the demand for introducing a CCT coming from? National stakeholders? International donors?
- Are policy makers aware of evidence of the pros & cons of CCTs & how CT recipients spend their transfers without conditions?
- Is a CCT necessary to gain support of critical stakeholders?

### Conclusions

• Rationale for CCTs:

i) parents don't appreciate value of education or health services – but is this correct?

ii) political economy

- Different types of CCT; poverty reduction / human development; punitive / facilitative / non-compliance
- Limited & mixed evidence on <u>additional</u> impact of conditionality – programs complex & context specific.
- Challenges: human rights, perverse incentives, psychological impacts, administrative capacity, stresses on front-line service staff

### Thank you

# Questions or Comments?